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WELCOME: DR. ROBERT (BOB) MORTLOCK, PRINCIPAL 
INVESTIGATOR, ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Dr. Robert Mortlock, PhD, CMBA, PMP, PE, COL USA (Ret), — Dr. Mortlock is the 
Principal Investigator, Acquisition Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School, managed defense 
systems development and acquisition efforts for the last 15 of his 27 years in the U.S. Army, 
culminating in his assignment as the project manager for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment 
in the Program Executive Office for Soldier. He retired in September 2015 and now teaches defense 
acquisition and program management in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from 
the University of California, Berkeley, an MBA from Webster University, an M.S. in national resource 
strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and a B.S. in chemical engineering from 
Lehigh University. He is also a recent graduate from the Post-Doctoral Bridge Program of the 
University of Florida’s Hough Graduate School of Business, with a management specialization. He 
holds DAWIA Level III certifications in program management (PM), test & evaluation (T&E), and 
systems planning, research, development & engineering (SPRDE).  
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WELCOME: DAVID H. LEWIS, VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY 
(RET), ACQUISITION CHAIR, ACQUISITION RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 
Vice Admiral David H. Lewis, USN (Ret.) took the helm as the Naval Postgraduate School 
Chair of Acquisition. As chair, he will lead the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) in the Graduate 
School of Defense Management and connect NPS with leaders and policymakers in the acquisition 
community. 
Lewis graduated from NPS in 1988 with a Master of Science in Computer Science, and we’re 
pleased to welcome him back to campus in this leadership role. Lewis is replacing the founding Chair 
of Acquisition, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Jim Greene, who retired this June. 
Most recently, Lewis served as Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, 
managing over $7 trillion in defense contracts. In this role, he oversaw the agency’s efforts to ensure 
that supplies and services contracted for by the Department of Defense are delivered on time and in 
line with contract performance requirements. 
During his career at sea, Lewis served as a communications officer, fire control and missile 
battery officer, and combat systems officer aboard destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. 
Upon selection to flag rank in 2009, Lewis served as Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command and then served four years as Program Executive Officer, Ships, where he directed the 
delivery of 18 ships and procurement of another 51 ships. From 2014-2017 he served as 
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command where he led a global workforce of 
10,300 civilian and military personnel who design, develop and deploy advanced communications 
and information capabilities. 
Lewis’s extensive experience in shipbuilding has given him a unique understanding of the full 
acquisition lifecycle. He has delivered ships as a program manager and program executive officer, 
then later sustained and modernized them as a fleet engineer and systems commander. He will bring 
valuable perspective to NPS students and faculty, as well as the broader acquisition innovation 
community working to get superior capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. 
Lewis’s expertise in product delivery will amplify ARP’s ability to execute its mission of 
delivering the real-time information and analytical capabilities needed by today’s acquisition 
professionals and policymakers. Adding VADM Lewis to the team also demonstrates NPS’s 
continued commitment to providing world-class defense-focused education and research... 
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WELCOME: ANN E. RONDEAU, Ed.D, VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. 
NAVY (RET.), PRESIDENT, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE 
SCHOOL 
Ann E. Rondeau, Ed.D, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), was appointed as President, Naval 
Postgraduate School on January 29, 2019. She brings to the assignment an unparalleled record of 
leadership and achievement within the military and academia in the areas of education, training, 
research, executive development, change management, and strategic planning. Prior to her 
appointment, Adm. Rondeau served as the sixth president of the College of DuPage. Her most recent 
military position was as the President of the National Defense University, a consortium of five 
colleges and nine research centers in Washington, DC. 
Rondeau has extensive leadership experience in significant military and educational roles. In 
1985, she was selected and served as a White House Fellow in the Reagan Administration and went 
on to serve as the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command in Illinois, Pentagon 
Director/Chief of Staff for the U.S. Navy Staff, Commander of the Navy Personnel Development 
Command in Virginia, Commander of the Naval Service Training Command at Great Lakes, Ill., 
Pacific Fleet Staff Chief of Staff in Hawaii, Commanding Officer of Naval Support Activity in 
Tennessee and other staff and commanding responsibilities with policy, planning, Fleet support, joint 
logistics, training and education. Rondeau retired from the U.S. Navy as a three-star admiral in 2012 
and was the second woman to have achieved that rank in the Navy. She then served as a partner 
and later an independent consultant with the IBM Watson group. 
President Rondeau's leadership has served many, both past and present, to include: Board 
of Directors, United States Institute of Peace; Board of Directors, German Marshall Fund; Board of 
Directors, The Atlantic Council; Board of Directors, National Museum of the American Sailors; Board 
of Directors, Council of Higher Education Accreditation; Board of Directors, Chicago Regional Growth 
Corporation; Board of Directors, Choose DuPage (regional development organization for Chicago 
northwest suburbs); Tennessee/Mid-South Economic Development Board; DoD liaison to the Center 
for the Study of the Presidency; Military Advisory Board (studying energy and environment impacts on 
national security); Flag Officer Advisory Council for Arizona State University, the National Naval 
Officers Association Senior Advisory Panel, the Eisenhower Memorial Commission and the National 
Cold War Veterans Memorial Design Steering Committee among others.  
Rondeau holds a B.A. from Eisenhower College (NY), an M.A. from Georgetown University 
(DC) and an Ed.D. from the College of Education at Northern Illinois University in DeKalb. She also 
holds an honorary Doctorate in Public Service from Carthage College (Kenosha, WI) and an honorary 
Doctorate in Humane Letters from Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science (Chicago, 
IL).... 
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KEYNOTE SPEAKER: STACY CUMMINGS – ACTING, 
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND 
SUSTAINMENT 
Ms. Stacy Cummings is a career member of the Senior Executive Service, and is currently 
performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(USD(A&S)). In this position, she is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for all matters pertaining 
to acquisition; contract administration; logistics and materiel readiness; installations and environment; 
operational energy; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; the acquisition workforce; and the 
defense industrial base. 
Prior to this temporary role, she served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition (PDASD(A)). In this position, she advised the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition (ASD(A)) on matters relating to the Department of Defense Acquisition System while 
advancing innovative, data-driven approaches across the acquisition enterprise. 
Previously serving as the Program Executive Officer, Defense Healthcare Management 
Systems (PEO DHMS), Ms. Cummings managed the delivery of healthcare and advance data 
sharing through a modernized electronic health record for service members, veterans, and their 
families. 
Ms. Cummings previously held senior executive positions at the Department of 
Transportation, where she established strategic direction, provided executive leadership, and 
managed daily operations as the Executive Director for the Federal Railroad Administration and the 
interim Executive Director for the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration. 
Beginning her career with the Department of the Navy, she held senior positions at the Naval 
Air Technical Data and Engineering Services Command; Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers; 
Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence; and 
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. 
Ms. Cummings holds a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces and a Master of Science in Management/Information Systems from the 
Florida Institute of Technology. She received her Bachelor of Science in Business Logistics from the 
Pennsylvania State University. 
Certified in both Program Management and Acquisition Logistics, Ms. Cummings is a 
graduate of the Naval Air Systems Command’s Senior Executive Management Development Program 
and the Defense Senior Leader Development Program. Ms. Cummings received Meritorious and 
Superior Civilian Service Awards from the Department of the United States Navy, Meritorious Public 
Service Award from the United States Coast Guard, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal 
for Exceptional Civilian Service. Stacy Cummings is a career member of the Senior Executive 
Service, and currently serves as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
(PDASD(A)). In this position, she advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (ASD(A)) 
on matters relating to the Department of Defense Acquisition System while advancing innovative, 
data-driven approaches across the acquisition enterprise. 
Previously serving as the Program Executive Officer, Defense Healthcare Management 
Systems (PEO DHMS), Ms. Cummings managed the delivery of healthcare and advance data 
sharing through a modernized electronic health record for service members, veterans, and their 
families. 
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PANEL 1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 
FOR THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
Tuesday, May 11, 2021 
7:45 a.m. – 
9:00 am. 
Chair: Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, 
Defense Budget analysis and Aerospace Security Project, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
Panelists:  
Hon. David Berteau, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics 
and Materiel Readiness and Current President & CEO, Professional 
Services Council 
Hon. Elaine McCusker, Former Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and Current Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 
Hon. Peter Levine, Former Deputy Chief Management Officer of the 
Department of Defense and current Senior Research Fellow, Institute for 
Defense Analysis 
Todd Harrison—is the director of Defense Budget Analysis and director of the Aerospace 
Security Project at CSIS. As a senior fellow in the International Security Program, he leads the 
Center’s efforts to provide in-depth, nonpartisan research and analysis of defense funding, space 
security, and air power issues. He has authored publications on trends in the defense budget, military 
space systems, threats to space systems, civil space exploration, defense acquisitions, military 
compensation and readiness, and military force structure, among other topics. He teaches classes on 
military space systems and the defense budget at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies. 
Hon. David Berteau—Mr. Berteau is PSC President and CEO, with 400 member companies 
of all sizes providing federal contract services. Mr. Berteau was ASD for Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness and served 14 years in the Defense Department, under six defense secretaries.  Earlier, 
Mr. Berteau was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syracuse University’s 
National Security Studies Program, and SAIC.  He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration and taught graduate courses for 14 years at the Maxwell School, Georgetown, and the 
LBJ School.   
Hon. Elaine McCusker—is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 
where she focuses on defense strategy, budget, and innovation; the US military; and national 
security. She has a background in defense planning and budgeting, military campaign assessments, 
defense data analytics, contingency operations and science and technology, and substantial 
experience in resolving complex strategic and tactical-level challenges, including those with 
international dimensions. 
Hon. Peter Levine— Peter Levine is Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for Defense 
Analyses. Prior to joining IDA, Peter most recently performed the duties of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness.  In this capacity, he served as principal assistant and advisor 
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on readiness; National Guard and Reserve 
component affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management, including 
equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of life. 
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PANEL 2. SHIP MAINTENANCE AND ACQUISITION 
Tuesday, May 11, 2021 
9:15 a.m. – 
10:00 a.m. 
Chair: Glen Sturtevant, Director for Science & Technology, Program Executive 
Office for Ship 
A Governance Model and Safety Management System Framework for 
Industrial Fire Safety during Naval Ship Maintenance Availabilities 
Cheryl Marek, University of Maryland 
John McGowan, NAVSEA 
Qingbin Cui, University of Maryland 
Joseph Bradley, Main Sail LLC 
Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) and Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) 
of Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) Functions within a 
Sandbox Program 
Bruce Nagy, NAVAIR, China Lake 
Guna Sivapragasam, Naval Sea Weapons Division, Dahlgren 
Loren Edwards, NAVAIR, Weapons Division, China Lake 
Changing Course to a 21st Century Acquisition Strategy: Navy-Industry 
Collaborative Design 
Tim Nichols, Ubiquitech Llc 
Peter Jaquith, Consultant 
Robert Keane, Ship Design USA 
Barry Tibbitts, CAPT USN (ret.), Consultant 
 
Glen Sturtevant— is the Director for Science and Technology assigned to the United States 
Navy Department’s Program Executive Office for Ships in Washington, D.C. 
He graduated from College du Leman in Geneva, Switzerland, earned a Bachelor of Science 
in Civil Engineering from the University of Delaware and a Master’s degree in Management from 
Indiana University. He has completed Program Management and Engineering programs of study at 
National Defense University, Webb Institute, Virginia Tech and MIT. 
Mr. Sturtevant began his career in 1978 as a Project Engineer at Philadelphia Naval 
Shipyard. In 1983 he was assigned to the Surface Ships Directorate at Naval Sea Systems 
Command Headquarters in Washington D.C. where he was responsible for the conversion of USS 
BELKNAP (CG 26) to U.S. 6th Fleet Flagship in Gaeta, Italy, the overhaul of USS STERETT (CG 31) 
in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines and the modernization of USS BIDDLE (CG 34), the first 
ship of the Navy’s New Threat Upgrade Program. 
In 1987 he was assigned to the Aegis Shipbuilding Program (PMS 400) where he held 
positions as Plans and Programs Manager, Cruiser Conversion Program Manager, and from 1998 to 
2004 was Program Manager for the Navy’s Smartship Program where he led the introduction of 
commercial technologies to the Fleet. Mr. Sturtevant was the Navy’s Response Team leader 
activated as a result of the al Qaeda bombing of USS COLE (DDG 67) in Aden, Yemen in October 
2000. 
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As Chief Technology Officer, his duties include senior advisor to the PEO and NAVSEA’s 
Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare for National Shipbuilding Research Program, Flexible Ships, 
Arctic Operations, Energy Security, Acquisition Research at the Naval Postgraduate School, Small 
Business Innovation Research Program, Allied Navy collaboration, the Ship Design & Analysis Tools 
Strategic Sealift R&D and Unmanned Systems-Ship Integration. 
He is a member of the American Society of Naval Engineers Programs Committee, World 
Scientific Engineering Academy and Society, Surface Navy Association, American Management 
Association, Navy League of the United States, National Defense Industrial Association, and has 
served on the Association of Scientists and Engineers Professional Development Committee and as 
Chair of the Science and Education Committee. He is a Project Management Institute certified Project 
Management Professional and is a certified Defense Acquisition Corps Professional in Program 
Management and Systems Engineering. Mr. Sturtevant has received the Association of Scientists and 
Engineers Professional Achievement Award, Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Aegis Cruiser 
Reduced Total Ownership Cost Award, the individual Aegis Excellence Award and is a member of the 
Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society. 
Mr. Sturtevant has provided professional consultation to multiple allied Navies, has written 
numerous technical papers and has been published in several professional society journals. He is 
married to Karen Birkofer Sturtevant and they have 3 grown children. 
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A Governance Model and Safety Management System 
Framework for Industrial Fire Safety During Naval Ship 
Maintenance Availabilities 
Cheryl Marek—is a licensed Professional Fire Protection Engineer and PhD Candidate in Civil 
Engineering at the University of Maryland, College Park. Her research interests lie at the intersection 
of fire protection engineering, systems engineering, and the social sciences. She has several years of 
experience in the shipbuilding industry, is an active member of the Society of Naval Architects and 
Marine Engineers (SNAME), and is studying acquisition system influences on shipboard industrial fire 
safety. [cmarek@umd.edu] 
Joseph Bradley—is Chief Scientist at Main Sail, LLC, and an Adjunct Associate Professor at Old 
Dominion University (ODU). Prior to joining ODU, he was Deputy Director for Force Maintenance at 
Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet. He has served in various consulting roles, including 
Program Manager’s Representative for the SSGN conversion of the USS Ohio and USS Michigan. 
His research interests include complex system governance and decision-making using modeling and 
simulation. He received a Degree of Mechanical Engineering and a Master of Science in mechanical 
engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a BE from The Cooper Union. 
[josephbradley@leading-change.org] 
John (Jack) McGowan—is a Certified Safety Professional who works to help NAVSEA safety 
professionals reduce injuries and mishaps at NAVSEA Field Activities, which include Warfare 
Centers, Regional Maintenance Centers, and Naval Shipyards. Before starting at NAVSEA 
Headquarters, he worked as a Safety Manager at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, San Diego 
Detachment, and as a Project Safety Manager at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton. 
McGowan is now the lead Safety Professional for the Information and Analysis Branch in NAVSEA 
04, Industrial Operation Directorate. [john.mcgowan@navy.mil] 
Qingbin Cui—is a Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has over 20 years of 
industry and research experience and specializes in the areas of project management, public–private 
partnerships (P3), and sustainability. He is a technical consultant to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation for the P3 Capacity Building Program and a member of the expert panel for the U.S. 
Department of Energy on energy performance contracting, and built a university–industry partnership 
for data-driven construction research and education. [cui@umd.edu] 
Abstract 
Managing shipboard industrial fire safety during a depot or intermediate level maintenance 
availability on a commissioned naval vessel can be viewed as a complex system bounded by 
the defense acquisition system. Sociotechnical factors define the hazard and associated risk 
and risk management practices, and this complex system governs the resulting level of fire 
safety. Poor industrial fire safety practices during naval ship maintenance availabilities can 
directly impact project cost and schedule. If a fire is severe enough, these effects can trickle 
throughout the ship class’s maintenance program, adversely impacting fleet readiness and 
operations. Traditional viewpoints on fire safety prescriptively regulate the fire hazard. Rote 
compliance with this type of requirement does not provide clear mechanisms for measuring 
safety performance, resulting in uneven risk management. This paper presents a safety 
management system (SMS) framework for shipboard industrial fire safety based on the 
Complex Systems Governance (CSG) reference model developed by Keating and Bradley 
(2015). The value of a clearly defined governance model and SMS framework in conjunction 
with industry standardization and information sharing is the emergence of trends. This 
supports feedback loops between requirements and outcomes, allowing more effective 
management of fire safety across the broad stakeholder groups involved.  
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Introduction  
Shipboard fire incidents during industrial construction and maintenance activities 
pose a significant threat to fielding the required naval force strength. Naval vessels transition 
in and out of construction and maintenance periods throughout their life cycle, and 
protecting them from fires during industrial work is a complex issue. Fire risk involves not 
only risk associated with the fire itself, but also the risk associated with loss of an 
operational asset. The impact of small fires during ship construction or overhaul could be 
minor property damage or injury to a worker or sailor. Larger fires can result in schedule 
delays or loss of life, and a major fire can result in the total loss of a ship.  
When the USS Miami (SSN 755) was decommissioned after suffering a major fire 
while in dry dock at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in 2012, five deployments over her 
remaining 10-year operational life were lost (McDermott, 2013). Investigation of the July 12, 
2020, fire aboard the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) while pier side at Naval Base San 
Diego, CA, towards the end of a GD NASSCO overhaul availability is ongoing, with the ship 
declared a total loss in early 2021 (Ziezulewicz, 2021). Shortly after this fire, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition James Geurts (2020) 
issued a memorandum to the entire shipbuilding and ship maintenance enterprise stating, 
“Preventing shipboard fires is a team sport, no matter where the ship is in its life cycle, and 
no matter who is working on the ship,” and “There is no place in our Navy for complacency – 
the lives of our teammates and the accomplishment of our mission depends upon it” (p. 1). 
The USS Miami (SSN 775) Fire Panel Recommendations (Gortney, 2012, p. 1) also 
cite complacency, stating “the MIAMI investigation paints a picture of multiple processes 
within several organizations going through the motions, with no particular failure, but lacking 
focused attention and oversight, and missing the mark in the aggregate”, and “it is clear that 
the Navy has unintentionally accepted a reduced margin to fire safety when a ship enters an 
industrial environment -- where the risk of fire is at its highest.” In the weeks following the 
major fire on USS Bonhomme Richard, minor fire incidents related to hot work occurred on 
the USS John F Kennedy (CVN 79) at HII-Newport News Shipbuilding and USS Kearsarge 
(LHD 3) at GD NASSCO in Norfolk, VA (Eckstein, 2020), serving as a wake-up call to the 
industry.  
A few months prior to the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) presented the results of an effort initiated in June 2019 in response to 
2018 fires aboard USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) to assess 
industrial fire safety, fire prevention, and control programs based on self-assessment 
responses and reported data on fires that had occurred over the previous 30 months at 
public and private maritime maintenance facilities (McGowan & Smith, 2020). Their effort is 
summarized herein and built upon to propose the framework for a data-driven direction to 
addressing the Navy’s shipboard industrial fire problem.  
In June 2020, the Navy issued a new Safety and Occupational Health Manual that 
established the Navy Safety Management System (SMS) to “facilitate a transition from 
reactively managing safety to proactively managing safety and risk, and ultimately, to 
become predictive” (U.S. Department of the Navy [DoN], 2020, p. A1-2). This evolving 
direction provides an opportunity for deliberate implementation of a novel approach to 
managing fire safety during naval ship maintenance availabilities.  
Our approach aims to assess common systemic threads in major safety mishaps—
contributions of the system that frames management of risk to outcomes and the 
relationship between complacency and responsibility. The dual incidents of the recent major 
fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) and total loss of the USS Miami parallel the 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) dual losses of space shuttles 
Challenger in 1986 and Columbia in 2003, albeit separated by a much shorter period of 
time. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified organizational system 
failures and flawed organizational practices, including complacency and cultural beliefs. 
Specifically, “history again at work: how past definitions of risk combined with systemic 
problems in the NASA organization caused both accidents” (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board [CAIB], 2003, p. 195). 
We propose an SMS framework for shipboard industrial fire safety based on the 
Complex Systems Governance (CSG) reference model developed by Keating and Bradley 
(2015) to inform the transition from regulating fire hazards to systematic management of fire 
safety during maintenance availabilities on commissioned naval vessels. The focus is on 
developing feedback loops between requirements and outcomes through a data-driven 
approach to support proactive management of shipboard industrial fire safety, a reduction in 
lost operational days due to fire incidents, and identification of the gaps that must be 
addressed to implement this framework. 
Table 1. Research Goals and Objectives 
Goals Objectives 
Dissect the shipboard 
industrial fire safety problem, 
including acquisition system 
influences  
Evaluate the problem within the 
sociotechnical safety perspective on risk 
Evaluate the problem with respect to 
defense-in-depth 
Develop an SMS 
framework for Shipboard 
Industrial Fire Safety based on 
the CSG reference model 
Evaluate the problem within the Cynefin 
framework 
Evaluate how the Navy SMS framework 
integrates into the CSG reference model 
Identify necessary feedback loops between 
requirements and outcomes 
Identify gaps between framework 
architecture and the current state 
 
NAVSEA Shipboard Industrial Fire Incident Data Analysis Summary 
In June 2019, “COMNAVSEA directed Naval activities and requested private 
maintenance facilities to report all fires over the last 30 months. NAVSEA received 
responses from public and private maritime maintenance facilities. These responses were 
analyzed by 04RS for completeness, self-reflection, and innovation/solutions” (McGowan & 
Smith, 2020, slide 2). Data from 339 fire incidents were reviewed, and NAVSEA 04RS 
(Industrial Operations, Safety) performed an analysis of causal factors using the Department 
of Defense’s Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to identify trends 
and lessons learned. The top three sources of shipboard fires during industrial work were 
hot work, electrical, and temporary sources. Shipboard industrial fire incidents were also 
analyzed with regards to the Cognizant Activity and controlling document for fire safety 
requirements. Results are summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Fire Reporting Data  
(McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 4) 
Regardless of the source of the requirements, non-compliance related to 
fundamental fire prevention practices was identified as the cause of 85% of hot work fires, 
which occurred in improperly prepared areas. The distribution of fires among Cognizant 
Activities is related to the volume of work overseen by each, suggesting that the problem is 
universal across the naval maritime repair industry.  
Significant findings outlined next “were remarkably similar to other fires experienced 
by the Navy,” including “1942 SS Normandie, Total loss of the ship, 285 Injuries” and “1944 
USS Saturn, 15 fatalities, 20 injuries.” “Both events were the result of improper hot-work 
controls” (McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 8). These findings include the following: 
● Failure to follow the “35-foot rule” is the most frequent cause of hot work fires. 
● Port loading variations and high influx of temporary employees with low 
experience increase the likelihood of fire safety non-compliance. 
● Communication between fire watches and hot workers, and inspections by hot 
work supervisors, are less than adequate. 
● Failure to comply with the invoked standard (OSHA, NAVSEA Requirements) 
was common. (McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 7) 
In addition to the analytic side of this effort, actions taken by NAVSEA included 
establishing new hot work requirements in NAVSEA Standard Item (NSI) Fiscal Year 2020, 
Change 2, and “VADM Moore wrote a letter to all parties stating that a ship repair 
contractor’s non-compliance with fire prevention standards and regulations is a contractual 
non-compliance” (McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 10). A variety of recommendations to 
improve compliance were made for Naval maritime facilities (Naval shipyards, Regional 
Maintenance Centers (RMCs) and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP/SOS). Future 
initiatives identified by NAVSEA include sharing best practices across the industry and 
establishing a multi-functional committee to address issues uncovered through information 
sharing (McGowan & Smith, 2020). Uniformly implementing good and best practices in 
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private shipyards requires a combination of approaches, largely due to contractual 
influences.  
Methodology 
Defining the Problem 
 Sociotechnical Safety Perspective on Risk  
The concept of a sociotechnical system is derived from the context of work systems 
and was defined by Ropohl (1999) as  
established to stress the reciprocal interrelationship between humans and 
machines and to foster the program of shaping both the technical and the social 
conditions of work, in such a way that efficiency and humanity would not 
contradict each other any longer. (p. 59)  
Sociotechnical systems in this sense are made up of a hierarchy of action systems, or 
subsystems, with three primary levels that perform the work, oversee the work, and set 
goals for the work. These subsystems can further be divided into sub-subsystems, and 
significant feedback loops and couplings exist between them. In the case of overhaul work 
on a commissioned naval vessel, these lines can sometimes be blurred, and a single 
organization can have functions within multiple subsystems. Sociotechnical is further 
defined by Aven and Ylönen (2018)  
to include the following dimensions: 1) two or more persons, interaction with 
some form of 2) technology, 3) and internal work environment (both physical 
and cultural), 4) external environment (can include political, regulatory, 
technological, economic, educational and cultural sub-environments), 5) an 
organisational design and management subsystems. (p. 14)  
Continuing the parallels to the dual NASA accidents, the CAIB devoted chapters of its report 
to discussing organizational causes, history as a cause, and decision-making within the 
organization. The report identified a broken safety culture and pointed to Naval Reactors 
and the Navy’s SUBSAFE programs as strong examples of a good culture, with key 
differences being requirements ownership (technical authority) and emphasis on lessons 
learned (CAIB, 2003). 
 Safety vs. Risk 
A goal of the Navy SMS is to proactively manage both safety and risk (DoN, 2020). 
To do this, it is important to distinguish between these two interrelated objectives. The 
Society for Risk Analysis Glossary defines safe as “without unacceptable risk,” and safety as 
“the antonym of risk” (Society for Risk Analysis [SRA], 2018, p. 7). Risk is given several 
qualitative definitions, but for the context of this paper we will use “the occurrences of some 
specified consequences of the activity and associated uncertainties” (SRA, 2018, p. 4). 
Möller et al. (2006) argue that safety goes beyond the antonym of risk due to epistemic 
uncertainty and proposed the intersubjective concept of safety: “(1) it is based on the 
comparative judgments of severity of harm that the majority of humans would agree on, and 
(2) it makes use of the best available expert judgments on the probabilities and uncertainties 
involved” (p. 427). Aven (2009) argues that safety is the antonym of risk for certain 
perspectives (definitions) of risk, specifically, when risk is the two-dimensional combination 
of uncertainty and consequences, uncertainty is integral to the definition, safety is the 
antonym of risk, and safe can be defined as “acceptable risk and acceptable safety” (p. 
929). This is the perspective adopted in this paper. 
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 Defense-in-Depth 
Sorensen et al. (1999) identify that defense-in-depth as a nuclear industry safety 
strategy began development in the 1950s. Their review of the history of the term indicated 
that there was as of yet no official or preferred definition, but that when the term is used and 
if a definition is needed, “one is created consistent with the intended use of the term. Such 
definitions are often made by example” (p. 1). By 1999, the term had come to have two 
different meanings, roughly corresponding to the perspective of the particular model. Those 
perspectives were cast as either denoting “the philosophy of high level lines of defense, 
such as prevent accident initiators from occurring, terminate accident sequences quickly, 
and mitigate accidents that are not successfully terminated” (p. 3). The other portrays “the 
multiple physical barrier approach, most often exemplified by the fuel cladding, primary 
system, and containment” (p. 2). These two model perspectives are cast as either 
structuralist or rationalist:  
The structuralist model asserts that defense in depth is embodied in the 
structure of the regulations and in the design of the facilities built to comply with 
those regulations. The requirements for defense in depth are derived by 
repeated application of the question, “What if this barrier or safety feature 
fails?”. (pp. 3–4)  
Sorensen et al. (1999) portray that “the rationalist model asserts that defense in depth is the 
aggregate of provisions made to compensate for uncertainty and incompleteness in our 
knowledge of accident initiation and progression” (p. 4). They also assert that “the 
structuralist and rationalist models are not generally in conflict. Both can be construed as a 
means of dealing with uncertainty,” and further, they note that “neither incorporates any 
reliable means of determining when the degree of defense in depth achieved is sufficient” 
(p. 5).  
As more nuclear power plants were built and more service experience acquired, new 
rules were progressively added, yielding a very complex set of requirements for the last part 
of the existing fleet of reactors to be built. A variation of technical debt was building up; even 
with “the accumulation of experience with various incidents and accidents, a growing list of 
unresolved safety issues emerged” (Fleming & Silady, 2002, p. 206). Fleming and Silady 
(2002) highlight that even as requirements were increased,  
many additional incidents occurred, including literally hundreds of common 
cause failures in redundant safety systems. This experience casts doubt on 
the wisdom of excluding common cause failures from the design basis 
envelope, thereby exposing a serious limitation of the single failure criterion as 
a tool to help define what is credible. (p. 206) 
A footnote in Fleming and Silady (2002) notes that  
In the peer review of an earlier draft of this paper it was pointed out that the 
regulations governing nuclear power include one definition of defense-in-depth 
in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R which sets rules for fire protection in older 
plants. This definition sets forth the following objectives for the defense-in-
depth of fire protection. Prevent fires from starting, detect rapidly, control and 
extinguish the fires that do occur, and to protect SSCs needed to safely 
shutdown the plant from the effects of the fire and firefighting activities. (p. 207) 
Saleh et al. (2014), discussing the Texas City refinery fire, noted “a fundamental 
failure mechanism in this accident, namely the absence of observability or ability to 
diagnose hazardous states in the operation of the refinery, in particular within the raffinate 
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splitter tower and the blowdown drum of the isomerization unit” (p. 1). They go on to 
“propose a general safety–diagnosability principle for supporting accident prevention, which 
requires that all safety-degrading events or states that defense-in-depth is meant to protect 
against be diagnosable, and that breaches of safety barriers be unambiguously monitored 
and reported.” Further “violation of the safety–diagnosability principle translates into a 
shrinking of the time window available for operators to understand an unfolding hazardous 
situation and intervene to abate it.” They go onto conclude that “defense-in-depth be 
augmented with this principle, without which it can degenerate into an ineffective defense-
blind safety strategy” (Saleh et al., 2014, p. 1).  
Cynefin Framework  
Cynefin framework is a sense-making framework first developed by a group of 
researchers at IBM “conducting a program of disruptive action research using the methods 
of narrative and complexity theory to address critical business issues” (Kurtz & Snowden, 
2003, p. 462). This work was partially funded through the Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) with an interest in “new approaches to support policy-making” 
(Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 462). The group challenged three basic assumptions of 
decision-making and policymaking—order, rational choice, and intentional capability—
believing that while commonly available tools and techniques assume they are true, they are 
not universally true. With regard to order, they discuss situations where lack of order isn’t a 
bad thing and the concept of emergent order (un-order) that is self-organizing rather than 
controlled and emerges from the interaction of many entities. Ordered-systems thinking has 
limitations because it assumes “we can derive or discover general rules or hypotheses that 
can be empirically verified and that create a body of reliable knowledge, which can then be 
developed and expanded” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 466), and this does not hold true for 
all domains.  
Unlike the more traditional categorization framework with a two-by-two matrix where 
the most desirable condition exists in the upper right-hand quadrant, the Cynefin sense-
making framework “is used primarily to consider the dynamics of situations, decisions, 
perspectives, conflicts, and changes in order to come to a consensus for decision-making 
under uncertainty” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 468) and does not favor any of the domains 
as more desirable or imply value axes. The five domains, currently referred to as clear, 
complicated, complex, chaotic, and confused, are depicted in Figure 2. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 13 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 2. Cynefin Framework and Relationships 
 
Descriptions of Domains 
Clear (simple) is the domain of the known, with clear cause and effect relationships 
that are undisputed and generally empirical in nature. It is the domain of structured 
techniques and process engineering, with focus on consistency and efficiency (Kurtz & 
Snowden, 2003). In this ordered and obvious domain, optimal solutions can be identified. In 
other words, it is the domain of best practices (Fierro et al., 2018).  
Complicated is the domain of the knowable, or “known unknowns” (Fierro et al., 
2018, p. 6), with stable cause and effect relationships that are either not fully known or only 
known to a small group of people (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). With enough time and 
resources, anything in this domain could become known and move to the clear domain. 
Kurtz and Snowden (2003) described this as “the domain of methodology, which seeks to 
identify cause-effect relationships through the study of properties which appear to be 
associated with qualities” (p. 468). In this domain of reductionism, the goal is to analyze, 
versus categorize, and decompose a system or problem into its constituent parts with 
approaches governed by things like standard rules, procedures, and protocols manuals. 
Because there may be multiple right answers and multiple options must be considered, 
good practices are preferred to best practices (Fierro et al., 2018).  
Complex is the domain of the “unknown knowns” (Fierro et al., 2018, p. 8), where 
“there are cause and effect relationships between the agents, but both the number of agents 
and the number of relationships defy categorization or analytic techniques” (Kurtz & 
Snowden, 2003, p. 469). This is the domain of complexity theory, and “emergent patterns 
can be perceived but not predicted.” Fierro et al. (2018) refer to this domain as “unordered—
obvious in hindsight” (p. 8), where the facts can be understood through reconstruction and 
rationalized after the fact. In this realm, there a range of potential failures, and emergent 
behaviors between highly interconnected subsystems can result in the emergence of 
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different failure modes as actions are applied. The best approach in this domain is to “probe, 
sense, and then respond” (p. 8), and detailed planning is of minimal value due to the 
dynamic nature of sub-system interactions. An evolutionary strategy is recommended where 
solutions are developed in builds, and unlike an incremental strategy, it is acknowledged 
“that the user need is not fully understood and not all requirements can be defined up front” 
(p. 9). 
Chaotic is the domain of “unknown unknowns” (Fierro et al., 2018), where there are 
no perceivable relationships between cause and effect and there is insufficient response 
time to evaluate change because the system is turbulent. Here, best practices can 
contribute to the chaos because there is nothing to analyze and “waiting for patterns to 
emerge is a waste of time” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). This is an unordered domain where 
“we don’t even know which are the relevant aspects related to the problem, and no 
information is available even to be able to define the problem” (Fierro et al., 2018). 
Response in this domain is to act quickly to reduce turbulence, sense where stability is or is 
not present based on this action, and then “respond by working to transform the situation 
from chaos to complexity, where the identification of emerging patterns can both help 
prevent future crises that discern new opportunities” (p. 12). This is also known as “the 
domain of novel practice” (p. 12) and can sometimes be desirable on the path to innovation.  
Confused or Aporetic, formerly Disorder, is at the interaction of the other domains of 
the Cynefin framework, reflective in the conflict of decision-makers approaching a problem 
from different points of view (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In this domain, each decision-maker 
relies on their own comfort zone to pull the issue into the domain that plays to their strengths 
or desires. The goal in this domain is to adapt leadership styles based on context and shift 
the problem into the appropriate domain given the nature of the problem and decision-
making context (Fierro et al., 2018). 
Complex Systems Governance  
Complex System Governance (CSG) is an emerging field formally defined by 
Keating et al. (2014) as the “design, execution, and evolution of the metasystem functions 
necessary to provide control, communication, coordination, and integration of a complex 
system” (p. 274). Theory and concepts are derived from the fields of systems theory, 
management cybernetics, and system governance. The domain of complex systems 
includes the characteristics of complexity, contextual dominance, ambiguity, and holistic 
nature. The governance perspective of CSG is rooted in the cybernetic perspective of 
“design for ‘regulatory capacity’ to provide appropriate controls capable of maintaining 
system balance” (Keating & Katina, 2019, p. 690) and differs from management by 
emphasizing outcomes versus outputs with a higher degree of separation between action 
and response. The CSG model provides a framework for improving system performance 
(Keating et al., 2019). Discovery, classification, and engagement are neither mutually 
exclusive nor interdependent aspects of the framework, facilitating emergence of 
unabsorbed pathologies and the ability to improve resilience of the system. Included meta-
functions (pathologies), definitions, and their relationships are depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2. CSG Reference Model and Metasystem Definitions 
Policy and Identity (M5) – 
overall steering and trajectory for the 
system includes context and 
monitoring of the governance 
system. 
 
System Development (M4) 
– models current and future system; 
includes learning and environmental 
scanning. 
System Operations (M3) – 
day to day execution of the 
metasystem includes performance 
monitoring of the governed systems. 
Information and 
Communications (M2) – flow and 
interpretation of information 
necessary to execute metasystem 
functions; the "spine" of the system. 
Governed Systems (S1s) – 
the organizational components of the 
larger system that are governed by 
the meta-systems. They are 
identified here as Regional 
Maintenance Commands and the 
Contractors executing work. 
 
CSG provides a suitable framework for modeling the complex relationships between 
the ship/ship’s force, contractor/activity performing the work, and various Navy activities 
involved in the management of shipboard industrial fire risk. A model-centric approach to 
evaluating these relationships and the delegation of ownership for each aspect of the 
sociotechnical problem reveals emergence of the system and reduces ambiguity, providing 
answers to questions such as who owns the risk and are all aspects of the risk accounted 
for? 
Navy Safety Management System Framework  
The Navy Safety program updated its policy in June 2020 with the release of a 
revised Navy Safety and Occupational Health Manual (DoN, 2020). This manual 
“establishes the Navy Safety Management System (SMS), a comprehensive framework that 
will ensure operational readiness through continuous improvement and risk-based decision 
making processes and procedures” (DoN, 2020, p. A1-2). It defines an SMS as “a system of 
processes that proactively manages day-to-day safety and risk management in an 
organization across all operations and business lines. It is not a single written policy or 
database” (DoN, 2020, p. A1-4). The Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) Program is given as a 
Navy community-level example, with policy supporting the operational safety functional area 
of an SMS. 
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The Navy SMS is a high-level framework intended to be both transparent and 
scalable. The policy applies directly to Navy civilian and military personnel and operations 
worldwide but is not applicable where Navy contractors are responsible directly to state or 
the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for 
the occupational safety and health of its employees. However, the requirement for Navy 
SMS framework is an enterprise-level policy that encompasses areas beyond occupational 
safety, including industrial ship safety, industrial ship fire protection and prevention, and 
safety mishap reporting and investigation (DoN, 2020). Shipboard industrial fire safety is 
unique in that requirements and outcomes can dually influence both occupational safety and 
ship safety. Maintaining ship conditions goes above and beyond what is required to protect 
workers, similar to how building and life safety codes distinguish between life safety and 
property protection requirements. 
The manual is a requirements document that outlines the minimum requirements for 
an SMS framework, consisting of “an iterative continuous improvement cycle, four pillars, 
and one or more minimum fundamental elements that underpin those pillars” (DoN, 2020, p. 
A1-6). The four pillars and their fundamental elements are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Four Pillars of a Navy SMS and Fundamental Elements 
 
Note that some of the fundamental elements cross, or exist, in multiple pillars. 
Personnel awareness, education, and training are fundamental to both “Policy and 
Organizational Commitment” and “Promotion.” Similarly, risk monitoring and change 
management cross “Risk Management” and “Assurance.” These particular elements are key 
to establishing feedback loops between requirements and outcomes, or the continuous 
improvement cycle. 
With regards to appointment of SMS personnel, “SMS-related responsibilities and 
authorities must be defined, documented, and communicated throughout the organization” 
and “Safety management system personnel must be appointed with the authority to execute 
SMS processes and programs.” Although aspects of shipboard industrial fire safety are 
distributed among various safety functional areas, NAVSEA 04RS[1] (Industrial Operations, 
Safety) the technical warrant holder (TWH) for safety policy, is emerging in a leadership role 
in addressing fires throughout the naval enterprise. Previously NAVSEA 04RS limited its 
scope to collecting data and sharing that data within the NAVSEA community. During the 
past 2 years, NAVSEA 04RS has been engaged with the private shipbuilding community 
and the maritime industry at large to bring attention to the problem of fires onboard naval 
vessels during construction and maintenance availabilities. The focus of this paper is on 
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identifying ownership, accountability, and communication channels as they relate to roles 
and responsibilities within the framework. 
Research Results 
The Sociotechnical Problem 
Complexity emerges from decomposing contributing factors to the Navy’s shipboard 
industrial fire safety problem. Figure 4 outlines the sociotechnical factors that contribute to 
industrial fire safety during ship maintenance availabilities in each of the five contributing 








































































Figure 4. Sociotechnical Decomposition of Shipboard Industrial Fire Safety 
 
In addition to the underlying technical factors, multiple parties are involved with 
managing the risk. Shipboard industrial fire risk management occurs at the intersection of 
the contracting authority overseeing the work (NAVSEA), the contractor performing the 
work, and the ship that is being worked on or constructed. For a commissioned ship, U.S. 
Navy Regulations dictate that when work is performed in a private shipyard under a contract 
being administered by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, responsibility 
for safe execution of the work is assigned via contract to the contractor. The commanding 
officer retains responsibility for safety of the ship and requesting services necessary to 
maintain safety of the ship (DoN, 1990). This relationship is depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Risk Management Parties 
While the responsibility for ship safety is shared, the contractor is directly responsible 
for occupational safety (DoN, 2020). Unlike in the commercial shipbuilding and repair 
industry, Navy ship maintenance contracts do not require the contractor to retain a 
significant marine builder’s risk insurance policy, thus limiting the options for fire risk transfer 
between parties. This also limits the solution set for determining how to manage fire risk to 
what is in the contract, necessitating that the Government be specific in identifying fire 
protection and prevention measures above and beyond what is required by OSHA Standard 
1915 Subpart P, Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment. The SUPSHIP Operations Manual 
states, 
Under vessel fixed-price contracts, the Government customarily assumes the 
same risk of loss or damage as would have been assumed by private insurance 
underwriters had the contractor obtained and maintained marine builders risk 
insurance. This risk is subject to a deductible as identified in the contract. 
(Naval Sea Systems Command, 2021, p. 3-101) 
Transferring more of the liability for determining how to provide adequate fire 
protection and prevention for commissioned naval vessels to a contractor would have the 
unintended consequence of increasing the amount of insurance the contractor would need 
to carry in order to assume this liability. 
Defense-in-Depth 
Ships are most vulnerable to fire during construction and overhaul periods because 
the normal layers of protection are not present. Permanent fire protection systems may be 
out of service, fire resistant boundaries may be compromised, less of the ship’s force is 
present, and many industrial workers are present. As opposed to strict controls on material 
aboard, temporary services are run throughout the ship, and a significant amount of 
combustible materials are brought on board. When a ship is at sea, sources of fire ignition 
are planned for in the design of protective measures. During industrial work, sources of fire 
ignition include industrial work evolutions, permanent or temporary services installed in the 
ship, and human causes such as discarded smoking materials or criminal acts. There is a 
high reliance on human intervention rather than a layered approach to protection, which can 
be a critical single point of failure in preventing the escalation of an incident. 
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Cynefin Domains  
Within the “Policy and Organizational Commitment” pillar of the Navy SMS 
framework, it is important to recognize that different management approaches are required 
for different aspects of the problem. Approaching decision-making modalities from the 
correct domain is as important as making decisions at the right level. This could mean best 
practices (clear domain), good practices (complicated domain), evolutionary or novel 
approaches, or decomposing the problem in order to shift it into a domain where it is more 
easily managed. Table 3 provides examples of shipboard industrial safety problems that 
currently exist within each Cynefin domain. Note that from a programmatic standpoint, this 
topic currently exists in the confused domain at the intersection of other domains primarily 
due to identified gaps that will be discussed in more detail in a later section of this paper. 
The goal of implementing an SMS framework based on the CSG model and using the 
Cynefin framework to analyze it is to decompose the problem in a manner that makes it 
manageable. 
 
Table 3. Industrial Fire Safety Examples in Each Cynefin Domain 
Complicated Clear 
The work done by the welding 
engineer to determine the welding 
requirements and produce the technical 
work documents for a particular work 
evolution. 
Skilled work (tasks) performed by a 
welder.  
Complex Chaotic 
Interaction between welding (hot 
work) and the surrounding environment. 
Factors such as type of welding, proximity 
to combustibles, fire resistant and non fire-
resistant separations, and adequacy of the 
fire watch all contribute to the safe 
execution of this work evolution. 
Introducing a transient and unequally 
trained workforce with a few workers that may 
randomly decide to follow no rules into ship 
repair work evolutions. While emergence 
between sub-systems in the shipboard fire 
safety problem should be discernable, this is 
only possible when all agents are playing by an 
identifiable and uniform set of rules. 
Confused/Aporetic 




The system of interest (SOI) in this paper, depicted in Figure 6, is a maintenance 
availability on a commissioned naval vessel (otherwise known as a project). Boundary 
conditions (other systems) that interact with this system include the acquisition system that 
contracts the work, the ship maintenance activity that undertakes the work, and the ship 
itself. The context includes the shipboard industrial fire safety system and associated 
requirements that are transmitted into the SOI by contract items and include reference to 
Manuals and Instructions. 
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Figure 6. Architecture of System of Interest 
 
SMS Framework and Complex System Governance Model  
The governance model meta-function descriptions in Keating and Bradley (2015) 
provide the reference model assignments of requisite responsibilities and products. In 
Figure 7, we identify a preliminary assignment of the responsibilities with the corresponding 
meta functions. We also identify explicitly the governed systems (referred to as S1s) to place 
them in the appropriate location in the schema. 
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Figure 7. Metasystem Functions Identified for Shipboard Industrial Fire Safety Perspective 
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Setting policy at the NAVSEA Echelon 2 level that incorporates all the functions of 
the CSG model, which is inherently a risk communication and iterative continuous 
improvement cycle, can result in an SMS that is compliant with the new requirements for the 
Navy SMS framework. Developing procedures that adapt decision-making modalities and 
risk management practices based on system decomposition using the Cynefin framework 
support utilizing limited resources in a manner that is more likely to bring about meaningful 
change in shipboard industrial fire safety than seeking “one size fits all” solutions. Given that 
significant fires in the past decade on the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) and USS Oscar 
Austin (DDG 79) had similar root causes to historical fires on the SS Normandie and USS 
Saturn (AK 49), (McGowan & Smith, 2020), the current state mirrors NASA’s “‘failures of 
foresight’ in which history played a prominent role” (CAIB, 2003, p. 195). 
Identified Gaps  
 Technical Authority 
There is not a single technical authority or TWH with responsibility for shipboard 
industrial fire safety. This role is split between NAVSEA 04RS responsibilities as the TWH 
for safety policy, NAVSEA 04X6 responsibility for maintaining the NAVSEA Industrial Ship 
Safety Manual for Fire Prevention and Response (8010 Manual), and NAVSEA 05P 
responsibility for damage and survivability, which includes the ship’s fixed fire protection 
systems. Other TWHs have input within their respective areas of responsibility, but decision-
making and responsibilities do not roll up to a single entity. The lack of a TWH with overall 
responsibility can lead to issues such as contract negotiations over industrial fire protection 
and prevention requirements without the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. 
 Technical Cognizance 
In conjunction with the lack of an overarching TWH, there is not a clear flow down of 
technical requirements or a single entity responsible for adjudicating technical issues that 
arise in the domain of shipboard industrial fire safety. Nor do the activities performing the 
work have specific requirements to house this technical expertise internally. Where 
requirements are not clearly defined and rooted with a technical basis, decisions are made 
at the deckplate by individuals who may or may not have the expertise to make them. 
 Weaknesses in Defense-in-Depth 
Our initial work has indicated that the unwanted occurrence of significant fire events 
may be an indicator of an ineffective system to provide defense-in-depth. This potential gap 
will need to be explored further in later phases of this work.  
 Lags in Incorporating Lessons Learned Into Contracts 
Technical requirements related to shipboard industrial fire safety are typically found 
in NAVSEA Standard Items (standard specifications for ship repair and alteration), either 
directly or by reference to other documents, which may or may not be incorporated into 
every contract. Lessons learned from the USS MIAMI fire are still not fully incorporated into 
NSIs 9 years later, and even when new requirements are invoked, the multi-year nature of 
ship maintenance availabilities means that contractual requirements typically lag current 
recommendations. 
 Contract Requirements Are Not Driven by Data 
Trends are collected and analyzed by data; collection is not standardized and does 
not directly influence what is required in future contracts or contract modifications. Use of 
data is critical to the risk communication, risk monitoring, and change management 
fundamental elements of the Navy SMS framework. Within the CSG model, this reflects 
feedback loops between metasystems. 
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Conclusions  
There is not currently a uniform level of industrial fire safety during ship maintenance 
availabilities, primarily because there is not currently a cohesive governance model or 
framework that is driving specificity of requirements to manage risk. Rather than the current 
state of rote compliance (or noncompliance) to general requirements, contractual 
requirements should be data driven and vary based on risk, and there should be clear 
technical authority over setting these requirements and technical cognizance in ensuring 
they are met. Feedback loops between requirements and outcomes in conjunction with 
faster routes (such as contract modifications) to incorporate lessons learned into ship 
maintenance contracts support a higher level of safety through better management of the 
risks involved. Note that the underlying goal is not necessarily to avoid all fire due to the 
nature of the work but have defense-in-depth and “right-sized” work controls to prevent 
major fires and reduce the impact of minor ones while not unduly impacting production 
schedule or project cost. 
Planned Future Work  
This paper is the first step in a concerted effort towards implementing data driven 
decision-making for industrial fire safety during ship maintenance availabilities by defining 
the governance model and SMS framework. NAVSEA 04RS has already done a significant 
amount of work analyzing human factors in historical fire incident data, and the intent is to 
continue to build upon their efforts. The next step is to further analyze available historical 
data to identify causal factors in why small fires become large, forming the basis of 
determining what standardized data needs to be collected to analyze future trends and 
inform contract requirements. We will also evaluate where and how more robust defense-in-
depth principles can be incorporated. Then, we intend to create a standard data architecture 
and viewpoints for data-driven decision-making that could be implemented through creation 
of a new data repository held by a neutral third party.  
The long-term vision is for decision support systems that are a model-based 
engineering cross between tools like the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) 
database used for land-based fire reporting, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
maintained by NASA for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and more traditional 
project and program management dashboards. Having a tool such as this in the toolbox 
would allow the Navy, contractors, and the broader maritime repair industry to learn and 
evolve based on data from shipboard industrial fire incidents and near misses. 
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Abstract 
Development of advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) system-enabled 
weapons and combat systems for deployment in the U.S. Navy has become a reality. This is 
also true for the other armed forces, as well as in homeland security and even the Coast 
Guard. From the Navy standpoint, the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) 
is attempting to get ahead of the acquisition cycle by focusing on the development of policies, 
guidelines, tools, and techniques to assess mishap risk in Safety Significant Functions (SSF) 
that are identified. NOSSA’s efforts have the potential of influencing the acquisition 
community, including in requirements, development, and test and evaluation engineering. 
This paper makes recommendations for the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) and 
Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) analysis templates and focuses on ways to decrease 
autonomy within system operations and increase its correlated Software Control Category 
(SCC). The questions and discussions devised from this research aim to form guidance and 
offer best practices to address AI/ML system safety issues. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is rapidly approaching the point where system 
safety practitioners will need to conduct mishap risk assessments on AI functions within 
upgraded systems being deployed in the Fleet. These systems will be crucial to ensure the 
DoD retains its dominance in military power (Brose, 2020). The safety community will soon 
be required to conduct system safety analysis on systems, including weapon systems that 
contain Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) functionality (National Defense 
Authorization Act [NDAA], 2021; National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence 
[NSCAI], 2021). AI functions present unique challenges to system safety practitioners to 
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identify hazards, assess risk, and identify risk mitigation measures. This includes how to 
properly employ a system with AI capability in an operational or tactical environment while 
reducing the probability of a mishap. Currently, no guidance exists on how to conduct 
system safety analysis on AI/ML functions, and this will prevent the certification of these 
systems for deployment (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2008; National Institute 
of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2019).  
The Problem 
Assuring safety in AI/ML systems is a considerable challenge to current safety 
processes for traditional software. Traditional software can be assessed for safety through 
code review, and traditional software outcomes can be analyzed through automated code 
analysis techniques such as Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (Joint Software Systems 
Safety Engineering Workgroup, 2017). Together, these and other methods can provide a 
rigorous understanding of how software will function in a given situation, assuring some 
desired level of safety. However, a developed and trained AI/ML system cannot be analyzed 
with current analysis methods, and though it is theoretically possible for some ML designs 
(and completely impossible for others) to exhaustively test all inputs and outputs of an AI/ML 
software function, the calculation time required makes even small systems almost 
impossible to analyze. These issues, combined with the unique challenge of unpredictable 
real-world corner cases, result in AI/ML functions having an inherent lack of safety due to 
unknown, unanalyzable, and untestable factors (Sodhani, 2018). 
Within the DoD, MIL-STD-882E guides the software safety process. This standard 
provides a method for categorizing safety significant software based on its level of 
autonomy, called the Software Control Category (SCC). SCC 1, Autonomous, defines the 
highest level of autonomy, while SCC 4, Influential, defines the least autonomous category 
of safety significant software. These SCCs are combined with the severity of related hazards 
to define a Software Criticality Index (SwCI). Each SwCI level requires a requisite Level of 
Rigor (LOR), or a specific set of tasks to be completed before that safety significant software 
is considered “safe,” or representing a certain level of acceptable risk for the system. SwCI 1 
requires the most effort to achieve LOR, while SwCI 4 requires the least amount of effort to 
achieve LOR. 
For software where functional failure could lead to catastrophic hazards and that 
either has control over safety significant hardware or provides safety-critical information, the 
safest SCC possible is SCC 3, Redundant Fault Tolerant, which results in SwCI 2 (MIL-
STD-882E; Defense Standardization Program Office, 2012). If this function were instead 
SCC 1, Autonomous, or SCC 2, Semi-Autonomous, the resulting SwCI would be 1. In 
addition to the SwCI 2 LOR tasks, SwCI 1 LOR tasking additionally requires code level 
analysis, such as including MC/DC or equivalent testing (JS-SSA, 2017). This means that if 
the Safety Significant Function (SSF) that could lead to a catastrophic hazard is an AI/ML 
function, it would likely be impossible to perform full LOR tasking on that function, creating a 
considerable gap in software safety.  
The Need 
Unless new analysis techniques are developed that can address the specific issues 
described previously, the most effective way to increase confidence of safe operations in 
AI/ML systems is to decrease the safety significance of AI software. Per MIL-STD-882E, this 
can be accomplished by lowering the potential mishap Severity or the SCC of the function. 
The SCC is used to define the level of control that software has over SSFs. The higher the 
number (from 1 to 5), the less safety impact the software has. For catastrophic hazards 
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where the software either has control over safety significant hardware or provides safety-
critical information, SCC 3 is the safest possible category and should be the goal for all 
traditional and AI software functions. There is increased difficulty in reaching this SCC for 
AI/ML, however, due to the fact that in many applications of AI/ML, the AI system is 
independent (autonomous) and may be the only system that reviews data and makes 
decisions based on that data (Sodhani, 2018). 
In addition to this, the many uses of AI/ML throughout government and industry do 
not follow defined procedures for guaranteeing safe operations. The current processes used 
to determine how safe AI/ML software is, and the processes used to decrease the risk of 
hazards due to or involving AI/ML, vary widely and are not consistent between companies 
and government agencies (NSCAI, 2019). These varied approaches not only result in 
inconsistency and lack of safety rigor in deployed systems, but they also decrease trust in 
AI/ML technology. To address both of these issues, consistent approaches to AI/ML system 
safety analysis must be developed. 
In many modern implementations of AI/ML, there are neither components nor 
systems in place that actively decrease the autonomy level of these specially developed 
software functions.  
Figure 1 describes the process for performing a Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), 
which is the primary analysis used to determine SCC and SwCI determinations for safety 
significant software. In reviewing Figure 1, several questions are posed with regard to 
AI/ML:  
• Are unique tools needed because of the presence of AI/ML to complete this 
analysis?  
• How would we complete this determination for an AI/ML deployed system? 
• Are current SwCI definitions appropriate for AI/ML? 
These questions, alongside proposed answers and solutions to them, are presented 
in this paper.  
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Figure 1. FHA Workflow 
The Goal 
This paper focuses on how to identify an AI safety critical function, gives 
recommendations to reduce the function’s autonomy level, provides a format on how LOR 
for an AI/ML function can be identified, and includes some initial examples of AI/ML unique 
tasks for LOR. The goal of the research is to provide processes, questions, discussion 
points, and insights regarding the organization of the safety analysis in the form of tables 
and specifically labeled column headings. These structures and format recommendations 
are in support of system safety practitioners, providing guidance on how to conduct rigorous 
safety analysis on AI/ML software functions being deployed in weapon (MIL-STD-882E; 
Defense Standardization Program Office, 2012) or aircraft (DO-178C; Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics, 2012) systems. The paper provides, in table format and related 
recommendations, examples of two system safety analyses, the FHA and Subsystem 
Hazard Analysis (SSHA).  
A complete list of SSHA LOR task descriptions that arose from our analysis will be 
available through other Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) documented 
sources. This research, funded by NOSSA, will provide recommendations to be considered 
by NOSSA. These recommendations are to help better understand the robustness of the 
model being developed, especially if that model resides within an SSF. This paper makes 
recommendations for FHA and SSHA templates and related considerations to facilitate 
system safety analyses on AI/ML functions with a focus on ways to decrease the autonomy 
within system operations and increase their correlated SCCs. The questions and 
discussions devised from this research aim to form guidance and offer best practices to 
address AI/ML system safety issues. 
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Use Case to Investigate 
When considering an operational use case to implement within our sandbox development 
environment, our first step was to create a stakeholder’s analysis table, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Stakeholder’s Analysis Table 
 
From a review of Table 1, it became obvious that current system safety analysis 
methodologies (MIL-STD-882E; Defense Standardization Program Office, 2012) were 
inadequate to address the unique system safety needs of AI/ML functions. New 
methodologies would be required to ensure comprehensive system safety analysis of AI/ML 
functions. In order to conduct research to develop new methodologies, the effort focused on 
developing a fictional system that implemented various AI/ML functions, allowing the system 
safety team to investigate gaps in current methodologies when analyzing these specially 
developed functions. The fictional system would have to replicate parts of the acquisition 
cycle in detail. To support realism in our fabricated system, various ongoing development 
efforts within various project and programs in early to late research phases were modified 
and then combined into an ML hybrid mission planner and a multi-ML algorithm robot 
technology. Again, it should be emphasized that although the program is fictitious, 
# Name/Org Type Want/Need Concern/Loss Notes
1 Safety Engineer/NAWCWD D511000 Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool set available
2 Safety Engineer/Contractor(Weapon System Supplier) Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life
Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool 
set available
3 Warfighter User Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life Assumes that AI system is safe; unaware of lack of safety rigor
4 WSESRB Member Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool set available
5 Program Manager Sponsor Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life Pressured to meet military requirement; accepts safety risk
6 Civilian or Military Victim of Mishap Neutral Observer Safety in Battle Space as Non-Target Personal Death or Injury Unaware of Latent Safety Hazard
7 American Public Neutral Observer Assurance that weapon systems will not kill or injur friendlies or non-combatants Anger/Disapproval "How could this tragedy happen?"  "Who is responsible?""Why was a dangerous weapon system deployed by the US 
8 NOSSA, PM Sponsor, Developers What processes and policy associated with the various phases of the acquisition 
cycle will be needed to support system safety for AI/ML software? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system, 
PM: Added cost to retrofit safer 
9 NOSSA Sponsor
What tools, guidance and documentation would need to be created to support the 
processes and policy per each group’s needs? Groups: Developers need from 
system safety, System safety practitioners from system safety and Oversight folks 
from system safety.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
10 NOSSA Sponsor Along with the processes, what analytics need investigation for each user group? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
11 NOSSA Sponsor How would various AI/ML software designs affect the analytical approach? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
12 NOSSA Sponsor What kind of OQE is required per a given AI/ML technique and implementation 
structure to support a program moving forward? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
13 NOSSA Sponsor Will data and analytics be considered as separate pieces to inspect? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
14 NOSSA Sponsor
During a WSESRB or Technical Review Panel review that involves AI/ML, how would 
systems, data and numbers be presented to allow for proper investigation and 
analysis to ensure contextual accuracy based on group technical background? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
15 NOSSA Sponsor What are the factors and limitations associated with confidence of numbers 
presented regarding AI/ML performance? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
16 NOSSA Sponsor AI/ML performance is always associated within the context of the training data? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
17 NOSSA Sponsor
What does it mean to perform architecture, design, or code analysis (see MIL-STD-
882E Table V) with an AI/ML system, especially when, for example, even the 
developer has limited understanding on how the neural network works? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
18 NOSSA Sponsor
How will confidence be assured for each user group in terms of how the software 
will perform as specified to AI performance requirements (see MIL-STD-882E 
paragraph 4.4.1.b)?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
19 NOSSA Sponsor What would be the type of contractual language associated with AI/ML 
integration/deployment?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
20 NOSSA Sponsor
 Should it include the complete system because of potential reduction in overall 
system maturity? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
21 NOSSA Sponsor
Will AI/ML algorithms exponentially increase the complexity of the system under 
review affecting hardware issues involved with processing, bandwidth and storage? 
If not considered, will performance degrade, causing system safety concerns? How 
will this be analyzed? What are the limitations associated with confidence of 
numbers presented regarding AI/ML performance? Note: AI/ML performance is 
always associated within the context of the training data.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
22 NOSSA Sponsor
What format will allow technical and non- AI/ML technical stakeholders to support 
discussion, understanding and eventual application for their particular AI/ML 
situation? This sets the requirement for how processes and policy should be 
technically written and displayed while still supporting the necessary detail. It is 
anticipated that each group will have a different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
23 NOSSA Sponsor 1. how do we build confidence in the AI black box? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
24 NOSSA Sponsor
2. How do we build rigor into, or is it necessary to build rigor into, the training code 
for the AI? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
25 NOSSA Sponsor Is this the appropriate AI technique to use and is there an non-AI technique that could be used? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
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technology architecture, design, code, and test were based on existing research in the field 
of AI/ML currently being performed by various naval commands. 
An Operational Use Case was identified that had the potential to provide answers 
described in Table 1’s stakeholder analysis. Not only did it need to support answers to the 
questions posed in Table 1, but the operational used case also needed to be constructed 
from realistic aspects of AI/ML technology. An operational view of the Use Case is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Operational Use Case of Two Robots Delivering Packages 
Figure 2 is based on the following considerations involving the Operational Scenario, 
the Operational/Deployed Environment, and Key SSFs: 
 The Operational Scenario 
• The design consists of the following subsystems: (1) Two Robots, which are identical in 
performance, (2) Two Pickup Trucks, which are identical in performance, and (3) a 
Mission Planner. 
• The two robots are carried a partial way to their destination on the two pickup trucks. 
After the pickup trucks arrive at their destination, each robot will be unloaded from their 
respective pickup trucks. From the unload point, the robots will walk synchronously to 
arrive and deliver their packages to the single intended recipient at the same time. The 
two robots are able to walk long distances using GPS navigation, and as the robots gets 
closer to the subject receiving the package, a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) 
image recognition algorithm using color spectrum and infrared images from an EO/IR 
sensor on the robot will take over navigation. The special GPS navigation is pre-loaded 
with waypoints produced by an AI/ML trained mission-planning tool.  
 The Operational/Deployed Environment 
• It could be a rainy day when the robots are deployed. Weather conditions, houses, and 
buildings all result in background clutter and obstacles for the navigation system. There 
are cars and pickup trucks on the road, including other robots and people walking, 
complex highway systems, and city-like sidewalks and walkways that need to be 
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navigated by the two robots. Many other people, some looking very similar in side profile 
to the recipient, in this scenario are part of the environment. It is important that people 
should not receive this package by mistake, as the packages are hazardous and very 
valuable. Delivering a package to the wrong recipient will be a Catastrophic mishap. 
Thus, it is important to system safety that sufficient mitigations are incorporated into the 
system to minimize the risk of an incorrect person receiving the package by mistake 
from either robot. 
 Key Safety Significant Functions 
• Navigation. The navigation system of the robots uses a special GPS function following 
waypoints and then switches to an AI-based seeker function at a certain range from the 
recipient. The AI-based seeker function uses polar coordinates instead of waypoints to 
navigate. The AI/ML navigation system must avoid obstacles, as mentioned previously, 
during navigation. Some obstacles might include other people attempting to steal the 
package carried by a robot. The AI-based seeker does not take over navigation until a 
separate switching function determines when the robot is at a certain distance from the 
recipient. Once this switch is activated, robot navigation is turned over to the CNN 
function for final navigation to the recipient. The non-AI navigation is responsible for 
avoiding obstacles in route until the CNN takes over navigation. Again, once within a 
certain range of the recipient, the seeker function is switched on to take over the 
complete navigation of the system. The seeker function consists of a CNN, designed to 
recognize side profiles of the recipient, and avoid obstacles. The CNN is trained using 
synthetic images of side profiles within a synthetic clutter environment. The CNN is 
trained to navigate in such a way as to avoid people attempting to steal its package. 
While in a traditional system, package theft would be considered a security issue and not 
a safety issue, the team decided to identify this as a system safety concern to allow 
investigation of the CNN function. 
• Sensor Data. Each robot is receiving non-curated data from a 3-D sensor. The sensor 
streams a color scaled set of images that contain complex backgrounds at a certain 
sampling rate for database storage and CNN processing. Images are stored in a 
separate database for each robot with no data sharing between robots.  
• Image Recognition. There is a large amount of synthetic data available for training and 
some actual images of recipients’ side profiles. Unfortunately, the added clutter to the 
image is also synthetic (i.e., building and house backgrounds, day and night lighting, 
rain, etc.; see previous Operational/Deployed Environment section.) The developer is 
also considering a transfer learning approach to add another classification layer to the 
CNN to increase the probability of successful recognition.  
• Timing Synchronization. Timing synchronization is implemented using reinforced 
learning, with real time updates to the Mechanics Reinforced Learning (RL) Dynamics 
Manager neural network that affects the physics of the robots in terms of direction and 
speed. Both robots must deliver their packages at the same time, but they can take 
different routes to avoid environmental conditions. Once a robot delivers a package, the 
recipient will not wait for the second package. Therefore, it is important that both 
packages be delivered at the same time to avoid the recipient leaving and the possibility 
of the second robot delivering its package to someone who should not receive the 
package. Again, this is a significant system safety concern because delivery of a 
package to an incorrect recipient is considered a catastrophic mishap. 
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Sandbox Development Environment Approach 
Within the sandbox development environment, a variety of AI/ML algorithms 
supporting a mission planner and autonomous vehicle selection and navigation were 
developed—again inspired by existing AI/ML projects and programs. Formal Department of 
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) (Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 
[DoD CIO], n.d.; Dam, 2006) and Unified Modeling Language (UML; Booch, 2017) diagrams 
were created to support a System of Systems (SoS) design, including interface messages, 
SQL commands and Application Programming Interfaces (API). Using this sandbox 
approach allowed an initial top-down safety analysis, starting with system decomposition 
and traceability from an Operational View (OV), through a Systems View (SV), and then 
finally down to the algorithm’s code level supporting the specific AI/ML being implemented. 
This process was used to provide a broad scope representation of a potential DoD program 
implementing AI/ML and to "realistically” investigate conduct of the FHA and SSHA 
methodologies on a variety of AI/ML functions. 
Figure 3 represents the subsystems associated with the mission planner and robot. 
 
Figure 3. Robot and Mission Planner Subsystems 
The goal of the sandbox development environment was to implement a variety of 
AI/ML technologies that worked together as an SoS, offering a variety of ML approaches to 
investigate (Hastie et al., 2017). The mission planner provides analysis of the following 
AI/ML technologies: 
• The Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression algorithms receive sensor and human 
input data in order to select the appropriate type of meta-model from a repository. 
• The Random Forest algorithm, by creating a “Similarity Table” between branches of 
trees (and its counterpart “Distance Table” for other ML algorithms using distance 
analysis), allows for data estimation for missing data within the meta-model tables 
that was not originally identified in the Design of Experiment (DOE) simulation 
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requirements. Therefore, the Random Forest can account for the challenges when 
the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is missing inputs needed for a meta-model. 
Predicting the deployed operational future is difficult for a variety of reasons. 
Random Forest clustering allows estimation in situations with both limited inputs and 
an unknown statistical output. This allowed for greater flexibility in the mission 
planner’s ability to adapt in non-ideal operational environments.  
• The minimax, per meta-model selected, looks at the factors needing to be addressed 
in completing the mission, including tactical capability, external challenges and 
delivery issues. Based on sensor data, it selects “worst” case scenario and then finds 
the “best” case autonomous performance combined with tactical sequence needed 
to successfully complete the mission. “Worst” case and “best” case are represented 
by statistical structures within the route leg’s meta-model counterpart. 
• The meta-model tables are processed through the Random Forest approach and a 
minimax algorithm to determine the statistics for each leg in the route. Then a non-
linear optimization program determines the optimal selection of robots and routes. 
The robots’ autonomous platform provides analysis of the following AI/ML technologies: 
• Deep Neural Network (DNN) - supports the mechanical motion of the robot given 
various states. The states are determined based on real time input conditions of the 
robot movement. Input conditions include traveling surface and conditions. Based on 
the attributes received, the DNN would use a control feedback mechanism to adjust 
its walking mechanics. For example, if the robot, through the CNN, recognizes that it 
is about to approach the package recipient, it would slow down, unsecure the 
package, and extend its arms to show the package. While traveling, the package 
would be secure. Upon understanding its current travel state, the robot would use 
DNN to determine which mechanical state to implement. It should be noted that the 
sandbox will also be investigating how Deep RL might apply. 
• Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) - supports the recognition of the recipient. The 
input would be based on facial recognition. The result of this analysis would be input 
to the DNN in terms of its mechanical functions, as discussed previously. 
It should be noted that the sandbox is still in development. Design analysis of all 
AI/ML functions described previously has been completed. Implementation is ongoing. This 
paper’s findings are based on sandbox development environment investigations, as well as 
from previous game theory, DNN and CNN research with other projects. 
AI Type Definition 
There are many opinions surrounding the definition of AI. For this research, we 
defined the term “AI Type.” We defined an AI Type to be identified by objective 
measurements. Therefore, if a function is determined to be an AI Type based on its score 
from the following objective measurements, it requires special FHA and SSHA investigation. 
The definition and scoring are as follows: 
AI Type (Working Definition): For system safety concerns, an AI Type of function means that 
an algorithm will be developed:  
(1) using data approximations to build its algorithm (e.g., from simulations and synthetic 
data vs. an equation that accurately represents real world physics) and/or  
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(2) when data samples used to build its algorithm are a subset of the actual population 
size (e.g., training data samples from population to support machine learning, 
training data samples requiring clutter backgrounds). 
Scoring: For all functions that are candidates for being implemented using an AI/ML 
algorithm (examples in table), then each function must be graded using criteria (1) or (2), 
with corresponding points awarded. A final score of 1 or greater indicates that the function is 
an AI Type. 
Table 2 represents examples of scoring based on various AI Types. It is not intended 
to be a complete list. The goal here is not to provide the system safety practitioner with a 
complete list, but to aid the practitioner based on a practical scoring approach. 
Table 2. Example of Scoring Based on AI Type Definition 
 
The AI Type definition allows for a productive, focused discussion between the 
system safety practitioner and the function developer. Questions that might initiate the 
conversation would include: 
• What parts of the system need special rigor consideration (as compared to traditional 
algorithm code development)? 
• Does the SSF identified qualify as an AI/ML function? 
It is especially important to investigate if the function is an AI Type when an algorithm is 
identified as a safety-critical function using an FHA approach. Again, the hypothesis is that it 
is an AI Type function if 
• (Consideration 1) it uses data approximations to build/train its algorithm (e.g., data 
approximations can come from simulations and synthetic data vs. an equation that 
accurately represents real world physics), and/or  
• (Consideration 2) data samples are used to build/design its algorithm and these data 
sample are a subset of the actual population size (e.g., training data samples from 
population to support machine learning, training data samples requiring clutter 
backgrounds). 
One way to think about consideration (1) is to ask, “Could another developer create a 
different set of statistics under the same conditions?” If no, then maybe this algorithm is not 
an AI Type. If yes, then it meets the condition. As an example, if a statistical model of the 
function was developed, how accurate were the approximations used in creating the 
function. In other words, how close do these approximations fit the real world physics 
regarding operational deployment? If the function is based on simulation results, then the 
concern is the “garbage in, garbage out” issue—poor real world representative synthetic 
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data will result in an inferior model. The goal is to have good quality and comprehensive 
training data that would result in a robust model. 
One way to think about consideration (2) is to ask, “What is the actual population 
size of the training set?” If the training set is equal to the actual population size, then it is not 
an AI Type. Consider the most basic ML algorithm, a regression line. If all the points that will 
ever occur for this function are on the scatter plot used to approximate the curve, why use a 
regression line? If all the ML algorithm inputs and outputs are known, why use ML and not 
traditional code? Again, if traditional code can address the needs of the function, then that 
would be the goal. 
Notice that both considerations are related. It is like looking at two sides of the same 
coin: how ML algorithms are developed and why they need to be avoided in critical 
functions. 
Figure 4 describes the need to separate out AI Type designated functions from 
traditionally developed software coded functions. 
 
Figure 4. Flow to Assess AI Type Using Special FHA and SSHA Rigor 
Six Recommendations to Assess AI Type Functions 
This paper describes six recommendations. The first three are associated with the 
FHA assessment, and the last three involve the SSHA analysis. The FHA recommendations 
are provided in the form of a complete list of columns to use during the development of the 
FHA. It is noted that the current FHA approach works well in identifying the safety 
significance of a function. As shown in Table 3, three columns have been added in support 
of the three recommendations focused on reducing autonomy. The last three 
recommendations are in support of doing an SSHA. One recommendation is in structuring 
the table, with an added column regarding the focus of the analysis. The final two 
recommendations offer a list of questions listed as line items within the table focused on (1) 
API/MSG/SQL interface corruption to the ML algorithm and (2) modality of how well the data 
training the algorithm represents deployed conditions. The fifth recommendation addresses 
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the interface to the algorithm and asks questions involved with how data corruption might 
need to be addressed within the training data composition of the ML algorithm. The sixth 
recommendation is in regards to the modality of how the training data is gathered, organized 
and managed, known as curation. If the training data isn’t curated properly, the ML algorithm 
may not function properly. In either case, interface corruption or poor curation, a safety 
critical ML function could have a greater likelihood of becoming a hazard. 
 Functional Hazard Analysis 
Prior to addressing the first three recommendations, the initial steps of the functional 
hazard analysis (FHA) need to have been completed to identify the safety significance of the 
functions (JS-SSA Rev. A, 2017). It should be noted that the system safety analysis found 
no gaps in the FHA process in identifying the safety significance of a function when dealing 
with an AI/ML function. This is because the identification of the Severity, SCC, and resulting 
SwCI does not change when dealing with an AI/ML function. At this stage, it does not matter 
whether the function has AI/ML capability in it or not.  
An example of an FHA regarding our Use Case example for mission planning is 
described in Table 3. 
Table 3. FHA Example for Mission Planner From Sandbox 
 
Recommendation 1: Once an FHA identifies the SSFs, each function needs to be assessed 
using the AI Type definition following these three steps: 
(1) For each identified SSF that potentially has AI/ML within, identify the algorithm that 
will be used to support that function, and then document the grade each function 
receives in terms of AI Type definition (see previous section on AI Type scoring and 
definitions).  
(2) If the function scores either 1 or 2 (i.e., it is an AI Type), describe what specific AI/ML 
algorithm is going to be trained/implemented. 
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(3) If the specific algorithm is using DNN structures (i.e., three or more layers), identify if 
there is enough training data to support this approach and, if not, were older ML 
algorithms considered, like Logistic Regression, kNNs, etc. 
If function qualifies as an AI Type, follow these two recommendations: 
Recommendation 2: Verify that an AI/ML function is needed by asking the following 
questions: 
a) For AI Type definition 1: Can the algorithm be traditionally built using data 
approximations? Why or why not?  
b) For AI Type definition 2: Can the algorithm be broken into subpopulations to allow 
development of traditional code? Why or why not?  
Recommendation 3: Justify that an AI/ML function needs to be Autonomous by documenting 
the following: 
a) Document how the design can or cannot include a human in the loop or traditional 
hardware/software technology to provide checks and balances. 
b) If it cannot provide checks and balances, provide documentation as to operational 
limitations by: 
1. Describing weaknesses of each AI/ML technique (e.g., expected success rate of 
the function). For example, if AI/ML is built on data approximations (using AI 
Type definition), how much bias will the data approximations add to the functional 
outcome? Or if AI/ML is built on data samples (using AI Type definition), how 
representative are the samples to the population? 
2. Determining how the training data is being generated (e.g., truth, synthetic, 
combination). Are these sources valid? Why? 
3. Where is the training data coming from? Is it enough? (Remember the more 
sophisticated the AI/ML software, the more likely that it needs larger amounts of 
training data.) 
4. Will an outside independent source review the training, validation and test data 
created? Why or why not? 
5. Will an outside independent source validate the success rate of the AI/ML 
function as compared to other AI/ML functions used in industry? Why or why not? 
SSHA 
Table 4 and Table 5 show analysis of one of the AI/ML functions in the sandbox, a 
17-attribute, five-class Naïve Bayes algorithm for meta-model selection that implements 
statistically independent instances representing missing and sparse data operational issues. 
In our sandbox, we used 15,000 samples of training data to support classification training of 
Logistic Regression and Random Forest algorithms. Our analysis is independent of the 
categorization algorithm selected but focuses on how to assess it in terms of identifying 
hazards at the subsystem level. Naïve Bayes is used in the example to remove focus on the 
algorithm complexity and place it on the recommendations being offered. 
Recommendation 4: Table 4 identifies the hazard description and, again, provides a 
similar table approach to non-AI functions under investigation.  
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Table 4. SSHA for Meta-Model Selection Algorithm Within Mission Planner From Sandbox 
 
Recommendation 5: For system safety practitioners, Table 5 might also look familiar. 
The recommendation is to add a single column labeled “Focus” that categorizes the LOR list 
of descriptions that might be unique to ML algorithm development. Notice that the list of 
LOR Descriptions is based on the “Focus” described. It is a simple recommendation, but 
from our research within the sandbox, it helps organize the range of issues that might occur. 
For every AI Type identified in the FHA, it is recommended that an interface analysis be 
considered, as described in Table 5, using the LOR Description column. Each row in this 
LOR Description column provides API/MSG/SQL interface questions that might affect the 
algorithm’s performance during deployment, as will be explained next.  
Table 5. SSHA LOR Table Example Based on Data Flow Analysis of Meta-Model Selection Within the 
Mission Planner 
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To understand whether the ML Algorithm was trained properly to handle issues 
based on interface corruption, the following six questions (in sequential rows) are 
recommended based on our sandbox analysis: 
1. Would the corruption of the API/MSG/SQL/Other affect data variations requiring 
additional training of the AI/ML Algorithm? This is a yes or no answer. 
2. If yes, will quality (composition/complexity/structure) of Training Data significantly 
increase? Will it affect the ML Training Modality? Explain this specific to the 
API/MSG/SQL/Other. Corruption might result in a need to add secondary or tertiary 
sources. It might also affect how data is collected from various sources, potentially 
changing the ML Training Modality.  
3. Will these variations be part of the analysis for selecting the "best" algorithm? 
Explain. ROC sweet spot analysis might be used with hyper parameter changes 
based on the type of variation. 
4. Because of this issue, will quantity (more instances) of Training Data significantly 
increase? Explain this specific to the API/MSG/SQL/Other. This could result in a 
need to have more of a certain type of instance to train on based on mixes of 
primary, secondary, or tertiary attribute requirements. 
5. Will creating/finding enough training data replicating API/MSG/SQL/Other corruption 
be an issue? Explain. If it is synthetic, is may not be an issue, depending on the 
model. If it comes from “live” data, then would there be more training data associated 
with the effects of the corruption? 
6. Is there confidence that any additional data created/found will adequately represent 
the effects associated with replicating the corruption? Explain. This is an important 
statement related to the quality (composition/complexity/structure) of the Training 
Data. 
Recommendation 6: Another series of rows has been added to Table 5 based on modality 
associated with the training data. Table 6 provides additional questions for the algorithm 
developer and data analytics engineer to address based on modality regarding how the ML 
is trained. 
Table 6. Investigation Questions Based on Modality 
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A brief summary of modality types that support training data composition and size are 
described next: 
• ML Training Data Modality 1: This modality supports training data sets that are based 
on an operational environment from multiple data sources, where each source 
contains one or more attributes. The various sources of separate data attributes are 
either found from live events or synthetic simulations created to match the deployed 
operational scenario. Therefore, the input for the ML algorithm for training needs to 
replicate the input that will be received during deployment. 
• ML Training Data Modality 2: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a single data source, where the single data source contains 
multiple data attributes. The one stream set of aggregated attributes is either found 
from live events or synthetic simulations created to match the deployed operational 
scenario. Therefore, the input for the ML algorithm for training needs to replicate the 
input during deployment.  
• ML Training Data Modality 3: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a combination of multiple data sources where each source 
contains one or more attributes form various sources and from a single source 
containing multiple aggregated data attributes. It is a combination of Modality 1 and 2 
that the algorithm uses for categorization or regression.  
Conclusions and Final Best Practice Recommendations 
Our findings indicate that the FHA and SSHA for AI/ML SSFs need to be addressed 
differently from traditional functional analysis methods. To address these differences, the AI 
Type definition and scoring approach was introduced, along with six recommendations 
regarding the FHA and SSHA. The research describes questions/issues needing to be 
addressed when conducting safety analysis on AI/ML function types. It includes discussion 
on how the current FHA process is still valid for AI/ML functions and only requires three 
additional columns to support added justification that an AI/ML function is required to meet 
operational goals. The SSHA discussion provides a simple table modification and two 
examples of LOR Descriptions that need to be addressed when dealing with AI/ML critical 
functions: (1) interfaces to the algorithm to understand the impact of potential data 
corruption, and (2) modality issues to ensure robust curation of the data to ensure the 
algorithm is trained to meet deployment challenges.  
Along with the AI Type scoring and six recommendations associated with the 
analysis of critical functions, there were complementary “Best Practice” questions that arose 
from our sandbox development environment when developing AI/ML algorithms within a 
deployed weapons system. 
“Best Practice” areas to consider specific to AI/ML critical functions include: 
General AI/ML Questions: 
• When a critical function is identified, does it meet the AI Type definition criteria: (1) Is 
the algorithm built based on using data approximations, and/or (2) is the algorithm 
built based on using data samples from larger populations? 
• When doing M&S to create the training data, does the simulation adequately 
represent Classes for the ML process? If not, how are Classes represented? 
• Does each Class have a sufficient number of attributes that can be learned by the 
algorithm for that Class? Are overfitting and underfitting considered for that Class 
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with regards to the quantity of attributes simulated and does that reflect real world 
operations? 
• How do we know that the M&S creating the training data is aligned with the mission 
parameters? Was a traceability study performed to ensure adequate coverage? 
Have statistics been developed to show how many configurations exist and how 
many were trained using primary, secondary, and tertiary data sources? How are we 
avoiding overfitting and underfitting based on primary, secondary, and tertiary 
training data mixes and sets? Is the training data organized in terms of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary attributes to be able to represent missing and sparse data 
priorities from related sources? 
• How are we ensuring that the algorithm being deployed provides the correct answer 
when data input issues occur? Is the algorithm success rate determined by primary, 
secondary, and tertiary attributes? 
• Can other control entities (such as a human operator) be inserted into the loop to 
reduce the SCC? 
Operational “Realism” Questions: 
• Is the M&S able to create training data that represents reality when sparse and 
missing data issues occur? 
• Does the architecture, design, and code support sparse and missing data 
management; specifically, does it filter or select less significant attributes to do the 
calculations? 
• Does the data management support filtering to ensure the ML algorithm is provided 
accurate data input, avoiding “garbage in, garbage out?” Has what constitutes 
“garbage in, garbage out” been defined? 
• How well does the particular ML algorithm support increased complexity, and how 
does that affect sparse and missing data issues? 
Selected AI/ML Algorithm: 
Note: Individual types of AI/ML require specific questions that address their method and 
application. Naïve Bayes is used as a simple example, but Logistic Regression, Random 
Forest, DNNs, or other categorization algorithms could have used the training data 
produced within our sandbox environment. 
Some questions to guide the examination of Naïve Bayes are: 
• How do you trust the behavior in the real world for this Naïve Bayes function? 
Success Rate? Quality of Training Data? How did it compare with other 
categorization algorithms? 
• Was Naïve Bayes the correct selection for this function vs. other algorithms? The 
choice should be based on what gives you the best operational performance and 
understanding of operational limits (Potential OQE: k-fold cross validation 
comparisons, etc.). How reliable will the answers be in the real world? 
• How do you assess the operational limits of this Naïve Bayes (or alternate algorithm) 
categorization function? 
• Did the training set model enough noise/clutter (in this case, less significant 
attributes determined by SMEs for a particular meta-model class) for each class that 
allows for the function to work properly when deployed? Are there sparse data and/or 
missing data issues? How is the bias of the training set and variance of the test 
determined?  
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• How would you ensure simulation configurations (i.e., the training data) are 
adequately covering the real world experiences? Consider optimizing bias (how well 
it fits the training set) and variance (how well it predicts using the test set)—
overfitting/under-fitting. 
• How many types of simulations and how much training data is really enough?  
• Are the attributes used for the assessment really independent?  
• Is the size of the alpha correct? Is this hyper parameter optimally used?  
• Is MAP or Maximum Likelihood better for this calculation? 
Developing defined lists of questions/issues, as described in this paper, allows 
system safety professionals to identify how to increase the inherent safe operation of safety 
significant AI/ML functions. By following the guidance provided, the system safety 
practitioner can drive important discussions on the development of the AI/ML function and 
thereby potentially influence design of the overall system to decrease the mishap risk 
associated with these specially developed functions.  
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 Abstract 
The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. naval shipbuilding industry are facing an historic inflection 
point to realize the growth in the number of warships in the fleet over the next 2 to 3 decades. 
And a demanding shipbuilding program demands a new 21st-Century Acquisition Strategy: 
Navy–Industry Collaborative Design. This new strategy will enable and promote open, 
substantive collaboration between the U.S. Navy and naval shipbuilding Industry and will 
ensure the design, construction, and sustainment of a more affordable, adaptable, and 
durable fleet. The team of four authors of this paper with collectively more than 200 total 
years in naval ship acquisition, design, and construction management believes strongly the 
time is long overdue for such a bold strategy. No longer will the recent failed acquisition 
approaches enable the USN and U.S. shipbuilding industry meet and/or surpass the 
existential and growing challenges of its naval adversaries. Based on the team’s significant 
experience and insight into naval ship design and shipbuilding as well as a decade of 
American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) Global Shipbuilding Executives Summits 
(GSES), the authors have compiled in this paper a set of recommendations for a bold new 
acquisition strategy for the USN. 
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Executive Summary 
The U.S. Navy and U.S. naval shipbuilding industry are facing an historic inflection 
point to realize the growth in the number of warships in the fleet over the next 2 to 3 
decades. And a demanding shipbuilding program demands a new 21st-Century Acquisition 
Strategy: Navy–Industry Collaborative Design. This new strategy will enable and promote 
open, substantive collaboration between the U.S. Navy and naval shipbuilding Industry and 
will ensure the design, construction, and sustainment of a more affordable, adaptable, and 
durable fleet. The team of four authors of this paper with collectively more than 200 total 
years in naval ship acquisition, design, and construction management believes strongly the 
time is long overdue for such a bold strategy. No longer will the recent failed acquisition 
approaches enable the USN and U.S. shipbuilding industry meet and/or surpass the 
existential and growing challenges of its naval adversaries. Based on the team’s significant 
experience and insight into naval ship design and shipbuilding as well as a decade of 
American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) Global Shipbuilding Executives Summits 
(GSES), the authors have compiled in this paper a set of recommendations for a bold new 
acquisition strategy for the USN that is well-grounded on successful acquisitions for the Cold 
War fleet, proven recently in allied navies’ acquisitions and, moreover, will help avoid the 
mistakes of the past 2 decades.   
Additionally, best practices and lessons learned on naval ship design, engineering, 
construction, and sustainment are reviewed based on the innovations and breakthroughs 
global naval-shipbuilding leaders have implemented over the past 2 to 3 decades. For 
example, lean process re-engineering, digital shipyard process simulation and optimization, 
and enterprise-wide digital transformational have produced double-digital improvements in 
construction productivity, cycle reduction, and capacity throughput. Increase in shipbuilding 
capacity could be crucial in the U.S. shipbuilding industry to satisfying the dramatic increase 
in naval shipbuilding rates that are projected over the next 2 decades. 
The team finally lists a set of acquisition-related recommendations to build a long-
term commitment to naval shipbuilding continuous improvement and to create a pipeline of 
seasoned naval shipbuilding professionals to guide the future of the U.S. Navy through-out 
the 21st century and beyond. 
USN SITREP 
Figure 1 is our assessment of the current situation. What has been called the 
post-Cold War era is over. China is now a peer Navy, and Russia is a near-peer 
Navy. Both are growing in size and capability. U.S. sea control is being challenged 
for the first time in many years. 
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Figure 1. USN at Historic Inflection Point 
Our ships and personnel are overstressed, and even so, not all of the combatant 
commanders’ requirements can be met. USS Nimitz’s most recent deployment stretched to 
340 days, yet gaps in aircraft carrier coverage—once unheard of—now occur. The number 
of battle force ships dropped below 300 15 years ago and has hovered near 300 since then. 
The high tempo of ops creates a backlog of maintenance. Many ships are offline for 
maintenance and modernization, and most complete late—often quite late. Some new ships 
are delivered and commissioned but are years away from being deployable.   
The Navy is therefore at an historic point in time, but when it comes to the future 
fleet, there is uncertainty about both force level and force fix. Is the goal still 355, or is it 
much higher as the last administration proposed? As for the mix of ships, there are knowns 
like DDG(X), and unknowns like CVLs, light amphibious ships, and a host of unmanned 
vehicles.   
Over 30 years, DDG51 capability has substantially increased in a series of flights, 
but further growth is no longer feasible. Future weapons will require substantially more 
electric power and the ship space to accommodate larger missiles. This requires a new hull 
that incorporates the time-tested service life allowances, which enabled DDG51 Flight I to 
evolve into Flight III. DDG(X) will provide this future growth capability. 
CVNs are costly, and less expensive solutions are periodically examined and, up 
until recently, rejected. The F-35B, far more capable than the venerable AV-8B, operating 
off big deck amphibs, is seen by some as a game changer.   
The Marine Corp’s recent shift in emphasis from inland wars in the Middle East to 
Indo-Pacific littorals, has translated into the need for light amphibious warships. 
Finally, the broad array of unmanned vehicles presents both challenges for design 
and acquisition and opportunities for new concepts of operations. 
Build on Success 
There are lessons to be learned from successful acquisition programs for the Cold 
War fleet, including recent acquisitions of our allies (see Figure 2).  
SITREP 
• Post-Cold War era is over.
• Peer navies growing in size and strength.
• COCOMs’ requirements overstress ships and personnel
• Number of ba�le force ships stuck at 300 for over a decade
• Many ships offline for maintenance/moderniza�on for long periods
• New ships “deliver” years before deployable and over budget
• Future force level uncertain: 350 or 400 or 500
• Future force mix also uncertain: DDG(X), CVLs, Light Amphibious 
Warship, and broad array of Unmanned Systems
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Figure 2. Leverage Best Practices and Proven Principles of Good Design 
In the Virginia class, the U.S. submarine community built on lessons learned from the 
Seawolf (SSN 21) program. In SSN21, there had been a winner-take-all approach and as 
was also common in surface ship acquisitions, production started well before detail design 
was complete. A “design-build” strategy was adopted in Virginia to control costs, and both 
building yards acted as collaborators vice competitors. The Virginia class is built through an 
industrial arrangement designed to maintain both GD Electric Boat and HII Newport News, 
the only two U.S. shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines. Under the 
present arrangement, the Newport News facility builds the stern, habitability, machinery 
spaces, torpedo room, sail, and bow, while Electric Boat builds the engine room and control 
room. The facilities alternate work on the reactor plant as well as the final assembly, test, 
outfit, and delivery. 
In comparing U.S. and foreign shipbuilders, different ship types built to different 
requirements and facing different threats may present difficulties. A major exception appears 
to be the Asian shipbuilders, Japan and South Korea, which have built their own versions of 
DDG51 Flights I and IIA. The Aegis Combat System is common to all three navies, but the 
ships are quite different. Both displacement and size constraints had been imposed on 
DDG51 in a (vain) attempt to control cost. This was due in part to undue emphasis placed 
on weight (vice work content) when estimating cost. Kongo, the Japanese version of Flight I, 
is substantially larger than Arleigh Burke but being less dense was much easier to build.   
Our NATO allies will be covered later in the paper, and there is much to learn from 
them. They have pioneered in developing adaptable ships. In part to meet the needs of their 
own services, but also to appeal to a variety of foreign customers. Shipbuilders frequently 
collaborate, and this can include multinational programs.  
During the buildup to the 600-ship Cold War Navy, a number of tailored collaborative 
acquisition strategies were adopted. When it came to ongoing programs (and even some 
new starts) this included business practices such as multiyear procurements and the 
emphasis on fixed price contracts. Clean sheet of paper designs such as FFG7 and DDG 51 
were in-house designs with co-located NAVSEA-led design teams, assisted by the Navy 
labs (current Warfare Centers), industry (shipbuilders), and local design agents. The time 
BUILD ON SUCCESS
• US submarine community 
• Design-build strategy
• Shipbuilders’ collabora�on early in Navy - led design
• Asian Aegis Shipbuilders
• Proven design-build strategies
• No arbitrary displacement/size constraints thus less dense ships
• NATO Shipbuilders
• Long-term commitment (>30 years) to more adaptable surface combatants
• Shipbuilders' early collabora�on (including other na�ons) 
• Modular combat systems
• 1980s build up to 600-ship Navy
• Tailored approaches with Navy-led designs: FFG 7, CG 47/52, DDG 51 FLTs I/II/IIA, CVN 76, LPD17
• SEA 05 controlled ship design resources/capabili�es
        
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 47 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
from earliest concept studies until delivery of a lead ship takes a decade or more (source 
selection alone may take up to a year), the combat system may still be evolving, and yet the 
first of class must be “fully successful.” Indeed, in the case of DDG51, seven follow ships 
were on order or under construction at two shipyards before Arleigh Burke delivered, and 
three more before IOC was achieved. This is inherently risky, but the time scale for ships 
prevents the use of prototypes and “fly-offs” common to other DoD acquisitions. To minimize 
risk the Navy became “self-insured,” meaning NAVSEA (and predecessor organizations) 
developed a comprehensive shipbuilding specification which the potential shipbuilders bid 
on and followed. Combat systems were developed by the Navy, tested at sea and ashore, 
and delivered to the shipbuilder(s) as GFM. Land-based testing of new propulsion plants 
was also common, and their procurement was specified. Time has shown that this approach 
ensured that the new ship met its operational performance requirements and minimized the 
risk of incorporating new technologies.  
 
Figure 3. Focus on Building a World Class Team and Reducing Risks 
Avoid Past Mistakes 
Over the last 75 years, the Navy has employed many different warship acquisition 
strategies—often directed by higher authorities. In particular, the relative roles and 
responsibilities of the government and the shipbuilders have differed. Total Package 
Procurement (TPP) shifted major design responsibilities to industry in the 1970s, then during 
the buildup to the 600-ship Navy in the 1980s the Navy (NAVSEA) regained design 
responsibility, and then in the early 2000s under the banner of Acquisition Reform, design 
responsibilities were again shifted to industry (TPP reborn).   
As shown in Figure 3, as a result of Acquisition Reform, NAVSEA 05 was reduced 
from 1,200 naval engineers to 300, and lost control of ship design funding including RDT&E 
design funds for future ships in the Navy’s Shipbuilding Program, as well as funds to sustain 
the Navy’s ship design capabilities. Time-consuming industry design competitions were 
conducted, and as with any competition, this resulted in some designs that were never 




• Gu�ed NAVSEA 05 - Shi�ed early design responsibly to industry
• Reassigned ship design funds from SEA 05 to PMs
• Wasted scarce resources on designs never built 
• DDG 1000
• Many high-risk developmental systems
• Took too long - basic mission became OBE
• LCS
• Bypassed checks and balances determining requirements & costs
• Rushed ships into produc�on a decade before mission systems ready
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To ensure a fair competition, and to avoid protests, the Navy’s ability to influence the 
designs was limited. Unfortunately, the winning designs were seriously flawed. Axe (2021) 
states, “The U.S. Navy spent a decade in the early 2000s building warships that either don’t 
work, cost too much to build in large numbers, or whose designs are fundamentally flawed 
on a conceptual level. Or all three.” 
DDG 1000 must be deemed a failure. The acquisition strategy was to hold a design 
competition between two industry teams. The Navy requirements (speed, number of missile 
cells, rounds of gun ammunition, manning, etc.) were expressed as thresholds and goals. 
The goals could not be met without exceeding the cost constraints; the Navy did not indicate 
their preferences, and so each team decided which requirements to emphasize. Thus, 
industry assumed an inherently governmental responsibility. 
In addition, the government requirement ultimately necessitated development of far 
too many “critical technologies.” Radical new systems onboard this first-of-class warship that 
had to be fully integrated include: Integrated Propulsion System (IPS), Integrated Fight 
Through Power (IFTP), Advanced Perimeter Vertical Launch System (PVLS), Advanced 
Gun System (AGS), Advanced Signature Control across all spectrums, Large Composite 
Enclosed Deckhouse with Embedded Sensors, Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), 
Advanced Survivability and Recoverability, and Wave Piercing Tumble Home (WPTH) Hull 
Form. 
Construction started with the majority of these systems still immature; costs grew, 
and schedules slipped. The rise of peer navies, discussed earlier, and shore-based anti-ship 
missiles, rendered the basic mission of close in land attack in a “benign” environment moot. 
The program was truncated, and construction of DDG51s restarted. 
LCS. The problems with these two classes are well known and need not be dwelled 
on here. Reports from GAO and CRS are depressing to read. The LCS program has been 
controversial over the years due to cost growth, design and construction issues with the first 
LCSs, concerns over the survivability of LCSs (i.e., their ability to withstand battle damage), 
concerns over whether LCSs are sufficiently armed and would be able to perform their 
stated missions effectively, and concerns over the development and testing of the modular 
mission packages for LCSs.  
The program was flawed from the start. The time-tested cost versus capability 
studies were compressed, and NAVSEA was basically ignored. Cost was grossly 
underestimated. The potential risks and large ship impact of requiring 40 knots were also 
ignored.   
The ships (basic sea frames) were delivered on an accelerated schedule, but with 
many deficiencies. The government has experienced many delays in developing the three 
major mission modules, and the requirement to rapidly change modules had to be 
abandoned. Crew manning was far too low. Many years later a valid CONOPS still does not 
exist.  
The latest CRS report (RL33741 dated December 17, 2019) states:  
They could argue that the LCS program validated, for defense acquisition, 
the guideline from the world of business management that if an effort aims 
at obtaining something fast, cheap, and good, it will succeed in getting no 
more than two of these things, or, more simply, that the LCS program 
validated the general saying that haste makes waste. 
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Bold New Acquisition Strategy 
The Navy is at a crossroads. The fleet is too small to counter the increasing 
geopolitical threat(s). There is uncertainty about what types of ships to buy, how many of 
each, and how quickly. Between new construction, maintenance, and modernization the 
industrial base is stretched thin. Between DDG1000, both LCSs, and, yes, CVN 78, the 
Navy’s reputation has suffered. To meet all these challenges, we urge that the Navy adopt a 
bold new acquisition strategy. 
The key is increased collaboration between the Navy and the shipbuilders, 
capitalizing on the strengths of each. For programs like DDG(X) where there will be two 
shipbuilders, they must also collaborate with each other for the good of the nation. Both the 
Navy and the shipbuilders must agree, but there is precedent. The Navy, HII, and General 
Dynamics have been collaborating on the successful Virginia submarine program for years. 
Figure 4 illustrates key aspects.   
 
Figure 4. Navy–Industry Collaborate for Innovation Good for the Nation 
Industry would be involved in the cost, capability, and risk studies, which establish 
balanced and realistic requirements. These studies are conducted before there is even a 
“program of record,” but they lock in up to 80% of the cost and performance. The shipyards 
will bring a unique perspective. 
The Navy’s record for involving industry in the design process is mixed. With rare 
exceptions, FFG7 and SWATH T-AGOS19 for example, this has been too late to materially 
influence the design. When the acquisition strategy is one where multiple shipyards will 
compete against each other, they are often reluctant to share proprietary data. This 
reluctance must be overcome in order to develop a tailored vice a generic build strategy.   
Ultimately, it is the shipbuilding specifications and contract/contract guidance 
drawings (now, 3-D CAD product model) which define what gets built, and the shipbuilders 
should be active players in their development. In addition to participating in reading 
sessions, this could include assigning them responsibilities for preparing selective sections 
and early development of the 3-D CAD product model. 
NEED BOLD NEW ACQUISITION STRATEGY
• Involve industry early 
• AOA cost/capability/risk studies which establish requirements
• Incorporate produc�on planning into Navy - led ship design teams
• Ensure design decisions facilitate manufacturing and construc�on 
• In both shipyards when construc�on will be split
• Review/comment on shipbuilding specifica�ons/contract drawings
• Expand contract design to include aspects of func�onal design
• Assist in developing 3D product model
• Leverage digital twin/digital thread to minimize Total Ownership Costs
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The scope of the traditional contract design should be expanded to include elements 
of functional design—the initial step in developing the detail design.  
Best practices include developing a 3D product model. There are many benefits, but 
past efforts have failed due to incompatibility with shipyard systems and/or requiring them to 
“learn” a new system after the construction contract is awarded. The 3D product model 
should eventually reflect the “as delivered” ship and be maintained through its service life.  
Last, but far from least, greater emphasis must be placed on making decisions based 
on Total Ownership Costs (TOC). This sounds obvious but has proved to be difficult in 
practice. The elements that comprise TOC span many budget claimants. Acquisition 
managers focus on delivering ships on time and under cost. Others are responsible for 
maintaining and modernizing them during their long service lives, yet decisions made years 
earlier are major factors. Finally, the fleet operators live in the real world, and words like 
sustainment and availability are not just buzzwords to them. The GAO (2020) found that 
shipbuilding programs did not consistently address sustainment risks in acquisition planning 
documents. For example, for six shipbuilding programs whose costs GAO could assess, the 
Navy had underestimated sustainment costs by $130 billion. The application of digital 
twin/digital thread should be leveraged here. 
More Affordable, Adaptable and Sustainable Naval Ships 
Asian navies are building larger warships that are easier to construct, easier to 
maintain, and that have greater service life allowances for future combat system upgrade. 
They are also doing this at significantly lower acquisition and life-cycle costs than U.S. 
practice. A critical element in their ship design process is early application of production 
engineering and design optimization analysis that improves ship performance, life-cycle 
maintenance, and future combat system upgrade while reducing work content, reducing 
design variation, and ensuring design alignment with their warship manufacturing 
processes. Best early-stage warship design optimization practices include the following: 
• Superior Performance at Lower Cost. Early production engineering and lean design 
optimization analysis supports development of superior and more robust warship designs 
with reduced work content, reduced variation, design alignment with manufacturing 
processes and lower total ownership costs (TOC). 
• Integrated Product Team (IPT). Modern design practice harnesses the combined 
knowledge and experience of the Navy, shipbuilders, key suppliers, operators, and 
maintainers to consider alternative design solutions and select superior designs that can 
be produced at the lowest possible time and cost.  
• Production Engineering Focus. Stressing production engineering analysis in early-
stage design supports lean design (reduced work content) and design for manufacture 
and assembly (design alignment with manufacturing process); strategy improves design 
quality and reduces time and cost. 
• Robust Contract Design. Utilizing a robust design process with functional design level 
definition that meets current and future requirements, minimum work content and 
variation, and design alignment with manufacturing processes provides a stable basis for 
design execution and reduces time and cost. 
• Increased Displacement, KG, and Service Life Allowances. Modern warship designers 
use significantly larger displacement, KG, electric power, and cooling system service life 
allowances and design margins than U.S. practice. This strategy reduces design rework 
and program execution time and cost. 
• Reduced Outfit Density. Modern warships have significantly lower outfit density than 
recent U.S. practice. This design strategy provides significantly improved access resulting 
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in reduced construction, life-cycle maintenance, and future combat system upgrade time 
and cost. 
• Design Optimization. Utilizing modern engineering analysis tools (e.g., FEA, CFD, M&S, 
Functional Affinity Analysis, etc.) to optimize designs for functional performance, reduced 
work content, and design alignment with the manufacturing process improves design 
quality and reduces time and cost. 
• 3D Product Model. Utilizing 3D Product Modeling Systems starting in early-stage design 
provides a single voice of truth for design development, configuration management, 
production planning and control, and resource/material requirements planning; strategy 
improves design quality and reduces time and cost (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Design for Performance, Construction, Sustainment, and Upgrade 
Use of such a collaborative design organization supports direct engineer-to-engineer 
communication; rapid design decision-making; and development of higher quality more 
producible, maintainable, and upgradeable designs than traditional methods. 
Implementation of these best warship design practices requires early industry involvement 
and a new 21st century warship acquisition strategy. Recent NEJ articles by Keane et al. 
(2018, 2019) describe such a strategy. Further details on best early-stage warship design 
practices are addressed in the recent NEJ article “Asian vs. U.S. Warship Design, 
Production Engineering, and Construction Practice” (Jaquith, 2019). 
Optimize Design-Build Process 
An excellent case study is Bath Iron Works’ implementation of a comprehensive 
warship manufacturing plan on its FFG-7 Class program in the late 1970s (Jaquith, 2020). 
The plan focused on first-time quality, cost, and schedule reduction. Since the 1970s, 
technology developments including use of 3D product models, “interim product by stage-of-
construction” based work instructions, and digital reporting of installation and test status 
provide further improvements in productivity. Best manufacturing practices for warship 
construction include: 
MORE AFFORDABLE, ADAPTABLE AND 
SUSTAINABLE NAVAL SHIPS
• 21st Century Acquisi�on Strategy
• Industry collabora�on star�ng in early -stage design
• Increased design quality & reduced cost/work content
• Design for Performance & Reduced Cycle Time
• Design for performance & reduced cycle �me
• Robust contract design defini�on strategy
• Increased service life allowances
• Early considera�on of maintenance & upgrade
• Early 3D Product Model Development
• 3D Product Model ini�ated in early -stage design
• M&S of maintenance & CS equipment loadout
• Build Strategy included in 3D product model
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• Integrated Hull, Outfit, and Paint Build Strategy. Develop integrated build strategy 
starting in early-stage design; target >95% metal outfit and >90% equipment, piping, 
ventilation, and local cable installation in pre-outfit; strategy provides the basis for 
requirements/material planning and reduces time and cost.1 
• Design and Material Support. Ensure >98% design and material support to the 
manufacturing plan as measured at the work package level and >98% work packages 
completed without design or material change; strategy empowers production work teams 
and supports strategic reduction in construction time and cost. 
• Facilities and Tooling Support. Ensure >98% key facilities and tooling support of the 
manufacturing plan (e.g., major cranes, transporters, assembly and pre-outfit halls, panel 
lines, burning machines, etc.); strategy empowers production work teams and supports 
strategic reduction in construction time and cost. 
• Repeating Workstations and Work Teams. Utilize both real and virtual workflow to plan 
assembly, pre-outfit, ship erection, onboard outfit, test, and trials activities using repeating 
workstations and repeating work teams; strategy increases ship-to-ship learning, 
improves quality, and reduces construction time and cost. 
• Change Management. Manage both internal and customer change with time fencing 
rules to avoid production impact; accomplish critical changes in Post Delivery Availability 
(PDA); strategy empowers production work teams and allows construction to proceed 
under planned/controlled conditions, reduces time and cost. 
• 3D Product Model. Utilizing 3D Product Modeling Systems starting in early-stage design 
provides a single voice of truth for design development, configuration management, 
production planning and control, and resource/material requirements planning; strategy 
improves design quality and reduces time and cost. 
• Work Instruction Design. Utilize “interim product by stage-of-construction” based work 
instructions in lieu of traditional system drawings; strategy provides production work teams 
with clear direction reducing rework, construction time, and cost.2 
• Continuous Improvement, Accuracy Control, and Quality Management. Based on 
Deming Quality Management System; focus on improving work sequence, increasing pre-
outfit levels, reducing schedule durations, and addressing systemic quality issues; 
strategy improves quality and reduces time and cost. 
• Supply Chain Integration. Supplier and sub-contractor fabrication and installation 
schedules fully aligned to manufacturing plan; strategy empowers production work teams, 
improves quality, and supports strategic reduction in construction time and cost.  
• Navy and Shipbuilder Collaboration. Program milestones, funding for long-lead 
material, GFI, GFE, combat system installation and test schedules, Navy certification 
schedules, sea trials, and crew training fully aligned to the manufacturing plan; strategy 




1 Pre-outfitting includes the installation of outfit equipment and systems during the hull block 
(unit) assembly process prior to ship erection. Pre-outfitting also includes the use of shop assembled 
outfit modules (rafts). 
2 “Interim product by stage-of-construction” work instructions include all drawings, material 
lists, and instructions required for efficient construction. They are prepared automatically using the 3D 
Product Modeling System.  
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Figure 6. Design-Build to Enable Durability and Longevity > 40 Years 
For critical warship programs such as DDG(X), the use of two shipyards for Detail 
Design and Construction (DD&C) will reduce design and construction durations, increase 
production throughput, and increase ship-to-ship learning. Further details on best warship 
manufacturing practices are described in the recent NEJ article “Modern Warship 
Manufacturing Practice: Impact on Acquisition Cost, Schedule, and Industrial Mobilization” 
(Jaquith, 2020). 
NATO Navy Acquisition Innovations 
The international acquisition innovations that have been implemented over decades 
in Europe and Asia have focused in large part on the mid-range surface combatant, the 
backbone of most international navies. In several countries, this continuous focus on the 
naval frigate has spanned over 30 to 40 years. Navy officials and shipbuilders have joined 
forces to design and build naval ships that satisfy domestic as well as global markets. 
Designing a common solution to multiple markets has resulted in designs that are more 
versatile and adaptable. The latter being critical for a naval class to maintain its operational 
relevance for more than 40 years with two major upgrades. Moreover, the focus has 
increased shipbuilding design and construction productivity, cycle reduction, and throughput.   
In Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, there has been an emphasis on lean 
processes, elimination of non-value-added tasks and the implementation of a 
comprehensive digital transformation to provide a single, reliable source of knowledge about 
a ship class and each hull number. Now this digital backbone is being extended to the 
supplier network and sustainment infrastructure. The latter being an essential step to 
improving sustaining engineering and upgrade engineering efficiency and cycle reduction. 
The results of these innovations that have been dramatic improvements, for 
example, design versatility, 1,500 payload modules for one family of naval warships; 
production productivity: 50% reduction in design and construction cycle time, and 
upgradability: 75% to 90% module replacement cycle reduction and 33% to 67 % reduction 
in major ship systems upgrade cycle time. Additionally, leading naval shipyards in Europe 
have developed the processes and management versatility to enable international 
OPTIMIZE DESIGN-BUILD PROCESS
• 21st Century Acquisi�on Strategy
• Navy/shipbuilder collabora�on star�ng in early -stage design
• Two shipyard DD&C – reduced schedule & increased learning
• Design-Build Strategy
• Design for performance, construc�on, sustainment, upgrade & reduced cost
• Early-stage produc�on engineering & lean op�miza�on
• Work content iden�fied in 3D product model
• Warship Manufacturing Strategy
• Focus on planned & controlled produc�on
• Navy, shipbuilder & supply chain integra�on
• Design, material and tooling support of produc�on
• Focus on con�nuous improvement & schedule reduc�on
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customers to build their designs efficiently in local shipyards. This has permitted these 
shipyards to expand their markets and production base to further reduce the price of their 
ships.  
The discipline of a robust, comprehensive, and secure 3D model with all associated 
technical information has enabled shipbuilders in Europe to form coalitions with other 
shipyards that can transcend international borders to pursue new programs. For example, 
Luerssen in Germany and Damen in The Netherlands formed an alliance to pursue and win 
the Germany Navy, F126 Frigate Program [displacement 9,000 tons; four ships in the class], 
and Babcock Marine International won the UK RN F31 Frigate Program with an OMT Danish 
Stanflex hull design [displacement 5,700 tons; five ships in this class]. The total price of a 
UK RN F31 Frigate appears to have established a new benchmark for a naval frigate of 
$100,000 USD/ton. The new USN FFG62 Frigate at $135,000 USD/ton is very competitive 
with other current international frigates.  
Successful coalitions that have been formed in Europe are examples of what can be 
accomplished when leading shipyards join forces and share best practices with a secure 
digital backbone that synchronizes processes and change management and maintains a 
fidelity across all operations throughout the entire design and build cycle. Moreover, a 3D 
Product Life Cycle Management technical definition when maintained continuously can 
improve sustaining engineering efficiency which in turn can boost class availability and 
eventually enable operational relevance for more than 40 years (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Double Digit Improvements in Productivity, Cycle Reduction, and Production Throughput 
Acquisition-Related Recommendations 
The progress that has been made in acquisition strategy and design, construction, 
and sustainment process improvements have had significant impacts on naval shipbuilding 
programs, but this trend needs to be adopted more widely if the USN is going to satisfy 
current and future challenges while remaining compliant with budget constraints. Much of 
the success of European allies can be attributed to a long-term commitment by government 
and naval shipyard officials to designing and building more capable and cost competitive 
naval warships for both domestic and international markets (see Figure 8).  
NATO NAVY ACQUISTION INNOVATIONS
• Acquisi�on Ini�a�ves:
• Public-Private Focus on Surface Combatant Development: >30 years
• Joint Shipbuilding Coali�ons: in Germany, UK, Denmark, France, Italy, etc. 
• Versa�le Designs: 1,500 payload modules for a family of warships designs
• Durable Designs: 40+ years of opera�onal relevance/superiority with mul�ple upgrades
• Pursuit of both domes�c and interna�onal naval programs with collabora�ve design/pla�orm/specs. 
• Key Drivers/Mo�ves for Ini�a�ves:
• Mee�ng concurrently naval opera�onal obliga�ons and defense budgetary constraints
• Results:
• Average price of first 10 FFG62 frigates = $135,000 USD/long ton(FL)
• Average price of first 5 RN F31 frigates = $100,000 USD/long ton(FL)
• Successful collabora�ve programs:
• German Navy: F125 Frigate: tkMS and Luerssen; 
• German Navy: F126 Frigate: Luerssen and Damen
• UK RN: F31 Frigate: BMI and OMT
• Danish Navy: Frigate and Supply Ship common hull
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Figure 8. Long-Term Commitment to the Next Generation of Naval Warships 
After reviewing the progress and results over the last decade during annual naval 
shipbuilding summits, it was concluded, as a First Recommendation, that USN 
shipbuilding programs could benefit from forming a panel of shipbuilding experts from 
government, shipbuilding industry, and academia to develop a long-term shipbuilding 
strategic plan to improve the affordability, adaptability, sustainability, and durability of future 
USN warships. This panel could provide balanced and continuous advice to USN leadership 
to ensure that there is a focused campaign to implement the best practices and lessons 
learned from the leading shipbuilders in the world as well as breakthroughs from adjacent, 
relevant industries and academia. 
As a Second Recommendation from the shipbuilding summits is the 
implementation of appropriate and proven Information Technology for USN program 
management offices, U.S. shipyards, and principal suppliers in early-stage design and 
throughout the program life to synchronize knowledge management across the extended 
shipbuilding enterprise. It is evident that when advanced and proven Information Technology 
is implemented, it can have a significant impact on design and construction productivity and 
quality control throughout the entire build cycle, and moreover it can boost sustaining 
engineering and major upgrade efficiency and cycle reduction. Since the implementation of 
a comprehensive IT transformation can be very complex and time consuming, it is 
recommended that a small team of qualified experts be formed to review best practices and 
lessons learned from the implementation of IT enterprise-wide solutions at naval shipyards 
and related industries like aerospace and automotive to ensure the success of future U.S. 
shipyard implementations.      
The preponderance of the findings and results of the first decade of Global 
Shipbuilding Executives Summits (GSES) have been from shipyards in Europe and the 
United States. Over the next decade, Third Recommendation, more focus should be made 
on Asian naval shipyards and in particular shipyards in Japan and Korea where it appears 
that relatively modest increases in design dimensions may have a much greater impact on 
construction efficiency and reduce total construction labor. Additionally, the incorporation of 
automotive production and quality best practices in these shipyards may have also 
shortened construction cycle time and boosted throughput. Both issues are crucial to the 
ACQUISITION RELATED 
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Foster Substan�ve Collabora�on Between USN & US Shipbuilding Industry Officials 
Including WSI & key Naval Suppliers
• Form Group of Industry Experts to Accelerate Digital Transforma�on Across the USN 
enterprise based on best prac�ces from related industries, e.g., aerospace, defense, 
u�lity
• Form Flag-Level Commi�ee to Develop a Long -Term 50 -year Naval Warship Design, 
Construc�on and Sustainment Strategy
• Form Indo -Pacific Naval Special Interest Group to Maximize Return on Total Investment 
and Synergy Among New Naval Shipbuilding Programs in the USA, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, India, etc.
• Build career development program to develop future naval Ship Design and Program 
Managers focused on naval shipbuilding best prac�ces, innova�ons and lessons learned
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U.S. naval shipbuilding industry as it prepares to launch a significant increase in naval 
shipbuilding. 
The increase in U.S. naval shipbuilding for both traditional ship classes as well as 
some new and somewhat non-conventional designs will place enormous stress on the 
Navy–Industry collaborative design teams that will be tasked with managing these design 
and acquisition programs. It is imperative that a program, Fourth Recommendation, be 
implemented to accelerate the training and career development of the professionals who will 
be responsible for managing these programs over the next 30 to 40 years and avoiding 
costly mistakes of the recent past (Keane & Jaquith, 2021).   
Finally, a dedicated team needs to be tasked to efficiently upgrade the existing, 
strategic USN fleet assets, like the family of DDG51 destroyers, if the USN is going to 
realize a net gain of 50 to 150 ships over the next 2 decades. 
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How Long Does It Take to Award a Government Contract? 
Understanding PALT Time Frames with Big Data Analytics 
David I. Gill—Internal Revenue Service [david.gill@irs.gov] 
Timothy G. Hawkins, PhD—Data and Analytic Solutions, Inc. [Hawkins@DASconsultants.com]  
Abstract  
Awarding federal contracts is perceived as an excessively lengthy process. The purpose of 
this research is threefold: (1) to understand the drivers of procurement administrative lead 
time (PALT), (2) to identify opportunities to reduce PALT, and (3) to predict when specific 
requirements are likely to be awarded. These analyses will be performed using newly 
available, government-wide data for over 5 million federal contracts. 
Keywords: Contracting, Procurement Administrative Lead Time, Big Data Analytics, PALT, 
Predictive Modeling, Machine Learning, Data Visualization, Time to Contract Award 
Introduction 
Half a trillion dollars is spent annually on government contracts that are mission 
critical for performing all functions of government. The vision of the acquisition system is “to 
deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the customer” (FAR 1.1020). 
Even in the government, time is money. The average transaction cost of a formal source 
selection has been estimated at $245,000 (Hawkins et al., 2016). Given the enormous 
quantity of contract actions across the federal government, the cost in man-hours is 
enormous. Of course, more time taken to award a contract usually translates to delays to 
internal requiring activities that rely on the work products of contractors to help meet mission 
needs. “Complaints of excessive PALT continue to plague the acquisition system and 
present challenges to both government and industry” (Berteau, 2018). The federal 
government is addressing procurement administrative lead time (PALT) via the President’s 
Management Agenda. Therein, a cross-agency priority (CAP) goal called “frictionless 
acquisition” seeks to, among other things, deliver commercial items at the same speed as 
the commercial marketplace (U.S., 2021).  
Nevertheless, “understanding procurement cycle time is sometimes difficult because 
organizational buyer behavior processes are often dynamic and complicated” (Hult, 1997, p. 
403). Understanding PALT is necessary in order to muster and assign the necessary 
amounts and types of resources to complete required tasks. Once PALT is better 
understood, managing PALT is needed to reengineer processes that consume PALT and to 
prevent instances in which PALT exceeds reasonable bounds.  
In the context of a supply chain of physical goods, the importance of procurement 
cycle time cannot be overstated. The government operates numerous and varied instances 
of such supply chains. For example, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing runs a 
manufacturing operation to produce currency. The military departments each operate 
multiple depots wherein weapon systems are overhauled and repaired. The Defense 
Logistics Agency serves as an inventory control point for military systems. The Department 
of Veterans Affairs and the military departments operate multiple hospitals and clinics that 
rely upon the availability of medical supplies and operate pharmacies stocked with 
inventory. These supply chains rely upon proper inventory management to ensure needed 
supplies are on hand yet minimize inventory carrying costs. Forecast accuracy partly 
depends on the planning time horizon. Longer planning horizons caused by longer 
procurement cycles can increase forecast error resulting in either excess inventory (i.e., 
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inventory carrying costs) or stockouts (i.e., service failures), and therefore also increase 
safety stock levels (LeSueur & Dale, 1997). Longer lead times also result in larger cycle 
stock.  
Despite early calls by scholars and business leaders in procurement (now referred to 
as supply management) in forums such as the (then) Center for Advanced Purchasing 
Studies (CAPS) to reduce procurement transaction costs and purchasing cycle time (Carter 
& Narasimhan, 1996), little progress has been made in the federal sector.  
Some research has explored the antecedents of PALT. Significant factors have 
emerged such as dollar value of the contract action, type of goods and services, number of 
offers, number of evaluation criteria, contract type, and source selection method. However, 
research has been constrained by the unavailability of data at the transaction level (i.e., 
contract action) rendering models based on limited variables. Several potential predictors 
have not been explored such as: (1) the time remaining until the end of the fiscal year (i.e., 
funds availability time), (2) type of set-aside program, (3) orders against existing contracts 
(i.e., solicitation procedures), (4) interagency contracting, (5) buyer workload, (6) 
requirements returned to requiring activities (due to omissions, errors, or unresolved issues), 
(7) type of appropriation (i.e., one-year versus multiple-year funds), (8) buying agency, (9) 
buying activity, (10) option periods or quantities, (11) number of contract line items, (12) 
government furnished property, (13) narrative description, (14) contract consolidation or 
bundling, (15) the formality and rigor of trade-offs applied to task order awards, (16) 
combined synopsis/solicitations, and mandatory sources of supply (e.g., Ability One and 
FPI), to name a few. Several models have also been based on small sample sizes with low 
statistical power. Furthermore, models have been developed in limited contexts such as a 
few buying activities of only one federal agency. Research also rarely reports a comparison 
of adjusted R2 to predicted R2 and fails to report prediction intervals; thus, we don’t know 
how accurate the estimated models are.  
When contracts will be awarded is of significant interest to contracting officers, 
program offices, and vendors alike. The date a requisition turns into a signed contract is the 
culmination of the pre-award acquisition process. FAR 7.105 emphasizes the importance of 
identifying schedule “constraints,” “risks,” and identifying key “milestones” in the pre-award 
acquisition process on the way to contract award. Typically, acquisition plans include 
milestone schedules developed manually by the contracting officer. Award dates are 
projected without statistical rigor, and the accuracy of award date projections is rarely 
assessed. 
Meanwhile, in federal procurement, data is increasingly collected and made available 
publicly. Yet this vast and numerous contract award data has not been analyzed in order to 
build machine learning models that can be trained and result in improved predictive 
accuracy. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to explore new features (i.e., predictors) 
of PALT and to utilize them in machine learning models to more accurately predict PALT. 
These predictors can then be used to generate milestone schedule estimates informing 
customers when their contract is likely to be awarded. The research questions are as 
follows: 
RQ1: What are the significant unexplored features (predictors) of PALT? 
RQ2: Can machine learning models be applied to reliably and accurately predict 
when a contract action will be awarded?  
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. It begins with a review of the 
relevant literature surrounding PALT, both in the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. Next, 
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the study presents the methodologies of quantitative data collection and analysis to explore 
the research questions. Lastly, discussion, limitations, implications, future research 
directions, and conclusions are offered.  
Literature Review 
Factors affecting PALT in a government context have been studied, but not 
extensively. Several early attempts to explore PALT were conducted by graduate students 
at the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval Postgraduate School in the late 1980s 
and early-to-mid 1990s. However, these early studies predated the explosion of information 
technology and major changes in federal contracting processes such as the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995 that 
instituted PALT-reducing measures such as multiple-award contracts and commercial item 
procedures.  
MacKinnon (1992) found relationships between PALT and contract type, dollar value, 
and type of purchase (supply, service, or research and development) using a regression 
model of 559 contract awards by the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at China 
Lake, CA. Cost reimbursement contracts are associated with lower PALT. Additionally, 
contracts for research and development are awarded faster than other types of 
requirements. Contracts for supplies consumed more time than others (e.g., for services). 
Contracts for larger dollar values are associated with longer PALT. However, the extent of 
competition did not impact PALT. MacKinnon (1992) concluded that, due to complexity, it is 
difficult to accurately predict PALT.  
Ng et al. (1997), in their literature review of cycle time, identified several factors 
associated with procurement cycle time such as electronic commerce, automated 
reordering, and several practices associated with supplier alliances. Most of the practices 
pertained to partnering with suppliers; thus, they could only apply to orders once a supplier 
is selected. Examples included: increased frequency of buyer review of manufacturing 
schedule and internal requirements, supplier TQM involvement, sharing information, just-in-
time ordering, and early supplier involvement in design. In a government context, Ng et al. 
(1997) said practices could be implemented once a supplier is on-contract. Frequent 
competition and supplier switching would render these practices impractical.  
Lamoureux et al. (2015) examined contract awards (n = 33) from two U.S. Air Force 
installations in Colorado using data manually extracted from contract files (due to the 
limitations of FPDS-NG data). Using Multiple Analysis of Covariance, they explored whether 
characteristics of the source selection were associated with PALT and with contractor 
performance ratings (i.e., contractor performance assessment reports—CPARs). Their 
definition of PALT encompassed the time from receipt of the requisition to the time of 
contract award. They found the number of evaluation factors and the number of offers 
received have a significant effect on increased PALT, accounting for 62.7% of the variance 
in PALT. The source selection method (i.e., low-price, technically acceptable versus full 
trade-off) and the number of internal reviews did not affect PALT.  
Landale et al. (2017) also explored predictors of PALT and contractor performance. 
Notably, PALT, in this study, encompassed the time from receipt of a requirement in 
contracting to contract award. Using a sample of 124 U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy 
contracts and controlling for the effect of dollar value, PALT was found to be positively 
related to the number of offers and to the number of evaluation criteria. The full trade-off 
source selection method was found to be a marginally significant predictor of PALT (p < .10) 
showing a moderate effect size increasing PALT. The “average [PALT] was approximately 
36 percent longer for the [trade-off] supplier selection method than for source selections 
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using an LPTA approach” (Landale et al., 2017, p. 60). Also, the research revealed that an 
increase of one evaluation factor increased PALT by 28%. Furthermore, the study found that 
a 10% increase in the number of offers resulted in a 1.9% increase in PALT.  
Chung et al. (2018) explored the effects of several antecedents on PALT, but only for 
U.S. Air Force sole source major systems acquisitions exceeding $500 million (n = 26). 
Factors found to increase PALT included undefinitized contract actions (UCA) (i.e., the time 
to definitize a UCA such as a letter contract), the number of major subcontractors and 
corporate transfers, foreign military sales, and the type of weapon system acquired 
(bombers and fighters). Other factors decrease PALT such as award to a non-profit (for 
research and development efforts) and the type of goods (i.e., buying armaments). Notably, 
several factors had no effect on PALT including price, proposal quality (operationalized as 
the time of initial proposal minus the time of adequate proposal = 0), aggressiveness of the 
government’s negotiation position (contractor proposal—government objective)/contractor 
proposal x 100), the number of internal approvals for price being too high, and whether cost 
or pricing data was available on a previous acquisition.  
Some benchmark studies on procurement metrics of for-profit-sector firms provide 
insights as to the realm of possible PALT. Zycus’s (2014) Purchase to Pay Benchmarking 
study (n = 450+) showed that the average time from requisition to order was 4.6 days for 
“simple” requirements, 14.3 days for “complex” requirements, and 13 days for “services.” 
However, these categories were not defined; hence, it is unknown what renders a requisition 
simple or complex. The Center for Advance Procurement Strategy (CAPS Research, 2011) 
published benchmark metrics in 2011 showing average cycle times across 10 industries. 
They measured the time from requisition approval to purchase order for both direct goods 
and indirect goods. The averages for direct goods ranged from 1.52 days to 50.75 days 
(average 11.75 days). The averages for indirect goods ranged from 2.04 days to 12 days 
(average 6.36 days). These cycle times are drastically shorter than those prescribed by the 
various federal agencies. 
While efficiency is important, having sufficient PALT is also necessary. The 
perceived sufficiency of planned PALT (defined as the extent to which the buyer believed he 
or she had enough time to conduct a proper source selection process) has been shown to 
improve the sufficiency of the requirement definition, which, in turn, yielded higher service 
quality ultimately delivered by the contractor (Hawkins et al., 2015). PALT is also important 
in ensuring compliance with the myriad of laws, regulations, and policies in a federal 
contracting context. Hawkins et al. (2014) found a positive relationship between the 
perceived sufficiency of PALT and the perceived level of compliance of contracts. Having 
sufficient PALT has also been associated with bid protests. A study by Hawkins et al. (2016) 
showed that sufficient planned PALT reduced the fear of a bid protest. Fear of protest, in 
turn, increases added PALT (Hawkins et al., 2016).  
Methodology 
Multiple data sets were analyzed. Contract award data for all federal agencies from 
the USASpending.gov was used to better understand actual PALT. Newly available 
government-wide data on PALT time frames provides a large dataset that can be explored 
for answers to the research questions. PALT data collection in FPDS-NG began in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2018. A total of more than 5 million contract actions were compiled for analysis 
covering the time period from FY2018 to FY2020. The OFPP recently declared its formal 
definition of PALT as a response to a requirement of Section 878 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for 2019, Public Law 115–232. The OFPP’s definition of PALT measures a 
subset of the overall acquisition life cycle, including only “the time between the date on 
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which an initial solicitation or a contract or order is issued by a Federal department or 
agency and the date of the award of the contract or order” (Wooten, 2020, p. 3429).  
Separately, data on shopping carts (i.e., requisitions) from the IRS’s Procurement for 
the Public Sector (PPS) system were also used to construct a prediction model of 
acquisition lead time, given the minimal characteristics of the requirement known prior to 
transmission to a contracting activity (dollar amount, workload of assigned contract 
specialist, and days remaining in the fiscal year). 
The remainder of the methodology is organized as follows. First, we describe the 
method used for the explanatory model. Next, we describe how NLP of the contract award 
description data was used to enhance the explanatory model. Finally, we describe the 
shopping cart prediction model.  
Explaining PALT with USA Spending Data 
We look to explain the number of PALT days using variables available in the 
USASpending.gov data. We identified 11 data fields present among the data that are 
relevant to PALT: days remaining in the FY, month of solicitation, number of offers received, 
NAICS code, dollar value (base plus options), civilian agency, parent award type, small 
business or other status, solicitation procedure, type of contract, and assisted acquisition.  
The scope of the analysis omits contract modifications. The data included contract 
actions awarded in FY2020. In total, a random sample of 50,000 contract action awards 
were included. We applied a Random Forest regression model (provided through the 
randomForest R package) due to its ease of use and performance over other models. 
Random Forest models are trained using three as the ‘mtry,’ the number of predictors 
randomly sampled at each split when creating tree models. All other hyperparameters use 
default values. 
Natural Language Processing of USA Spending Contract Award Description Field 
The award description field is one of the few fields in USASpending.gov data that 
provides contextual information about what service or product is being procured. These 
descriptions can be key in defining the scope of work, nature of product, or complexity of 
service that is being procured. To limit the scope, only data on service contracts was 
analyzed. This analysis explored whether descriptions which are similar in context or share 
similar words will likely define similar scopes of work and therefore have similar PALT times.  
First, re-interpreting the text data was necessary. The chosen method was through 
text pre-processing, vectorization, Latent Dirichlet Allocation Analysis, and token analysis. 
We re-interpreted the data in a machine-passable way. This is the role of text 
preprocessing. In this stage, we simplified the text data. The text preprocessing techniques 
involved trimming out non-alpha characters, ensuring all documents were entirely 
lowercase, removing stop-words (i.e., removing: infrequent words fewer than 250 
occurrences, highly frequent words with higher than a 25% prevalence, and non-indicative 
words), and stemming (i.e., reducing words down to their stem). Using the text2vec library, 
there are two stages for pre-processing. The first is simply called “preprocessing” and it 
applies a string manipulation function to each entry. Then, the following “tokenization” step 
applies a string manipulation function to each word in each entry. The resulting tokens are 
the most common word-stems.  
The encodings that we used to indicate whether an award contains a particular token 
is similar to a one-hot-encoding. Each of the tokens found in the dataset, of which there are 
564, becomes a column. Then for each award row, the value in that column indicates how 
many times the token appears in the award description.  
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Then, we constructed a generalized linear model (GLM) to assess the “importance” 
of each token for predicting PALT. The GLM provided coefficients (weights) for the various 
token columns, and we can assess these coefficients to see whether a token indicates an 
increase or a decrease in PALT times based on whether it is positive or negative. Table 1 
displays a list of the 10 highest importance tokens from a GLM. It includes their coefficients 
from the linear model to allow investigation of which tokens have positive or negative 
weightings. The Variance Importance column helps to indicate how “important” a variable is 
for predicting PALT. In order to get a better idea of how different tokens affect the PALT of a 
contract action, we use the mean PALT days for all awards that contain that token. 
Table 1. Token Importance 
Token  Count  Coefficient  Variance Importance  Mean PALT Days 
idiq 3452 25.8 12.6 137.4 
tuition 736 -90.2 11.2 9.4 
macc 443 147.0 28.1 286.2 
ae 1963 18.4 7.1 119.3 
protect 895 45.2 12.1 143.9 
guarante 660 -58.6 7.6 196.8 
uss 1563 -35.2 9.7 38.2 
repair 9240  -12.4 9.8 70.5 
report 1545 27.7 8.4 178.4 
express 740 132.2 23.8 266.0 
 
To conduct topic analysis, we used an algorithm called Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA). It essentially looks at each document and creates a set of N topics based on the co-
occurrences of words. For example, if the words mechanic and vehicle often end up in the 
same award description, they are likely to be grouped together once the LDA has been run. 
In this case, we are defining N = 10. This value can be manipulated based on the analysts’ 
initial belief of the number of underlying topics. In our case, 10 topics yielded the best 
results.  
In this visualization (Figure 1), on the right we can see the “salience” of each term; 
salience is the extent a term is about this specific topic. These are the terms that appear the 
most frequently in concurrence with other words. As shown, the words base and task are 
near the top where we expect them to be. The hope is that we can create a distribution for 
each award, where we can see the likelihood that it belongs to each cluster. That likelihood, 
we hypothesize, will help in grouping similar awards and hopefully with predicting PALT.  
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Figure 1. Topic Salience 
 
Table 2 represents the topic distributions. Each row represents an award, and the 
columns indicate the likelihood for each topic. For example, the V1 column contains 
likelihoods of an award belonging to topic 1. Now, we can pass these into a GLM and 
assess the value of using these topic distributions to predict PALT. 
 
Table 2. Topic Distributions. 
 
 
The results of the GLM analysis are shown in Table 3. In this table, the Topic column 
is our interpretation of what a topic might be, based on some of the most salient words 
provided by the LDA. 
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Table 3. GLM Analysis of Topics 
Topic Sample Salient Words Coefficient Variance Importance 
1. Planning and 
Logistics 
Nation, require, plan, study, 




Program, manage, develop, 
office, technical 22.614 11.4 
3. Base Awards Base, year, phase, period, idiq 22.423 10.5 
4. Facility Operations Center, operate, engine, train, facility 24.069 12.8 
5. Equipment Provide, install, medic, labor, equip -4.9642 2.5 
6. Construction and 
Project Design 
Project, construct, design, 
integrate 4.7078 2.2 
7. Construction Repair, replace, build, water, roof 25.467 13.2 
8. New Task Orders Task, purpose, new, report, nurse, bpa -10.221 5.2 
9. Transportation and 
Maintenance Air, igfotigf, transport, repair, test 64.491 32.3 
10. General 
Maintenance 
Maintenance, federal, software, 
supplies -10.756 6.0 
 
Predicting Contract Award Dates with IRS Shopping Cart Model 
We look to predict the number of days until award for a new contract action. Rather 
than PALT, this model considers the time from the approval of a requisition (i.e., a shopping 
cart) to contract award, since the IRS dataset we are analyzing does not capture the 
solicitation issue date (RFX date). The scope of the analysis omits contract modifications. 
We ensure that contracts have a non-zero obligated value and are of the “Base Award” 
action type. The model is trained on all IRS obligated awards in FY2020 as of September 
30, 2020. Also, the model is deliberately limited to use only data elements that are also 
available on a new (open) requisition. Many desirable data elements (e.g., contract type, 
solicitation procedures, etc.) may be unavailable or not yet decided upon early in the 
acquisition process.  
We considered various machine learning models such as generalized linear 
regression and XGBoost, and settled on using a Random Forest regression model (provided 
through the randomForest R package) due to its ease of use and performance over the 
other models. Random Forest models are trained using nine as the ‘mtry,’ the number of 
predictors randomly sampled at each split when creating tree models. All other 
hyperparameters use default values. 
We chose features based on which data fields are available in both the IRS’s open 
and obligated ALT reports and provide information relevant to the time of shopping cart 
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award date. We identified 12 data fields present among the data that are relevant to days in 
procurement. We also created four additional features from these data fields to provide the 
model with more data on the contract time frame and workload of the contract specialist 
handling the contract award. In total, the 16 features we use are as follows: Contract 
Specialist (CS) Section, CS.Branch, CS.Office, CS.Division, Agency, Fiscal.Year, 
Fund.Expiration, total_Shopping Carts (SC)_completed_at_approval, Funding.Business Unit 
(BU), workload_proportion, Obligated, Fund, days_until_FY_end, Functional.Area, 
SC.PM.Approval date, and current_CS_workload. 
The four features we created evaluate the number of days until the fiscal year ends 
when the contract is approved (days_until_FY_end), the current number of contracts 
assigned to the contract specialist (CS) overseeing the contract (current_CS_workload), the 
total number of contracts the CS has completed in the last 90 days 
(total_SCs_completed_at_approval), and the proportion of their current workload to the 
amount they have completed in the last 90 days (workload_proportion). 
Results 
The data were analyzed using a combination of several methods—various data 
visualizations and machine learning models. Summarizing PALT by agency (see Figure 2) 
shows significant differences in typical time frames and the distribution of PALT for specific 
contract awards. The following chart sorts agencies by FY2020 PALT time frames with 
faster agencies appearing at the top. The top five agencies for short PALT time frames are 
the Small Business Administration, Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, 
Department of Agriculture, and the Social Security Administration. Also notable is that the 
DoD reported over 173,000 and the General Services Administration reported over 126,000 
PALT time frames in FY2020—a larger volume of awards than all other agencies combined. 
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Figure 2. USA Spending FY2020 Boxplot—PALT Time Frame by Awarding Agency 
USA Spending Model Explaining PALT Results 
A supervised ML model (see Figure 3) was used to train the model on the data. The 
training data included input data and response values (i.e., PALT days). The algorithm used 
was a regression Random Forest model, suitable for determining quantities. Ten decision 
trees were used, and three variables were tried at each split.  
Acquisition traits (FPDS data elements) were statistically ranked in descending order 
of importance as drivers of PALT time. ML models enable understanding PALT time drivers 
with statistical learning. The model had an explained variance of 92% and a mean of 
squared error of 3206.701. 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 68 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 3. USA Spending PALT Explanation Model Results 
 
 USA Spending Natural Language Processing of the Contract Award 
Descriptions Results 
In order to evaluate whether or not our encodings provide us with a more accurate 
PALT prediction, we appended the encodings features onto our base GLM features. Now, 
each award is represented by the base GLM features, as well as a series of binary columns 
that indicate whether or not the award contains any of the most indicative tokens in its 
description.  
This model (see Figure 4) had an explained variance of 72.32% and a mean of 
squared error of 4250.511. The following table shows us that the most important feature is 
days_remaining_until_FY_end because it has the highest %IncMSE. This (%IncMSE) can 
be interpreted as the projected loss in accuracy if the feature is omitted. 
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Figure 4. USA Spending Random Forest Model—NLP Encodings 
The topic analysis model shown in Figure 5 had an explained variance of 69.67% 
and a mean squared error of 4654.5.  
 
Figure 5. USA Spending Random Forest Model—NLP Topics 
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Figure 6 shows the token distributions of the two most informative topic features, 
topics 1 and 7.  
 
Figure 6. USA Spending—Top-30 Most Relevant NLP Terms for Topic 1 
 
 IRS Shopping Cart Model Predicting Contract Award Dates Results 
When evaluating our model for feature importance, we find that the number of days 
until the fiscal year end (days_until_FY_end), the current number of contracts assigned to 
the CS overseeing the contract (current_CS_workload), and the functional area 
(Functional.Area) of the contract have the largest impact on model performance. The 
ordered list of feature importance by the percent increase in MSE when values of a feature 
are shuffled and the increase in node purity are plotted in Figure 7. We provide hex plots 
comparing the counts of the pairings of both of the continuous features and a trend line 
showing how the number of days of award trends with a change in value of these features in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. IRS Shopping Cart Random Forest Model 
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Figure 8. IRS Shopping Cart Hex Plots of Features 
 
 IRS Shopping Cart Model Evaluation and Tests of Validity 
We evaluated the contract award date Random Forest model using 4-fold cross 
validation on the IRS’s obligation PALT data sheet available in the internal September 30, 
2020, PALT report. This sheet contains 2,960 observations of contract awards completed in 
FY2020. First, we divided these 2,960 observations into four independent subsets of 740 
observations (25%) each. Then, we trained a contract award date model on each 
permutation of three of the four sets and evaluated their performance on the fourth test set. 
We report the average Mean Squared Error (MSE), Root-Mean-Squared-Error (RMSE), 
Mean-Absolute-Error (MAE), and R2 value of these models in Table 4. We also provided 
contract prediction time frame metrics to better understand the range of time our predictions 
match the actual values. We provided the percent of contracts within a +/- 30-day range, 
same working month, a +/- 7-day range, and the same working week in Table 4. When 
training a model on the entire dataset, we find the out-of-bag (OOB) MSE comes to 541.9 
with an R2 value of .606. 
 
Table 4. IRS Shopping Cart Model Evaluation 
Evaluation Metric Value   Evaluation Metric Value 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
days 571.1 
  
Percent within +/- 30 days 86.75% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error 
(RMSE) days 23.8 Percent within same month 61.62% 
Mean-Absolute-Error (MAE) 
days 14.5 Percent within +/- 7 days 44.32% 
R2  0.563 Percent within same week 
24.
19% 
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Discussion 
Recently, government and industry leaders have expressed a need to accelerate the 
procurement process. Source selections consume a significant amount of time and, thus, 
transaction costs in terms of man-hours. Perhaps more importantly, agencies are delayed in 
executing their missions. Therefore, the purpose of this research was to explore new 
features (i.e., predictors) of PALT and to utilize them in machine learning models to more 
accurately predict PALT.  
Several findings emerged from the analyses. First, the number of days until the fiscal 
year end (days_until_FY_end), the current number of contracts assigned to the Contract 
Specialist (CS) overseeing the contract (current_CS_workload), and the functional area 
(Functional.Area) of the contract have the largest impact on the PALT prediction model 
performance. Next, the Small Business Administration, Department of Labor, Department of 
the Treasury, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Homeland Security have the 
lowest PALTs. Several variables seem to affect the amount of PALT including days 
remaining in the fiscal year, obligation value, number of offers, NAICS code, solicitation 
procedures, and contract type. Additionally, the award date of requisitions can reasonably 
be predicted within the same month 61% of the time and within seven days 44% of the time. 
We also found that tokens that appear in the award description field in FPDS that are useful 
in explaining PALT included: idiq, base, architectengin, tuition, year, macc, ae, air, 
physician, protect, guarante, uss, phase, militari, repair, region, report, mainten, express, 
period, and minimum.  
Lastly, useful topics included: Topic clusters V4 “Facility Operations,” V1 “Planning 
and Logistics, and V9 “Transportation and Maintenance,” which appear to affect PALT. 
Refer to Table 3 (GLM Analysis of Topics) for further information about topic clusters. 
Interestingly, these topic clusters usurped some characteristics of the procurement in 
importance (e.g., business size/type and assisted acquisition).  
Managerial Implications 
From the results, several recommendations for addressing PALT are made.  
• Make the prediction model available to customers, enabling them to more accurately 
forecast needs and when those needs will be fulfilled.  
• Using the results, consider adjusting the IRS’s PALT standards by redefining 
categories of shopping carts/requirements by solicitation procedure, competition, 
dollar value, and type of goods/services with commensurate PALT goals. 
• Consider expanding the definition of PALT to reflect the time from the identification of 
the need to contract award. To do so, the date the need was identified would need to 
be added to FPDS-NG reporting.  
• One strategy for reducing PALT is to maximize coverage of requirements by an 
existing IDIQ contract, basic ordering agreement (BOA; Findenstadt & Hawkins, 
2015), or BPA.  
• Consider how the IRS forecasts requirements in advance of need (i.e., before they 
get to contracting, during the customer’s budgeting process). If suppliers know the 
requirements well in advance, they might be able to quote/bid/offer faster. 
Forecasting requirements could also be useful in consolidating transactions and in 
ensuring an IDIQ, BOA, or BPA can cover it (i.e., in scope)—or in getting an IDIQ 
contract, BOA, or BPA in place. 
• Evenly distribute workload to CSs so that anyone CS is not overloaded. Evaluate 
workload models to ensure proper staffing levels, and rebalance across 
organizations where necessary. 
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• Benchmark agencies that have lower PALT for best practices. 
Study Limitations 
As with any research, this study is not without limitations. The lack of solicitation 
dates limited the contract award actions analyzed. There could be systematic reasons for 
award actions not including solicitation issue dates, which would introduce bias into the 
results. Additionally, solicitation issue dates are only available beginning in 2018. Thus, the 
data is mostly limited to 2019 and 2020. Additionally, the narrow definition of PALT that 
excludes all of the work after the identification of a need but before the solicitation is issued 
omits many decisions that affect PALT (e.g., source selection method, extent of market 
research, contract type, etc.). Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 may have 
distorted buying patterns, such as goods and services purchased and more rapid 
procedures (e.g., sole source awards). Finally, data coding errors in the USA Spending data 
set could distort the results.  
Directions for Future Research 
This research raises further questions related to PALT. For example, the definition of 
PALT could be expanded to include all of the pre-award process from need identification to 
contract award. Then repeat the analyses herein to determine the factors affecting all of pre-
award cycle time. Then, explore the end-to-end value chain by further examining the post-
award effects of pre-award decisions. For example, what are the effects of shortened PALT 
on contract compliance? What are the effects of shortened PALT on post-award 
modifications? Does shortened PALT affect contractor performance? Additionally, for the 
Shopping Cart predictive model, the current contract award date Random Forest model 
could be extended to use training data from awarded contract data from both FY2020 and 
FY2021. With a larger dataset that spans fiscal years, we will look to predict on unawarded 
contract actions available in the open obligation PALT sheet. Finally, the NLP analysis 
raises opportunities to further explore the nature of the impactful topics and tokens in order 
to understand what is it about the appearance of terms such as “tuition” or “phase” in the 
award description field that either increases or decreases PALT.  
Conclusion 
Government and industry leaders have recently expressed a need to accelerate the 
procurement process. PALT was a focus of study in the 1980s and 1990s; however, 
emergent technology and the availability of big data provide opportunities to apply more 
robust methods and explore more complicated questions. Using machine learning, newly 
collected, standardized PALT data was analyzed to better understand factors influencing 
time to contract award. The goals were to explain the key factors impacting PALT, identify 
opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce PALT, and use a data-driven approach to 
generate milestone schedule estimates informing customers when their contract is likely to 
be awarded.  
This study confirms findings from prior PALT research and also provides a more 
comprehensive, government-wide explanation of factors driving time to contract award. 
Confirmed factors affecting PALT include dollar value, number of offers received (i.e., extent 
of competition), the goods or services procured (i.e., NAICS code), and type of contract. A 
number of new insights into PALT have been quantified using a large dataset. Differences 
between agencies were found, with some agencies awarding contracts in a particular dollar 
value range faster than others. The choice of solicitation procedures by the contracting 
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officer impacts time to contract award. Further, the number of days remaining until the fiscal 
year end is a powerful driver of contract award dates. The contracting personnel’s workload 
also affects PALT, as does the organization which they support. Finally, certain words and 
word-combinations in the award description field are related to PALT. A better 
understanding of these factors should help acquisition teams to reduce PALT and help 
acquisition leaders to set policies and processes to mitigate PALT. 
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Abstract  
This paper demonstrates that the Department of Defense (DoD)’s primary methods of 
marketing requirements and soliciting information from prospective suppliers inhibit the 
military’s access to innovative nontraditional companies. To conduct this research, we 
leveraged qualitative and quantitative research techniques, including assessing the features 
of more than one million DoD solicitations from https://beta.sam.gov and surveying small 
businesses on the readability of DoD requirements. Our results concluded that DoD 
solicitations are not conducive to attracting nontraditional suppliers because they are difficult 
to discover, lack ample response time frames, are not easy to read or understand, and lack 
critical information. These and other factors deter innovative, nontraditional companies from 
participating in the DoD’s market research process, in turn limiting the pool of suppliers 
available to the military. We offer recommendations for how the DoD can improve the way it 
writes and markets solicitations to attract and engage innovative, nontraditional companies 
more competitively. 
Introduction 
Over the last 2 decades, companies outside of the U.S. military’s traditional industrial 
base—rather than entrenched defense contractors—have increasingly driven advancements 
in areas of critical importance to national defense. This paradigm shift has forced the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to rethink how it sources and funds new technologies and has 
prompted continuous investment—to the tune of billions of dollars annually—in innovation 
initiatives and rapid acquisitions programs whose stated purpose is to accelerate the 
adoption of commercial technologies. In spite of these efforts, we demonstrated in research 
we published in 2020 that the vast majority of DoD suppliers, including participants in DoD 
innovation programs, continue to be legacy contractors (Bresler & Bresler, 2020). We 
posited that one reason why the DoD does a poor job of attracting innovative new vendors 
(“nontraditionals”) is its failure to adequately market its requirements to communities outside 
of the traditional defense industrial base (DIB).This research aims to explore that hypothesis 
in more detail. Specifically, we sought to analyze how the composition and marketing of 
DoD requirements impacts the military’s efforts to attract innovative, nontraditional suppliers. 
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Research Approach 
This paper begins by providing an overview of the DoD’s current methods of 
marketing open requirements (“opportunities” or “requirements”) and soliciting information 
from prospective suppliers (“supplier outreach”), including the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), which dictates these procedures. Next, employing quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, we analyzed the extent to which these methods enable the 
DoD to engage innovative, nontraditional companies outside of the DIB. We primarily 
focused our analyses on the following criteria:  
● discoverability: the extent to which nontraditionals can find relevant DoD 
opportunities  
● response time: the number of days between when an opportunity is posted and 
when responses are due 
● content: the extent to which requirements are written in a clear and readable fashion 
and the extent to which requirements contain the information needed for 
nontraditionals to adequately evaluate them  
● redundancy: the extent to which multiple DoD/government entities are 
simultaneously seeking similar solutions and how redundancy may affect 
nontraditionals’ ability to prioritize relevant opportunities  
In each section, we demonstrate that the DoD’s methods of marketing its 
requirements and conducting supplier outreach substantially inhibit the military’s access to 
companies outside of the DIB. This finding offers important context relative to our 2020 
research results insofar as it makes clear a driving factor behind the DoD’s failure to 
introduce a significant number of innovative new suppliers into the defense market over the 
last decade. Throughout the paper, we offer concrete recommendations for how the DoD 
can improve the way it communicates with industry to reach and engage a broader and 
more diverse audience of potential suppliers, thereby ensuring that the warfighter has 
access to the cutting-edge technologies necessary to fight and win.  
How the DoD Markets Requirements: Federal Acquisition Regulation  
The primary ways in which the DoD markets requirements and conducts supplier 
outreach in the procurement process are dictated by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
These regulations create a set of rules that government stakeholders must comply with 
when procuring products and services. Certain exceptions exist within contract 
administration that allow contracting personnel to employ non-FAR contract strategies, such 
as Other Transactions, Procurements for Experiments, and Research and Development 
(R&D) Agreements (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). However, the majority of contracts 
are FAR based, and non-FAR contracts are not always precluded from the marketing-
specific requirements most relevant to this research.  
For the purposes of this research, it is important to understand FAR Part 5, Part 6, 
and Part 10. FAR Part 5 requires contracting officers to “disseminate information on 
proposed contract actions ... expected to exceed $25,000, by synopsizing in the 
Governmentwide Point of Entry (GPE)” (FAR 5.1, 2021). The website https://beta.sam.gov 
(hereafter referred to as beta.sam), which replaced legacy site FedBizOpps in 2019, serves 
as the GPE. Thus, to comply with the FAR, all contract actions are made public on 
beta.sam, and the archived and active data on the site serves as a primary resource for our 
quantitative analyses. FAR Part 6 requires “with certain limited exceptions, that contracting 
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officers shall promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and 
awarding Government contracts” (FAR 6.1, 2021) and  
contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition through 
use of the competitive procedure(s) contained in [the FAR] subpart that are 
best suited to the circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the 
need to fulfill the Government’s requirements efficiently. (FAR 6.1, 2021) 
In short, FAR Part 6 requires government stakeholders to ensure that opportunities 
are marketed competitively.  
Additionally, and of particular import, FAR Part 10 explicitly addresses the “policies 
and procedures for conducting market research to arrive at the most suitable approach to 
acquiring, distributing, and supporting supplies and services” (FAR 10, 2021). These policies 
dictate that government stakeholders must follow a number of steps during the market 
research process, including but not limited to the following: 
● Conduct market research appropriate to the circumstances-  
○ Before developing new requirements documents for an acquisition by that 
agency; … 
○ On an ongoing basis, take advantage (to the maximum extent practicable) of 
commercially available market research methods in order to effectively 
identify the capabilities of small businesses and new entrants into Federal 
contracting that are available in the marketplace for meeting the requirements 
of the agency.  
● Use the results of market research to- 
○ Determine if sources capable of satisfying the agency’s requirements exist; 
○ Determine if commercial items or, to the extent commercial items suitable to 
meet the agency’s needs are not available, nondevelopmental items are 
available that-  
■ Meet the agency’s requirements;  
■ Could be modified to meet the agency’s requirements; or  
■ Could meet the agency’s requirements if those requirements were 
modified to a reasonable extent; 
○ Determine the extent to which commercial items or nondevelopmental items 
could be incorporated at the component level; … 
● When conducting market research, agencies should not request potential 
sources to submit more than the minimum information necessary. (FAR 10, 
2021) 
While the intention of these and other FAR clauses may be to foster competition, we 
sought to analyze, in practical terms, the extent to which these objectives are met. 
Furthermore, the importance of broadly marketing requirements and fostering healthy 
competition go beyond regulatory requirements. As we mentioned previously, now more 
than ever, the military needs innovative capabilities originating outside of the DIB, yet the 
DoD has continued to fall short in the critical mission of engaging these types of firms. This 
trend has persisted in spite of the FAR requirements and in spite of substantial investments 
into defense-sponsored innovation initiatives.  
Discoverability  
Beta.Sam Awareness 
In our 2020 research, we argued that one reason why legacy contractors continue to 
receive the vast majority of DoD contracts is because there is a general lack of awareness 
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among companies outside of the DIB on the basics of how to identify and engage with 
military customers (Bresler & Bresler, 2020). While the majority of this paper is concerned 
with whether or not specific features of DoD opportunities inhibit the military’s ability to 
engage nontraditionals, it is first important to consider whether or not nontraditionals can 
discover DoD opportunities at all. Simply put, are nontraditionals aware of beta.sam, and do 
they know how to leverage it to identify prospective opportunities?  
We do not have access to information about website traffic to beta.sam, precluding 
us from quantitatively assessing the reach and composition of the site’s audience. However, 
we can tell from site embeddings that the government does track critical data, such as 
overall site traffic, the number of unique visitors, the locations of visitors, and more. We 
encourage the DoD to make use of this information to assess the effectiveness of its 
marketing initiatives and to shape the development of future marketing and search engine 
optimization (SEO) strategies.  
In the absence of site traffic data, we nevertheless have reason to believe that many 
nontraditionals are unfamiliar with beta.sam and/or struggle to navigate it. For instance, in 
addition to the multibillion dollar lobbying and consulting industry centered around helping 
firms navigate the defense market, companies such as GovWin, Bloomberg Government, 
and GovShop charge firms a subscription fee in exchange for repackaged opportunity data 
from beta.sam. The existence of a secondary market for publicly available government 
opportunity data suggests that beta.sam fails to serve as a viable resource for this 
information. The result of this “pay to play” paradigm is that the DoD does not see 
companies with the most cutting-edge capabilities. Rather, the military’s requirements 
primarily reach only those companies willing to pay for access. While service providers and 
relationships will always play a role in navigating an organization as large and bureaucratic 
as the DoD, it is important that basic information about the military’s requirements be 
accessible to a wide and diverse audience.  
While the remainder of our analyses make the assumption that nontraditionals can 
successfully reach beta.sam, there is clearly a need to market the site better overall. Further 
research is required to determine the appropriate level of investment the DoD should make 
to broaden awareness of the site, along with how to allocate those resources. For starters, 
we suggest that they invest in SEO to ensure that beta.sam is returned at the top of all 
search engine searches for queries related to selling products/services to the government. 
Additionally, we suggest that the DoD engage a marketing firm to develop a strategy for 
promoting the site in places heavily trafficked by nontraditionals, like Bloomberg 
Businessweek, Crunchbase, LinkedIn, The Wall Street Journal, and more.  
Site Design  
Assuming companies successfully reach beta.sam to explore potential DoD 
opportunities, they face yet another obstacle: how to navigate the site. It is clear from the 
landing page, a snapshot of which is provided in Figure 1, that it is not designed with 
supplier outreach in mind. Rather, it explicitly states that it is “for people who make, receive, 
and manage federal awards” (General Services Administration, n.d.). These distinct 
stakeholder groups have markedly different purposes for visiting the site and have markedly 
different levels of familiarity with government data and terminology. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 80 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 1. Beta.Sam Landing Page 
 
Nontraditionals face an immediate challenge of trying to decipher the wide array of 
links and drop-down menu options to determine what content is relevant to them. 
References to topics such as “Wage Determinations’’ and “Contract Data Reports’’ confuse 
and intimidate companies unfamiliar with the government market. Furthermore, there is no 
explicit call to action on the homepage for companies interested in learning more about 
selling their products/services to the government—only a drop-down menu that allows a 
user to select “Contract Opportunities” and small text towards the bottom of the page that 
says “Learn More” followed by “Contract Opportunities (FBO).”  
Rather than relying on a single site to serve multiple distinct stakeholder groups, we 
recommend that the federal government create a separate site specifically for suppliers. The 
site would speak directly to prospective and current suppliers using simple, clear, and 
straightforward language. It could be linked to the “New Supplier Portal” we recommended 
in our 2020 research paper—a resource specifically for companies with no prior experience 
selling to the government (Bresler & Bresler, 2020). There would be a prominent search 
feature with an explicit call to action to the effect of “Interested in Selling Your 
Products/Services to the Government? Search for Open Opportunities Here.” Additionally, 
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we suggest that investments made by the DoD to market beta.sam be specifically focused 
on marketing this offshoot, supplier-specific site.  
Search Functionality 
If and when users reach the landing page associated with “Contract Opportunities,” 
they can input keywords to conduct Boolean searches for relevant opportunities. Two 
significant limitations to this search functionality include: 
● When inputting a search term, beta.sam only returns matches that reference the 
exact term searched; it does not stem the search term to generate matches for 
related terms. For instance, if a company searches “UAV,” they will not see matches 
for “drone” (unless the “drone” opportunity also contains the term UAV). As it stands, 
the scope of relevant opportunities presented to a company is substantially limited, 
which in turn limits the pool of prospective suppliers that participate in a given DoD 
opportunity. We recommend that the federal government at large, including the DoD, 
incorporate related terms to beta.sam’s search function. They can leverage 
resources such as the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) thesaurus to do 
so in a consistent fashion.  
● Beta.sam only searches for the input term in the title and description of that 
opportunity—it does not search for the term in the attachment data. DoD customers 
often outline their needs in attachments rather than in the description, particularly in 
calls for market research. As it stands, companies who rely solely on beta.sam 
searches miss out on many potentially viable opportunities. We recommend that the 
DoD either mandate stakeholders to outline their needs areas in the description field 
or enable queries to search attachment data.  
Of note, identifying too many opportunities can also be problematic, so it is important 
that the opportunities presented are easy to assess and understand. These nuances are 
addressed in greater detail in the Readability and Redundancy sections below. 
Response Time 
Acknowledging that a lack of awareness of beta.sam, coupled with challenges posed 
by the design of the site, greatly inhibit the DoD’s ability to reach a broad audience, we now 
shift our focus to assess the features of DoD opportunities. These analyses make the 
assumption that companies know beta.sam exists and are using it to search for potential 
DoD opportunities. The first feature we explored is the length of time a company has to 
prepare and submit a response from when an opportunity is made public to when 
submissions are due. Response time is an important metric for competitiveness because 
companies need adequate time to identify an opportunity, to evaluate whether the 
opportunity is worth pursuing, and to prepare and submit a compliant response.  
To quantitatively analyze the response time frames associated with DoD 
solicitations, we aggregated the archived solicitation data from beta.sam in each year from 
2002 through 2020, starting in 2002 because the data sets become more complete in that 
year. After joining and cleaning 18 years’ worth of data, we filtered the data to isolate 
solicitations issued by the DoD. To ensure we counted only distinct solicitations, we also 
filtered the data to include just the most recent solicitation listing associated with a particular 
solicitation identification (solicitation ID) and title. Additionally, we excluded solicitations that 
contained no text in the name or the solicitation description and/or listed a response date 
that occurred prior to the publishing date.  
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We also excluded 
● Solicitations associated with notice types for “Sale of Surplus Property,” 
“Modification/Amendment/Cancel,” and “Foreign Government Standard” 
● “Award Only” notices 
● “Justifications” 
We excluded these listings because they contain features inconsistent with the majority of 
the data and are generally unrelated to the market research process.  
Our resulting data set of total DoD solicitations for analysis was 1,050,933. Figure 2 
shows the total number of DoD solicitations by year. 
 
 
Figure 2. Total DoD Solicitations by Year 
 
We then determined the response time frame for each solicitation by calculating the 
number of days between the date the solicitation was published and the date by which a 
response was due, both of which are standard data fields. As shown in Figure 3, every year 
from 2002 through 2020, 22% to 35% of all DoD solicitations had a response time of 10 
days or less, and 45% to 87% of all DoD solicitations had a response time of 21 days or 
less. In each year over the last decade, 70% or more of all DoD solicitations had a response 
time of 21 days or less; and with the exception of 2020, at least 30% of all solicitations 
annually required responses within 10 days. 
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Figure 3. DoD Solicitation Response Time by Year 
 
While these turnaround times may not violate the FAR, it is unreasonable to expect 
that companies with little or no experience in the public sector will have ample time to 
participate in the market research process for opportunities open 21 days or less, and a time 
frame of 10 days or less is that much more challenging. Furthermore, as the data show, the 
problem has become progressively worse over the last 2 decades. This trend is especially 
concerning since, over that same time frame, the military has become increasingly reliant on 
technologies being developed outside of the traditional DIB. In other words, as the need to 
engage nontraditionals has grown, the process for companies to do so has become more 
anticompetitive.  
Response Time by Notice Type 
According to the DoD Guidebook for Publicizing Notices in Contract Opportunities, 
government stakeholders are required to publish notices for “proposed contract actions 
valued at more than $25,000,” which include “announcements through official solicitations in 
the pre-award process, and up through award” (DoD, 2020, p. 3). As such, each opportunity 
corresponds to a specific notice type, depending on the purpose of the particular contract 
action. Each of the 1,050,933 opportunities in our data set corresponded to one of the 
following notice types, as defined by the Guidebook for Publicizing Notices in Contract 
Opportunities (DoD, 2020, p. 5): 
● Special Notice: To increase competition and broaden industry participation, a 
special notice may be used to announce small business conferences, business fairs, 
long-range procurement estimates, pre-bid or preproposal conferences, meetings, 
and the availability of draft solicitations or draft specifications for review. 
● Sources Sought: Use the sources sought notice type for Requests for Information 
(RFI) and other types of market research. An RFI is used when the Government 
does not presently intend to award a contract, but wants to obtain price, delivery, 
other market information, or capabilities for planning purposes. Responses are 
information only and shall not be used as an offer or proposal. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 84 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
● Presolicitation: In appropriate cases, use a presolicitation notice to advise suppliers 
on the scope and purpose of the acquisition and to invite potential offerors to submit 
information. This allows the Government to advise the offerors about their potential 
to be viable competitors. Responses are information only and shall not be used as 
an offer or proposal. The FAR requires that a presolicitation notice be published in 
advance of a solicitation notice unless the combined synopsis/solicitation is used.  
● Solicitation: Requests for proposals (RFPs) are used in negotiated acquisitions to 
communicate Government requirements to prospective contractors and to solicit 
proposals.  
● Combined Synopsis: Use a combined Synopsis/Solicitation when the procurement 
meets the applicable conditions outlined in the FAR to reduce the time required to 
solicit and award contracts for the acquisition of commercial items. This notice type 
combines the synopsis and the issuance of the solicitation into a single document.  
The purpose of Special Notices, Sources Sought, and Presolicitations is to allow the 
DoD to collect information from a broad range of suppliers about what capabilities they 
possess and how they would approach solving the DoD’s stated problem(s). The DoD then 
uses the feedback gathered to shape and inform future requirements. It is especially 
important that nontraditionals participate in these types of information exchanges. 
Otherwise, the military’s view of how problems can be solved is shaped exclusively by 
entrenched suppliers, which is inherently limiting as they do not always possess the most 
cutting-edge capabilities and may not be incentivized to encourage the DoD to consider new 
approaches. As such, we were interested in understanding how response times varied 
across these different notice types, and—in particular—for Special Notices, Sources Sought, 
and Presolicitations. 
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the vast majority of Special Notices and Sources 
Sought, and nearly half of all Presolicitations, have a turnaround of 21 days or less. Based 
on response time alone, suppliers unfamiliar with the DoD’s supplier outreach methods are 
effectively closed off from participating in these critical calls for market research.  
 
 
Figure 4. Response Time by Notice Type 
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Figure 5. Percentage of DoD Solicitations, by Response Time and Notice Type 
 
While technically speaking, the DoD may comply with FAR Parts 5 and 6 by making 
these opportunities public, one could argue they fail to meet the objective of FAR Part 10 by 
virtue of these short turnaround times. Furthermore, DoD opportunities with aggressively 
short turnaround times are often referred to in industry as “wired” (Walinskas, 2017). A wired 
opportunity is one where the customer has already identified its vendor, and the formal bid 
process exists only for compliance purposes. The odds of another supplier winning a future 
contract are effectively zero.  
We recognize the importance of DoD stakeholders being able to engage with 
suppliers swiftly—in fact, allowing companies to contract quickly is critical for attracting 
innovators. However, the volume of opportunities with anticompetitive turnaround times 
indicates a disconnect between the intent of the regulatory standards and how they are 
employed in practice. To the extent that DoD stakeholders are making opportunities public 
for 21 days or less as a loophole to award contracts to suppliers they have already identified 
illustrates that there is a need to allow DoD stakeholders the ability to quickly engage certain 
suppliers, without doing so at the expense of the military’s overall marketing and outreach 
strategies. Specifically, we recommend that DoD stakeholders be required to make 
solicitations active for at least 30 days or be able to formally justify circumventing this 
requirement to bring a supplier on more quickly, similar to the use of sole-source 
justifications. If no such justification exists, a suitable response window—coupled with 
aggressively marketing the DoD requirements in general, as previously discussed—is 
essential to ensuring that the military has the ability to reach and engage nontraditionals. 
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Content 
Readability: Reading-Ease & Grade Level 
In order to ensure fair competition, opportunities not only need a reasonable 
response time but also must be written clearly so that potential suppliers can understand the 
requirements. Directly to this point, we sought to evaluate the content of DoD solicitations to 
determine the extent to which they are readable and easily understood by a wide audience.  
To do so, we utilized the Flesch–Kincaid (F–K) readability tests. The two F–K tests, 
the F–K Reading-Ease test and the F–K Grade Level test, weigh features such as total 
words, total sentences, and total syllables to indicate how difficult a passage is to 
understand (“Flesch–Kincaid readability tests,” n.d.). For the F–K Reading-Ease test, a low 
score indicates that a passage is difficult to read, while a high score indicates that a text is 
easier to read. The F–K Grade Level test scores text based on U.S. grade levels or the 
number of years of education generally required to understand the text. The scores 
correspond to one another, insofar as text that is classified as “Difficult to Read” is 
equivalent to the “College” grade level, “Very Difficult to Read” is equivalent to “College 
Graduate” grade level, and so forth. Figure 6 lists each F–K Readability Group and its 
corresponding F–K Grade Level.  
To calculate the F–K scores of the 1,050,933 solicitations in our data set, we 
assessed the text contained in each solicitation description. As shown in Figure 6, which 
presents the breakdown of the solicitations by F–K Reading-Ease and Grade Level, the 
majority of solicitation descriptions analyzed were “Difficult” or “Very Difficult” to read. Nearly 
59% of all solicitations require some college-level education, and another nearly 20% of 
solicitations are suited for individuals that graduated from college. By comparison, fewer 
than 3% of solicitations are written in plain English.  
 
 
Figure 6. DoD Solicitations, Scored by Reading-Ease and Grade Level 
 
Figure 7 provides three examples of solicitation descriptions that were classified as 
“Difficult to Read,” according to the F–K test. They contain esoteric acronyms and range 
from including excessive information to including almost no information at all. 
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Figure 7. Sample “Difficult to Read” Solicitation Descriptions 
To attract a broad audience, requirements must be written in concise, accessible 
language. Requirements that consist of complex, incomprehensible language limit 
competition because companies become frustrated by the challenges and effort needed to 
decipher the text. Furthermore, these poorly written requirements run contrary to the DoD 
Plain Writing Act of 2010. The act requires federal agencies to write “clear Government 
communication that the public can understand and use” and stipulates guidelines for 
compliance that require the DoD to write new documents in “plain language” (Washington 
Headquarters Services, n.d.).  
We recommend that the DoD require all solicitation descriptions to be written in plain 
English, suitable for an 8th- to 9th-grade reading level. To implement this policy, the 
government can incorporate a feature on the back end of beta.sam that automatically reads 
the text of every new solicitation inputted by a DoD stakeholder and calculates its F–K 
scores. If the scores do not meet the recommended reading level, the system automatically 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 88 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
recommends simpler replacement language that the stakeholder can review and approve. 
Only once the appropriate levels of readability are met can the solicitation be published. We 
also recommend that text on all public-facing DoD websites, including beta.sam, as well as 
text in DoD collateral materials meant for public distribution, be written in plain English.  
 Readability: Supplier Feedback 
In addition to analyzing the readability tests on the 1,050,933 solicitations in our data 
set, we also surveyed 23 small businesses to gather their feedback on government 
solicitations. The 23 firms are nontraditional dual-use companies that are currently 
participants in the Air Force’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. For 
each company, we utilized publicly available information, including their SBIR award 
description and related keywords, to establish a basic understanding of their capabilities. 
We then identified opportunities via beta.sam that appeared to relate to their capabilities, 
shared the links to the relevant opportunities with a designated company point of contact 
using Survey Monkey, and asked them to offer feedback on each match. Because they are 
SBIR participants, they are inherently more familiar with navigating the DoD’s solicitation 
processes than companies with no prior defense business, which would imply a greater 
comfort level with deciphering additional DoD opportunities presented to them. On the 
contrary, the companies were frustrated by how challenging it was to decipher the 
solicitations. Specific feedback included: 
● “I cannot tell from the (Areas of Interest) (AOI) what they are asking” 
● “I’m struggling mightily to find the AOIs that say what the DoD really wants.” 
● “Super annoying that I had to comb through attachments to find the AOI’s topic.” 
● “(Broad Agency Announcements) (BAAs) are complex” 
● “These BAAs take quite a while to go through and communicate.” 
● “That was SUPER painful ... because of the opacity with which those SAM postings 
are written. There are a couple—even AFTER downloading the documents from 
SAM—that remain mysterious.” 
To competitively attract and engage nontraditionals, opportunities must be written 
clearly and provide the detailed information necessary for a company to evaluate whether or 
not the opportunity is worth pursuing. The aforementioned feedback highlights another 
problem with the DoD’s marketing and outreach methods: critical information is often buried 
in cumbersome attachments or omitted altogether. Having to sift through complex files to 
understand the requirements does not inspire a company to respond to a solicitation. 
Accordingly, in addition to ensuring that the description text of an opportunity is written in 
plain English, we also recommend that all opportunity descriptions explicitly state the 
customer’s primary areas of interest.  
 Requisite Information 
By assessing the features of the data contained in our solicitation data set and 
reviewing publicly available opportunities on beta.sam, we found that the DoD often omits 
critical pieces of information from opportunity listings altogether. Specifically, there are no 
structured fields requiring DoD stakeholders to indicate on the landing page of beta.sam the 
value of the opportunity (estimated or actual) or the performance period (estimated or 
actual).  
We recognize that providing specific contract values or performance periods for all 
notice types is a challenge for DoD stakeholders, because the market research process is 
intended to help shape the requirements. However, nontraditionals, especially those with 
robust private sector revenue streams, are unlikely to invest time and resources to explore 
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an engagement with a DoD customer without some sense of the potential upside and/or 
when the work might begin.  
We suggest that the DoD be required to provide an estimated contract value/range 
for all opportunities. An algorithmic approach can be employed to generate the estimates, 
including aggregating and weighing factors such as average contract size awarded by the 
corresponding contracting office over the last 5 years; average contract size for the 
particular product or service the opportunity corresponds to (for instance, if the opportunity 
relates to drones, calculating the average size of drone contracts in DoD over the last 5 
years); budget estimates for that particular product/service as provided by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB); and other related data points. The solicitation would state 
that the information provided is an estimate and subject to change. While the process for 
calculating the estimate requires further research and refinement, we believe it is essential 
for the DoD to invest in providing this data point as part of its marketing and communication 
efforts. Companies, particularly nontraditionals attempting to scale with limited resources, 
also need some sense of performance period to prioritize which opportunities to pursue. 
DoD stakeholders should, therefore, be required to provide an estimated period of 
performance as well. 
Redundancy 
Another challenge that companies face when trying to prioritize DoD opportunities is 
that many of the same technologies are in high demand by stakeholders across all service 
branches. The DoD’s 2020 modernization priorities, for example, emphasize the importance 
of “the development and procurement of high priority systems—such as artificial intelligence, 
directed energy, small satellites, hypersonics, a 5G network and unmanned aerial systems” 
(Vergun, 2020) for the whole of military.  
For companies with applicable capabilities, a large addressable market may make 
investing in the defense sector more appealing. However, as discussed throughout this 
paper, to capitalize on the market, companies must have the ability to navigate it. In cases 
where multiple DoD stakeholders are seeking similar solutions (“redundancy”), the 
challenges we have highlighted are compounded by the fact that a company must identify 
and decipher the relevant opportunities and then decide which ones to pursue. To assess 
the scope of this redundancy problem, we sought to explore the extent to which multiple 
DoD stakeholders are simultaneously seeking capabilities related to two of the military’s 
modernization priorities, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI).  
Redundancy Analysis 
To calculate how many DoD solicitations corresponded to UAVs and/or AI, we 
employed a more computationally intensive approach that required us to utilize a smaller 
data set. We focused our analysis on a data set of 69,933 solicitations from the year 2020. 
Next, we leveraged the DTIC thesaurus to expand the set of terms we used to describe 
UAVs and AI. The DTIC thesaurus allows for the provision of an input term, such as 
“unmanned aerial vehicle,” and returns a set of related keywords with varying degrees of 
proximity to the original term. For the purposes of this research, we limited the results to 
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related terms, which can be understood as synonyms.3 Next, we algorithmically searched 
for incidences of these terms in the description, ID, and title for each solicitation. A matched 
term indicated that an opportunity corresponded to a UAV and/or AI requirement. With this 
methodology, we identified 42 DoD opportunities in 2020 that corresponded to UAVs and/or 
AI. 
As previously discussed, the DoD often buries critical information, including the 
areas of interest, in attachments. To more accurately calculate the number of solicitations 
related to UAV/AI capabilities would, therefore, require searching for the terms in the 
attachment data. Solicitations can have dozens or even hundreds of pages of attachments 
across multiple files and file types, and because supporting documents are formatted 
inconsistently, it was not feasible to incorporate the text and data from attachments for all 
69,933 solicitations. Instead, to enhance the search, we decided to incorporate a small 
subset of attachment data.  
Specifically, we first filtered the data to isolate opportunities that corresponded to 
either a Sources Sought or a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA). While BAAs are not a 
specific notice type, they—like the DoD’s other methods of conducting market research—
request “scientific or research proposals from private firms concerning certain areas of 
interest to the government” (AcqNotes, 2021) and may lead to contract awards. The DoD 
relies on BAAs to communicate with industry and gather critical market research. For 
instance, the DoD’s SBIR topics are issued as BAAs. To identify BAAs in our 2020 data set, 
we searched for the terms “Broad Agency Announcement’’ and “BAA” in the contract ID, 
solicitation name, and solicitation description. We then combined the BAAs with the 
opportunities corresponding to a Sources Sought notice type, excluding any Sources Sought 
that were already counted as BAAs. In total, we identified 2,519 opportunities in 2020 that 




3 Keyword Corpus: AI APPLICATIONS, AI COMPUTING, APPLIED COMPUTER SCIENCE, 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COMPUTING, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
SOFTWARE 
COMPUTATIONAL PROCESSES, COMPUTER VISION, COUNTER-DRONE TECHNOLOGY, 
COUNTER-UAS 
COUNTER-UAV TECHNOLOGY, COUNTER-UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, DEEP LEARNING, 
DEEP STRUCTURED LEARNING, DRONE, DRONE CONTROL AIRCRAFT, DRONE SWARMS, DRONES, 
EXPERT SYSTEMS, HEAVY FUEL ENGINES, HEAVY FUEL UAV ENGINES, HIERARCHICAL LEARNING, 
INFERENCE ENGINES, INTELLIGENT PERSONAL ASSISTANTS, INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, LAMP RAY 
ROV, MACHINE LEARNING, MACHINE PERCEPTION, MICRO AIR VEHICLE, NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING, NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING SOFTWARE, NEURAL NETWORKS, REMOTELY 
PILOTED AIRCRAFT, SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING, SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM, 
SOFTWARE AGENTS, SUPERVISED LEARNING, SUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING, SURVEILLANCE 
DRONES, SWARM INTELLIGENCE, SWARMING DRONES, SWARMING TECHNOLOGIES, SWARMS OF 
FIXED WING DRONES, TARGET DRONES, UAS, UAV, UGV, UNDERWATER DRONES, UNINHABITED 
AIRCRAFT VEHICLE, UNMANNED AERIAL, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE, 
UNMANNED AEROSPACE VEHICLE, UNMANNED AIR SYSTEMS, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT, UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT VEHICLE, UNMANNED GROUND SYSTEMS, UNMANNED 
GROUND VEHICLE, UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLE SYSTEMS, UNMANNED SYSTEMS, UNSUPERVISED 
LEARNING, UNSUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING 
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text and data contained in their attachments and utilized optical character recognition (OCR) 
and other methods of text extraction to search this data for UAV/AI terms.  
With this methodology, we identified an additional 22 DoD opportunities in 2020 that 
corresponded to UAVs and/or AI, bringing the total to 64. In other words, utilizing OCR and 
text-extraction on just 3.6% of the solicitation data increased the number of matched 
opportunities by more than 50%. Based on these results, one can assume that the total 
number of DoD stakeholders that posited demand for UAV/AI capabilities in 2020 was 
substantially more than 64.  
Demand Outside of DoD 
Furthermore, our analyses did not include solicitations from federal stakeholders 
outside of the DoD. When assessing the challenges companies face in trying to prioritize 
DoD customers, it is worth considering the potential effects of demand from non-DoD 
customers—particularly because, with the beta.sam process, companies discover DoD and 
non-DoD opportunities simultaneously. We recommend further research to explore the DoD-
level findings we have addressed in this paper across the entirety of government, and we 
recommend that this further research incorporate attachment data to the best extent 
possible.  
In the interim, we conducted a microanalysis to explore the potential impact of non-
DoD demand on our research results. To do so, we aggregated all open federal 
opportunities—DoD and non-DoD, including attachment data—from a single day—October 
8, 2020—and searched for UAV terms across this data set. As shown in Figure 8, on that 
single day, 132 open opportunities corresponded to UAVs. 
 
Figure 8. Open Solicitations Related to UAVs on October 8, 2020 
 
Assessing redundancy using any one of the aforementioned methodologies, it is 
clear that companies with high-priority capabilities can encounter anywhere from dozens to 
hundreds of prospective DoD and non-DoD opportunities. Therefore, if and when a 
company identifies and deciphers relevant opportunities, realistically it cannot participate in 
all of them. The DoD’s failure to coordinate its outreach and communication efforts results in 
negative consequences for both nontraditionals and the warfighter. DoD customers only 
receive feedback from a small number of firms and are not guaranteed to receive feedback 
from firms with the most applicable capabilities. As a result, they have a myopic view of how 
their problems can be solved. Companies interested in serving the needs of government 
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have to decide which customer(s) to engage with the information they have at hand. As a 
result, they are not necessarily choosing the customers whose use cases align most 
seamlessly with their capabilities, and they are not necessarily choosing the customers with 
the most urgent need for their capabilities.  
Better intra-government communication would benefit the supplier and the 
government; thus, it is essential that military stakeholders coordinate their outreach and 
communication efforts to maximize exposure of their requirements. For priority verticals, we 
recommend that DoD stakeholders issue joint requirements in the market research/outreach 
phases. Further research is required to determine the best way to implement this concept, 
including how to appropriately incentivize DoD stakeholders to take the necessary actions. 
We suggest that prior to release, the DoD circulate requirements related to priority verticals 
to designated offices within each service branch. This action will allow DoD stakeholders to 
incorporate related requirements into the solicitation. In addition to helping the DoD gather 
information from a wider range of potential suppliers and steer them in different directions 
more effectively, this approach would allow companies to market their capabilities to multiple 
prospective customers simultaneously—a major advantage over the current stovepiped 
system. 
Conclusion 
In spite of billions in investment for innovation initiatives and unremitting rhetoric from 
senior leadership about the DoD’s commitment to a culture of innovation, our 2020 research 
proved that the military has failed to attract and engage a significant number of new 
suppliers over the last decade, which puts the warfighter at risk (Bresler & Bresler, 2020). In 
this paper, we employed qualitative and quantitative research techniques to illustrate that 
how and where the DoD communicates with industry have contributed to this problem. We 
identified a series of conditions that must be met in order for the DoD’s requirements and 
messaging to reach suppliers outside of the traditional DIB:  
● Companies need to know where to go to search for DoD opportunities, and the 
search process must be user-friendly and intuitive. 
● Companies need enough time to identify, assess, and respond to an opportunity.  
● Companies need to easily understand what DoD customers are asking for. 
● To determine whether or not an opportunity is worth pursuing, companies need 
certain pieces of critical information, including the potential contract size. 
● The DoD needs to coordinate its marketing and outreach efforts, especially for 
capabilities in high demand across the government.  
The absence of any one of these conditions not only fails to meet the objective of the 
FAR but also creates a bottleneck that limits industry participation in the market research 
process. The military, in turn, operates with an incomplete picture of how its problems could 
be solved and what capabilities exist to solve them. The recommendations outlined 
throughout this paper are intended to help the DoD address each of these bottlenecks as 
efficiently as possible and to make the process of engaging with the military more seamless 
for nontraditionals accustomed to operating in the private sector. Ultimately, the military 
needs access to the best and brightest suppliers to preserve the strength of the warfighter—
and to attract best suppliers, the DoD must behave like a better customer.  
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Abstract 
In this paper, we survey a small group of Air Force contracting personnel to understand their 
views on contracting in sole-source environments. Our findings suggest Air Force contracting 
personnel in this setting know that sellers in non-competitive relationship have more leverage 
and power than the buyer. Indeed, 90% of respondents feel they operate at a negotiating 
disadvantage in sole-source contracts. Arming them with certified cost and pricing data does 
not improve leverage according to majority of them. Rather, they identify two constraints in 
their qualitative responses. First, the sole-source environment itself contributes to the 
problem. Second, many respondents feel they operate at an informational disadvantage 
compared to their private counterparts. This suggests specific training on their contracts 
would be more valuable than any general training on business acumen.  
Introduction 
Non-competitive spending in the DoD is large. Per the DoD Competition Scorecard 
for quarter 3 FY2018, non-competed dollars accounted for 63% of total dollars by the Air 
Force and 65% by the Navy.4 A majority of Navy and Air Force dollars are, thus, obligated in 
non-competitive settings where few large firms dominate. Understanding the views of 
government contracting personnel on working in such non-competitive markets is critical to 
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and civilian Air Force contracting personnel at the F-22 program office. The majority of the 
F-22 program office contract actions are awarded in sole-source environments.  
Section 843 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) tasked the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to assess whether there are 
any “gaps in knowledge of industry operations, industry motivation and business acumen in 
the acquisition workforce” and how such gaps, if any, can be closed with training and 
development (NDAA, 2018). To that end, Congress asked the Under Secretary to submit a 
report on the knowledge of “industry operations, industry motivation and business acumen” 
necessary for each acquisition position and how non-DAU sources (industry and other 
universities) can be used to improve training. In response, RAND prepared a report drawing 
on interviews of subject matter experts in the DoD and industry, and published sources 
(Werber et al., 2019). But the report was unable to speak to the views of acquisition 
personnel because they did not have the time to survey them.  
Our project takes a first step in addressing this gap. We survey Air Force contracting 
personnel at the F-22 program office on their experience with sole-source contracting, 
which accounts for a large share of the Air Force budget. We hope our small survey, among 
others, will help identify gaps in training, if any, that may help acquisition personnel better 
negotiate contracts and determine “a fair and reasonable” price in these sole-source 
settings (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2018).  
By explicitly targeting business acumen, industry operation, and motivation, 
Congress wants trained acquisition personnel to understand the business of firms. In 
particular, how do firms price, cut costs, negotiate with buyers and suppliers, and respond 
to market conditions? A solid foundation in these concepts is likely to help DoD acquisition 
personnel secure more favorable terms when they buy goods and services. Yet, these 
concepts are not uniformly defined in the DoD as noted in the RAND report (Weber et al., 
2019). Moreover, contracting for common support services such as waste disposal is 
different than contracting for a major weapons system. A general understanding of firm 
behavior may be useful to both, but acquisition personnel for a major weapons system need 
to understand the background and motivations of the big defense firms operating in their 
field. Identifying gaps in knowledge, thus, requires differentiating between general business 
learning versus more specific learning tailored to the experience and career path of 
acquisition personnel.   
Our results support this point. In our survey, the majority of Air Force contracting 
officers know that sellers in non-competitive (i.e., sole-source) relationships have more 
leverage and power than the buyer. Indeed, 90% of respondents feel they operate at a 
negotiating disadvantage in sole-source contracts. Giving them certified cost and pricing 
data does not help, according to the majority of them. Rather, they identify two constraints 
in their qualitative responses. First, the sole-source environment itself contributes to the 
problem. Second, many respondents feel they operate at an informational disadvantage 
compared to their industry counterparts.  
Respondents in our study are familiar with the basic constraints of buying in non-
competitive markets. They mention an inability to negotiate prices and the associated power 
asymmetry between them and the sole-source contractor. Yet, many respondents point to 
specific information gaps. One respondent mentions that defense-focused firms have more 
nuanced goals such as maximizing revenues that are perhaps not as clearly related to 
models of profit-maximization. Other respondents say they do not have information on sub-
contract terms. And still others say their industry counterparts work on these programs for 
decades and are familiar with the ins and outs of the contract in ways that government 
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acquisition personnel are not. These responses suggest more specialized training on the 
contracts themselves and the firm involved is more valuable.  
We also find differences between individuals with 7 or fewer years of contracting 
experience compared to those with more experience. Less experienced individuals are 
unfamiliar with issues of nonconformance and consideration in sole-source contracts. 
Consideration in contracts is the idea that both parties benefit from entering into a contract. 
Given these issues, these differences are perhaps unsurprising because resolving 
nonconformance involves many steps and can take time.  
Our survey focuses on a small population of 57 government contracting personnel at 
the F-22 program office. That combined with our low response rate of 28% makes us 
cautious in drawing strong conclusions. That said, our findings are perhaps unsurprising 
and we offer a few tentative recommendations for training acquisition personnel in non-
competitive procurements. Clearly, an individual contracting officer cannot change the 
market in which they operate. But, we can give them more information on the contract 
itself—a short readable summary of the contract highlighting any incentives, due dates and 
changes, a brief history of the negotiations leading to the final contract, and the main 
players involved. Such details are often included in the “after action report” of seasoned 
contracting personnel, but we should make them a standard practice. Moreover, we should 
give more technical and economic information on the particular contract, which would 
strengthen the commanding officer’s negotiating position. On a related note, we may also 
want to develop in-depth profiles of the principal firms operating in these markets. Finally, 
we recommend a larger survey of government contracting personnel across multiple 
commands to better understand and inform the training of acquisition personnel.  
Background  
We review the RAND report here that motivates our survey. RAND researchers 
undertook their study in response to Section 843 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA). On behalf of the DoD, their report assesses the current state of training in 
“industry operations, industry motivation and business acumen” in the acquisition workforce, 
documents gaps in that training, and offers recommendations, in particular on the role of 
non-DAU sources. Their assessment relies on interviews of subject matter experts in the 
DoD and industry, published competencies for acquisition personnel, and related literature 
(Werber et al., 2019).  
Their findings first highlight that there are no consistent definitions of the terms 
“industry operations, industry motivation and business acumen” in the competency models 
associated with different acquisition career fields. Moreover, the competency models 
themselves are not uniform across career fields. Although the RAND researchers 
constructed a working definition of these terms, it was difficult to identify which career fields 
in particular needed knowledge of these terms. Yet, the Report finds that most acquisition 
career fields need to know these terms and related issues with career fields in contracting 
requiring more knowledge than science and technology management for example.   
Although the acquisition workforce uses both internal sources (e.g., Defense 
Acquisition University [DAU], Naval Postgraduate School [NPS]) and external sources (e.g., 
commercial training companies, civilian colleges, and universities) for training and 
education, the Report was unable to identify precise gaps. This is perhaps due to the study 
relying on interviews with SMEs as opposed to surveys of acquisition personnel. Finally, the 
Report finds very little evaluation of the effectiveness of training and development programs. 
Apart from student responses to courses and some higher-level focus groups, there are no 
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systematic evaluations of whether acquisition personnel make changes in their jobs based 
on their training and whether those changes translate into improved outcomes.  
To address gaps in Section 843 areas of “industry operations, industry motivation 
and business acumen,” the Report first recommends that the DoD decide what level of 
knowledge of these areas is required for each career field. Then it recommends the DoD 
measure the required knowledge of these terms among acquisition personnel. This would 
enable the DoD to precisely identify gaps, if any, in this knowledge. It also recommends 
better tracking of training by personnel throughout their career. This would allow for stronger 
assessments of training and development programs in the acquisition workforce. Our survey 
addresses an important gap in this study by surveying Air Force contracting personnel on 
their knowledge of contracting in non-competitive environments. Our findings suggest that 
most Air Force contracting personnel have a basic understating of industry operations in 
their field. However, our findings also indicate that the surveyed personnel need more 
specific knowledge on contracts, sub-contract terms, and contract history,   
Survey Methodology 
To understand the views of Air Force personnel on sole-source contracting, we 
surveyed 57 individuals in the F-22 System Program Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base, OH, and Hill Air Force Base, UT. Of these 57, five are Air Force officers and 52 are 
Air Force civilians. After receiving the necessary approval from the Air Force Survey 
Organization, an administrator emailed a link to the online survey, using the NPS approved 
Lime Survey web-based survey system. The survey was open from December 6, 2019, to 
December 31, 2019. It was a voluntary and anonymous survey. We did not ask or collect 
any personally identifiable information. Moreover, we added the following statement in the 
beginning: “Your participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate 
you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the survey. You will not be 
penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you 
choose not to participate in this survey or to withdraw.” This was to ensure respondents felt 
comfortable sharing their feedback without fear of retaliation. 
Our survey consisted of two parts. Part 1 asked seven demographic and background 
questions, while Part 2 asked respondents about their experience in non-competitive 
contracting, whether they feel they are at a disadvantage in such settings, and to identify 
factors if they do feel they are operating at a disadvantage. We also asked their experience 
with non-conformance and consideration in non-competitive contracts. The complete survey 
is available upon request.  
Despite multiple email reminders, our response rate was only 28% (16 individuals) 
dropping to 23% (13 individuals) with complete responses. December is a busy time with 
year-end deadlines and holidays. This perhaps reduced the number of respondents. Given 
the small number of respondents, we view the survey results as more qualitative evidence 
and hope future surveys with larger populations can provide more insight into the issues 
raised by the F-22 Air Force personnel.  
Results 
We first describe the background characteristics of the respondents. Unfortunately, 5 
of the 16 responses were incomplete. We summarize the responses below for everyone that 
responded to a question. Of our 16 responses, 3 identified as Air Force officers and 10 as 
Air Force civilians. Another three chose not to respond. This translates into a higher 
response rate of 60% among the Air Force officers compared to 19% among AF civilians. 
Our survey population included 5 Air Force officers, 3 responded, while 10 out of 52 civilians 
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responded. In terms of gender, men accounted for 69% of responses compared to 31% 
women.  
Among the military responses, 2 are of ranks O-1 to O-3, while 1 is of rank O-4 to O-
6. Among civilians, a majority of the responses (60%) are at GS-13 and GS-14 grade, 
compared to GS-12. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the professional background of the 
respondents. Almost 80% have more than 4 years of contracting experience with the federal 
government, and 50% have more than 8 years of experience. This suggests our survey 
responses reflect the views of both entry-level and advanced acquisition personnel. Most 
respondents (85%) also have a Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
certification of Level 2 and 3.  
 
Figure 1: Years of Contracting Experience. 
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Figure 2: DAWIA Level Contracting 
As shown in Figure 3, our respondents have experience in multiple contracting areas 
with the majority in weapons systems acquisition followed by operational contracting. 
 
Figure 3: Areas of Contracting 
We turn next to our experience questions on non-competitive acquisitions. Given our 
focus on the F-22 program office, it is unsurprising that 67% of our respondents have been 
involved (current or past) in non-competitive relationships with incumbent contractors. These 
would be sole-source contracts. Of these 11 individuals (67%) responding “Yes,” all but one 
(90%) feel they are at a negotiating disadvantage with the contractor in this setting. Arming 
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them with certified cost and pricing data does not change their views. Of the group that feels 
they are at a negotiating disadvantage, 90% continue to feel at a disadvantage even with 
certified cost and pricing information.  
Such a lopsided response naturally leads to the question of why contracting 
personnel feel at a disadvantage in non-competitive settings. Their qualitative responses fit 
into two categories. First, they feel disadvantaged because private contractors leverage the 
sole-source environment. Some responses mention the negotiation/power asymmetry in 
particular of not being “able to walk away and either not purchase the item at all or to 
purchase it elsewhere.” Others mention the inability to negotiate lower prices because the 
sellers leverage their sole-source position.  
This explanation is perhaps unsurprising. We know from economic theories of firm 
behavior the difference between markets with lots of sellers (i.e., competitive markets) and 
one seller (i.e., monopoly). Prices are lower in competitive markets because buyers can 
choose from different sellers. Moreover, buyers can switch from one seller to another if they 
are unsatisfied with the product or price. This leads to lower prices for goods traded in 
competitive markets. But the military does not often operate in competitive markets. They 
buy custom products designed and built to their specific needs. Yet private firms also order 
custom products in many industries where dual-sourcing is a common response to diversify 
risk across multiple suppliers and reduce cost. Indeed, Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) show 
using a theoretical model that dual sourcing can reduce costs in a setting where firms face 
learning and entry costs, common to most DoD acquisitions. An empirical study confirms the 
advantages of dual-sourcing. Using a unique though small dataset of 14 tactile missile 
contracts between 1975 and 1995, Lyon (2006) shows that dual sourcing was undertaken to 
improve quality, not reduce cost per se, but still led to lower procurement costs.  
Other qualitative responses fall under the second category of government 
contracting personnel operating under an informational disadvantage compared to their 
industry counterparts. For example, a respondent mentioned that the “Program Office is not 
trained or knowledgeable [sic] on their requirements.” Another respondent mentioned they 
(i.e., government contracting personnel) do not have a “very deep understanding” of “true 
cost” or the government’s “negotiated price.” In yet another variant, a respondent described 
the difficulty in obtaining certified cost or pricing data from sub-contractors. Many 
respondents mentioned that the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) certification does not 
include data on the terms between contractors and their subcontractors. While sole-source 
contracts make these information barriers worse, it seems the Air Force should demand 
more data from their contractors and then disseminate it widely within the DoD acquisition 
community.   
Fifty percent of respondents that used incentive contracts such as Cost-Plus Award 
Fee (CPAF) or Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) felt such contracts better incentivized 
necessary performance among contractors. But the other 50% of respondents disagreed, 
describing some problems with incentive-style contracts. One respondent mentioned that 
contractors are not motivated by fees: rather their business model works around “cash flow” 
and “quarterly earnings.” Another respondent noted that contractors seem to pursue a 
revenue maximization strategy over profit maximization. Most incentive contracts assume 
firms seek to maximize profits by cutting costs. Yet these responses suggest these firms 
have goals that the government does not consider in the negotiation process. 
Our final experience questions centered on non-conforming supplies. Fifty percent of 
respondents had experience with contractor non-conformance. Though 50% 
nonconformance is high, it is difficult to interpret without more information on non-
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conformance in other DoD contracts and industry contracts. Of those that experienced non-
conformance, 88% said consideration was sought based on their highest dollar value 
contracts. Figure 4 describes the type of consideration sought with change in schedule 
being the most common followed by a decrease in price and more additional supplies.  
 
Figure 4: Types of Consideration Sought 
When consideration was sought for non-conformance, 57% of respondents said it 
was recovered. This seems low, but again it is hard to interpret the data without more 
information on the specific contract and dispute. In cases where consideration was 
recovered, 75% of respondents felt the consideration was fair. But in cases where 
consideration was not sought, the respondents again noted power asymmetry problems of 
sole-source contracts.  
Comparing the survey responses across different groups can offer more insight into 
these overall findings. But we are cautious in analyzing responses by group because of the 
small number of respondents in some groups. That said, we can use experience to bin 
individuals into two almost equal–sized groups. This exercise offers qualitative evidence on 
differences between those with more or less contracting experience.  
Among respondents reporting their years of contracting experience, we binned 6 
individuals (46%) as those with less experience ranging from 1 to 7 years. We binned the 
other 7 individuals (54%) as those with more experience ranging from 8 to 25 years. Both 
groups have similar exposure to non-competitive acquisitions. For example, all but one 
respondent in each group responded yes to the question on whether they had any 
experience with sole-source contracting. While both groups had similar backgrounds in sole-
source contracting, respondents with more experience felt they were at a negotiating 
disadvantage in larger numbers compared to those respondents with less experience. Four 
of those with less experience responded they were at a disadvantage compared to six of 
seven of those with more experience. Interestingly, respondents with more experience saw 
less value in certified cost and pricing data compared to those with less experience. Yet 
both groups mentioned power asymmetry and informational barriers as obstacles to 
effective negotiating in sole-source environments. 
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In response to non-conformance, respondents with more experience are more likely 
to run into non-conformance issues (6 out of 7) compared to those respondents with less 
experience (2 out of 6). However, more contracting experience also translates into seeing 
consideration being sought for non-conformance (5 out of 6 individuals) and consideration 
being recovered (4 out of 6 individuals). None of the respondents with less experience 
recalled consideration being recovered for their highest dollar value contract. Now these 
responses may just be a function of time. Non-conformance complaints and considerations 
can take time to resolve. While some resolve in days, others drag on for multiple years.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
We surveyed a small population of Air Force contracting personnel at the F-22 
System Program Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and Hill Air Force Base, 
UT. Our response rate was 28% or 16 respondents with higher responses among military 
personnel compared to civilians. Given our small population at one program office and low 
response rate, we are cautious in extrapolating to the larger government contracting 
population. That said, our findings likely confirm the  perspective of many contracting 
professionals working in government acquisition. With the caveats in mind, we want to offer 
tentative recommendations based on our survey.  
We recommend the Air Force undertake a large survey in scope and population. In 
scope, the survey should include (1) basic business and economic questions on non-
competitive markets and (2) specific questions on the contracts associated with each 
program office. Based on our survey responses, most contracting personnel are perhaps 
familiar with basic business concepts, but do not have the requisite specialty knowledge. If 
that is the case, a larger survey could help identify those gaps and then give the necessary 
information. Moreover, the survey should target multiple program offices, or at least those 
involved in the five largest dollar programs.  
Apart from surveys, we also recommend a detailed study on dual-sourcing. This is 
not a new recommendation. Rather, dual-sourcing has been extensively discussed in the 
operations academic literature and among DoD decision-makers. But, we suggest research 
that takes one product such as missiles in the Lyon (2006) article and follows its design and 
manufacturing history for the DoD to assess the potential for dual-sourcing. Such exercises 
may exist, and we are perhaps unaware of them. If they do exist, we should consider 
disseminating them widely so decision-makers are aware if there are precedents for dual-
sourcing in their specific domain and how to incorporate them.  
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Optimal Long-Run Talent Management of the Department 
of Defense Acquisition Workforce in Response to COVID-
19: A Dynamic Programming Approach 
Tom Ahn—Naval Postgraduate School [sahn1@nps.edu] 
Amilcar Menichini—Naval Postgraduate School [aamenich@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
As the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic lingers, with the speed of recovery still 
uncertain, the state of the civilian labor market will impact the public sector. Specifically, the 
relatively stable and insulated jobs in the Department of Defense (DoD) are expected to be 
perceived as more attractive for the near future. This implies changes in DoD worker quit 
behavior that present both a challenge and an opportunity for the DoD leadership in retaining 
high-quality, experienced talent. We use a unique panel dataset of DoD civilian acquisition area 
workers and a dynamic programming approach to simulate the impact of the pandemic on 
worker retention rates under a variety of recovery scenarios. We find that workers will choose 
not to exit from the DoD while the civilian sector suffers from the impact of the pandemic. This 
allows leadership to more easily retain experienced workers. However, once the civilian sector 
has recovered enough, these same workers will quit at an accelerated rate, making gains in 
talent only temporary. These results imply that while the DoD can take short-run advantage of 
negative shocks to the civilian sector to retain and attract high quality workers, long-run 
retention will be achieved through more fundamental reforms to personnel policy to make DoD 
jobs more attractive, no matter the state of the civilian labor market. 
Introduction 
The initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. civilian labor market was 
massive, with unemployment spiking to 15% in September 2020. While most world 
economies contracted in 2020, there is some consensus among economists of a relatively 
robust recovery in the near future, with average global economic growth projected to be 
about 5.5% in 2021 (International Monetary Fund, 2021). In the United States, the 
unemployment rate has already recovered partway since the nadir. However, the trajectory 
of recovery remains unclear, dependent on a host of public health programs, government 
stimulus, and the macroeconomic environment.  
While the civilian labor market has seen extraordinary swings in employment 
numbers, the government sector has been somewhat immune to the short-term effects of 
the pandemic. We examine the potential impacts of the gyrations and continuing uncertainty 
in the civilian labor market on the labor market decisions of public-sector workers, focusing 
on the civilian acquisition workforce (AWF) in the Department of Defense (DoD). While 
senior DoD leadership has historically been concerned with losing qualified senior civilian 
workers to the private sector, the labor market impact of COVID-19 may present a pressing 
need to adjust personnel policy as well as an opportunity to leverage the stability of DoD 
positions to compete against the draw of the private firms. 
We solve a dynamic programming model of worker attrition behavior, where long-
lasting shocks in the civilian labor market are explicitly modeled. In particular, the model 
allows for a negative AR(1) shock to the civilian sector, which slowly recovers through time. 
After calibrating the model parameters to the AWF using a unique panel administrative 
personnel dataset that tracks the civilian DoD labor force over the span of thirty years, we 
simulate civilian-side labor market shocks that correspond to economic recoveries of varying 
speeds and forecast the retention behavior of the workforce.  
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We find that a persistent negative shock to the civilian sector (plus insulation of the 
government/DoD labor market from the shock), for our case, the COVID-19 pandemic, leads 
workers to devalue jobs in the private sector in the short-run and remain in the government 
sector for a longer period of time. Depending on the severity and persistence of the shock, it 
may take more than a decade for workers to return to valuing civilian jobs as they did before 
the pandemic. This relative increase in attractiveness of government jobs is only temporary, 
however, and workers will accelerate their exit from the government sector into the private 
sector once the economic recovery is well underway. That is, the attrition rate when the 
economy recovers turns out to be higher than the rate that would have prevailed had there 
not been the global pandemic. 
The following section describes in more detail the labor market impact of COVID-19 
on the private sector and the long-run career trajectories of the typical AWF worker. Then, 
we explain the dynamic programming model, while the section after that describes the 
dataset and calibrates the model parameters to the AWF data. Then, we simulate potential 
COVID-19 scenarios going forward, and project the attrition behavior of the workforce under 
differing scenarios of economic recovery. Finally, our paper concludes, and the Appendix 
explores the retention effects of a one-time bonus. 
The Impact on Unemployment Arising from COVID-19 
The short-run impact of COVID-19 has been extraordinary, with the unemployment 
rate spiking to almost 15% from near historical lows (3.5%) in 2 months. As Figure 1 shows, 
even during the Great Recession, the unemployment rate peaked at 10.6%. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the U.S. economy will grow 4.6% in 2021, 
after contracting 3.5% in 2020. These are significantly upwardly revised estimates from its 
report in July 2020, when the CBO projected a growth rate of 4%. Correspondingly, 
employment has recovered sharply since September 2020 (Congressional Budget Office, 
2021). 
However, when the economy can return to business as usual and the vigor with 
which it can rebound remain unclear. Public health factors such as the efficacy of vaccines 
and their distribution, the discovery of more infectious variants of COVID-19, and sustained 
use of masks and social distancing until herd immunity is reached, will all play a role. In 
addition, the recovery of the rest of the world, additional federal, state, and local fiscal 
stimuli, as well as permanent changes in the economy such as expanded work-from-home 
and reconfiguration of global supply chains, may impact the private-sector labor market for 
years to come. 
The impact of such changes to the private sector will inevitably affect the public 
sector, especially for the civilian workforce within the DoD. The uncertainty in the private 
sector and the comparably stable government sector is expected to alter their long-term 
career trajectories. Figure 2 shows the attrition rate of DoD AWF workers, reproduced from 
Ahn and Menichini (2019). The sample covers September 1987 to December 2018. 
Approximately 30% of workers leave the DoD after about 8 years of service. By 
approximately 25 years of experience, roughly three-quarters of employees have left. While 
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these attrition rates are relatively low compared to many civilian industries, DoD leadership 
still expresses a desire to hold on to highly skilled, senior civilian workers.5  
 
Figure 1. Civilian Unemployment Rate. (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
While the shock of COVID-19 has been felt in almost every sector of the labor 
market, the government sector has notably been shielded from the worst of the impact. As 
Figure 3 shows, as of November 2020, government workers experienced an unemployment 
rate around 4%, which is lower than workers in the education and health services fields, 
which have received much wider media coverage of labor shortages due to the health risks 
from their proximity to the pandemic.  
While job stability has always been a draw for the government sector, the state of 
the economy as well as the continuing uncertainty about the speed of economic recovery, 
should make jobs in the DoD relatively much more attractive. Indeed, this argument is 
parallel to what has been known for a long time in military recruiting: demand for military 
jobs is countercyclical to the state of the civilian economy. With the backdrop of this large, 
negative, persistent, and unpredictable shock to the civilian labor market, we model the 





5 For example, “Highly educated, skilled, and experienced government acquisition professionals are vital 
now and, in the future, to provide warfighters the products they need” (DoN, 2018). Or, “All this relies on our 
most important asset, our people, and the approaches we take to recruit, train, and retain the workforce we need 
to compete and win in support of our national defense strategy.” - The Hon. James F. Geurts, ASN (RD & A) 
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Figure 2. Career Trajectories of DoD AWF Employees. (Ahn & Menichini, 2019) 
 
Figure 3. Unemployment Rate by Sector, November 2020. Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Model 
In this section, we describe the different parts of the dynamic programming model of 
employee attrition that will be used to produce policy simulations. 
We assume AWF workers are rational decision-makers who make career choices in 
order to maximize utility over their lifetime. The individual evaluates, at each decision point, 
all the costs and benefits involved in each possible choice, including pecuniary as well as 
non-pecuniary elements, which we describe here. At the beginning of each period (i.e., 1 
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year in this paper) the worker chooses between leaving the AWF to continue their career in 
the private sector, and staying in the public sector one more period.6 
We next describe all the costs and benefits (including monetary and non-monetary 
elements) that the individual trades off at every decision point. We assume that the 
pecuniary components include 
• AWF compensation, including basic pay, health insurance, locality adjustment, 
bonuses, etc. 
• Compensation in the private sector. 
We also assume the AWF employee is included in the Civil Service Retirement 
System (CSRS), and model public retirement accordingly.7 For employees working in the 
private sector, we assume they are contributing to a 401(k) plan where the employer 
matches up to 10% of gross pay.8 
The non-pecuniary components refer to the individual’s taste or preference for a job 
in the AWF versus a career in the private sector. These components attempt to capture the 
taste of those agents who prefer the higher predictability and stability of public sector 
employment, even at the cost of a lower salary compared to the private sector, and vice 
versa. To capture these relative preferences, we use taste parameters reflecting monetary-
equivalent preferences for careers in the private versus the public sectors. 
In particular, we use the following notation to construct the dynamic model: 
• Wtm indicates compensation in the AWF (including all pecuniary components) in period 
t 
• Wtc denotes compensation in the private sector in period t 
• ωm is the public sector taste parameter, which captures the monetary-equivalent 
preference for a career in the AWF 
• ωc is the private sector taste parameter, which captures the monetary-equivalent 
preference for a private sector career 
• T denotes the labor time horizon (number of working periods before final retirement) 
• 𝛽𝛽 = 1
1+𝑟𝑟
 is the discount factor, where r represents the subjective discount rate 
• E[.|εt-1] indicates the expectation operator, given the shock in the previous period 
• εtm and εtc are the random shocks affecting government and civilian jobs, respectively, 
in period t 





6 We further assume that leaving the AWF is an irreversible decision. 
7  The dataset contains employees from both the extinct CSRS and the current Federal Employee 
Retirement System (FERS). We model the CSRS because there are more individuals belonging to that system 
than FERS. 
8 As we note in the data section, the modal AWF employee has a bachelor’s degree or above and earns 
close to $100,000 at their highest paygrade. Workers with these characteristics in the civilian sector most often 
have employer matching 401(k) options. 
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𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 = 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 +𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽[𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿 |𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐] + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (1) 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 = 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 + 𝜔𝜔𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽[𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1|𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚] + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚, and (2) 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 ,𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆] (3) 
In these equations, super-index S denotes the agent’s choice to continue working 
one more period in the AWF (i.e., S = Stay). Alternatively, super-index L indicates the 
individual’s choice to quit the AWF job to continue their career in the private sector (i.e., L = 
Leave). Therefore, VtS denotes the (present) value of remaining in the public sector one 
more period, while VtL indicates the (present) value of switching to the private sector. 
Equation 3 implies that the individual will decide to be part of the AWF force in every period 
in which VtS > VtL, and will leave the force as soon as the opposite is true. 
Regarding stochastic variables εtm and εtc, we assume they are independent and 
mean reverting over time (t dimension). The specification of the random shocks is the 
following: 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐2) (4) 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 + 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2 ), and (5) 
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  independent of 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 (6) 
That is, the shocks evolve independently of each other, oscillating around their own 
long-run (unconditional) mean over time. In the context of equations 1–3, these innovations 
could be interpreted as random shocks to salaries in the civilian and private sectors (i.e., 
Wtm and Wtc, respectively) stemming from, for instance, fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Ashenfelter and Card (1982) find that nominal wages are well represented as AR(1) 
processes. Accordingly, equations 4 and 5 define AR(1) representations for the error terms. 
These AR(1) processes play an important role for our main results as they allow shocks to 
persist over time; that is, to gradually fade as time passes.9 As we explain in more detail 
later, we use parameter ρ to define the speed at which the economy (and wages) recovers 
from a shock (such as from the COVID-19 outbreak). In terms of the optimization problem 
described in equations 1–3, random shocks εtm and εtc indicate state variables observed by 
the AWF worker at the time of the decision. 
Data Description and Model Calibration  
In this section, we describe the AWF sample as well as the selection and calibration 
of the parameter values necessary to implement the dynamic programming model described 
previously. In the next section, we show those parameters provide a good approximation of 




9 As opposed to white noise processes, where shocks do not persist over time (i.e., they return to the 
mean immediately), or random walk processes, where shocks do not return to the mean. 
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DATA: The Acquisition Workforce  
The DoD Acquisition workforce is comprised of approximately 150,000 employees, 
covering the period September 1987–December 2018. Civilians make up about 90% of the 
workforce, while active duty makes up the remaining 10%. The AWF’s mission is the “timely 
and cost-effective development and delivery of warfighting capabilities to America’s combat 
forces” (DoD, 2015). The AWF is responsible for overseeing equipping and sustaining the 
military, spending over $1 trillion in FY2021. About 26% of the AWF belongs to the 
engineering career field, followed by contracting at 19%. Historically, the AWF was sharply 
reduced in size and capability during the 1990s. The DoD has been working to rebuild the 
AWF starting in 2008, increasing the AWF by approximately 30,000 employees over 7 
years.  
For this analysis, we restrict our sample to workers who were ever in the contracting, 
industrial property management, or purchasing fields.10 Our sample workers were born after 
January 1, 1950, but before December 31, 1980. Workers with birthdates outside this range 
are either too old, in that the environment in which they made their labor decisions may not 
be reflective of current jobs in the AWF, or too young, in that these workers have not had 
time to make labor decisions that are pivotal to their careers. Restricting the sample nets us 
over 2 million worker-month records, with over 13,000 unique workers tracked through their 
careers. Table 1 presents some summary statistics for our sample.  
The workforce is predominantly white and female. Over half the workforce has a 
bachelor’s degree or above. Compared to the civilian sector, careers in the AWF is stable, 
with the average career length lasting well over a decade. This workforce is also highly paid, 
with the average worker earning almost $100,000 toward the end of their career. The 
average worker in this sector begins her/his career at age 33, which indicates that the 
position in the AWF is not her/his first job. In fact, a large number of these workers have 
prior military experience. 
To rigorously assess the impact of the civilian sector on the attractiveness of the 
DoD position, every worker in the dataset must be “assigned” a civilian wage that they can 
expect to earn. To accomplish this, we estimate a hedonic regression using the Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). As this dataset contains a 
representative sample of workers in the United States, including, most importantly, those 
who are in the government sector, it is possible to make an apples-to-apples comparison 
with workers in the private sector.11  
We run a hedonic regression using the individual sociodemographic characteristics, 
professional and education experience, and locality indicators from the ORG of the CPS 
which broadly match the AWF variables summarized in Table 1 to obtain predicted civilian 
and government sector wages. The difference in the wages across private and public 





10 These fields correspond to Occupation Codes 1102, 1103, and 1105, respectively. 
11 See Ahn and Menichini (2020) for a detailed description.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 0.632    
Minority 0.278    
Disability 0.202    
Prior Military Service 0.619    
Has Bachelor’s Degree 0.547    
Has Post-graduate Degree 0.332    
Gained Additional Education in 
AWF 
0.441    
Career Length in AWF (in years) 12.0  (8.6) 0.1 25.8 
Age at Entry 33.0  (8.2) 15 65 
Age at Exit 48.2  (10.55) 20 68 
Position Type: Professional 0.657    
(Ever Held) Technical 0.245    
Blue-Collar 0.018    
White-Collar 0.297    
Ever Rated Not Fully Satisfactory 0.575    
Highest Salary 95,143.67  (30,410.74) 27,397 189,600 
Observations 13,590    
Calibration Results 
Before simulating the model described in equations 1–3, we need to start defining 
the parameter values, which we show in Table 2 and subsequently describe. We can 
observe in Table 2 that all parameter values, except compensation, are constant over the 
career of the AWF employee.  
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As we described in the section Data: The Acquisition Workforce, estimates from the 
hedonic regressions suggest that income in the private sector (i.e., Wtc) is, on average, 
around 17.61% higher than in the AWF (i.e., Wtm) for individuals with similar characteristics. 
For this reason, after initially normalizing Wtm=1, we let Wtc=1.1761. We then add the income 
from the different retirement systems and, thus, compensation changes over time. The data 
described in that same section show that the longest observed labor time horizon among all 
individuals is 25 years. For that reason, we let T=25. The subjective discount factor is 
assumed to be 0.95, implying an interest rate of 5.26%.12 
Table 2. Parameter Values 
 
Regarding the taste parameters, we calibrated parameter ωm so that the survival 
curve predicted by the model approximates the empirical survival curve as closely as 
possible via grid search (we show the graphical results of this calibration in the next 
section). In more technical terms, the calibration exercise searches for the value of ωm that 
minimizes the summed squared distance between the points of the empirical AWF survival 
curve and the points of the survival curve predicted by the model. As Table 2 displays, we 
normalize 𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 = 1 and, from the calibration exercise, we obtain 𝜔𝜔𝑚𝑚 = 1.2782.13 These values 




12 This interest rate is similar to the average 30-Year T-Bond Constant Maturity Rate reported by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the period covered by the data set. 
13 Ahn and Menichini (2020) estimate a similar dynamic model where economic shocks to the civilian 
and public sectors are i.i.d. with mean zero. They find the difference between military and private sector taste 
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The remaining parameter values in Table 2 refer to the stochastic process of the 
error terms εtm and εtc. We follow Ashenfelter and Card (1982) to define the parameter 
values that govern the AR(1) processes of those terms. Accordingly, we let parameters μm 
and μc be equal to zero, we assume values of 0.005 for the standard deviation of the errors, 
σm and σc, and let the mean-reversion coefficients ρm and ρc be equal to 0.9. These values 
depict the historical behavior of the error terms. In particular, those observed values of the 
mean-reverting coefficients suggest that wages have a high level of persistence over time 
and, thus, that the effects of shocks require a long time to disappear. 
Model Solution and Policy Simulations 
In this section, we describe our policy simulations to forecast the evolution of the 
behavior of the representative AWF worker under a number of scenarios with differing 
speed rates of economic recovery from a large, abrupt, and unanticipated negative impact 
(i.e., COVID-19) to the private sector. This is a major systematic event that adversely affects 
all sectors of the economy, except for the public or government sector, which we assume 
keeps its employment constant.14 The latter is consistent with the assumption of 
independent errors in equation 6. 
Concisely, we “shock” the model with a large negative civilian error draw at a 
specified point in time. Then, we allow the system to recover and converge back to the 
steady state. We start analyzing retention behavior assuming the economy recovers 
according to the empirical historical speed. However, given the observed recovery from the 
current pandemic seems to be, so far, much faster than normal, we also study the retention 
implications of different scenarios for the speed of recovery. We “control” the speed of 
recovery of the economy by setting the autoregressive term, ρ, which controls the velocity at 
which shocks gradually disappear over time. 
While the private sector goes through its gyrations, at every period, the 
representative AWF agent in our model surveys the current state of the private sector, 
forecasts the evolution of the state of the economy, and makes the ex ante optimal decision 
to stay or leave the AWF. We describe the simulation procedure in more detail next. 
We solve the model described in equations 1–3 via backward induction (see Rust 
[1987] for an empirical treatment). That is, we start from the final period (i.e., t=T=25) and 
decide whether to stay one more (final) period in the AWF or to leave for the private sector. 
We then move one period backward (i.e., t=24) and select to stay one more period or to 
leave the AWF, considering the value from the optimal decision in period T=25. We continue 
moving backward, deciding rationally in every period, until we reach the present period (i.e., 
t=0). This solution characterizes the retention behavior of a representative AWF employee in 
all possible states of the economy. 
We then stochastically simulate the model forward (i.e., over the 25 years of work) 
100,000 times, which produces the stay/leave decisions of 100,000 employees in all 
possible different situations over the labor period. These simulations summarize the 




14 While our negative shock is the COVID-19 pandemic, any future unanticipated national shock to the 
economy and/or public health that is concentrated in the private sector can be expected to operate in a similar 
manner. 
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exhibits the calibrated, model-predicted survival curve of the representative individual (blue 
line) and displays the cumulative probability of the worker staying in the force after a certain 
period of time. For example, the figure suggests that the likelihood that the employee is still 
part of the AWF after 10 years is about 65%. The figure also shows the empirical survival 
curve for the AWF employees (red line) from the data described in the section Data: The 
Acquisition Workforce, suggesting that the calibrated model predicts actual behavior quite 
closely. 
 
Figure 4. Retention Behavior 
Associated with the previous survival curves are the yearly, model-predicted probabilities of 
leaving the AWF, which we show as the blue line in Figure 5. The attrition rate is relatively low every 
year, as is shown by the fact that the likelihood of leaving is always below 10% per year, and below 
5% in the great majority of years. In addition, the attrition rate is high initially, and diminishes through 
time before increasing again toward the end of the individual’s career. For instance, the probability 
that the employee departs from the AWF in year 10 is around 2%. As before, we also show the 
empirical likelihood of leaving (red line) for comparison purposes. 
We then proceed to shock the model with a large negative error on the civilian side (i.e., εtc) 
at year 10. The shock is equivalent to 3 standard deviations below the mean and is intended to 
capture the large effect of the sudden appearance of COVID-19. In economic terms, given the 
calibration shown in Table 2, this shock could be interpreted as a roughly 1.5% reduction in the 
civilian salary, Wtc, while the public sector salary, Wtm, remains unchanged. The fact that the error 
terms (both εtm and εtc) are mean reverting over time implies that the impact of the negative shock on 
the civilian salary gradually disappears as time passes. As mentioned before, the speed of return to 
the pre-shock state will depend on the mean-reversion coefficient, ρ. 
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Figure 5. Probability of Leaving 
In Figure 6 we show, given the initial negative shock, how the shocks are expected 
to evolve over time for four different values of the coefficient of mean-reversion. The purple 
bars depict the historical case, which is based on the observed historical mean-reversion 
coefficient of ρ=0.9. It is clear that the historical coefficient implies it would easily take a 
decade or more to return to normality. However, after a year of the appearance of the virus, 
the economy seems to be recovering much faster than suggested by historical terms. We 
attempt to capture the faster rebound by reducing the coefficient of mean-reversion (i.e., via 
a quicker dissipation of the shock). Accordingly, we analyze three different scenarios 
featuring dissimilar speeds of recovery, all of which are faster than the historical speed. 
Scenario 1, with the blue bars and ρ=0.3, represents the case of a relatively faster return to 
the pre-COVID economy. On the other hand, the yellow bars in scenario 3, with ρ=0.7, 
reflect a slower recovery to normality as compared to scenario 1. In between are the red 
bars of scenario 2, showing an intermediate speed of recovery with ρ=0.5. Even in the more 
optimistic recovery scenario 1, it is clear that the effects of the large negative shock remain 




15 The magnitude and persistence of shocks are speculative, although they are informed by very recent 
(and ongoing) research. Many scholars are currently attempting to forecast the long-run impact of COVID-19 on 
the economy. See Petrosky-Nadeau and Valetta (2020), for example. 
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Figure 6. Expected Impact of COVID-19 on Civilian Shock 
The effect on retention behavior of the representative AWF worker can be observed 
in Figure 7. The figure shows that, during the initial 10 years, the retention behavior is 
equivalent to the blue line in Figure 4. At year 10, the COVID-19 shock happens, and the 
retention behavior changes considerably. As we mentioned before, we study the attrition 
behavior in four different contexts. The green line shows the retention impact of the virus 
under historical terms (i.e., ρ=0.9). The other lines depict the expected retention behavior for 
three faster rates of economic recovery (i.e., ρ=0.3, ρ=0.5, and ρ=0.7 for recovery scenarios 
1, 2, and 3, respectively). In all cases there is a kink and sudden flattening of the curve, 
suggesting that the individuals stay longer in the AWF, in an attempt to avoid the sharp 
negative effect of the virus shock on the civilian labor market. Depending on the speed of 
recovery, it might take a substantial amount of time for the employee to return to the pre-
shock retention behavior. For instance, in the historical case it takes around 10 years for the 
representative employee to return to the pre-virus retention behavior, while in scenarios 1, 2, 
and 3, the return to normality takes roughly 2, 3, and 5 years, respectively. These long-
lasting effects on retention behavior have important implications for the hiring policies of the 
public sector. 
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Figure 7. Retention Impact of COVID-19 
It is worth noting that the time required to return to the “original” behavior specified 
above does not mean that all workers will choose to delay leaving the AWF by several years 
due to the impact of COVID-19. Instead, all workers will process the negative shock in the 
civilian economy as making the AWF job more attractive. Until the shock fully dissipates, the 
DoD position will be more attractive than had there not been the global pandemic. However, 
given the substantial wage premium in the civilian sector, the pandemic shock does not 
need to completely disappear before workers who were planning to move to the civilian 
sector resume their plans. 
To complement the analysis of the return to the pre-COVID context, we present 
Figure 8. The figure shows the model-predicted yearly probabilities of leaving the AWF for 
the four different values of parameter ρ. The green line shows the attrition behavior in the 
historical recovery scenario, confirming that it takes around 10 years to return to the pre-
COVID retention behavior (the latter is represented by the no-COVID-19-shock blue line). 
The red, yellow, and purple lines, reflecting faster speeds of economic rebound, suggest 
that around 2, 3, and 5 years, respectively, are required to eliminate the effects of the 
COVID-19 shock on retention. In all four scenarios, the likelihood of leaving the AWF goes 
roughly to zero in the year of the shock, and then slowly starts to return to the no-shock 
levels as time passes and the effects of the shock dissipate.  
It is also important to note that, after the return to normality, the probability of leaving 
is higher in the slower recovery scenarios and lower in the faster rebound scenarios. More 
generally, after the COVID-19 shock dissipates, in all cases with shock, the likelihood of 
leaving is higher than in the no-shock case, with that probability increasing in parameter ρ. 
Indeed, the slower the recovery from the pandemic (i.e., higher 𝜌𝜌 value), the larger the 
magnitude of exit probability after the recovery. This outcome suggests that, as more people 
decide to stay longer in the AWF during the pandemic, when the economy returns to normal, 
the pent up demand to leave for the private sector is expressed as higher attrition rates in 
the later years. This implies an opportunity as well as a problem for the AWF leadership. 
While a slower recovery may induce more employees to stay longer, it cannot be a 
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permanent solution to retain high ability workers. A higher 𝜌𝜌 will result in a much sharper exit 
of workers from the AWF once the civilian economy recovers.  
 
Figure 8. Likelihood of Leaving with COVID-19 
In order to retain these workers, fundamental (and traditional) personnel policy 
reforms will be required. For example, a pay increase or expansion of benefits before the 
civilian sector fully recovers may permanently induce senior workers to remain in the AWF. 
Similarly, a one-time retention bonus, set far enough into the future when the civilian 
economy is back to normal, could prevent that exit.16 
Conclusions 
As of early 2021, the overall unemployment rate in the U.S. stands at 6.7%, an 8 
percentage point decrease in just 8 months from the worst unemployment rate in almost 90 
years arising from the COVID-19 global pandemic, yet still almost double the unemployment 
rate from just 1 year ago. While the recovery has been as dramatic as the decline, the future 
remains very much in doubt. For example, in December 2020, payrolls shrank by 140,000. 
Outlook has considerably brightened since, but the whiplash in long-run forecast of 
economic recovery itself adds uncertainty to future labor market prospects in the civilian 
market. 
In this environment, we analyzed the potential impact of the economic recovery on 
the labor market trajectory of the AWF. The contrast in stability of jobs in the government 




16 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to calculate optimal policy to retain workers as the civilian 
sector recovers, Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the attrition rates of AWF workers with a) no change in 
compensation after the COVID-19 shock and b) a one-time bonus of 25% of monthly salary at the 25 year of 
service mark. The bonus induces experienced workers to remain longer in the AWF. 
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the recovery proves to be slow or unpredictable. We built and calibrated a dynamic 
programming model of employee retention behavior, analyzed the impact of a negative 
persistent shock to the civilian sector, and simulated different recovery paths. 
Our results show that government positions become more attractive the larger the 
magnitude of the negative shock to the civilian economy, and the slower the economic 
recovery, such that workers may value government positions more highly compared to the 
pre-pandemic period for several years.  
While this environment can reduce attrition of the average worker from the AWF, 
leadership should understand that, eventually, recovery of the civilian sector will push down 
the relative desirability of government jobs. This may lead to a speedy exodus of many 
senior-level workers who were being held back due to economic uncertainty. Personnel 
planning without considering the temporary reduction in attrition at the beginning of the 
shock may lead to over-hiring, especially at the junior-levels. On the other hand, short-
sighted reductions in hiring due to the initial impacts of the negative shock may lead to a 
hollowing out of the workforce, once the impact of the shock wanes. In addition, as the 
economy recovers, there may be fundamental structural changes to the labor market that 
remain, changing the valuation of both government and private sector jobs in unpredictable 
ways. Forward-looking leaders should regard these simulation results not as predictions of 
the future, but as guides to help set personnel policies that are flexible enough to adjust to 
and even take advantage of the gyrations in the civilian economy. 
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Appendix 
As we describe in Section 5, the AWF will face a higher-than-normal employee 
attrition rate when the COVID-19 shock disappears and the economy fully recovers. In this 
appendix, we study one particular way by which that expected effect could be counteracted. 
In particular, we analyze the effect of a one-time bonus on the probability of leaving the 
AWF when the economy returns to normality. We assume the bonus is equivalent to 25% of 
the individual’s monthly salary and is paid at year of service 25 (with the virus shock 
occurring at year 10). Figure 9 shows the main results of this exercise. The expected bonus 
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has a fairly small effect on employee attrition in the early- and mid-career years, as the 
attrition rates are almost equivalent with and without the bonus. However, as expected, the 
effect of the bonus is more visible in the final years of the employee’s career, when the 
economy has fully recovered from the COVID-19 shock. Without the bonus (red line), the 
attrition rates are substantially higher than with the bonus (yellow line), suggesting that, 
indeed, a bonus would induce experienced workers to stay longer in the AWF after the 
recovery. To finish, the bonus is just one of the tools available to the AWF to affect individual 
retention behavior (for instance, salary raises would be another useful tool). 
 
Figure 9. Likelihood of Leaving with COVID-19 and a Bonus at 25 Years of Service 
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Abstract 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2020 directed the Secretary of Defense to 
implement a professional certification program for all members of the acquisition workforce 
that is based on standards developed by a third-party accredited program based on nationally 
or internationally recognized standards. In response to this NDAA (2019) requirement, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) senior procurement executives agreed to the establishment of 
a new contracting competency model and a single level of certification program based on the 
National Contract Management Association’s (NCMA) Contract Management Body of 
Knowledge (CMBOK; NCMA, 2019a) and American National Standards Institute—accredited 
Contract Management Standard (CMS; NCMA, 2019b). The purpose of this research is to 
develop a new competency assessment instrument based on the NCMA CMBOK and CMS 
to be used in assessing the DoD’s contracting workforce competency. This research will 
answer the following question: How can the CMBOK/CMS competency structure be used as 
the basis for developing a survey-based instrument for assessing the competencies of the 
DoD contracting workforce? An additional research question is: Based on the competency 
assessment results, in which contract management competencies is the workforce less 
proficient and less knowledgeable? We conduct this research by developing a survey-based 
assessment instrument for assessing the competencies of the DoD contracting workforce. 
We then deploy the assessment instrument to DoD contracting organizations and analyze the 
assessment results to identify contract management competencies that need additional 
training emphasis. 
Introduction 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2019) continues to list contract 
management as a high risk and has done so since 1992. Additionally, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) inspector general has identified contract management as a top DoD 
management challenge (Office of Inspector General [OIG], 2019). Both agencies identify the 
need for increased technical competency in the contracting workforce. Furthermore, recent 
research on organizational climate assessment on the DoD’s contracting workforce indicates 
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that competency management is a critical part of ensuring a trained and experienced 
contracting workforce (Rendon & Powley, 2017). Thus, how an organization’s competency 
framework is structured may have a significant impact on the competence level of its 
workforce.   
Recent legislative initiatives reflect Congress’s concerns about the adequacy of the 
DoD’s acquisition workforce training and competency. For example, the Fiscal Year 2016 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 2015) Section 809 required the Secretary of 
Defense to establish an independent advisory panel on streamlining acquisition regulations. 
The Section 809 Panel stated that if the DoD is to achieve its acquisition workforce goals, it 
will need to prepare and develop its workforce differently (Scott & Thompson, 2019). The 
Section 809 Panel identified several recommendations for improving the professional 
development of the acquisition workforce. These recommendations included creating career 
paths for the contracting functional area that would include those technical competencies 
and key work experiences as reflected in industry standards. The Section 809 Panel also 
recommended that the DoD revise its contracting professional development programs to 
emphasize skills that are transferable across government and industry and focused on a 
defined set of qualifications connected to contracting positions. Additionally, the panel 
recommended that the DoD revise its contracting professional development programs to 
emphasize sufficient domain knowledge, emphasize professional skills, and provide a broad 
perspective to interact effectively with industry. Finally, the panel recommended that the 
DoD adopt a common contracting body of knowledge, which would also enhance 
communication and collaboration between government and industry (Scott & Thompson, 
2019).   
Even more recently, in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 2019), 
Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to implement a professional certification 
program for all members of the acquisition workforce that is based on standards developed 
by a third-party accredited program based on nationally or internationally recognized 
standards (NDAA, 2019).   
Purpose of Research 
Recent research has shown that the current DoD contracting competency model 
may not be sufficient in assessing today’s contracting workforce (Rendon & Winn, 2017). 
Additionally, further research found that the National Contract Management Association’s 
(NCMA) Contract Management Body of Knowledge (CMBOK; NCMA, 2019a) and the 
Contract Management Standard (CMS; NCMA, 2019b) may be more suitable and effective 
in assessing the contracting workforce competency in today’s dynamic acquisition 
environment (Rendon, 2019). The purpose of this research is to develop a new competency 
assessment instrument based on the NCMA CMBOK and CMS to be used in assessing the 
DoD’s contracting workforce competency. This research answers the following question: 
How can the CMBOK/CMS competency structure be used as the basis for developing a 
survey-based instrument for assessing the competencies of the DoD contracting workforce? 
An additional research question is: Based on the competency assessment results, in which 
contract management competencies is the workforce less proficient and less 
knowledgeable? Thus, the objective of the research is focused on adopting the 
CMBOK/CMS contracting competency model as the basis for assessing the DoD contracting 
workforce.  
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Methodology 
The methodology for this research consists of two components. The first component 
is the development of a survey-based assessment instrument for assessing the 
competencies of the DoD contracting workforce. We draw from the workforce competency 
literature and survey development literature for this component (Rendon & Schwartz, 2020). 
The second component of the methodology is the deployment of the assessment instrument 
to DoD contracting organizations and analysis of the assessment results to identify contract 
management competencies that need additional training emphasis.  
DoD Contract Management Workforce Competency 
Recent research compared the DoD contracting competency model with the NCMA 
CMBOK/CMS (Rendon, 2019; Rendon & Winn, 2017). The CMS has received third-party 
accreditation by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as an ANSI-accredited 
standard. The CMBOK/CMS is used by both government agencies and industry 
organizations for managing contracts. The research found that the CMBOK/CMS 
competency framework may provide an innovative approach for developing and assessing 
the DoD contracting workforce. The CMBOK/CMS’s concise and detailed contract life cycle 
and greater emphasis and granularity in each of the life-cycle phases and tasks may help 
develop and fortify the DoD’s contracting processes and practices. Providing greater 
emphasis on each of the contract life-cycle phases and organizing competencies using a 
hierarchical structure that aligns each competency with processes, tasks, and subtasks 
would support the development of a professional contracting career path that aligns 
contracting technical competencies and key work experiences (Rendon, 2019). The recent 
Section 809 Panel recommended that the DoD create career paths for the contracting 
functional area that would include such technical competencies and key work experiences 
as reflected in the CMBOK/CMS.   
Additionally, expanding the DoD’s contracting workforce knowledge to include 
industry’s side of contracting (e.g., industry operations and processes) as reflected in the 
CMBOK/CMS will help in developing technical and professional skills that can transfer 
across government and industry, as well as improve communication and collaboration 
between government and industry. Including the industry side of contracting would also 
result in strengthening systems thinking within the contracting workforce (Carlson, 2017). 
The current DoD contracting competency model may be resulting in linear thinking among 
the contracting workforce, with contract managers believing that contracting problems have 
“direct causes and that you can optimize the whole by optimizing each of the parts” 
(Carlson, 2017). Contract managers using systems thinking will know that contract 
management “problems can have hidden, indirect causes” and it is the “relationships among 
the parts that matter the most” (Carlson, 2017). Adopting the CMBOK/CMS competency 
framework may provide the DoD contracting workforce with a stronger foundational 
understanding of not only the complete contract life cycle but also an understanding of the 
different perspectives in contractual relationships (e.g., buyer, seller, subcontractors, 
suppliers, end users, etc.). Using systems thinking, contract managers will be able to “see 
the gaps where complications or opportunities can arise” within the acquisition process and 
understand how their contracting decisions may impact contractors and subcontractors 
(Carlson, 2017). Including the industry competencies for the DoD contracting workforce may 
also strengthen “communication, collaboration, problem-solving, and adaptability” skills 
(Carlson, 2017). The Section 809 Panel recommended that the DoD revise its contracting 
professional development programs to emphasize skills that are transferable across 
government and industry and focused on a defined set of qualifications connected to 
contracting positions (Rendon, 2019).  
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Furthermore, there may be value in broadening the current DoD contracting 
competency model to include disciplines such as business management, financial 
management, project management, risk management, and supply chain management, as 
reflected in the CMBOK. The inclusion of these disciplines may enhance the DoD 
contracting workforce’s critical thinking, problem solving, and analytical skills—bringing 
increased efficiency to its contracting processes (Rendon, 2019). The Section 809 Panel 
recommended that the DoD revise its contracting professional development programs to 
emphasize sufficient domain knowledge, emphasize professional skills, and provide a broad 
perspective to interact effectively with industry. A recent RAND study found that, within the 
defense acquisition workforce, knowledge gaps in business acumen, industry operations, 
and industry motivation exist. The RAND report also found that the lack of standardized 
definitions and competency model formats obscures the need for knowledge related to 
business acumen, industry operations, and industry motivation (Werber et al., 2019).  
A greater understanding of these CMBOK/CMS disciplines, as well as understanding 
both government and industry sides of the contracting relationship, will help develop “T-
shaped” acquisition professionals who have both “depth of knowledge in a particular 
expertise as well as have the ability to work and communicate across disciplines” (Carlson, 
2017). T-shaped acquisition professionals will be capable of introducing innovation and 
process change into the DoD contracting processes. If the DoD would adopt the 
CMBOK/CMS as its competency framework, it would achieve a desired recommendation 
from the Section 809 Panel that both the DoD and industry adopt a common contracting 
body of knowledge, which would also enhance communication and collaboration between 
government and industry (Rendon, 2019). As previously stated, in the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2020 (NDAA, 2019), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to 
implement a professional certification program for all members of the acquisition workforce 
that is based on standards developed by a third-party accredited program based on 
nationally or internationally recognized standards.   
Furthermore, in April 2020, the DoD senior procurement executives decided to 
establish a new contracting competency model and a single level of certification program. 
The new competency model is based on the NCMA CMBOK and ANSI-accredited CMS. 
The new DoD contracting competency model complies with the requirement in Section 861 
of the FY2020 NDAA to base a professional certification on standards developed by a third-
party accredited program. The CMS uses terms that are relevant and applicable across the 
DoD, federal agencies, and industry. The model also has an overarching narrative of guiding 
principles aligned with professional competencies that apply across all phases of the 
contracting life cycle. The basic top-level structure of the NCMA CMS is reflected in Figure 1 
(NCMA, 2019b).  
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Figure 1. Contract Management Standard.  
(NCMA, 2019b) 
Development of Competency Assessment Instrument 
The development of the contracting competency assessment instrument included 
structuring contracting competency statements for each of the contract management phases 
(pre-award, award, post-award), as well as from both contracting perspectives (buyer and 
seller). More specifically, the contracting competency statements reflect the contracting 
competencies and the specific job tasks for each contract management phase and for each 
perspective as reflected in the CMS. The competency statements would be rated by the 
contracting workforce members using a Likert scale reflecting different levels of proficiency 
for performing the buyer job tasks and a Likert scale reflecting the different levels of 
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knowledge of the seller job tasks. The proficiency rating scales, for performing buyer job 
tasks, are identified and defined below:  
1.  Aware: Applies the competency in the simplest situations and requires 
close and extensive guidance.  
2.  Basic: Applies the competency in somewhat difficult situations and requires 
frequent guidance.  
3.  Intermediate: Applies the competency in difficult situations and requires 
little or no guidance.  
4.  Advanced: Applies the competency in considerably difficult situations and 
generally requires no guidance.  
5.  Expert: Applies the competency in exceptionally difficult situations and 
serves as a key resource and advises others.  
N/A: Not applicable/not needed in my job.  
The knowledge rating scales, for understanding seller job tasks, are identified and 
defined below:  
1.  None: I am not aware of this contractor competency.  
2.  Aware: I am aware, but have no knowledge of this contractor competency.  
3.  Basic: I have some basic level knowledge of this contractor competency.  
4.  Intermediate: I have intermediate level knowledge of this contractor 
competency.  
5.  Advanced: I have advanced level knowledge of this contractor 
competency.  
Deployment of Competency Assessment Instrument 
Upon development of the survey instrument, the assessment survey was deployed to 
the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) contracting organization. With the assistance 
of our graduate students, the assessment survey was deployed using the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) open-source survey tool LimeSurvey. The web-based 
LimeSurvey allows participants to respond anonymously to the self-assessment items. The 
MCSC contracting workforce population consists of 220 government civilian (GS 1102) and 
military equivalent contracting professionals (Hayashi & Pfannenstiel, 2021).   
Findings 
Of the MCSC 220 government civilian and military contracting professionals, 43 
contracting professionals completed the assessment, equating to approximately 19.5% of 
the MCSC contracting workforce. The demographic data of the responding population are 
reflected in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of the respondents were 
DAWIA Contracting Level 3 certified and had at least 9 years of contracting experience.    
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 129 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 1. MCSC Contracting Workforce Competency Assessment Demographics 
 








Figure 2 reflects the assessment results of the Buyer Proficiency component of the 
competency assessment. The figure reflects the categories of buyer tasks, as reflected in 
the NCMA Contract Management Standard (CMS), along with the average proficiency 
rating, based on the buyer proficiency rating scales. As can be seen in Figure 2, the average 
buyer proficiency ratings range between 3.34 (Intermediate) and 4.20 (Advanced). 
Additionally, the Pre-Award and Award competency rating averages are higher than the 
Post-Award competency rating averages. Finally, the lowest proficiency rating average was 
3.34 for the Manage Disagreement competency.  
 
 
Figure 2. MCSC Contracting Workforce Competency Assessment Buyer Proficiency 
Seller Knowledge 
Figure 3 reflects the assessment results of the Seller Knowledge component of the 
competency assessment. The figure reflects the categories of seller tasks, as reflected in 
the NCMA Contract Management Standard (CMS), along with the average knowledge 
rating, based on the seller knowledge rating scales. As can be seen in Figure 3, the average 
seller knowledge ratings range between 2.95 (Aware) and 3.68 (Basic). Additionally, the 











None 1   3 or Less 5 
Level 1 3   4 to 8 5 
Level 2 5   9 to 13 21 
Level 3 41   14 to 18 4 
      19 or more 17 
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averages. Finally, the lowest proficiency average rating was 2.95 for the Manage 
Disagreement competency.  
 
Figure 3. MCSC Contracting Workforce Competency Assessment Seller Knowledge 
Discussion 
The overall findings from the competency assessment indicate that the 
organization’s competency levels for the buyer proficiency tasks are higher than the 
organization’s knowledge levels of seller’s tasks. Specifically, based on the competency 
assessment, the majority of the buyer proficiency competency ratings are at an Intermediate 
level, with seven out of 10 competencies rated within this range. The remaining three 
competencies received ratings of an Advanced level. Additionally, when these competencies 
are analyzed by contract life-cycle phases, the average pre-award phase competency level 
is Advanced whereas the average award and post-award phases are both at an 
Intermediate level. The lowest rated competency was that of Manage Disagreements in the 
Award phase. 
Additionally, based on the competency assessment, seller knowledge competency 
ratings are at a Basic level with all 10 competencies scoring in this range. When these 
competencies are analyzed by contract life-cycle phases, the pre-award, award, and post-
award phases all rate at a Basic level. The lowest-rated competency was that of Manage 
Disagreements in the Award phase, which is closely followed by the competency of Prepare 
Offer in the Pre-Award phase.  
The Advanced and Intermediate average competency levels for the Buyer tasks may 
be related to the background of the surveyed workforce. The majority of respondents are 
DAWIA Contracting Level 3 certified and have an average of at least 9 years of contracting 
experience. This level of training and experience may indicate a higher competency level in 
performing the buyer tasks reflected in the CMS. Additionally, the higher average 
competency ratings for the pre-award and award competency categories may also be 
related to past Naval organizational contract management process maturity assessments 
based on the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM). Those CMMM process 
assessments indicate that Naval contract management process maturity is higher for pre-
award and award contracting processes compared to post-award contracting processes 
(Rendon, 2015).     
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The higher competency levels for the buyer tasks (Advanced and Intermediate) 
compared to the lower knowledge levels of the seller tasks (Aware and Basic) may reflect 
the scope and focus of the contracts training received by the DoD acquisition workforce. The 
contracts training provided by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and based on the 
current DoD contracting competency framework reflects only the buyer processes and 
related tasks, specifically dictated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The DAU 
contracts training courses do not cover the seller (industry) processes and related tasks. 
Finally, the consistency in lower proficiency and knowledge levels of the Manage 
Disagreement competency category for both buyer and seller tasks is indeed an interesting 
finding. This CMS competency area specifically deals with the seller tasks of submitting 
protests and appeals and the buyer tasks of responding to protests and appeals. The low 
proficiency and knowledge levels from the surveyed population in this competency area may 
reflect a deficiency in the knowledge, skills, and abilities related to these contract 
management tasks.  
Based on these competency assessment findings, our research provides 
recommendations for the assessed organization for competency development. These 
recommendations can be used by the organization for developing a training roadmap for 
targeting competencies and knowledge areas needed for improvement within the 
contracting workforce.  
Recommendations for Competency Development 
Based on the findings and discussion on the results of the MSCS competency 
assessment findings, there are a couple of targeted recommendations for the assessed 
organization. Additionally, there are a number of recommendations for areas of further 
research as well as suggestions for uses of the competency assessment as a tool to aid 
contract management supervisors.  
Targeted Recommendations 
The first recommendation for the assessed organization is to develop a curriculum 
for the existing training program focused on the seller processes and job tasks (NCMA, 
2019b). Because the survey results indicate only a Basic level of knowledge for all seller 
tasks, the new curriculum should incorporate seller task information from the CMBOK for all 
the contract life-cycle competencies (NCMA 2019a). Additional emphasis could also be 
placed on the Post-Award phase since the results indicate an overall lower knowledge level 
as compared to the Pre-Award and Award phases. 
The second recommendation for the assessed organization is to develop and/or 
revise the training module covering managing disagreements. This recommendation is 
based on the survey results indicating that the Manage Disagreements task within the 
Award phase was the lowest score for both buyer task proficiency and seller task 
knowledge. Development of this training module could start by incorporating information 
from Section 5.4 of the CMBOK, Manage Disagreements (NCMA, 2019a). Additional 
information from the CMBOK could also be incorporated to improve skills such as critical 
thinking, problem solving, and decision-making related to managing and resolving protests 
and appeals. Specifically, the CMBOK covers information on these skill sets within the 
Leadership, Management and Guiding Principles Competencies (NCMA, 2019a). 
Areas for Further Research 
The primary area for further research is to deploy the currently developed survey 
instrument to additional contracting activities throughout the DoD. This would increase both 
the sample size of survey responses and collect data from activities with more diverse 
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contracting mission sets. For example, the organization surveyed for this research, MCSC, 
has a primary mission focused on Pre-Award and Award tasks for procuring major weapon 
systems for the Marine Corps. Conducting surveys of organizations whose mission is either 
procuring base support functions or administrating awarded contracts would likely show data 
results with different levels of proficiency of buyer tasks and knowledge of seller tasks and 
produce different targeted recommendations. 
Another area for further research would be to revise the existing survey instrument to 
add questions about the levels of contracting experience in the private sector. The additional 
information could demonstrate correlation between that level of experience and the data 
results regarding the level of knowledge of seller job tasks and associated knowledge gaps. 
The final area for further research could be conducted once the DoD has established 
and implemented the new contracting competency model and single level of certification 
program. The research would compare the buyer and seller tasks of the CMS (NCMA, 
2019b) with the objectives of the new certification program to identify any differences or 
gaps that could be addressed. 
Suggestions of Tools for Contract Management Supervisors 
One suggestion is to provide the existing survey instrument to contract management 
supervisors. They could deploy the survey to their subordinates for self-assessment of the 
buyer tasks proficiency and seller tasks knowledge as well as personally completing the 
survey for each of their subordinates to assess the supervisor’s perception of the same 
levels of proficiency and knowledge. The self-assessments and supervisor assessments 
could be compared to improve both the mentoring and personnel evaluation responsibilities. 
The other suggestion to aid contract management supervisors would require revising 
the current survey instrument to add questions on a Likert scale as to the importance of all 
the buyer tasks. Once revised, the survey could be deployed similarly to the first suggestion 
and the results could assist the supervisor in developing targeted and personalized 
individual training plans. The training plans would better align the employees’ lower 
proficiencies of buyer tasks with the organization’s mission priorities. 
Conclusion  
The GAO and the OIG both continue to identify contract management as a high risk 
and a top management challenge for the DoD. Additionally, research has shown that the 
current DoD contracting competency model may not be sufficient in assessing today’s 
contracting workforce competencies (Rendon & Winn, 2017). Furthermore, the NDAA 2020 
resulted in congressional direction to the Secretary of Defense to implement a professional 
certification program for all members of the acquisition workforce based on standards 
developed by a third-party accredited program that is based on nationally or internationally 
recognized standards (NDAA, 2019). Finally, in April 2020, the DoD senior procurement 
executives decided to establish a new contracting competency model and a single level of 
certification program. The new competency model will be based on the NCMA Contract 
Management Standard (CMS), which is accredited by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI).  
The purpose of this research was to develop a new contracting competency 
assessment instrument based on the NCMA CMS to be used in assessing the DoD’s 
contracting workforce. The competency assessment instrument has been developed and is 
being deployed throughout the DoD. This specific research reflects the application of this 
competency assessment instrument to the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) 
contracting workforce. Based on the assessment results, the MCSC can develop a training 
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roadmap for targeting competencies and knowledge areas needed for improvement within 
the contracting workforce. This research should be expanded by applying the competency 
assessment tool to other DoD contracting agencies as a way of benchmarking the DoD 
contracting workforce competencies against the newly adopted NCMA Contract 
Management Standard. 
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Abstract 
In 1990, the Government Accountability Office began publishing their high-risk series meant 
to review federal programs prone to waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Defense 
acquisitions has appeared in every high-risk list’s publication due to the tendency to miss 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives. In 2019, Congress passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act, which mandated every acquisition career field to realign their certification 
requirements to be based on the nationally recognized standards of an accredited third party. 
This study offers recommendations for improving the DoD program management (PM) 
training standards by providing traceability between the DoD PM competencies and the 
Project Management Institute’s standards for project, program, and portfolio management. 
The study elaborates on the extent of alignment, finding that 96% of the DoD PM competency 
elements align to PMI standards. Areas of misalignment identify opportunities to augment 
DoD PM training and highlight areas where DoD PM training deviates from industry 
standards.  
Keywords: project management, program management, portfolio management, Defense 
acquisitions, functional career field competencies, training, industry standards 
Introduction 
For decades, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been criticized for its inability to 
manage the various programs funded by the U.S. taxpayers. These repeated failings in the 
realms of program cost, schedule, and performance have been documented in numerous 
reports from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and in a myriad of theses and dissertations (Bond et al., 2016; Choi, 2009; 
H.R. 5211, 1990; GAO, 2019a, 2019b; Kupec, 2013; Pernin et al., 2012; President’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986; Redshaw, 2011). A debate continues 
as to whether the acquisition program failings are caused by the DoD’s inherently complex 
acquisition system or the quality of its acquisition personnel. In an article entitled, “Does the 
Program Manager Matter? New Public Management and Defense Acquisition,” the authors 
claim that until the acquisitions system and processes of the DoD are fixed, the training and 
education of program managers (PMs) could be considered inconsequential to the success 
of defense programs (Eckerd & Snider, 2017). However, based on the recommendations in 
GAO-18-217, which was focused on improving program management, the DoD’s program 
performance would improve if the DoD would “improve practices that do not align 
extensively with leading practices” (GAO, 2018a, “GAO Highlights” section). This 
recommendation is further supported by the GAO’s annual high-risk list, which lists the DoD 
career fields that pose a great level of risk to the government if not improved upon or 
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appropriately monitored. DoD weapon systems acquisition has consistently been included 
on this list since 1990 (GAO, 1995, 2019a). According to the most recent list developed in 
2019, DoD program management was considered high risk because of the anticipated $1.66 
trillion investments into their acquisition and procurement portfolio (GAO, 2019a). After 
decades of continuous defense acquisition reform initiatives, there is still no effort 
guaranteed to resolve the continued shortfalls in meeting cost, schedule, and performance 
goals for acquisition programs (GAO, 2019a). These three factors are commonly referred to 
as a program’s triple constraint and form the acquisition program baseline for management.  
While the DoD has struggled to develop solutions meant to resolve their continued 
issues with meeting their program’s planned cost, schedule, and performance baselines, the 
DoD has made attempts. One such attempt was implemented under President Reagan’s 
administration. A group of acquisition professionals were assembled under the leadership of 
David Packard to form President Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission, also commonly 
referred to as the Packard Commission. This commission provided a series of 
recommendations that are still being implemented today. As it pertains to this research 
study, the Packard Commission’s most relevant recommendation was to require business-
related education and training for acquisition personnel (President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986).  
This recommendation led to the passing of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, which then led to the establishment of the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU). Since its inception in 1991, the DAU has structured its 
acquisition curriculum in a way that would best prepare PMs to maneuver the complexities 
of the defense acquisition system, which consists of the interoperation of management 
processes (the Adaptive Acquisition Framework), requirements processes (like the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System [JCIDS] for formal programs of record), 
and a resourcing process (referred to as the planning, programming, budget, and execution 
[PPBE] system; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment 
[OUSD(A&S)], 2020a, 2020b). In 2016, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition distributed the functional career field competencies for PMs and broke them 
down into the following DoD PM categories: Acquisition Management, Business 
Management, Technical Management, and Executive Leadership (MacStravic, 2016). From 
the DoD’s perspective, these competencies serve as the standards that enable PMs to 
effectively “deliver mission-critical capabilities in terms of equipment and services” 
(MacStravic, 2016, p. 2). Furthermore, this list of competencies serves as the basis for the 
program management (PM) DAWIA certification standards adopted by the services. 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) is an independent, private organization that 
has led the way in establishing the internationally recognized standards for project 
management, program management, and portfolio management across industries. They 
offer a variety of certifications to business and management professionals that are 
recognized globally. Since 1999, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) has 
approved PMI’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge® (PMBOK Guide; 
PMI, 2017a) as the American national standard for project management (Holtzman, 1999). 
A contributing factor to the PMBOK Guide being ANSI-certified is its wide range of 
applicability across industries. No matter what industry one is in, the knowledge areas 
discussed in the PMI’s PMBOK Guide and the performance domains of The Standard for 
Program Management (TSPgM; PMI, 2017c) and The Standard for Portfolio Management 
(TSPfM; PMI, 2017b) apply. 
In December 2019, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA). The section of this act that is relevant to this research is Section 
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861, “Defense Acquisition Workforce Certification, Education, and Career Fields” subsection 
(c), “Professional Certification.” It states,  
The Secretary of Defense shall implement a certification program to 
provide for a professional certification requirement for all members of the 
acquisition workforce. … The certification requirement for any acquisition 
workforce career field shall be based on standards developed by a third-
party accredited program based on nationally or internationally recognized 
standards. (NDAA, 2019) 
This subsection has mandated a refocusing of how the DoD trains its acquisition 
professionals. Per the NDAA, it is the role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
produce the realigned certification program based on nationally or internationally recognized 
standards of an accredited third party (NDAA, 2019). Per the DAWIA (H.R. 5211, 1990), it is 
the DAU’s role to provide the training that meets the requirements of the acquisition 
workforce. 
The purpose of this research is to understand the extent to which the DoD’s PM 
functional career field competencies currently align with the internationally recognized 
standards for project, program, and portfolio management published by the PMI. This 
research will be used to make recommendations to the DoD on how to best transition from 
its current PM certification requirements to certification requirements based on the PMI 
standards. This study answers the following research questions: 
• To what extent are the DoD’s program management competency elements at the 
basic, intermediate, and advanced DAWIA levels aligned with the PMI’s PMBOK 
Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM?  
• To what extent are the knowledge areas and performance domains in the PMI’s 
PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM aligned with the DoD’s program management 
competency elements at the basic, intermediate, and advanced DAWIA levels? 
The results of this study provide insight and recommendations for the decision-
makers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DAU charged with 
realigning the program management professional certification. This will enable them to make 
informed decisions on carrying out the modifications to the program management 
certification requirements as mandated by the NDAA. 
This research focuses on the shift in the basis for DoD program management 
certification requirements. Specifically, this study pertains to the alignment of the DoD’s 
program management functional career field competencies (MacStravic, 2016) to the PMI’s 
10 knowledge areas that comprise the PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2017a), the program 
management performance domains of TSPgM (PMI, 2017c), and the portfolio management 
performance domains of TSPfM (PMI, 2017b). This study provides traceability between the 
DoD program management competencies and the industry standards and elaborates on the 
extent to which they are aligned. Finally, this study highlights areas of inconsistency and 
results in recommendations for changes in DoD standards for training and education and 
potential policy changes. 
Literature Review 
The study of PM career field competencies can be linked to work in other acquisition 
workforce career fields. Rendon (2019) states that it is important to make an organization 
auditable so it is better suited to achieve its mission goals and objectives. The concept of 
auditability consists of three main components: capable processes, effective internal 
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controls, and competent personnel. The DoD has robust processes within defense 
acquisition in the form of acquisition management framework, requirements, and resourcing 
processes. The DoD also has internal controls provided by the GAO, the DoD’s Office of 
Inspector General (DoD IG), congressional oversight, and adherence laws such as annual 
NDAAs and acquisition acts like the Nunn–McCurdy Act (Schwartz, 2010). This research 
aids the DoD in improving upon the third component of auditability: competent personnel. 
As previously discussed, defense acquisitions have been criticized for failing to meet 
cost, schedule, and performance program baseline objectives. In response to the 
deficiencies in these three areas, the DoD has implemented multiple acquisition reform 
initiatives to improve its processes. The reform initiatives have also modified the acquisition 
reporting structure and used the power of government watchdogs such as the GAO and the 
DoD IG to implement effective internal controls. To improve the quality of its acquisition 
professionals, the DoD has made frequent modifications to the training and education 
requirements. This literature review covers former acquisition reform initiatives, external 
findings on DoD acquisition performance, the standards published by the PMI, and scholarly 
articles that express support and opposition to modifying the alignment of the DoD 
competencies to the standards of a third party. 
In 1985, the Reagan administration appointed former U.S. Secretary of Defense 
David Packard to lead its Blue Ribbon Commission, which was established to make 
recommendations on how to improve defense acquisitions. The output of the Packard 
Commission resulted in nine recommendations; the one addressed in this research study is 
the recommendation to enhance the quality of acquisition personnel (President’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). This recommendation focused on 
improving the appointment criteria of senior-level personnel to more effectively run programs 
and portfolios and called for business-related education for civilians and for federal law to 
allow acquisition personnel to pursue expanded opportunities for education and training 
(President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). This 
recommendation was implemented via the passing of the DAWIA in 1990. The DAWIA (H.R. 
5211, 1990) resulted in the development of the DAU and the establishment of baseline 
training requirements for acquisition professionals.  
The DAU is the primary source of training for defense acquisition professionals. The 
DAU provides formal courses as well as continuous learning to promote continuing 
education and professional growth for thousands of students every year (Woolsey, 2019). 
To date, these courses are structured to accommodate DAWIA certification requirements 
and have been broken down into three levels (DoD & DAU, n.d.): 
• Level I: basic or entry level 
• Level II: intermediate or journeyman level 
• Level III: advanced or senior level (DoD & DAU, n.d.) 
The content of the training requirements for PMs is based on the DoD PM functional 
career field competencies, which make up four overarching PM categories that serve as the 
basis for developing the learning objectives and training materials for PMs (MacStravic, 
2016): 
• Acquisition Management 
• Business Management 
• Technical Management 
• Executive Leadership (Level III education for unique positions)  
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In November 2019, the NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to implement a 
certification program based on standards developed by a third party (NDAA, 2019). For the 
DoD’s PM training curriculum, this requires adjusting the training standards from being 
based solely on DoD unique functional career field competencies to instead being founded 
on the “standards developed by a third-party accredited program based on nationally or 
internationally recognized standards” (NDAA, 2019, p. 778). This shift from DoD-centric 
competencies to the widely accepted standards of the private sector is an attempt to 
improve the quality of defense acquisition personnel by making them more capable to work 
with industry partners throughout the acquisition process.  
Defense acquisition management has been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 1990 
because of the failure in meeting the five criteria for removal: leadership commitment, 
capacity, action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress (GAO, 2019b). Of those five, 
defense acquisition management meets the criteria for leadership commitment but only 
partially meets the other four. This continued pattern of insufficiency makes the DoD 
vulnerable to budget overruns, schedule slips, and underperformance—observed in major 
defense acquisition programs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (GAO, 2018b) and the Army 
Future Combat Systems (Pernin et al., 2012). The poor returns on investment exhibited by 
these and other programs have led to the acquisition management career field remaining on 
the high-risk list (GAO, 2019b) and have created a continual demand for acquisition reform 
(Gansler et al., 2007).  
While there is generally consensus among lawmakers and DoD senior leaders that 
there is room for improvement in how the DoD manages programs, there are different 
thoughts on how the DoD should work to improve the acquisition career field. Multiple GAO 
reports have contradicting views on what needs to change to remove defense acquisition 
from the high-risk list. Some reports recognize that the certification training offered by the 
DAU is capable of providing adequate training to PMs (GAO, 2010), whereas others state 
that the issues emanate from those very same training standards not aligning with leading 
practices (GAO, 2018a). The takeaway is that the DAU has the infrastructure and 
organizational alignment to provide effective training, but the current training can be more 
effective if aligned with more widely accepted standards. This issue could be addressed by 
incorporating the advisement provided by the GAO to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) by adopting “an existing set of consensus-based standards, such as the widely 
accepted standards for program and project management from the Project Management 
Institute” (GAO, 2019a, p. 11).  
The PMI is a not-for-profit association that publishes standards for certification 
programs including the PMP, the PgMP, and the PfMP. Earning these credentials certifies 
that one is qualified to lead a project, manage a program, and meet strategic objectives in 
overseeing one or more portfolios, respectively (PMI, 2020). The PMI certifications are 
recognized globally due to their widely applicable and highly detailed standards that have 
proven over time to improve the outcomes of projects, programs, and portfolios if applied 
and resourced appropriately.  
In 1999, the ANSI first approved the PMI’s PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2017a) as the 
American national standard for project management (Holtzman, 1999). PMI also awards the 
project management professional (PMP) credential. This credential is ideal for individuals 
who lead and manage projects, which the PMI defines as “temporary endeavors undertaken 
to create a unique product, service or result” (PMI, 2017a, p. 4).  
The PMBOK Guide is broken down into 10 knowledge areas, which are made up of 
49 processes. Project management knowledge areas are categorized by their knowledge 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 139 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
requirements and are described in terms of their various component processes, practices, 
inputs, outputs, tools, and techniques (PMI, 2017a). Project management processes are 
defined as “systematic activities directed toward causing an end result where one or more 
inputs will be acted upon to create one or more outputs” (PMI, 2017a, p. 18). Figure 1 
includes a complete list of the 49 processes that fall under the 10 different knowledge areas 
in the PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2017a).  
 
Figure 1. Ten Knowledge Areas of the PMBOK Guide  
(PMI, 2017a) 
The program management professional (PgMP) certification is based on The 
Standard for Program Management (TSPgM; PMI, 2017c). The purpose of TSPgM is to 
provide generally recognized guidance to support good program management practices, 
establish a common understanding of the role of a PM, and offer guidance for PMs’ 
interactions with portfolio and project managers as well as any other program stakeholders 
(PMI, 2017c). According to the PMI, a program is made up of “related projects, subsidiary 
programs, and program activities managed in a coordinated manner” (PMI, 2017c, p. 3). 
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When programs are run effectively, they can deliver benefits that would not have been 
attainable had their subsidiary programs and projects been managed independently.  
Similar to the PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2017a), TSPgM discusses five performance 
domains that are “complementary groupings of related areas of activity or function that 
uniquely characterize and differentiate the activities found in one performance domain from 
the others within the full scope of program management work” (PMI, 2017c, p. 23). The 
purpose of these domains is to provide PMs with a general checklist of tasks and concepts 
to complete and consider throughout the life of the program (refer to Figure 2).  
The portfolio management professional (PfMP) certification is based on The 
Standard for Portfolio Management (TSPfM; PMI, 2017b), the purpose of which is to provide 
portfolio management principles and performance management domains that are 
considered to be good practices for organizations that manage complex programs and 
projects. TSPfM provides a common understanding of the role of a portfolio manager as well 
as a unified vocabulary to use across industries (PMI, 2017b). According to the PMI, “a 
portfolio is a collection of projects, programs and subsidiary portfolios and operations 
managed as a group to achieve strategic objectives” (PMI, 2017b, p. 3). The purpose of 
managing a portfolio versus independent programs and projects is to achieve organizational 
objectives and strategies that could not be met otherwise.  
TSPfM is very similar to TSPgM in that it consists of seven performance domains 
and is supported by the PMBOK Guide. These seven performance domains, when followed 
and executed correctly, are what allow for the portfolio management plan to achieve its 
desired impact on strategy and performance (PMI, 2017b). For a complete list of these 
domains and what items are associated with them, see Figure 3. 
 
(PMI, 2017c) (PMI, 2017b) 
In the early 2000s, the DoD worked with the PMI to develop the U.S. Department of 
Defense Extension to: A Guide to the PMBOK (PMBOK Guide; DoD & DAU, 2003). The 
purpose of the DoD and PMI collaboration was to identify defense applications of the 
PMBOK Guide’s knowledge areas and to meet the objective of the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) to build 
credibility in acquisitions by delivering systems at lower cost and on schedule (DoD & DAU, 
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2003). However, the PMBOK Guide’s extension was never implemented into the DAU 
certification curriculum (Kupec, 2013). 
It has been well established that DoD acquisition programs have struggled to 
effectively manage program cost, schedule, and performance (GAO 2018a, 2018b, 2019a). 
The NDAA (2019) addresses this issue by mandating that the DAU modify its existing 
certification requirements to be based on the standards of an accredited third party with 
nationally recognized standards. Because of the high visibility of defense acquisitions, there 
have been many scholarly studies on how the DoD could improve their training standards by 
mirroring an entity like the PMI (Choi, 2009; Kupec, 2013; Redshaw, 2011). In comparison 
to the progressive complexity of PMI’s certifications for project, program, and portfolio 
management, the DAWIA certifications for Level I (basic), Level II (intermediate), and Level 
III (advanced) “correlate to the complexity and responsibilities required for designated 
positions and different types of assignments in weapon systems, services, business 
management systems and information technology, and international acquisitions” 
(Redshaw, 2011, p. 55). Both Choi (2009) and Kupec (2013) concur with this analysis and 
elaborate further that modeling the new DAU standards after only one of the PMI 
credentialing standards—PMP for example—would not be sufficient. Individuals who earn 
the PMP credential have proven themselves to be capable of effectively leading project 
teams and managing a temporary project. While this credential holds value in the program 
management industry, the body of knowledge that accompanies it would not be enough to 
equip an individual to run a complex decade-long program or portfolio. For these reasons, it 
is essential to base the new DAWIA certification requirements on all three of the PMI 
credentials. 
According to auditability theory, in order for an organization, project team, program 
office, or portfolio executive officer to meet their specific objectives, it is critical that 
competent personnel are employed, effective internal controls are maintained, and capable 
processes are implemented (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). As it relates to defense acquisition 
reform, there are divergent opinions as to which of the three components of auditability 
should be focused on to improve program metrics in cost, schedule, and performance. For 
example, Eckerd and Snider (2017) claim that the defense acquisition processes should be 
the focal point for reform due to their complexities. They add that the environmental politics 
that DoD PMs maneuver daily prevent them from being effective, which nullifies any quality 
training they undergo. Other research comes to a similar conclusion that in order to make 
significant changes in federal acquisitions, acquisition reform needs to comprehensively 
consider changes to the management processes (acquisition framework), the resources 
processes (PPBE system), and the requirements processes (Bond et al., 2016). Mortlock 
(2020) asserts that providing DoD PMs with professional-level training and adopting 
internationally recognized industry standards (for example, PMP, PgMP, and PfPM 
certifications) could help improve the effectiveness of PMs, help gain acceptance for 
program management as a profession, and help solidify the credibility of the defense 
acquisition workforce. 
Methodology 
This research involved a qualitative, lexicographic analysis of the descriptions of the 
DoD’s program management competencies and the descriptions of the PMI’s knowledge 
areas and domains in the PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2017a), TSPgM (PMI, 2017c), TSPfM (PMI, 
2017b), the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA, 2019), and other key sources. This 
highlighted key words, phrases, and meaning from the description of each knowledge area, 
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domain, and competency and allowed for an informed mapping of the DoD’s PM 
competencies to the PMI’s standards. 
The OUSD(AT&L) memorandum entitled Program Management Functional Career 
Field Competencies served as the primary DoD source used in analyzing the alignment 
between the DoD’s program management competencies and the PMI’s standards 
(MacStravic, 2016). According to the memorandum, an integrated product team developed 
the updated competencies while considering the three certification levels: Level I (basic), 
Level II (intermediate), and Level III (advanced; MacStravic, 2016). The memorandum 
includes the following information used in this research: 
1. Program Management Competency Units and Competencies: The PM 
competencies are organized into the four program management categories and 18 
units of competency. Figure 4 demonstrates the distribution of the competencies.  
 
Figure 4. DoD Program Management Competency Units and Competencies (MacStravic, 2016) 
2. Program Management Functional Career Field Competencies: Descriptions of 
the 70 competencies are provided for each of the three DAU certification levels.  
The data sources used from the PMI include the PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and 
TSPfM. Although the PMBOK Guide is the only ANSI-accredited standard, the contents of 
TSPgM and TSPfM are recognized internationally and accepted industry practices for 
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program and portfolio managers, respectively. TSPgM and TSPfM define the standards for 
the application of their principles and practices, which enhances the likelihood of program 
and portfolio success (PMI, 2017b, 2017c). The PMI standards were mapped to each of the 
190 elements at the basic, intermediate, and advanced level (570 total element 
descriptions). PMI conference papers served as the primary source for additional 
information on PMI standards (Alie, 2016; Ross & Shaltry, 2006; Shenhar & Dvir, 2004). 
This research required the qualitative analysis of data—the data being the DoD’s PM 
competency descriptions and the contents of the PMI’s knowledge areas and performance 
management domains, and the qualitative analysis being the alignment mapping. Six 
qualitative analyses of lexicographic comparisons were preformed: 
1. The DoD’s basic (DAWIA Level I) PM competencies to the PMI’s PMBOK Guide 
knowledge areas and processes  
2. The DoD’s intermediate (DAWIA Level II) PM competencies to the PMI’s PMBOK 
Guide knowledge areas and processes 
3. The DoD’s intermediate (DAWIA Level II) PM competencies to the PMI’s TSPgM 
program management domains 
4. The DoD’s advanced (DAWIA Level III) PM competencies to the PMI’s PMBOK 
Guide knowledge areas and processes 
5. The DoD’s advanced (DAWIA Level III) PM competencies to the PMI’s TSPgM 
program management domains 
6. The DoD’s advanced (DAWIA Level III) PM competencies to the PMI’s TSPfM 
portfolio management domains 
The analysis resulted in the mapping of 1,085 DoD PM competency elements to PMI 
knowledge areas and domains. The next step in this research applied a quantitative analysis 
to the completed competency map (Bernard, 1996). This transition to a matrix format was 
completed in conjunction with the more qualitative analysis by classifying each element 
mapping as either aligned (Green/“G”), somewhat aligned (Yellow/“Y”), completely 
unaligned (Red/“RR”), or not applicable (Black/“N/A”).  
Data Analysis 
This section addresses the extent to which the DoD’s 2016 PM functional career field 
competencies are aligned with the PMI’s PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM. The first step 
taken in the analysis was to count how many DoD competency elements were mapped to 
the PMI’s PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM and were classified as aligned, somewhat 
aligned, completely unaligned, or N/A (refer to Table 1). Categories were created for the 
PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM by combining the basic, intermediate, and advanced 
elements that mapped to each standard. A fourth category was included that combined the 
findings across all three PMI standards to demonstrate the extent of alignment between the 
DoD PM competencies and the PMI standards for when all PMI standards were applied. For 
example, if a single element was labeled as aligned under the PMBOK Guide but completely 
unaligned under TSPgM and TSPfM, it would be classified as aligned under the All PMI 
category. This method demonstrates the value of applying all three PMI standards in DoD 
PM training instead of only the PMBOK Guide. Finally, a fifth category was applied that 
shows the number of elements categorized as 100% aligned, somewhat aligned, or 
completely unaligned with the PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM. This category is 
significant because it shows that when all three PMI standards are applied, only eight of 190 
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DoD PM competency elements are completely unaligned with the PMI standards. According 
to the research, the DoD PM competencies align with the PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and 
TSPfM as depicted in Figure 5. 
Table 1. Quantity of DoD PM Competency Elements Mapped to the PMI’s Standards 




Figure 5. Extent to Which the DoD PM Competency Elements Align to the PMI Standards by Pie 
Chart 
Based on these findings, it is evident that the PMBOK Guide is the PMI standard that 
is most aligned with the DoD PM competency elements. This is expected, as the PMBOK 
Guide serves as the building block for TSPgM and TSPfM and is the broadest of the three 
standards. However, by adding TSPgM and TSPfM standards to the standards of the 
PMBOK Guide, the alignment level of the PMI standards with the DoD PM competencies 
increases to 96% (61% completely aligned and 35% somewhat aligned). Furthermore, the 
percentage of elements that are categorized as completely unaligned or not applicable 
decreased to 4% and 0%, respectively. 
Figures 6–9 further elaborate on the impact achieved when applying all three PMI 
standards to DoD PM competencies in order to provide sufficient detail in determining which 
DoD PM competency elements need to be improved upon to ensure sufficient alignment 
with the PMI standards. These figures provide a visualization of the progressive 
improvement in alignment as all three PMI standards are applied. Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 
8, and Figure 9 demonstrate the different levels of alignment within the Acquisition 
Management, Business Management, Technical Management, and Executive Leadership 
DoD PM categories, respectively. 
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Figure 6. Alignment of Acquisition Management DoD PM Category by PMI Standard 
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Figure 7. Alignment of Business Management DoD PM Category by PMI Standard 
 
 
Figure 8. Alignment of Technical Management DoD PM Category by PMI Standard 
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Figure 9. Alignment of Executive Leadership DoD PM Management Category by PMI 
Standard 
The visualizations in these figures demonstrate the alignment improvement of 
incorporating all three PMI standards to the DoD PM categories. The visualizations also 
provide a clear view of which DoD PM category is least aligned with the PMI standards. The 
Acquisition Management DoD PM category from Figure 6 contains the two DoD PM units of 
competency that are the least aligned across all three PMI standards. They include 
Acquisition Law and Policy (0% aligned, 33% somewhat aligned, and 67% completely 
unaligned) and the International Acquisition and Exportability (0% aligned, 74% somewhat 
aligned, and 26% completely unaligned) units of competency. This is not surprising since 
these two units of competency are mostly exclusive to the DoD’s nature of work and would 
not contain lexicon that would be commonplace in an industry-wide standard. Therefore, 
courses in these two units of competency would need to augment acquisition/PM training if 
the DoD adopted PMI certification standards.  
The next section provides a breakdown of the competency mapping by the PMBOK 
Guide project management knowledge areas, TSPgM program management performance 
domains, and TSPfM portfolio management performance domains to answer the question, 
What PMI knowledge areas and performance domains are most aligned and least aligned 
with the DoD program management functional career field competency elements? Analyzing 
the level of alignment between the DoD’s PM functional career field competencies and the 
PMI standards at this level enables DoD officials to see which knowledge areas and 
domains are not being applied in the DoD’s PM competencies.  
This analysis required the approach of mapping the DoD’s PM competency elements 
to the PMI knowledge areas and performance domains by determining the DoD PM 
competency elements that aligned (both completely and somewhat) with the PMI’s 
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knowledge areas and performance domains. This process enabled the tallying of each 
knowledge area and performance domain that aligned with the DoD PM competency 
elements. Figure 10 demonstrates the extent to which each of the PMBOK Guide’s 10 
knowledge areas align with the DoD PM competency elements. This analysis enables DoD 
stakeholders like the DAU to adjust training objectives to appropriately integrate the PMBOK 
Guide project management knowledge areas into PM certification curriculum.  
 
Figure 10. Alignment of the PMBOK Guide Project Management Knowledge Areas to DoD 
Competency Elements 
The knowledge areas that exhibited the greatest level of alignment include 4 – 
Project Integration Management, and 12 – Project Procurement Management. 
• 4 – Project Integration Management: This knowledge area made up 19% of all the 
aligned and somewhat aligned DoD PM competency elements—more than any other 
section. Project Integration Management includes the coordination of processes 
across every PMBOK Guide process group (initiating, planning, executing, 
monitoring and controlling, and closing).  
• 12 – Project Procurement Management: This knowledge area made up 13% of all 
the aligned and somewhat aligned elements.  
The knowledge areas that exhibited the lowest level of alignment include 6 – Project 
Schedule Management, 10 – Project Communications Management, and 7 – Project Cost 
Management. 
• 6 – Project Schedule Management: This knowledge area made up only 3% of the 
aligned and somewhat aligned DoD PM competency elements. This deficiency in 
alignment is concerning because managing schedule is one of the three project 
management tenets that make up the triple constraint of project management 
(Atkinson, 1999).  
• 7 – Project Cost Management: This knowledge area made up 6% of the aligned 
and somewhat aligned DoD PM competency elements. As stated, cost management 
is one of the three components of the triple constraint and is therefore critical in 
project management.  
• 10 – Project Communications Management: This knowledge area made up only 
5% of the aligned and somewhat aligned DoD PM competency elements. The impact 
that communications management can have on a project cannot be overstated. 
Mortlock (2016) opined that including some form of communications document (e.g., 
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a strategic communication [STRATCOM] plan) that conveys a project’s or program’s 
desired impact and synchronizes its implementation and execution plans has proven 
valuable to program success.  
To summarize, the least aligned PMBOK Guide knowledge areas include project 
cost, schedule, and communications management. Two of these three are related to the 
triple constraint, which—if not well-managed—can significantly impact project outcomes. 
The fact that the DoD PM competencies do not align well with these PMBOK Guide sections 
may be cause for concern because it is an indicator that the DoD is not adequately training 
their PMs on the importance of managing schedule, cost, and communications—at least in 
the realm of formal acquisition training. 
This section demonstrates the extent to which each of TSPgM’s program 
management performance domains—and elements across all domains—align with the 
intermediate and advanced DoD PM competency elements (see Figure 11). This analysis 
enables DoD stakeholders to focus on the most relevant TSPgM program management 
performance domains when restructuring their certification curriculum.  
 
Figure 11. Alignment of TSPgM Program Management Performance Domains to Intermediate and 
Advanced DoD Competency Elements 
The program management performance domains that exhibited the greatest level of 
alignment include All – Elements Across All Knowledge Areas and 3 – Program Strategy 
Alignment. The remaining four performance domains exhibited mostly similar levels of 
alignment (9%–11%).  
This section demonstrates the extent to which each of TSPfM’s portfolio 
management performance domains—and elements across all domains—align with the 
advanced DoD PM competency elements (see Figure 12). This analysis enables DoD 
stakeholders to focus on the most relevant TSPfM program management performance 
domains when restructuring their certification curriculum.  
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Figure 12. Alignment of TSPfM Portfolio Management Performance Domains to Advanced DoD 
Competency Elements 
The portfolio management performance domains that exhibited the greatest level of 
alignment include 2 – The Portfolio Life Cycle, 3 – Portfolio Strategic Management, and 4 – 
Portfolio Governance.  
• 2 – The Portfolio Life Cycle: Just as the PMBOK Guide Project Integration 
Management knowledge area was highly aligned with the DoD PM competencies, so 
too is this performance domain (13%). Project Integration Management and Portfolio 
Life Cycle Management heavily rely on information systems that enable effective 
communication and support seamless and timely transitions between project and life-
cycle phases (PMI, 2017a, 2017b). 
• 3 – Portfolio Strategic Management: This performance domain makes up 15% of 
the aligned DoD PM competencies. Decisions relying on strategic alignment are 
made at the executive level.  
• 4 – Portfolio Governance: This performance domain makes up 14% of the aligned 
DoD PM competency elements. The effective implementation of Portfolio 
Governance aids an organization in becoming auditable (Rendon & Rendon, 2015).  
The performance domain that exhibited the lowest level of alignment was 8 – 
Portfolio Risk Management. 
• 8 – Portfolio Risk Management: This domain made up the lowest number of 
aligned DoD PM elements. This indicates that the current DoD PM competency 
elements do not include many elements related to risk management at the advanced 
level. The DoD should consider addressing this training gap to improve their PMs’ 
ability to identify, analyze, and manage risks at the portfolio level.  
Conclusions 
This research provided the DoD with information and insight necessary to effectively 
respond to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA’s (2019) mandate to base acquisition workforce 
certification requirements on nationally or internationally recognized third-party standards. 
The goal of the NDAA’s mandate is to improve the quality of the DoD’s program 
management workforce through effective training. As globally recognized standards, PMI’s 
PMBOK Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM serve as excellent foundations on which to base the 
DoD’s program management certification requirements. The researchers investigated the 
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degree to which the DoD’s PM competencies align with the standards of the PMI’s PMBOK 
Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM. Analyzing and defining the level of alignment between the two 
standards enables training organizations to provide more comprehensive training to the 
acquisition workforce that leverages internationally recognized PM standards.  
From a high-level perspective, the PMBOK Guide proved to be the most aligned, 
TSPgM is the second most aligned, and TSPfM is the least aligned with DoD PM 
competencies. The knowledge areas and performance domains that were most aligned with 
the DoD’s PM competency elements included concepts for strategic management and life-
cycle management. The most concerning finding from this research was the discovery of the 
relatively low level of alignment of the schedule and cost management knowledge areas 
across DoD PM competencies.  
Table 2. Summary of Research Findings 
 
The following are recommendations based on this research.  
1. Base the new DAWIA PM training certification requirements on the PMBOK 
Guide, TSPgM, and TSPfM. 
A review of the literature and the analysis of the mappings between the DoD’s PM 
functional career field competencies and the PMI standards have led the researchers to 
believe that the DoD should base their new certification requirements on all three PMI 
standards. The progressive complexity and scope of the DAWIA certifications “correlate to 
the complexity and responsibilities required for designated positions and different types of 
assignments in weapon systems, services, business management systems and information 
technology, and international acquisitions” (Redshaw, 2011, p. 55). Because the PMBOK 
Guide is exclusively aimed towards individuals charged with managing temporary endeavors 
(projects), it would not suffice as the sole source of training for the DoD’s program 
management workforce. For example, many PMs lead complex, decades-long programs 
and manage portfolios that contain a multitude of different projects and programs. Such 
endeavors require a higher-level managerial perspective and scope of control than the 
PMBOK Guide provides. Therefore, the PMBOK Guide would not be able to meet the 
progressive complexities of the DAWIA certifications and operational responsibilities that are 
reflected in the DoD’s acquisition workforce. By adding TSPgM and TSPfM to the 
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certification framework of their PMs, the DoD can account for the increase in managerial 
scope that PMs will see as they progress in their careers.  
2. Maintain the three-tiered certification model.  
The DAWIA three-tiered certification model consists of Level I (basic), Level II 
(intermediate), and Level III (advanced). This progressive education model enables PMs to 
be trained on relevant subject matter that align with required responsibilities and prevents 
them from learning out-of-scope material too early in their career. For example, a DoD 
project manager would rarely require training on portfolio life-cycle management when the 
scope of their responsibilities is to manage small projects. On the other hand, DoD program 
executive officers, who primarily manage portfolios, require training on basic project 
management practices because project and program management fundamentals form the 
basis of portfolio governance and strategic alignment across projects, programs, and 
portfolios. To guide PMs from project management to being capable of leading vast 
programs and portfolios, the DoD must establish training that gradually increases in scope in 
correlation with the scope of the PM’s current job responsibilities. This can be accomplished 
by establishing certification standards based on the following model: 
• DAWIA Level I (basic/project managers) – PMP certification based on the PMBOK 
Guide 
• DAWIA Level II (intermediate/PMs) – PgMP certification based on TSPgM 
• DAWIA Level III (advanced/program and portfolio managers) – PfMP certification 
based on TSPfM 
This would allow for a gradual increase in program management knowledge and application 
and align experience to training certifications. To improve upon this model, the DoD should 
enable cross-sectioning of the three PMI standards into each certification level. As 
mentioned, the PMBOK Guide serves as the foundation for both TSPgM and TSPfM and 
therefore holds valuable information that should be used in the training of managers of 
programs and portfolios. Likewise, including sections of TSPgM and TSPfM with the Level I 
education allows inexperienced DoD PMs to understand the larger picture of their projects 
and how they fit into programs and portfolios. 
3. Augment professional certifications with DoD-specific PM training. 
As this research has demonstrated, the three PMI standards alone do not cover all 
the DoD PM competencies. For example, if the PMP certification is adopted for DAWIA PM 
Level I (basic), TSPgM certification is adopted for DAWIA PM Level II (intermediate), and 
TSPfM certification is adopted for DAWAI PM Level III (advanced), additional DAU training 
courses would need to focus on the areas least aligned, like Acquisition Law and Policy and 
International Acquisition and Exportability. Additional DAU training would be required in the 
areas not covered by PMI standards sufficiently, including the following: 
• Acquisition Management 
o Acquisition Policy and Law 
o International Acquisition and Exportability 
• Business Management  
o Contract Management, specifically in pre-solicitation planning and 
execution 
• Technical Management 
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o Engineering Management, specifically technical planning in 
understanding, applying, and ensuring program protection, cybersecurity, 
and counterintelligence 
Considering that 190 DoD PM competencies exist, the fact that PMI standards aligned 
reasonably well reinforces the recommendation to adopt the PMI standards. 
4. Consider all three components of auditability. 
In conjunction with the modification to its PM certification requirements, the DoD 
should consider the research of Eckerd and Snider (2017) and Rendon and Rendon (2015). 
Both sets of research emphasize the importance of ensuring capable processes and 
effective internal controls. While this research exclusively considered the development of 
competent personnel through an analysis of training standards, the DoD should ensure that 
correct measures are being taken in modifying training certifications and in developing 
effective processes to transition the workforce and the training staff to the new standards. 
5. Revitalize the U.S. Department of Defense Extension to: A Guide to the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge. 
To fill competency gaps that are not covered by PMI standards, the DoD should look 
to the U.S. Department of Defense Extension to: A Guide to the Project Management Body 
of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide; DoD & DAU, 2003).  
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Abstract  
This study is an analysis of workforce turnover behavior among two segments of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian workforce. Its research objective is to identify turnover 
trends among the civil service medical healthcare workforce and the civilian component of the 
defense acquisition workforce. The study employs a logistic regression model to estimate the 
relationship between employee personnel characteristics and the likelihood of separating 
from the civil service. In both groups, the overall pattern of attrition was consistent with a life-
cycle model of turnover behavior. The results highlight specific employment categories where 
improvement in recruiting a more diverse workforce is needed. 
Introduction 
This study is an analysis of workforce turnover behavior among two segments of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian workforce. Its research objective is to identify turnover 
trends among the civil service medical health care workforce and the civilian component of 
the defense acquisition workforce. The focus on the civilian medical workforce is notable 
because the Defense Health Agency (DHA) is currently undergoing a significant 
reorganization. Establishing baseline turnover patterns prior to the completion of the 
reorganization will facilitate future program evaluations of the impact of the reorganization 
on the medical workforce. 
In both groups, the overall pattern of attrition was consistent with the life-cycle model 
of turnover behavior. Employees that are not yet eligible for retirement had higher 
propensities to separate at early stages of their careers and relatively low attrition rates as 
they approach retirement eligibility. Retirement-eligible personnel conversely separate at an 
accelerating rate as they move past their earliest eligibility date. The preliminary statistical 
analysis illustrated how these two overall patterns hold for both medical and acquisition 
employees but also highlighted how the acquisition workforce benefits much more from mid-
career appointments. This surge of older appointees flowing into the workforce from 
uniformed services also affects the outflow years later as these employees retire. Even if 
medical and acquisition employees respond relatively similarly to advancement in age and 
tenure, the difference in the composition of the workforce will change the recruitment, 
training, and succession planning strategies needed to manage the two types of employees. 
Another finding from this study is that the DoD can do much better in hiring racial 
minorities into technical and white-collar positions. This analysis of the medical workforce 
found that personnel identifying as Black, Native American, and Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
were almost twice as likely to be employed in blue-collar work, while employees identifying 
as White or Asian were nearly evenly distributed between the two labor categories. Pursuing 
diversity and representation within occupational categories, and not just within the workforce 
as a whole, is essential to achieving a public workforce that aligns with the American public. 
Furthermore, our attrition analysis found that employees identifying as Black, Asian, and 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander had lower likelihoods of voluntarily separating when 
compared to white employees. Attaining diversity within these technical fields will also bring 
a more stable workforce. 
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For the acquisition workforce, the study employed command-level employee 
satisfaction survey results to estimate whether organizational climate affects turnover 
behavior. On this point, the model output was inconclusive, and no statistically significant 
relationship between turnover and employee satisfaction was identified. Sensitivity analysis 
revealed a similar life-cycle trend for employees in both the medical and acquisition 
workforces. The primary difference in turnover incidence between the two segments of the 
workforce is the much larger intake of employees at the mid-career level of experience 
within the acquisition workforce. This difference in the inflow of acquisition personnel leads 
to a different demographic profile of the workforce when compared to the medical 
professionals. 
Background 
Turnover Behavior in the DoD 
Understanding turnover behavior among the DoD civilian workforce is an important 
component of strategic workforce management. Civilian personnel perform a variety of 
functions that are crucial to the operations of the DoD. This workforce, however, has for 
decades been subject to a variety of adverse environmental conditions, such as pay 
freezes, furloughs, and other factors that can contribute to increased rates of voluntary 
separation (Fernandez et al., 1985). While turnover among uniformed military personnel has 
been a topic of focused study for many years, the civilian DoD workforce has received less 
attention (Baldor, 2018; Buddin, 1984; Gebicke, 1998; GAO, 1997; Rabkin, 2000).  
This study explicitly builds off of prior research by Brien (2019) and Buttrey et al. 
(2018). These studies, conducted in collaboration with TRAC–Monterey and the DoD Office 
of People Analytics, include nonparametric survival analyses of turnover among civilian 
employees across the entire DoD. Collectively, the studies examined gender-based turnover 
differentials in a variety of different contexts, such as the variation in gender-based turnover 
differentials across different military branches. Their work also explored gender differentials 
across different categories of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-
affiliated occupation statuses. The key findings of those studies centered on the lack of a 
gender differential in turnover for women filling STEM occupations, while a significant 
gender gap persists in non-STEM job categories. 
This study advances research on turnover among the civilian DoD workforce by 
examining two subsets of the workforce in greater detail. The healthcare workforce and the 
acquisition workforce constitute two distinct subsets within the DoD. The nature of their work 
and their skillsets are crucial to continued DoD operations. Analyzing the trends associated 
with turnover in each of these communities separately may help produce insights that 
improve the administration of these populations. 
The Medical Civilian Workforce  
Understanding the institutional background of the ongoing reorganization of the DoD 
civilian medical workforce provides context for current turnover trends within this 
subpopulation. In a thesis completed in collaboration with this research project, Paone 
(2020) described the motivation for this reorganization: 
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, the DHA began a four-year transition plan to assume 
authority of the DoD’s Military Healthcare System (MHS) including over 400 military 
treatment facilities (MTFs) that serve over 9.4 million patients worldwide (DHA, 2019a). The 
U.S. Congress mandated the formation of a centralized governance of the MHS in 2013, 
and subsequently, the deputy secretary of defense directed the official establishment of the 
DHA as a Combat Support Agency (CSA) in March of the same year (DoD Directive: 
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3000.06, 2013). However, the proposal to integrate military medical services into a joint 
system to increase quality of care and efficiency is not a new concept and is one that 
experts have been proposing repeatedly since the 1980s. The most recent push and 
subsequent creation of the DHA followed a 2011 DoD special task force report on MHS 
governance that cited inconsistencies and inefficiencies in the delivery system (DHA, 2017). 
Under the previous system, each of the armed services (U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force), 
respectively, managed its own medical treatment facilities in a jointly supportive but non-
integrated system.  
The purpose of the DHA is to ensure the standardization of quality of care to all its 
military healthcare beneficiaries as part of a larger effort to provide greater integration of 
services and a more centralized control over purchased care. The DHA reports its mission is 
to achieve greater integration of direct and purchased care delivery systems, so it can 
accomplish a “4-point aim”—achieve medical readiness, improve the health of its 
beneficiaries, enhance the experience of care, and lower healthcare costs (DHA, 2019a). 
The DHA further establishes its agency goals as follows: 
Empower and Care for Our People  
Optimize Operations Across the Military Health System  
Co-create Optimal Outcomes for Health, Well-Being and Readiness  
Deliver Solutions to Combatant Commands (DHA, 2019a, p. 1)  
The DHA is expected to complete a full transition of operations governance before 
FY2022 across all armed services and their respective MTFs. At this time, military active 
duty manpower will fall under the command of a joint readiness center environment, which 
will share a commanding officer with the MTF during the transition. The commanding officer 
will be accountable to both the DHA and combatant commanders. This proposed 
organizational structure has remained fluid with evolving strategy, and it may continue to 
change with strategy implementation as this landmark organizational transition continues 
(Paone, 2020, pp. 1–2). 
Examining the healthcare workforce separately from the rest of the civilian workforce 
may help reveal the ways that the unique aspects of healthcare work impact turnover 
decisions. Healthcare workers experience unique training, labor hours, and environmental 
conditions relative to other DoD employees. Recent research on turnover among the 
broader healthcare community highlights the role of burnout in increasing employees’ 
intention to voluntarily separate from medical employment (Aiken et al., 2002; Gesesew et 
al., 2016; Rambur et al., 2008).  
Although medical professionals endure many years of specialized training to become 
doctors, nurses, physician’s assistants, and the other various forms of medical 
professionals, recent research has identified relatively high turnover rates among younger 
professionals. McGrail et al. (2017) examine physician turnover rates in both rural and urban 
communities. Their analysis revealed that, during the 2000–2014 period, physicians under 
the age of 45 had double the turnover rate of their older colleagues. The authors identify 
institutional sorting as one problem; it led to poorer and more rural areas losing their 
physicians at a higher rate.  
The institutional factors that McGrail et al. (2017) identify as having an impact on 
turnover behavior may manifest in the DoD medical workforce. As organizations undergo 
periods of transition, it is more complicated and challenging to offer the institutional support 
that younger professionals need to keep them in the profession. Additionally, adverse 
institutional conditions may cause older professionals to accelerate their retirement plans. 
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Understanding the baseline turnover prior to the organizational changes will enable future 
researchers to perform a program evaluation of the impact of DHA’s transition plan on 
employee retention.  
The Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Ensuring that the Defense Acquisition Workforce is sufficiently staffed, both in terms 
of size and breadth of skills, is essential to maintain the pace of defense procurement. 
McCauley’s (2020) thesis, written in collaboration with this research project, describes the 
challenge of monitoring and stabilizing turnover within this workforce: 
The U.S. government annually spends hundreds of billions of dollars on national 
defense; although this is a tremendous amount of money, every cent of that is needed to 
ensure that the United States remains the world’s strongest military power. The DoD 
Acquisition Workforce (AWF) oversees the utilization and spending of large amounts of this 
budget. These General Schedule (GS) employees are responsible for the “development, 
acquisition and sustainment of warfighting capabilities, systems and services” (Secretary of 
the Navy [SECNAV], 2019, p. 1). In keeping with the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, the AWF is made up of highly skilled and qualified 
federal employees. For example, most of the Department of the Navy’s acquisition 
employees are a GS-13, which is two below the max rank for the General Schedule system; 
their military counterparts are usually an O-4 ([SECNAV], 2019). These are relatively senior 
positions that require a great deal of training and responsibility.  
However, due to contractual differences between military and civilian personnel, 
civilian employees can be much harder to maintain and replace. Civilians can decide to 
terminate from a position whenever they choose, regardless of whether there is a scheduled 
replacement or not. Acquisition employees also have incredibly valuable skills that can 
easily transfer to high paying, private sector positions. The very jobs and contracts that the 
AWF oversees provides the expert experience needed for the lucrative civilian market. For 
this exact reason, it is critical that the DoD does its absolute best to retain the talent it 
already has. Hiring new employees within the GS system is incredibly difficult as well. There 
is a great deal of litigation that goes along with the process that keeps it from being quick 
and timely. This same process makes it equally difficult to fire or terminate undesirable 
employees. That is why it’s so important to acquire and retain qualified workers the first time 
around. If the AWF is experiencing high attrition rates, the entire acquisition process can 
sometimes come to a screeching halt. This is not only a waste of millions—and sometimes 
billions—of taxpayer dollars, but in some instances, it can cost the lives of U.S. military 
members. It is always of the utmost importance that we get safe, reliable, and superior 
equipment to our fighting forces as fast as humanly possible. Therefore, every action 
possible must be taken to mitigate civilian acquisition attrition and ensure that the AWF 
always employs the best and brightest people (McCauley, 2020, pp. 1–2). 
A series of studies published by RAND have sought to document changes in the 
inventory of the defense acquisition workforce over the last 2 decades (Gates et al., 2008, 
2009, 2013, 2018). These reports provide a detailed descriptive analysis of various 
characteristics of acquisition employees, such as the distribution of new acquisition hires 
across the military service branches, the relative level of education of employees, and the 
pace of retirements among this workforce. Key findings include observations that 1. new 
hires into acquisition job categories have a higher level of education in 2017 than they did a 
decade prior, and 2. the civilian acquisition workforce has a lower turnover rate that the rest 
of the civilian DoD workforce (Gates et al., 2018).  
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The authors of the RAND studies note that a key limitation of their work is the lack of 
data on contracted workers performing acquisition tasks. This is a near universal constraint 
on studies relying on extracts from the Defense Manpower Data Center, which only contains 
records of direct employees of the DoD. Another aspect of the RAND studies that is not a 
limitation, but a feature that differs from this analysis, is that they do not engage in statistical 
modeling to identify the relationships between employee characteristics and turnover 
behavior. The studies provide deep and detailed historical descriptions of trends within the 
acquisition workforce, but they do not seek to identify causal relationships between different 
features of the workforce.  
Methodology and Data 
The data for this analysis are obtained from the civilian master files maintained by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center. These data were accessed through the PDE operated 
by the AAG. The data used in this study consist of two subsets of the full civilian workforce 
data set used in Brien (2019) and Buttrey et al. (2018). As described in the prior report,  
the civilian master files contain demographic and detailed information found in 
an employee’s personnel file. We merge the civilian transaction files with the 
civilian master files to catch all the data transactions that take place within each 
employee’s record. These transactions are changes in the employee’s career, 
which include salary changes, changes of appointment, and, most importantly, 
separation. We flag those employees with separation transactions to determine 
which employees attrite during the eight years of our study. We also classify 
employees as “disappeared” who do not have a separation transaction file, but 
their master file quarterly snapshots end during the research period, indicating 
they are no longer employed. (Buttrey et al., 2018, p. 30) 
After the separations were identified in the data, we limited the data set to a cohort of 
civilian DoD employees who were appointed to their positions in 2009. This reduced the 
total count of individuals tracked in our study to 102,009. Another 4,355 records were 
dropped due to missing or inconsistent data. The total number of individuals tracked in the 
2009 employee cohort was 97,654. These individuals were observed over an 8-year period. 
As time passed, we were able to observe members of the 2009 cohort separate from federal 
employment and then conduct statistical analyses of the employee attributes that were 
associated with higher turnover rates. 
Limiting the analysis to the 2009 cohort provides a comparable sample of individuals 
for an analysis of separation behavior. Members of the cohort were subject to the same 
macroeconomic effects that influence turnover behavior. Although cohort members were all 
newly appointed to federal service in 2009, the sample contains considerable variation in the 
age at entry, level of education, and employment history characteristics.17 This study 
examines two subsets of this cohort: the acquisition and medical workforces.  
Although Brien (2019) and Buttrey et al. (2018) employed nonparametric survival 
analysis methods to examine turnover behavior, this study ultimately used parametric 
logistic regression methods to model relationships between employee and environmental 




17See Brien (2019) for descriptive statistics of the entire 2009 cohort. 
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intended in the project proposal was made for two compelling reasons. First, peer reviewer 
feedback received on an academic manuscript that was derived from the Brien (2019) report 
highly recommended using a parametric approach that is more familiar to the academic 
audience of the public human resource management literature. As noted in Brien (2019), the 
public human resource management literature contains relatively few studies of turnover 
behavior, and those that do exist, such as Cho and Lewis (2012), do not have access to 
individual-level behavior tracked over multiple consecutive years. The relative novelty of the 
data set used in this series of studies makes replicating some of the earlier estimates in the 
broader literature of the marginal effects of individual characteristics on turnover behavior a 
highly desirable contribution. Given this external feedback, the methodology of this study 
has been adjusted to have greater external impact. A second reason motivating the change 
in methodology is that it allowed the thesis students who assisted in this research, Paone 
and McCauley, to participate to a much greater extent because the methods aligned with 
those presented in their NPS coursework.  
Shifting from a survival analysis approach to a logistic regression strategy 
necessitated a narrowing of the analytic focus of the analysis. Instead of measuring turnover 
outcomes of the entire cohort from 2009 through 2017, the study instead examines turnover 
within the cohort that occurred within a single year—2014. This allows the creation of a 
single binary outcome variable measuring whether the individual separated from 
employment in 2014.  
Two subsets of the data are created: one for the healthcare workforce and the other 
for the acquisition workforce. The healthcare workforce is identified using the Job Family 
Standard (JFS) series code (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2017). The 0600 
classification identifies jobs in the Medical and Healthcare Group. This includes physicians, 
nurses, physical therapists, and other categories of medical professionals. Individuals in the 
0600 group whose occupation is associated with custodial work or dental care were 
excluded from the subset. Additionally, individuals whose listed age at time of entry to 
employment was below 18 or over 80 were dropped from the analysis. The final count of 
individuals taken from the 2009 cohort that were employed for at least part of 2014 consists 
of 50,946 unique people.  
The acquisition workforce was identified by selecting 20 job series codes that are 
associated with acquisition work. After limiting the 2009 cohort to just these job series and 
following the same data cleaning process as used with the medical data, a subset of 
105,940 individuals were identified. 
The personnel data obtained from the PDE environment contain a variety of 
individual characteristics that may impact turnover behavior. Individual demographic 
characteristics such as age, sex, and race are each included in the data. The medical 
workforce subset includes codes that distinguish between nine different occupational 
categories. These allow differentiation between occupations that require higher-education 
degrees versus those that do not. Additionally, some professions, such as nurses, require 
regular shift work, which may incur a higher physical toll on employees over time. 
Differentiating between nurses and medical professionals that do not commonly engage in 
shift work, such as physical therapists, may help further identify differences in turnover 
behavior within the medical workforce.  
Prior research stemming from this multiyear project focused on turnover differentials 
between blue-collar and white-collar employees (Morgan, 2019; Urech, 2019). Their studies 
sought to determine whether employees engaged in different types of work exhibit different 
turnover patterns. Copeland’s (2008) review of transformational trends in the composition of 
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the federal workforce highlighted the increase in the number of white-collar jobs and the 
underrepresentation of women in white-collar jobs, particularly among the Senior Executive 
Service. More recently, some career areas that have been traditionally filled by women, such 
as nursing, have been described as “pink-collar” (Howe, 2017). These professions 
traditionally require significant education and credentialing but do not operate in an office 
environment.  
As shown in Figure 1, we divide the medical workforce into four categories: (1) 
healthcare tech or clerical assistant, (2) medical officer, (3) healthcare professional, and (4) 
nurse. We create indicator variables for each category and include them in the model to 
estimate whether the medical occupation class is associated with differential turnover 
behavior. Understanding these behavioral differentials may help guide strategic hiring to 
replace losses to voluntary attrition. It may also help identify subpopulations of the medical 
workforce that could be targeted for retention policies. The first category, healthcare tech or 
clerical assistant, is omitted from the model and is treated as the baseline subpopulation. 
The estimates of the other categories are the differential turnover effect of being in those 
other categories relative to the base subpopulation’s behavior.  
The fields from the personnel records that describe the individual’s federal work 
history are especially important to this analysis. The appointment date field, in combination 
with the employee’s age, is used to compute retirement eligibility dates. These dates are 
also adjusted using records detailing prior years of federal service. From the retirement 
eligibility dates, we generate indicator variables to identify whether the employee is eligible 
to retire in 2014. The level of educational attainment is also reported in the civilian records. 
We create a series of indicator variables to denote different education levels.  
The personnel records include fields describing the organizational location of the 
employee within the DoD. These codes identify both the service branch in the U.S. military 
and, for the acquisition employees, an organizational code that identifies the naval 
command employing Navy personnel. Controlling for these organizational characteristics 
may help capture some unobserved features of organizational climate and culture that 
influence employee satisfaction and, subsequently, turnover behavior.  
The acquisition data are merged with the survey results from a Director for 
Acquisition Career Management (DACM) employment satisfaction survey. The results from 
this survey were used in two NPS theses assessing acquisition command climate (Collins & 
Garcia, 2018; McKeithen, 2016). In the survey, employees were asked to report on 11 
dimensions of job satisfaction. The questions related to job satisfaction, supervisor-related 
commitment, their job characteristics, job role ambiguity, job stress, commute strain/safety, 
work/family conflict, organizational justice, job fit, workplace values, and high-quality 
relationships. These questions were designed from work on organizational theory by Fields 
(2002). We computed average satisfaction scores by Navy command group and then use 
the command average for each measure as a control for the overall climate on that measure 
for all employees in the PDE cohort sample.  
There are several limitations to this approach. First, the respondents to the survey 
are not the same individuals in the 2009 cohort. The survey was administered to both 
uniformed and civilian personnel, and it is not possible to separate them. Second, the survey 
was administered on a relatively small sample of acquisition employees. After cleaning the 
data, complete results that are usable for the analysis were only obtained from 672 
respondents. Examining the distribution of responses across the Navy commands, some 
commands only had a handful of usable results. Table 2 displays the distribution of 
responses by command and sex.  
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Table 1. Survey Observations by Command (McCauley, 2020) 
Observations by Command 
and Gender 
Code Male Female Total 
NAVAIR 
(Naval Air Systems Command) 
1 46 79 125 
NAVSEA 
(Naval Sea Systems Command) 
2 66 73 139 
NAVSUP 
(Naval Supply Systems Command) 
3 74 68 142 
SPAWAR 
(Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command) 
4 14 26 40 
MARCORSYSCOM 
(Marine Corps Systems Command) 
5 1 2 3 
MSC 
(Military Sea Lift Command) 
6 12 6 18 
SSP 
(Strategic Systems Programs) 
7 1 1 2 
BUMED 
(Bureau of Medicine and Surgery) 
8 1 0 1 
OPNAV 
(Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations)  
9 2 4 6 
OSBP 
(Office of Small Business Programs) 
10 2 2 4 
MARCOR I&L  
(Marine Corps Installations and 
Logistics Command) 
11 2 2 4 
NAVFAC 
(Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command) 
12 78 93 171 
ONR 
(Office of Naval Research) 
13 8 9 17 
TOTAL  307 365 672 
 
Due to the limited number of responses in some command units, we exclude those 
commands from the analysis of acquisition turnover. Only five commands, NAVAIR, 
NAVSEA, NAVSUP, SPAWAR, and NAVFAC are included in the analysis. Making this 
restriction reduces the subsample size of the acquisition workforce to 5,541 individuals. 
Although this is costly in terms of data, the scientific benefits of conducting a turnover 
analysis with both measures of actual behavior and employee satisfaction justify this 
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limitation. As discussed in Brien (2019), studies of public sector turnover have had very 
limited access to actual turnover data, and those that have had it relied on agency-level 
figures of turnover rates. The individual-level data this team has accessed in the PDE 
environment is still relatively unique in this field. Integrating it with employment data to test a 
more complete model of turnover behavior that incorporates both economic and 
psychological factors relating to turnover is a significant advancement to the study of 
workforce attrition.  
Model of Turnover Behavior 
This study examines turnover behavior among the DoD civilian workforce using a 
life-cycle model of turnover behavior. This model, described by Cho and Lewis (2012), 
explores the economic rationale behind the employee’s decision to voluntarily separate from 
their job. This economic model predicts that employees will choose to leave their job when 
the expected benefits of other employment or retirement exceed their current compensation. 
Tangible factors such as pay, commuting costs, and health and retirement benefits are key 
factors in this decision. Other nontangible factors also included in the model are the 
organizational environment and employee job satisfaction (Pitts et al., 2011).  
This analysis employs a logistic regression model. The dependent variable is a 
binary indicator of whether the individual voluntarily separated from public service in 2014. 
The model is designed to obtain estimates of the marginal effect of changes in the 
explanatory variables on the odds that an attrition event will occur.  
The estimates generated from a logistic regression are the log of the odds ratio, 
often referred to as the log-odds ratio. Although the log-odds ratio can indicate the sign and 
statistical significance of the marginal effect of a variable on the odds of an attrition event, it 
has relatively little interpretative value. Usually, the log-odds is converted to an odds ratio by 
exponentiating it. Additionally, because the logistic function is nonlinear, the marginal effects 
of the odds ratio is calculated at different values of the explanatory variables, especially if 
they are discrete categorical variables, such as sex, education level, or profession. For 
continuous variables, the marginal effects are typically calculated at the mean value.  
Findings 
Figures 2a and 2b present, for the nonretirement eligible population, employee age 
in 2014 for the medical and acquisition workforces, respectively. The two lines in each graph 
separate the age distributions of the employees that did separate from federal employment 
from those that remained in employed status. Figure 2a illustrates that among the 
nonretirement eligible medical employees, a higher percentage of those that separated fell 
within the ages of 23 to 40. For those between the ages of 40 and 61, a higher percentage 
did not experience turnover. Among the acquisition employees depicted in Figure 2b, the 
younger workforce between 23 and 40 does not appear to show a difference in turnover 
behavior, while those aged between 40 and 55 show a relatively lower propensity to 
separate from federal employment. This indicates that retaining medical employees at 
earlier stages in their careers may be a greater challenge than retaining acquisition workers. 
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Figure 2a. Nonretirement Eligible Medical Employees’ Age by Turnover Outcome 
 
Figure 2b. Nonretirement Eligible Acquisition Employees’ Age by Turnover Outcome 
The retirement-eligible workforce depicted in Figures 3a and 3b exhibits a sharply 
different age distribution than the nonretirement eligible workers. The age distribution of the 
retirement-eligible medical workers show that relatively few are younger than 60 years of 
age. Additonally, the age distribution of those that separate and those that remain is 
relatively similar. There is a slightly higher percentage of employees older than 65 among 
those that do turn over than those that remain within the retirement-eligible medical 
workforce. 
The age distribution of the acquisition workforce is much more lumpy than the 
medical workforce, which had a single peak in the mid-1960s. The prior reports issued from 
this research project by Brien (2019) and Buttrey et al. (2018) showed that the relatively 
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retirements among uniformed personnel and their subsequent rehiring in civilian positions. 
The difference in the age profiles between the medical and acquisition employees illustrates 
that the medical workforce does not receive the same level of intake of former uniformed 
personnel as the DoD at large. In contrast, the acquisition workforce appears highly reliant 
on military rehires. Age does not appear to be associated with a turnover differential among 
acquisition workers between the ages of 58 and 64. Workers younger than 58 appear to 
have a lower rate of turnover, while those above 64 have a higher rate of turnover. This 
observation is consistent with a life-cycle model of employee turnover. 
 
 
Figure 3a. Retirement Eligible Medical Employees’ Age by Turnover Outcome 
 
Figure 3b. Retirement Eligible Acquisition Employees’ Age by Turnover Outcome 
Another key finding of the preliminary analysis relates to the representativeness of 
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4 depicts the blue/white collar distribution for different racial groups identified within the 
medical workforce sample. The same statistics are visualized in Figure 6. Whites are 
distributed almost evenly across blue- and white-collar occupation types, with a slightly 
higher proportion in white-collar work. All other racial categories had a larger share 
employed in blue-collar work. Employees that identified as Black, Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander, or Native American were highly concentrated in blue-collar occupations. Targeting 
recruitment to improve representation of racial minorities within while-collar occupations 
should be an immediate goal of the DoD. 












Asian 3,475 Blue Collar 1,830 52.66% 
  White Collar 1,645 47.34% 
Black 9,972 Blue Collar 6,886 69.05% 
  White Collar 3,086 30.95% 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 497 Blue Collar 354 71.23% 
  White Collar 143 28.77% 
Native American 428 Blue Collar 268 62.62% 
  White Collar 160 37.38% 
White 28,918 Blue Collar 14,027 48.51% 
  White Collar 14,891 51.49% 
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Logistic Regression Estimates 
The odds ratio estimates obtained from the logistic regressions are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows the results from the medical workforce. After controlling for 
years of service, age, professional classification, and race, we find that gender has no 
impact on turnover among medical employees. This is consistent with findings by Lewis and 
Park (1989) in their study of the determinants of turnover in the federal workforce. 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Results of Medical Workforce 2014 Attrition 
Variables  
Nonretirement  
Eligible Retirement Eligible 
Sex  0.997 1.127 
  (0.024) (0.157) 
Years of Service  0.863*** 1.168*** 
  (0.005) (0.050) 
Year of Service^2  1.004*** 0.997*** 
  (0) (0.001) 
Age  0.710*** 1.097 
  (0.007) (0.103) 
Age^2  1.003*** 0.999 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Graduate Education  0.894*** 0.617** 
  (0.026) (0.100) 
College Graduate  0.892*** 0.716** 
  (0.024) (0.117) 
Less Than High School  1.515 0.880 
  (0.446) (0.973) 
Medical Officer  1.226*** 0.550*** 
  (0.067) (0.114) 
Administrative Health Professional  0.873*** 1.474* 
  (0.035) (0.348) 
Nurse  1.033 1.161 
  (0.028) (0.182) 
Black  0.929*** 0.638*** 
  (0.025) (0.097) 
Asian  0.698*** 1.258 
  (0.030) (0.262) 
Native American  0.908 0.843 
  (0.101) (0.488) 
Hawaii or Pacific Islander  0.740*** 0.587 
  (0.078) (0.368) 
Constant  4,902.237*** 0.010* 
  (1334.304) (0.025) 
N  45,151 1,475 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.049 0.089 
All estimates have been converted to odds ratios. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Years of service is modeled as having a quadratic relationship with turnover. The 
base estimate of 0.866 and the estimate of 1.004 for the squared term collectively indicate 
that at relatively low years of service, a marginal increase in tenure reduces the likelihood of 
separating. This marginal effect is diminishing, however. The marginal effects of the quadric 
relationship were calculated and displayed in Figure 7. These lines represent the first 
differences of the quadratic relationship between increasing years of service and the percent 
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change in the odds of separating from federal service. For the nonretirement eligible group, 
the left-hand side of the line is below zero, starting at approximately -2.5%. This is 
interpreted to indicate that an employee with 5 years of service is 2.5% less likely to 
separate than an employee with 4 years of service, on average. Moving to the right, 
however, the effect diminishes. Where the line crosses the axis at 20 years of service, there 
is essentially no statistically significant marginal effect of another year of service.  
 
Figure 7. Marginal Effect of Years of Service on Turnover Odds for Medical Civilians 
 
This marginal relationship is inverted for the retirement eligible community. For 
medical personnel eligible for retirement with relatively few years of service, adding 1 more 
year to their tenure increases their odds of separating by over 2%. As tenure increases, this 
effect declines. Once tenure reaches approximately 25 years of service, the marginal effect 
is not statistically distinguishable from zero, meaning that there is no additional impact on 
the odds of separating for further years of service. Once employees reach a late career 
status, length of service has no additional effect.  
The age variable exhibits a similar quadratic relationship, as years of service does 
for the nonretirement eligible population. For younger employees, growing older is 
associated with a lower retirement likelihood, but at a diminishing rate. In contrast, age does 
not have a statistically significant relationship with turnover within the retirement-eligible 
medical workforce. This is consistent with the years of service estimate that once employees 
reach retirement eligibility there is an overall shift in turnover behavior, but the marginal 
effects of additional years of service or age are close to zero. 
The occupational classifications show that different medical professions appear to 
experience significantly different turnover rates within the nonretirement eligible population. 
In comparison to blue-collar healthcare technicians, medical officers have higher odds 
(approximately 22.6%) of separating during preretirement eligibility. Nurses, however, 
appear to have a similar turnover rate to the blue-collar medical workers. Other healthcare 
professionals, which includes administrators and pharmacists, have a lower turnover rate in 
comparison to the blue-collar medical workers. Their attrition differential is estimated to be 
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the medical workforce to understand the environmental conditions and work schedules of 
medical employees and how that factors into their turnover decisions.  
The results of the regressions using the acquisition data are depicted in Table 6. This 
table depicts estimates of a model of turnover among a subset of Navy acquisition 
employees. As discussed earlier, the personnel records are merged with average command-
level employee satisfaction survey results. The intent of including these variables was to 
capture organizational differences in different measures of satisfaction. All 11 measures 
were tested for fitness in the model with a series of sensitivity tests. Ultimately, none of the 
satisfaction measures were statistically significant in the turnover model. Sensitivity testing 
revealed that there was insufficient variation in the satisfaction scores across organizational 
groups to reveal a relationship between employee satisfaction and turnover behavior. Table 
3 displays one of the permutations of the sensitivity tests that included two of the most 
salient measures: job satisfaction and job stress.  
 






Sex  0.759 1.229 
  (0.216) (0.341) 
Years of Service  1.038 1.329 
  (0.059) (0.244) 
Years of Service^2  1.000 0.996 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Age  0.637*** 3.14** 
  (0.053) (1.721) 
Age^2  1.005*** 0.992* 
  (0.001) (0.004) 
Job Satisfaction 
Average  0.266 0.636 
  (0.327) (0.922) 
Job Stress Average  0.382 1.652 
  (0.401) (2.066) 
Grade  1.050 1.059 
  (0.05) (0.069) 
College   0.895 1.184 
  (0.24) (0.396) 
Graduate School  1.026 0.310 
  (0.343) (0.225) 
Constant  870,379.8* 0** 
  (6960931) (0) 
N  4,839 702 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.056 0.065 
All estimates have been converted to odds ratios. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The estimates of the two main components of the life-cycle model, age and years of 
service, fared differently in the acquisition data than in the medical data. The age variable 
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was modeled with a quadratic term, similarly to the medical data, and produced the 
expected results for both the retirement eligible and ineligible groups. The years of service 
variable, however, was not statistically significant in the acquisition data. Additionally, none 
of the other control variables, such as grade and education, were statistically significant in 
the acquisition data. 
The lack of statistical significance on any of the variables except for age raises the 
question of whether dropping so many records to be able to include the satisfaction survey 
fields reduced the power of the model to measure differences in turnover behavior. Since 
the employee satisfaction fields were not providing useful estimates, we decided to drop 
them from the model and add back in the acquisition employees from other branches of the 
Navy as well as other service branches of the DoD. The model depicted in Table 6 was 
rerun on the larger population of acquisition personnel. The results from this sensitivity test 
showed that years of service continued to be statistically insignificant, while grade and 
education indicators each became significant. Their estimates were similar in sign and 
magnitude to those estimates obtained from the medical data.  
Discussion 
This analysis of two very different segments of the DoD workforce has helped reveal 
differences in the composition and behavior of civilian personnel. In both groups, the overall 
pattern of attrition was consistent with the life-cycle model of turnover behavior. Employees 
that are not yet eligible for retirement had higher propensities to separate at early stages of 
their careers and relatively low attrition rates as they approach retirement eligibility. 
Retirement-eligible personnel conversely separate at an accelerating rate as they move past 
their earliest eligibility date. The preliminary statistical analysis illustrated how these two 
overall patterns hold for both medical and acquisition employees but also highlighted how 
the acquisition workforce benefits much more from mid-career appointments. This surge of 
older appointees flowing into the workforce from uniformed services also affects the outflow 
years later as these employees retire. Even if medical and acquisition employees respond 
relatively similarly to advancement in age and tenure, the difference in the composition of 
the workforce will change the recruitment, training, and succession planning strategies 
needed to manage the two types of employees. 
Future use of these estimates for strategic workforce management may help defense 
budgeting. Conducting fiscal impact simulations of different turnover scenarios can prepare 
the DoD for future fiscal stress (Brien et al., 2020; Hansen et al., 2018). Defense budget 
cuts or other adverse fiscal conditions may result in hiring freezes or even force reductions. 
Understanding the pace of attrition behavior may help DoD officials understand the 
expected losses to the civilian workforce during such a period. Developing a forward-looking 
fiscal plan that takes into account potential actions by Congress fits within a broader goal of 
making strategic fiscal policies that are intentionally crafted in response to other levels of 
government (Brien, 2017; Brien & Sjoquist, 2014; Brien et al., 2017; Brien & Yan, 2020). 
Additionally, turnover simulations may provide guidance on where to target recruitment to 
avoid future gaps in workforce capability. 
Another finding from this study is that the DoD can do much better in hiring racial 
minorities into technical and white-collar positions. This analysis of the medical workforce 
found that personnel identifying as Black, Native American, and Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
were almost twice as likely to be employed in blue-collar work, while employees identifying 
as White or Asian were nearly evenly distributed between the two labor categories. Pursuing 
diversity and representation within occupational categories and not just within the workforce 
as a whole is essential to achieving a public workforce that aligns with the American public. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 172 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Furthermore, our attrition analysis found that employees identifying as Black, Asian, and 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander had lower likelihoods of voluntarily separating when compared 
to white employees. Attaining diversity within these technical fields will also bring a more 
stable workforce. 
The lack of empirical results with respect to the employee satisfaction survey data 
obtained from the acquisition workforce was a disappointing outcome, but this null result 
points towards methodological improvements that may be made in future studies. Using 
average satisfaction rates at the command level was found to be too aggregated at the 
organizational level. Satisfaction survey results obtained from organizational units lower 
down within the DoD and naval organizational structures will be necessary to effectively test 
the relationship between employee satisfaction and turnover behavior. This remains a 
pressing goal within the public human resource management literature. While there is a 
broad body of research examining the relationship between reported turnover intention and 
employee satisfaction, a growing body of research has questioned turnover intention as a 
valid proxy for actual behavior (Cohen et al., 2016; Dalton et al., 1999). Finding new sources 
of employee satisfaction data that can be integrated into the PDE environment for secure 
and PII-protected research into turnover behavior will be part of the next step of this project. 
Understanding the patterns of turnover behavior within different segments of the DoD 
workforce is one part of strategic workforce management. This study, which used a 
parametric approach to modeling turnover, was able to contrast the break points in life-cycle 
behavior as employees approach and move into retirement eligibility. One of the primary 
benefits of estimating these relationships is that it will provide a baseline for turnover 
behavior prior to the ongoing reorganization of DoD medical operations. In coming years 
there will be a pressing need to perform evaluations of the impact of this transformation on 
the civilian medical workforce. The changes to the nature of the work performed by civilian 
medical employees may have significant impacts on retention and recruitment. This study 
lays an important groundwork for the pre–post comparisons that will be conducted. 
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Abstract 
In the modern acquisition, it is unrealistic to consider single entities as producing and 
delivering a product independently. Acquisitions usually take place through supply networks. 
Resiliency, efficiency, and effectiveness of supply networks directly contribute to the 
acquisition system’s resiliency, efficiency, and effectiveness. All the involved firms form a part 
of a supply network essential to producing the product or service. The decision-makers have 
to look for new methodologies for supply chain management. Blockchain technology 
introduces new methods of decentralization and delegation of services, which can transform 
supply chains and result in a more resilient, efficient, and effective supply chain.  
This research aims to review and analyze the selected current blockchain technology 
adoptions to enhance the resiliency of supply network management by facilitating 
collaboration and communication among suppliers and support the decision-making process. 
In the first part of this study, we discuss the limitations and challenges of the supply chain 
system that can be addressed by integrating blockchain technology. In the final part, we 
analyze multiple blockchain-based supply chain use cases to identify how the main features 
of blockchain are suited best for supply network management. 
Keywords: supply chain, blockchain, supply network, resilience, acquisition 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DOD) spending on goods and services has grown 
significantly since the Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to well over $250 billion annually (Walker, 
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2006). The process of DoD supply chain includes all government and private-sector 
organizations, processes, and systems that individually or collectively play a role in planning 
for, acquiring, maintaining, or delivering material resources for military or other operations 
conducted in support of U.S. national defense interests (Reay, 2000). The supply chain 
complexities, which create significant challenges throughout the networks, arise from 
various factors, such as changes in customer expectations, multiple market channels, and 
international markets. Access to the latest technologies in various fields can be a great 
support in supply chain management. Innovations, including digitalization and industry 4.0, 
have developed new paradigms, principles, and models in supply network management. 
Through the literature review by (Ivanov et al., 2019), the digital technologies include big 
data analytics, advanced manufacturing technologies with sensors, decentralized agent-
driven control, advanced robotics, augmented reality, advanced tracking and tracing 
technologies, and additive manufacturing. The development of the digital supply chain and 
smart operations are facilitated using Internet of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, and 
smart products. Blockchain technology is attracting a rising level of interest reflected by 
Google trends that returned 21.6 million Google queries for blockchain released on January 
10, 2017 (Fosso Wamba et al., 2018). However, there is a need for novel models to support 
supply chain management in the future (Ivanov et al., 2019).  
Resiliency, a vital feature for the viability of supply chains, is defined to be a measure 
of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still 
maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables (Holling, 1973). The 
common resiliency metrics for the supply network system are availability, connectivity, and 
accessibility, which can be improved by the decentralized, distributed, and fault-tolerant 
features of blockchain technology. The highly resilient architecture and distributed nature of 
blockchain technology make it an interesting platform to defend against attacks and 
preserve the integrity of the identity network (Shrier et al., 2016).  
This study proposes applying blockchain technology, which can address many of the 
mentioned technological challenges and enhance supply network management. This study 
includes a systematic literature review of the current most critical challenges of supply chain 
and supply networks in the Literature Review section. The Block Chain in Supply Chain 
section covers the solutions that can be provided by utilizing blockchain technology for the 
supply network challenges identified from the academic and grey literature. Several use 
cases that applied blockchain technology in supply chain management are analyzed in the 
Case Studies section, followed by a conclusion in the last section.  
Literature Review 
In this section, the limitations and challenges of the supply chain system that can be 
addressed by integrating blockchain technology are identified through the literature, and the 
blockchain-based solutions are mapped to those challenges.  
A systematic literature review is an efficient tool for summarizing the results of 
existing studies and assessing consistency among previous studies. It provides a 
systematized approach to identify current challenges, new methodologies, and research 
avenues (Queiroz et al., 2019). This study provides a systematic literature review on the 
current supply chain challenges and limitations in a supply network. For this purpose, the 
Web of Science database is used. Table 1 shows the details of the papers that were 
extracted by each keyword. In the next step, papers that were relevant to the topic were 
selected for full paper reading in addition to relevant papers that were selected from Google 
Scholar, ISI journals, and conference papers. The third step included assessing the quality 
of the selected paper, and lastly, final papers were selected as the references for this report. 
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The protocols followed for this systematic literature review include 1. determining Web of 
Science and Google Scholar as the main research databases, and 2. only considering the 
English language journal publications for this review. The data extractions details are 
defined and can be seen in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Literature Review Structure 
Database Total # of results Number Selected of 
papers 
Web of Science 3217 + 338 29 
Google Scholar 132 127 
Total 3687 156 
 
The three keywords that were used for the Web of Science database are supply 
network challenge, blockchain technology, and the combination of supply chain challenges 
AND blockchain, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Keyword Search History 
 
The articles in the supply chain field include a broad area of applications and 
theories. Hence, this study has narrowed down the content search to three main categories 
of technologies, theories, and applications (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Search Content Categories 
Content Categories 
Main technologies Blockchain technology, smart contracts, modeling, & 
simulation 
Main theories Conceptual, reviews, frameworks, and case studies 
Blockchain application 
area 
Supply chain network 
 
The study retained 29 articles out of the combination of 3,217 papers with the topic 
of supply network challenges, and 338 papers with both topics of blockchain and supply 
chain up to summer in the two decades of 2000–2020 (see Figure 1). The report categorizes 
the blockchain applicability in supply network challenges into four areas: communication, 
transparency, data and information, and performance.  
The region-based literature analysis revealed that supply network challenges is a 
popular topic in different regions across the world. Figure 2 shows the distribution of papers 
in different countries within the past two decades; most articles were published in the United 
States, followed by China and England.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 179 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 2. Supply Network Challenges Paper Region Distribution 
 
On the other hand, the systematic review shows that the interest in research in the 
field of supply networks has gained more attention recently, as depicted in Figure 3. In 2019, 
there were around 500 articles published related to supply network challenges. 
 
 
Figure 3. Supply Network Challenges Publication (2001–2020) 
Supply Chain Network Management 
A supply chain is a network of multiple businesses and relationships (Lambert & 
Cooper, 2000) considered as a complex system due to having multiple levels and numerous 
facilities at each level (Beamon, 1999). Supply chain management is a system capable of 
rational planning, management, and control of the supply chain and the logistics. It enables 
the stakeholders to accurately monitor and provide real-time responses to the supply chain 
issues (Yoo & Won, 2018). The evolution of supply chain management was studied by 
Fawcett and Magnan (2002) and is shown in Table 3. It is rooted back to the 1950s and 
1960s, where the focus was on minimizing the production cost. In the 1970s, material 
requirement planning was developed. In the 1980s, the global competition developed 
management programs such as Just-In-Time that forced firms to offer low-cost, high-quality, 
and reliable products with greater flexibility in the design. In the 1990s, the outsourcing of 
non-core operations was introduced as a solution to reduce or transfer some of the risks, 
which developed more interactions and integrations among different involved parties in a 
supply network. The changes shift the focus to more collaborations and performance 
management of a supply network for the success of a firm. Lastly, with the advent of new 
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technologies, the concentration is more on creativity, improving collaboration, and 
communication among the stakeholders.  
 
Table 3. Supply Chain Management Evolution Era (Fawcett & Magnan, 2002) 
Era Description 
Creation Era In the 1980s, the supply chain term was coined by an American 
industry consultant. 
Integration Era Through the 1960s–1990s, the electronic data interchange system 
was developed and led to enterprise resource planning systems. 
Globalization Era The objective of organizations changed to competitive advantage, 
creating value-added, and reducing costs through global sourcing 
Specialization 
Era – Phase One 
In the 1990s, the focus became more on core competencies and 
adopted a specialization model. Firms outsourced non-core 
operations to the other companies and abandoned vertical 
integration. 
Specialization 
Era – Phase Two 
New aspects of supply planning, collaboration, execution, and 
performance management were adapted to the supply chain. 
Supply Chain 
Management 
The use of the World Wide Web (Web 2.0) led to more creativity, 
information sharing, and collaboration among users. 
 
Harland (1996) described supply network as a dynamic, interconnected, complex, 
interdependent network of suppliers, manufacturing facilities, and linking multiple 
organizations (Bales et al., 2004). The structure of the supply network includes the member 
companies and the links between them. Lambert and Cooper (2000) suggest that three 
primary aspects of the company network structure include: 
 
1. Members of the supply chain 
2. Structural dimensions of the network 
3. Different types of process links across the supply chain 
 
Based on the characteristics of a supply network and the challenges that might arise 
managing such supply chains, this study applies blockchain technology to provide a 
decision-making framework that can capture the emerging phenomena of complex supply 
network challenges.  
 Blockchain Technology 
Blockchain technology created by Nakamoto (2008) is an emerging information 
technology that provides new opportunities for decentralized market design with transparent 
and user-friendly applications that allow consumers to participate in the decision-making 
(Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Based on the World Economic Forum report in 2015, blockchain 
has been considered as one of the megatrends that are going to change the world in the 
next decade (Kshetri, 2018).  
Blockchain consists of nodes within a communication network that contain a 
common communication protocol. Each node stores a copy of the blockchain on the 
network, and a consensus function verifies transactions to preserve the immutability of the 
chain (Wang et al., 2019). Each block is identified through its cryptographic hash, and each 
block is referred to as the hash of the previous block, which creates a link between blocks to 
form a blockchain. The transactions of each block are hashed in a Merkle tree. The root 
hash and the hash of the previous block are recorded in the block header. Blockchain 
provides interaction between users by a pair of public and private keys (Casado-Vara et al., 
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2018). The hashing process transforms assets into a digitally encoded token that can be 
registered, tracked, and traded with a private key on the blockchain (Ivanov et al., 2019).  
 Supply Chain Challenges and Adaptation With Blockchain Technology 
In a supply network, flows of data have different forms and satisfy different needs. 
This leads to a complex course of controlling, ensuring immutability, and security 
transparency. Therefore, an efficient mechanism is required that enhances immutability and 
ensures confidentiality of transactions in the supply network.  
This study aims to explore the feasibility of using blockchain technology to address 
current limitations, efficiently manage the process, and enhance the resiliency of supply 
chain systems. We grouped the current supply network systems limitations (Apte & 
Petrovsky, 2016; Fawcett & Magnan, 2002; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Kshetri, 2018; Wilding 
et al., 2012) to be addressed under four main categories per the blockchain features: 
 
• Network Communication and Information Flow: (1) Analog gaps between customer 
and supplier, (2) lack of information sharing among all involved stakeholders, (3) lack 
of an integrated global view concerning increasingly dynamic supply chains 
• Transparency: (1) Lack of traceability of failures in the flow of the process, (2) limited 
visibility concerning how and where products are sourced, made, and stored  
• Data and Information Management: (1) Disparate record keeping, (2) lack of 
accurate and reliable data for analytics, (3) excessive redundancy and 
crosschecking, (4) long and costly audit processes 
• Performance measurement: (1) high cost of managing the network, (2) decreased 
speed due to network arrangement and communication, (3) lack of flexibility due to 
various policies and structure in the network 
 Categories of Supply Network Challenges and Blockchain-Related Solutions 
The supply network’s complexity consists of multiple elements, including raw 
material suppliers, distributors, manufacturers, retailers, and end consumers (Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018). The major complexity of supply chain processes has led to challenges in 
the supply network and conflicts that are raised from local objective versus network 
strategies (Terzi & Cavalieri, 2004). Defining boundaries among the multiple 
interconnections of a network is one of the methodological challenges in studying the supply 
network (Park et al., 2013). One of the other challenges is the coordination of complex influx 
and outflow of materials (Park et al., 2013).  
This study identifies the main challenges and limitations of supply networks through 
the literature and aims to provide related blockchain empowered solutions to improve the 
current challenges. Table 4 describes the taxonomy of challenges in supply chain networks 
and the related blockchain features identified as a solution in the literature. The blockchain 
features that can improve those challenges are linked to each category of supply network 
challenges as the recommended solution to tackle those challenges.  
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Table 4. Taxonomy of Challenges in the Supply Networks and Adaptation With Blockchain 
Technology 





Miscommunication between suppliers 
and retailer (Ludema, 2002)  
Value chain visibility for all 
parties (Kshetri, 2018) 
Inappropriate use of power and 
opportunistic behavior (Dani et al., 
2003)  
Seamless networks, 
visibility, and symmetric 
information to all actors 
(Wang et al., 2019) 
Lack of effective collaboration, 
communication, and partnership 
(Fawcett & Magnan, 2002; Saberi et al., 
2019; Terzi & Cavalieri, 2004; Wang et 
al., 2019) 
Conflicts in local versus global interests 
Strong reluctance of sharing common 
information 
(Fawcett & Magnan, 2002; Terzi & 
Cavalieri, 2004)  
 
Risks and disruptions from natural 
disasters or conflicts (Ivanov et al., 
2019; Park et al., 2013) 
Defining boundaries among the 
interconnections of a network (Park et 
al., 2013) 
Coordination of complex influx and 
outflow of materials (Park et al., 2013) 
 
Contradictory operational objectives 
and priorities; 
Different culture and geographical 
disperse of the partners (Saberi et al., 
2019; Wang et al., 2019) 
 
Complicated distribution structure and 
lack of information about the margins of 




Category Supply Chain Network Challenges Blockchain Empowered Solution 
Transparency 
Lack of common purpose; power 
imbalances; culture and procedures; 
autonomy (Fawcett & Magnan, 2002) 
Immutable Ledger (Abdirad 
& Krishnan, 2020; Chen et 
al., 2017; Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Kshetri, 
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2017, 2018; Queiroz et al., 
2019) 
Lack of accountability (Fawcett & 
Magnan, 2002; Kshetri, 2017) 
Decentralized platform 
(Kshetri, 2017, 2018) 
Real-time basis data and 
tracking (Kshetri, 2018; 
Wang et al., 2019) 
Traceability disruptions (Queiroz et al., 
2019) 
Smart contracts improve 
responsiveness; reduce 
lead time; decrease 
transaction and monitoring 
cost; enhance visibility, 
trust, security, and 
transparency (Queiroz et 
al., 2019); 
smart contracts ensure the 
participation of the 
consumers (Kshetri, 2017) 
Information privacy of customers; lack 
of audit trails (Kshetri, 2017; Tatar et al., 
n.d.) 
Encrypted data with hash 
functions; 
no single point of failure;  
secure messaging between 
devices; 
audit trail to ensure 
accountability (Kshetri, 
2017, 2018) 
Lack of transparency (Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Yoo & Won, 2018) 
Data is controlled with 
private & public keys 
(Kshetri, 2017)  
Owner choose the 
information that is released 
(Kshetri, 2017) 
Lack of trust in information legitimacy 
(Chen et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019); 
Fraud, corruption, tampering, and 
falsifying the information as trust 
problems (Tian, 2017)  
Transparency (Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Saberi et 
al., 2019); 
Traceability (Chen et al., 
2017; Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Ivanov, 
Dolgui, & Sokolov, 2019; 
Mengelkamp et al., 2018; 
Saberi et al., 2019) 
Unstable distribution prices (Yoo & 
Won, 2018) 
Authenticity and legitimacy 
(Wang et al., 2019) 
Accountability (Fosso 
Wamba et al., 2018) 
 
Openness, neutrality, 
reliability, and security for 
all members of the supply 
chain (Tian, 2017) 
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 Trust (Folkinshteyn & 
Lennon, 2016; Kiviat, 2015) 
 
Transactions are viewable 
by the whole network that 
protects against double-
spending (Yoo & Won, 
2018) 
 




Inefficient transactions, fraud, pilferage, 
centralized and stand-alone information 
management system (Saberi et al., 
2019)  
Disintermediation (Saberi et 
al., 2019) 
Transparency (Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Saberi et 
al., 2019; Tian, 2017) 
Traceability (Chen et al., 
2017; Francisco & 
Swanson, 2018; Ivanov, 
Dolgui, & Sokolov, 2019; 
Saberi et al., 2019) 
Lack of information about the origin of 
the product (Casado-Vara et al., 2018) 
Authentication & privacy 
(Abdirad & Krishnan, 2020; 
Kshetri, 2017) 
 
Category Supply Chain Network Challenges Blockchain Empowered Solution 
Performance  Cost 
Paper records elimination 
Reduce regulatory 
compliance costs 
Tracking processes with IoT 
Identify the defective 
products easily from the 
source 
Track the quality and 
counterfeit of the 
ingredients from the 
partners; 
Provide meaningful data to 
assess the quality 
No costly regulation and 
overhead (Yoo & Won, 
2018)  
Cost reduction due to 
disintermediaries 
(Folkinshteyn & Lennon, 
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process and reduce 
interactions and 
communications time 
(Kiviat, 2015; Kshetri, 2018) 
Delays and defaults in the delivery of 
goods (Casado-Vara et al., 2018) 
 
Dependency 
Partners should be more 
responsible and 
accountable for their 
actions 
Digital certification 
Audit trail (Kshetri, 2018) 
Risk Reduction 
Address the holistic source 
of risk by verifying 
provenance 
Network only permits 
mutually accepted parties to 
engage in transactions 
(Kshetri, 2018) 
Sustainability Validation of participants’ identity (Kshetri, 2018) 
Flexibility 
Address consumer’s 
concern about the products 
Higher level of impact with 
IoT integration (Kshetri, 
2018) 
 
Blockchain in Supply Chain 
Blockchain has the potential for supply chain improvements. Based on the features 
of blockchain technology, Kshetri (2018) claims that blockchain has the potential to help 
achieve supply chain critical objectives. There are some pilot practices of blockchain 
technology in a supply chain with no evidence of large-scale adoption (Wang et al., 2019). 
The supply chain has been expected to be one of the most promising non-finance 
application domains of blockchain (Kshetri, 2018). There is limited empirical evidence of the 
advantages of blockchain on the existing supply chain. Supply chain as a complex workflow 
has been identified as one of the main potential areas of blockchain application to deliver a 
real rate of interest (Kshetri, 2017). Wang et al. (2019) categorize the current literature of 
blockchain in the supply chain into four types: descriptive, conceptual, predictive, and 
prescriptive. The sources of insecurity can be tracked within a supply network. Blockchain 
can facilitate managing crisis situations regarding security vulnerabilities. Blockchain can be 
applied to register time, location, price, involved parties, and the related information while 
the ownership of an item is changing (Kshetri, 2017). Trust enhancement, accurate 
information sharing, and verifiability are crucial because of current challenges such as 
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inefficient transactions, fraud, pilferage, and poor performance in the supply network (Saberi 
et al., 2019). The technological developments and applications of blockchain technology can 
improve supply chain transparency, security, durability, and process integrity, which results 
in more organizational, technological, and economic feasibility (Saberi et al., 2019). As the 
supply networks contain large numbers of stakeholders, process tracking would be more 
difficult.  
Smart contracts can automate the processes. The agreed contracts can be delivered 
to the specified parties for digital execution. Programs can be updated based on agreed 
verifications, and copyright documents can be released to the relevant parties. Smart 
contract adoption can fundamentally change the supply chain structures and governance 
(Wang et al., 2019). The governance and process rules of smart contract in a blockchain-
based supply chain provides actor certification and approval and the processes that are 
permitted to be accessed for execution (Saberi et al., 2019; Sabz Ali Pour et al., 2018).  
A blockchain-based supply chain management system can improve the system in 
several ways. First, it provides the ability to record, provide, and share prices. Second, 
companies can deliver honest information to consumers. Third, the purchase intentions of 
buyer information can be obtained. Fourth, marketing operations for exploiting customers’ 
propensity with no personal information can be included. Fifth, the trading contracts process 
can be automated using smart contracts (Yoo & Won, 2018). The supply chain management 
processes can be improved by blockchain monitoring, which provides efficient customer 
service management and convenient demand management (Yoo & Won, 2018). 
The literature on blockchain technology in the supply chain is still in its early stages. 
The literature mostly describes blockchain as a distributed ledger technology because it is 
data-management technology that consists of a chain of decentralized computer terminals 
and a network software protocol on the base of a peer-to-peer node’s network (Fosso 
Wamba et al., 2018). Several systematic literature reviews studied the blockchain 
applications in supply chain management (Denyer & Transfield, 2009; Transfield et al., 
2003) and offered a more in-depth understanding of the technology (Queiroz et al., 2019). A 
list of literature review articles in the field of supply chain and blockchain is presented in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5. Supply Chain and Blockchain Literature Review Studies 





review of supply 
chain cases over 




Illustrates technology evolvement and adaptation of organizations 










future supply chain 
Retained 24 articles out of 227 papers in 2017 and categorizes 
the blockchain applicability in the supply chain into four areas:  
visibility and traceability, supply chain digitalization and 
disintermediation, improved data security, and smart contracts. 
The study identified the main drivers of blockchain development 
within supply chains as trust, product safety, authenticity and 
legitimacy, public safety and anti-corruption, and supply chain 








Twenty-seven papers were identified in the past decade that 
address it, with the main theoretical approach of conceptual and 
framework. It shows essential implications for managers, 
practitioners, consultants, and decision-makers in the field 
(tracking enhancement, real-time visibility, decentralized 
operation, smart contracts, improving securities, reduced 
transaction costs). Also, the study identified a vital gap in the 
literature relate to blockchain–supply chain management 




Literature review on 
the application of 
blockchain and 
smart contract to 
overcome the 
potential barriers in 
supply chain 
Introduced four categories of barriers for blockchain technology 
adaptation, including inter-organizational (new rules, 
responsibilities, policies, and expertise), intra-organizational 
(relationships among parties and their privacy policies related to 
information and data usage), technical (technology access 
limitation to get real-time information, data manipulation, and 
information immutability) and external barriers (pressures, lack of 
proper governmental and industry policy). 
Ivanov et 
al. (2019) 
Conceptual model Adoption and application of blockchain technologies applied to 
supply chain traceability and introduced the behavioral theory as 
the lens for this framework on theoretical guidance of Unified 






Smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain platform that 
execute a provenance trace and enforce traceability limitations.  
Chen et 
al. (2017) 
Conceptual model Adoption of blockchain technology to improve supply chain 
quality management and develop a blockchain-based supply 







Identify the key elements and barriers to digital innovation. The 
main identified barriers include high cost of implementation, 
technology-oriented culture, lack of investment initiatives, low 








Applied blockchain and smart contracts for price-tracking that 
improve the transparency of the product distribution structure. 
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Case Studies 
In this section, three blockchain-based supply chain use cases are analyzed to 
explore how the main features of blockchain are suited best for supply network 
management. 
Walmart 
Partners: Walmart, the largest grocery retailer in the United States, has partnered 
with IBM, JD.com, and Tsinghua University to conduct studies on the adoption of blockchain 
technology in the food supply chain (JD, 2017).  
Purpose of Blockchain: Walmart’s ultimate goal of using blockchain in their supply 
chain is to enhance transparency (IBM Blockchain, 2017). The partners established the 
Blockchain Food Safety Alliance to design blockchain solutions for food tracking, 
traceability, and safety (JD, 2017).  
Benefits of Blockchain: Traceability includes tracking and tracing the products 
throughout both directions of product flow within the supply chain. Products can be tracked 
from their origins to the stores, and they can be traced back from the shelves to the farms. 
With blockchain, identifying the sources of foodborne illnesses and tracing back to the 
farms/origins can be reduced from days to seconds (JD, 2017). Such abilities not only 
provide benefits for public health but also reduce the economic impact for Walmart since 
only the contaminated products would be discarded, rather than all similar products (Tan et 
al., 2018).  
Other benefits of blockchain for Walmart are improved security and trust. Customers 
can learn more about the products they consume, which results in higher confidence. In the 
food supply chain, most of the data is still processed on paper or in systems that cannot talk 
to each other (IBM Blockchain, 2017). Blockchain adoption provides immutability that avoids 
any alteration and transparency that provides everyone to access the ledger. This can 
effectively reduce the chance of food fraud and human errors (Tan et al., 2018).  
Another benefit of the adoption of blockchain technology is to reduce waste by 
providing faster routes for perishable items, eventually leading to more sustainable 
operations. Still, a large portion of food is spoiled before arriving at the stores. Decreased 
delivery times can reduce waste by applying blockchain technology (Tan et al., 2018). 
Method: Walmart conducted two pilot projects to test the effectiveness of the 
developed blockchain application. A pilot study was conducted in China on the pork supply 
chain, and the other pilot study was conducted in the United States on the mango supply 
chain (Tan et al., 2018). Both studies were successful in improving food safety, increasing 
recall speed, building higher trust for customers, and decreasing costs (Tan et al., 2018). 
Challenges: The adoption pilot studies showed that adoption of blockchain 
technology is achievable; however, the mass adoption would introduce more challenges. 
Walmart has hundreds of thousands of suppliers worldwide, more than 4,000 retail stores in 
the United States, and more than 6,000 stores in 23 other countries (Walmart, 2021). Within 
its huge supply chain, most small- and medium-size enterprises do not have the 
technological infrastructure or training to adopt blockchain. Moreover, broad adoption of 
blockchain requires a high cost of implementation.  
Maersk 
Partners: Maersk, the world’s largest integrated shipping company, has partnered 
with IBM to develop the TradeLens platform utilizing blockchain technology in the global 
supply chain in 2018 (Gausdal et al., 2018). TradeLens brings a diverse set of stakeholders 
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together in a platform, including shippers/cargo owners, freight forwarders, intermodal 
operators, ocean carriers, ports, terminal operators, customs authorities, and financial 
service providers (TradeLens, 2018). Similar supply chain companies, including Hapag-
Lloyd, Ocean Network Express (ONE), CMA CGM, and Mediterranean Shipping Company 
(MSC), joined TradeLens, extending the scope of the consortium to include more than half 
of the global ocean container carrier industry (Maersk, 2019). 
Purpose of Blockchain: Maersk’s ultimate goal of using blockchain technology is to 
improve collaboration and trust across the partners of the global supply chain (Maersk, 
2019). It is expected to increase the efficiency of the supply chain that mostly depends on 
manual processes in current technology (Kralingen, 2018). 
Benefits of Blockchain: Senior Vice President of IBM states that “blockchain for the 
enterprise is solving previously unsolvable problems” (Maersk, 2019). TradeLens provided 
supply chain visibility, ease of documentation, and the ability to add new features on top of 
the platform (Kralingen, 2018). The built-in security feature of blockchain that makes it 
immutable prevents any alteration in the history of the transactions or smart contracts. This 
enables trust among the partners and keeps the records so that partners can keep track of 
the documentation digitally rather than undertaking all the processes manually on paper.  
Method: Maersk and IBM utilized the open-source Hyperledger technology program 
by the Linux Foundation, contributed by a couple of hundred developer enterprises to 
develop TradeLens (Kralingen, 2018; TradeLens, 2018). The platform is governed 
transparently by the partners, enabling the trust that brings the partners together. The 
platform supports innovation with its structure that eases adding new features and 
applications to serve the diverse needs of different types of stakeholders of the supply chain 
(TradeLens, 2018). All communication among the blockchain nodes is end-to-end 
encrypted, increasing its security (Kralingen, 2018). Only the partners of the permissioned 
blockchain platform can access the data. The partners participate in consensus for 
transaction validation and data hosting.  
Initial Phases: A pilot project involved shipment with Saudi Customs demonstrated 
immutability, auditability, and transparency features of the platform, in addition to reducing 
costs and processing time (Madsen, 2019).  
The initial phase of the developed platform implemented the processing of Bill of 
Lading among the supply chain partners. It resulted in a significant decrease in the 
administrative costs—up to 15% of the cargo value based on the initial tests. Considering 
the industry covers almost 60% of the world’s GDP, the efficiency increase is considered 
astounding (Gausdal et al., 2018).  
As of September 2019, the utilization of TradeLens included more than 100 
organizations, five out of the world’s six largest shipping companies, 55 ports, and almost a 
dozen customs authorities, with more than 10 million weekly shipping events (Madsen, 
2019). 
DHL and Accenture for Pharmaceutical Industry 
Partners: DHL, an international courier, package delivery, and express mail service, 
and Accenture, a multinational company selling consulting and processing services, 
cooperated to develop a blockchain application for the healthcare and life sciences industry 
(Accenture, 2018). The blockchain application is suitable to establish communication among 
various stakeholders, including manufacturers, storage facilities, distributors, hospitals, 
pharmacies, and healthcare providers (Accenture, 2018).  
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Purpose of Blockchain: DHL and Accenture’s ultimate goal of using blockchain 
technology is to fight against counterfeit medications. They aim to reach this goal by 
implementing serialization, tracking, and tracing features in a blockchain platform (Heutger 
et al., 2018).  
Benefits of Blockchain: The pharmaceutical industry is under the threat of 
counterfeit drugs. According to Interpol, more than one million deaths are related to 
counterfeit drugs every year (Aces & Kleeberger, 2018). The developed blockchain platform 
can provide the ability to verify the point of origin of the drug and whether it is genuine or 
counterfeit, helping to save lives.  
It helps pharmaceutical supply chain companies to maintain their reputation by giving 
them the ability to track every step of drugs in all parts of their life cycle. It enables better 
management of drug inventory at any part of the supply chain by determining faster delivery 
routes, handling and storage conditions, and tracking expiration dates (Heutger et al., 2018).  
Another benefit of the blockchain platform is to keep drug quality high. When a drug 
is detected as non-compliant, it can immediately be traced back to the origin. All drugs 
manufactured under the same conditions can seamlessly be located and recalled. This 
process can take weeks with a paper-based supply chain. However, it can be completed in 
seconds using blockchain technology. 
Method: The partners developed a working prototype of the blockchain platform. 
After working on the proof of concept, they developed the blockchain-based serialization 
prototype with supply chain partners in six locations to track the life cycle of drugs. 
Simulations demonstrated that the blockchain platform for genuine medicine could process 
7 billion new serial numbers and 1,500 new transactions per second (Accenture, 2018). 
The events related to the drugs in each step of the supply chain are recorded in the 
blockchain, and since it is immutable, they cannot be changed. A serial number is given to 
each sealed unit of drugs. Information including manufacturer, plant ID, and the expiration 
date is associated with the serial number and stored in the blockchain. While each unit is 
aggregated into cases and pallets, shipped to distributors, and eventually placed on the 
shelves, blockchain can track the exact location of each drug unit. Pharmacies, healthcare 
providers, and patients can trace back the drugs to see the origin of the drugs and whether it 
is counterfeit (Accenture, 2018; Aces & Kleeberger, 2018; Alla et al., 2018). 
Conclusion 
This research reviewed current blockchain technology adoptions aiming to enhance 
the resiliency of the supply network. Most of the blockchain adoption efforts facilitate 
collaboration and communication among suppliers to support the decision-making process. 
The limitations and challenges of the supply chain system were addressed by integrating 
various applications of blockchain technology.  
In this study, we analyzed three blockchain-based supply chain use cases to 
identify how the main features of blockchain are suited best for supply network 
management. Immutability, traceability, tracking, and security by encryption are the features 
of blockchain technology utilized by most of the applications. Transforming from traditional 
paper-based manual supply chain management procedures to digital, immutable, and 
rapidly processing characteristics of blockchain technology helps enterprises provide 
solutions to improve public health, prevent fraud, significantly reduce costs and processing 
times, and ensure trust among partners. 
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Blockchain brings some benefits for the supply chain; however, it also presents 
some challenges to implement. In particular, some of the case studies we explored showed 
that the supply chain architecture and characteristics, stakeholder relations, and 
technological infrastructure of the organization and its stakeholders are important 
parameters for blockchain adoption. Qualitative studies have been conducted in the 
literature so far; however, there are still benefits of developing quantitative studies that 
enable researchers to test various scenarios on a well-informed blockchain adoption 
decision support system that uses modeling and simulations techniques. 
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Abstract 
Blockchain is highly adaptable and enables distributed transaction logging through its 
cryptographic underpinnings, making it an attractive technology for diverse suppliers and 
acquisition integrators. Supply chain tracking using blockchain must, however, support 
updates to item records throughout the life cycle—including repair and carcass tracking 
within Depot Level Repairable (DLR) and back into operation. Unmanned systems, 
additive manufacturing of parts, and version-control of software updates are all 
exemplars related to the supply chain requiring addition, deletion, updating, and 
mergence of a wide array of records. This raises the question of how to build and 
integrate an integrity-protected item history record that is updateable regardless of when 
or where changes may occur. We call this approach to updateable record management 
blockchain mergence and investigate how item tracking can be achieved throughout the 
full item life cycle, even under intermittent connectivity of deployed assets in combat 
environments. We demonstrate blockchain mergence through an interweaving of dual 
chains—an authenticated local history signature chain and a global blockchain—and 
apply it to an unmanned aerial system repair case. Blockchain mergence offers 
significant opportunities for distributed decentralized trust among diverse producers and 
consumers of both materiel and information, ashore and afloat. 
Background 
Blockchain has been widely researched for applications due to the technology’s 
ability to support consensus among distributed participants. The chain is, by design, 
required to be a single, forward path of events; if branches appear, the chain consensus 
ensures that all but one branch is discarded (Zheng et al., 2017). A supply chain, in 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 195 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
comparison, particularly on the production side, is a reversed architecture. In this case, 
small parts are used to build larger parts, hence requiring a form of mergence (e.g., a 
final ready-for-use vehicle is comprised of multiple smaller parts sourced from various 
vendors, manufacturers, and even countries). Blockchain, according to its current 
design, fundamentally disallows this. Assuring supply chain integrity and visibility 
requires an adaptation of blockchain use to allow for the mergence that the original 
concept was not designed to handle. Such adaptive blockchain solutions provide new 
capabilities and support the potential for future manufacturing changes. 
Approach 
We survey existing blockchain solutions for forms of mergence, that is, solutions 
for merging chains into a single blockchain, such as would be necessary for supply chain 
assurance. 
We analyze potential solutions using partner signatures (where supply chain 
partners commit to chain addenda by digitally signing new blocks while also committing 
to the entire previous chain). This requires analysis of security considerations based on 
different commitment variants. Furthermore, it requires consideration of potential time 
lines and time line collisions of block production. 
The above solutions are evaluated with respect to formal blockchain integration. 
In particular, we investigate whether mergence of distributed ledgers is possible within 
exiting blockchain architectures or if it is feasible as a parallel assurance mechanism, 
such that commitments are uploaded to an existing blockchain. This evaluation will be 
made on mathematical feasibility as well as use case comparison. 
Current Research on Ledger Mergence 
Blockchain technology has been often touted as a solution to various challenges 
since its inception under Bitcoin and cybercurrency. An interesting question is how 
blockchain technology might benefit Navy logistics. In essence, blockchains are a list of 
records, or blocks, cryptographically linked as a distributed ledger for recording 
transactions among parties in a permanent and verifiable way (Zheng et al., 2017). 
Blockchain might also support “smart contracts,” which may be a way to reduce the 
administrative friction associated with honoring requirements across a large enterprise.  
The hallmarks of a robust Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) are 
decentralization between blockchain networks and the individual nodes in those 
networks, as well as the consensus reached when validating individual blocks when 
added to a network’s blockchain ledger (Khan, 2019). Khan (2019) also noted that 
characteristics such as the number of transactions per second (TPS) that a network can 
process, the network’s scalability, and how a particular network guards against malicious 
attempts to add false information are also key to a good system. 
We focus on authentication of changes at the micro-level, with transparency in a 
ledger for support of supply chain assurance. Industry is working on a number of efforts 
involving supply chain logistics and supply chain management (SCM)—such as 
Hyperledger (2020), Everledger (2020), and Ethereum (2020)—that may have an 
application to the Navy’s logistical systems and perhaps could contribute to an agile 
logistical system. The central challenge is applying such efforts beyond acquisitions to 
the whole life cycle of the supply chain. 
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A Quick Look at DLT Then and Now 
Nakamoto (2009) is considered the conventional originator of the original 
description of blockchain technology, although it is focused on the financial and Bitcoin 
applications. One should note, however, that the concepts surrounding blockchain 
predate this by a decade or so, and there is other research available on distributed 
ledgers before that time frame. Beyond Bitcoin, DLT and blockchain have been 
researched for various financial and operational tracking purposes. Zheng et al. (2017) 
and Natarajan et al. (2017) provided a general and fairly informal introduction into DLT 
and how it might integrate into mainstream day-to-day operations in the financial, 
private, and government sectors. Natarajan et al. (2017) also provided a sense of how 
“decentralized records of flow of commodities and materials across a supply chain by 
using trusted stakeholders to validate flows and movements” could benefit those 
stakeholders, lending credence to adopting DLT, which would enhance trust in the 
supply chain. For an overview of blockchain research, we point to Fosso Wamba & 
Queiroz (2020), which highlights the benefits of the creation of value in operations and 
supply chain management (OSCM). Statistics such as the number of published papers 
by country, topic, keyword summary, and relationships are recorded.  
Although not explicitly addressing blockchain technology, Bonanni (2011) 
discussed supply chain discovery/awareness, concepts and concerns that motivate our 
work. Bonanni argued for “Radical Transparency” in the context of sustainable (carbon 
cost) supply chains, carbon-footprint measured supply chains, and product life cycle 
awareness and optimization. This runs into a similar problem set that Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition may encounter—companies’ unwillingness to reveal their 
supply chain details as trade secrets, or an inability to do so because the companies are 
unaware of the source of their sources. 
There has also been a line of research covering direct application of blockchain 
to SCM. Korpela et al. (2017) provided an analysis of how blockchain could be used to 
solve or ameliorate the issues of concern of the major stakeholders involved in a very 
large supply chain operation. The main contribution of the paper is the proposed 
elimination of a third party to mediate/handle supply chain inter-business and then 
address these popular concerns. Meanwhile, Banerjee (2018) provided an 
overview/summary of the use and benefits of blockchain in supply chain operations, 
such as 
• reduced counterfeiting and origin tracing 
• digital product details/life cycle 
• custom-built provenance solutions: Software service providers can use 
the blockchain framework to build provenance solutions for its customers 
(permission blockchain) 
Based on Banerjee’s work, custom-built solutions appear to have gained traction 
within industry. For instance, Infosys has developed a product provenance solution using 
Oracle Blockchain Cloud Services that is based on Hyperledger Fabric. Infosys has also 
developed a coffee bean tracking provenance solution for its customers. Such examples 
point towards a demand for custom-built provenance solutions that can be developed 
with product- or industry-specific validations. It is important to note that the concept of 
provenance only functions when all the supply chain stakeholders are part of the 
blockchain network. The architecture of blockchain inherently traces products as they 
pass from one supply chain entity to another. These transactions are stored as blocks 
and chronologically linked according to the physical movement of “the goods.” 
Supporting such tracking technologies motivates our solution (see the section titled A 
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Ledger Mergence Either in Blockchain or as a Module Approach Leveraging Existing 
Blockchain Solutions). 
Kshetri (2018) provided a theoretical framework related to key objectives of SCM. 
Kshetri’s work covers several corporate case studies of how the Internet of Things (IoT) 
blockchain SCM can be used by companies with differing levels and areas of interest in 
supply chain verification/source confidence (see Table 1). Such case studies, including 
the Chipotle E. coli outbreak ingredient tracing case study, may shed light on potential 
parallel solution behaviors involving a faulty/compromised hardware component recall in 
the DoD. Under a similar formal goal, Queiroz and Fosso Wamba (2018) covered 
blockchain SCM adoption in the United States and India. The study advocated for 
drawing on emerging literature on blockchain, supply chain and network theory, and 
technology acceptance models (TAMs). Queiroz and Fosso Wamba (2018) introduced a 
model based on a slightly altered version of the classical unified theory of acceptance 
and the use of technology (UTAUT).  
 
Table 1. Cases Selected and Their Classification in Terms of Incorporation of the IoT and 
Deployment of Blockchain to Validate Individuals’ and Assets’ Identities (Kshetri, 2018) 
 
A Method for Adapting Distributed Ledger for Supply Chain Use 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Use Case: Systems Deployed by U.S. Navy Ships 
Littoral combat ships (LCS) have two classes of relatively small surface warships 
designed for operations near shore by the U.S. Navy (“Littoral combat ship,” n.d.). 
Modern designs allow for flexible mission execution, various mission payloads, and other 
tasking. Reduced crew complements mean individuals are assigned yet with reduced 
inventories of spare parts and supplies. 
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The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) help in this regard. These vehicles 
are employed for scouting and other rapid response detailing that minimize risk to the 
overall mission, ship, and crew. The ecosystem for a typical UAV consists of four 
categories of components: 
• hardware: airframe, sensors, computers 
• software: communication, guidance and control 
• additive manufacturing (AM): 3D printed wings, tails and other small parts 
for ad hoc repair 
• information: keys, training, repair instructions, feedback, safety 
Within these four categories of components, each is different and necessary for 
aggregation into a complete device, and each has different stakeholders and supply 
chains feeding ships’ supplies. Thus, four parallel supply chains of interest exist, and 
each is interdependent; therefore, any mergence solution should necessarily support all 
four aspects, as seen in Figure 1. Note that even with acquisition of a device as a single 
unit, the nature of updates, potential repairs, and parts reuse between devices imply that 
it must be possible, for tracking purposes over the device lifetime, to handle the 
mergence of all four aspects. 
System Constraints and Requirements Identification 
In this section we explore the various system requirements in the context of the 
UAV use case. 
 Scenario: UAV Deployment, Repair, and Operations 
Suppose that a ship deploys with stock gear and consists of two distinct yet 
similar versions of a UAV. The ship must maintain its current pace of operations until 
return to port or resupply. 
Under normal operations, the following issues may affect device history—in that 
they impact the integrity of the device or its trustworthiness—and, therefore, should be 
added in an authenticated manner to the device history: 
• software updates  
• training and safety updates to ship tactics, training, and procedures (TTP) 
and standard operating procedures (SOP) 
Now suppose that a collision occurs during testing between the two UAVs, causing 
damage to each vehicle. The following may also be important changes to the device 
history, requiring authenticated changes in device records: 
• hardware replacements on board, including classified components 
• 3D printing for upgraded tail assemblies 
• maintenance feedback to shore commands 
Any mergence solution must, therefore, support per minimum such a variety of changes 
to the item history. 
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Figure 1. UAV Operational Assembly and Modification 
 
 Mergence Requirements Assessment: Verifiability 
In addition to the aforementioned types of item record changes, there are also 
requirements in how a change is recorded. In particular, the record must be verifiable. In 
terms of verifiability, the following requirements are also essential and must be 
supported by a mergence solution: 
• conformation that a given component X is on the ship 
• conformation of all devices in the inventory that have X as a component 
• conformation if and when X has been replaced/repaired and so on within 
a particular device 
• conformation of the change entity—the responsible party to 
change/split/remove/combine X as a component within devices 
• ability to add logs or metadata  
The above requirements emerge from use case issues. For example, if a device 
component is found to be compromised and must be removed, the logged data 
associated with the device should indicate if it has been removed and by whom. 
Furthermore, it is important for administration purposes to identify all possible devices 
containing the compromised component for swift handling and damage mitigation. In 
these contexts, “components” may refer not only to hardware but also malicious software 
or poorly executed AM (e.g., 3D printed wings with vulnerable integrity). 
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 Mergence Requirements Assessment: Flexibility 
Finally, we list flexibility requirements associated with mergence. Since 
mergence solutions must support potential external (industry/non-DoD) supply chain 
tracking of unpredictable natures, the mergence solution must be fairly adaptable. 
Furthermore, external supply chain tracking may differ from internal (DoD) tracking, and 
the potential solution must support one or more blockchains used internally to the DoD. 
As many acquisition devices may be of a sensitive nature, the mergence solution must 
furthermore support various classification levels, such that unclassified devices may be 
administered in unclassified environments, while devices of higher classification levels 
can also be managed within the same mergence solution without sensitive information 
leakage. Finally, in addition to all of these, devices transfer hands between 
organizations, ships, and so on, requiring a flexibility to record management. This leads 
us to the following final four solution requirements: 
• flexibility independent of source/industry in the external supply chain 
• flexibility with internal blockchains(s) within the DoD 
• flexibility with classification levels 
• flexibility for device transfer between organizations, ships, and so on 
internally 
Ledger Mergence Either in Blockchain or as A Modular Approach Leveraging 
Existing Blockchain Solutions 
There is a natural separation between external-DoD and internal-DoD supply 
chain tracking. This intrinsically leads to a dual solution, with the acquisition boundary 
denoting a change in authenticity tracking. Even for internal supply chain tracking, 
satisfying all solution requirements appears, on the outset, to be impossible. Notably, a 
solution that crosses classification boundaries must be carefully handled, especially for 
full item records and tracking information. We handle this by further separating out the 
internal DoD authentication chain into two parts. 
 External and Internal Chains 
DoD equipment is typically procured via outside commercial manufacturing 
vendors. The supply chain starts outside of the DoD, where parts and other equipment 
must be verified and validated before becoming available inside internal supply chains. 
Conceptually, manufacturers may require supply chain assurance as well, tracking 
purchased components for integration in building devices. This may take the form of 
various blockchains (see Figure 2). Minimally, manufacturers may be required to present 
verification on the types and sources of a device’s components. At acquisition, a new 
item record will be formed, such that the component history of the acquired device is 
verified and authenticated by the acquisition authority, who registers components under 
a digitally signed genesis block. Once a genesis block for the internal ledger is formed, 
tracking may proceed internally.  
What is essential at the DoD boundary/component registration step is the actual 
verification of internal components to a device. Information on processing chips, 
software, and so on must be recorded. This enables future tracking such that if, for 
instance, a component is later discovered to be compromised in the manufacturing 
chain, all devices containing the critical component can be identified. The genesis block 
thus serves as an initial registration for all components, such that it is only necessary to 
record changes to that initial list within the device history record.  
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Figure 2. DoD Acquisition: Verification of External Input Chains(s), Registering of Devices 
to Initiate Internal Chains 
 
 Mergence Operations 
We break internal tracking into two further chains to support classification 
boundaries. The device chain handles immediate time history and authenticates records 
as visible to the admin. Moreover, the device chain is designed to support the current 
Depot Level Repairable (DLR) system. Within the mergence solution, in addition to the 
device chain, we also support one or more internal blockchains. These may be 
organization level blockchains or classification level blockchains. Here we employ the 
term blockchain for a distributed immutable ledger, without specification that restricts to 
any particular ledger format or consensus method. This in turn meets the flexibility 
requirements specified in the section of this paper titled System Constraints and 
Requirements Identification. 
We are motivated to show how blockchain technology might be applied to handle 
the full range of potential fleet resupply maintenance and modification requirements. We 
define the following device chain operations, in accordance with system requirements, 
as the fundamental primitive operations that together provide the general coverage 
necessary for distributed accountability of system modifications: 
• device registration: adding a new, original item to a ledger. This creates 
the genesis block for the device chain. 
• device repair: adding a new component onto an existing device. This 
differs from device combine in that the component being added has no 
registration history (i.e., no genesis block). This may occur if the repair 
takes place using AM. 
• device split: separating components within an existing device. This 
supports potential reuse or disposal, such as when a component breaks 
and is removed from the current item record (device history is still 
maintained). This creates two separate device chains: one for each split 
component.  
• device combine: integrating two components into a new combined device. 
This supports customization of devices after acquisition and parts 
replacement (e.g., a newly purchased component added to an existing 
device). 
Device split can be employed if a device breaks but components can be reused. 
For example, suppose that a UAV (UAV1) malfunctions, but certain components can be 
used to repair another UAV (UAV2). The broken device would then have a device split 
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operation in its item record, creating two new chains: one for the component that will be 
reused and one for the remaining unusable assembly UAV1. A device combine 
operation then integrates the split component into UAV2. As such, the item history of 
UAV1 is now linked to UAV2. If there were relevant repairs to the reused component or if 
it comes to light that the reused component was compromised during manufacture and 
must be pulled from use, it will be immediately clear from UAV2’s record history that the 
part now resides within UAV2 instead of the UAV1 device carcass. 
Each of the stated operations must be authenticated. For this, we use the public 
key infrastructure (PKI) already inherent in the DLR system. The operator responsible for 
the device signs the various operations. The signature covers the current record for the 
device(s) being operated on as well as what type of operation is performed. The 
authenticated transcript is stored as part of the device chain. These operations are 
shown in Figure 3. 
The distributed ledger and shared memory exist beyond the immediate device 
chain history, such that an item record cannot be changed a posteriori. For this we 
employ a blockchain, which records the signatures from the device chain operations. 
Note that we only require the signatures, and not the related device information, to be 
stored on the blockchain, although the latter may be stored also. Storage of further 
information or metadata may be beneficial for device tracking but could also leak 
information (such as if the device or its location is sensitive). Instead, we require the 
minimum information on the blockchain concerning the current signature state.  
 
 
Figure 3. Sequencing Operations for Blockchains 
 
 Multilevel Security Classification Agility Considerations 
For hybrid devices used in the fleet, activities may occur and be needed across 
multiple levels and domains of security, such as UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, 
SECRET, and TOP SECRET. For this, we map our solution to the multilevel security 
(MLS) classification system and demonstrate interoperability. 
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Note that while a distributed chain contains data blocks of potentially classified 
information, the information sent to the blockchain is comprised of merely the signature 
on the data rather than the data itself; any further additions are optional. Even with a 
time code associated to the signature object representation, there is no intrinsic value to 
the information outside of the context of the signed data, especially with a plentitude of 
blockchain transactions. Thus, the blockchain information can be shared across MLS 
systems since these codes are useless to an attacker without corresponding ledger 
(database) access. 
In addition to the above observation, we can also allow for blockchains operating 
at different classification levels, such that more relevant device information than merely 
the signature may in fact be added to the blockchain. This in turn implies that any device 
may have a record with varying classification levels attached to different aspects of the 
associated information and that the associated data may be placed on the relevant 
blockchain. Naturally, higher classification can correlate same- and lower-level data 
records, but not write to them, per the properties of the MLS system. Figure 4 illustrates 
this framework in practice. 
 
Figure 4. MLS Classification Agility Within a DoD Blockchain Network 
 
To consider how this may work in practice, we walk through the following 
conceptualized steps for handling the mergence solution of device chains and 
blockchains within MLS: 
1) A new item genesis record for an UNCLASS device is created for the device 
chain. This correlates to a device origin record with signature information 
populated to the various blockchains. 
2) The device is transferred from an UNCLASS environment to a SECRET 
environment. The device chain is now maintained at SECRET. 
3) The device is repaired, using a combine operation on the device chain. 
Necessary information is populated to the appropriate and corresponding 
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SECRET level blockchain, while other chains record signature information 
only. 
If it is later discovered that the device of interest contained a malfunctioning or 
compromised component (e.g., through manufacturer notification), then an operator 
might inspect all associated components in the device genesis block, recognizing that 
the critical component is present. It can then be seen that the device was associated to a 
different classification (or organization blockchain), and the appropriate authority for that 
blockchain can be contacted, who can then trace the device’s history to identify if the 
component is still present or has been replaced. 
DOD Equipment Repair Transactions Using the Hyperledger Fabric Framework for 
Distributed Blockchain Ledger Keeping 
Using the open-sourced Hyperledger Fabric framework (Hyperledger, 2020) 
hosted on GitHub (2020), we have constructed a case study exemplar using open-
source software and demonstration records that shows how various repair level 
organizations might use blockchain mergence solutions to record supply chain 
transactions between participants using blockchain as a distributed ledger technology.18 
 UAV Camera 
For our case study, we have an organizational level (O-level) end user that 
currently possesses a UAV that houses a camera subcomponent, a DLR that requires 
repair at the depot level (D-level). The client application transactions that take place and 
are recorded on the blockchain ledger are 
1. O-level issues the nonfunctional DLR camera to D-level for repair 
2. D-level accepts and conducts the required repairs for the DLR camera 
3. D-level reissues the repaired DLR camera back to O-level 
The intent is to show chain of custody for the DLR camera subcomponent, 
camera metadata (i.e., serial number), and status of repair of the DLR in the supply 
chain. The blockchain network (N) is comprised of the following consortium 
organizations, components, and entities (illustrated in Figure 5): 
• Organizations R1 (D-level), R2 (O-level), and R4 (blockchain network 
administrator). 
• Client applications A1 (D-level transactor) and A2 (O-level transactor). 
Client applications conduct transactions on behalf of their respective 
organizations. 
• Certificate authorities CA1, CA2, and CA4. Each organization can prefer 
their own vetted certificate authority. 
• Peers P1 (D-level) and P2 (O-level). Peers maintain local copies of and 
record blockchain ledger transactions in accordance with agreed upon 
smart contracts (chaincode) within the consortium. 
• Blockchain ledger L1. Each peer maintains and communicates with other 
network peers to ensure local blockchain ledger copies are kept uniform 




18  Details can be found at https://gitlab.nps.edu/tdnorbra/blockchain-mergence    
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• Smart contract (chaincode) S5. Peers are able to maintain blockchain 
ledger uniformity through consortium member agreed upon smart 
contracts. 
• Network ordering service O4. The ordering service serves as the initial 
administrative gateway between consortium members upon network 
standup. 
• Network configuration NC4. Consortium members R1, R2, and R4 all 
agree upon the blockchain network configuration policies administered by 
ordering service O4 via NC4. 
• Channel configuration CC1. The channel configuration allows for network 
peers to accept and distribute blockchain ledger transactions between 
authorized organizations in accordance with NC4. 
• Channel 1. The communications channel where organizational peers 





Figure 5. DoD Equipment Repair Blockchain Network (N) Configuration Topology 
 
 Using the Fabric Test Network 
We apply the Hyperledger Fabric test network for our case study test 
benchmarking (Hyperledger, 2020). Depending on the operating system of the 
developer’s choice, a specific environment may first be set up on a local machine to 
leverage the Hyperledger Fabric framework. Once the prerequisites are complete, the 
test network is invoked via command line scripts and the demonstration can proceed. In 
our case, the demonstration code was modified locally to mimic our UAV camera 
scenario. 
 DLR Transactions in Action 
The codebase and a demonstration video for this contribution is maintained in 
open-source version control, located on the Naval Postgraduate School’s GitLab server 
(Norbraten, 2020). In particular, we trialed the following case study stages: 
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1. Upon network standup/startup, the various organizational peers, admins, 
and so on are defined, registered, enrolled, and assigned certificate 
authorities, which then issue authenticating certificates for each 
respective network node. The agreed upon smart contract (chaincode) is 
deployed to each organizational peer node and tested. Finally, each 
organizational peer node is given local custody of the blockchain ledger, 
which is then readied for acceptance and recording of ledger 
transactions. 
2. The network facilitates transactions. Each client application (authorized 
organizational transaction entity) submits their authentication data to the 
network before the network authorizes the transaction to take place.  
3. Finally, the network is operational, and authorized organizational entities 
are recognized. Transactions may begin, but only those that are 
delineated in the smart contract (an O-level entity submitting a UAV 
camera to D-level for repair). We run three example transactions, as per 
the smart contract constructs initiated from each of the O-level and D-
level authorized entities. These transactions are initiated from each client 
gateway interface application that has knowledge of the network from 
their respective remote locations.  
 Basic Network Timing Data 
For any system component introduction, computational expense is valuable to 
assess. We performed distributed ledger testing on commodity hardware, and delays 
were tolerable once system initialization was complete. Table 2 below annotates various 
local network timing data benchmarks for tests performed. Experiments were run using a 
2015 Apple MacBook Pro laptop with a 3.1 GHz dual-core Intel i7 and 16 GB of RAM 
running the latest macOS operating system. 
 
Table 2. Network Timing of Various DLR Transactions on Network (N) 
Network Action Time Units 
Blockchain Network Startup/Standup 2 min 19 sec 
Client Application Authentication 19.4 sec 
 O-level DLR Issue Transaction 18.3 sec 
D-level Acceptance/Receipt ACK of DLR 17.8 sec 
D-level Reissue of RFI DLR 18 sec 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The span of device life cycle and rapid evolution from design to development, 
prototype testing, requirements approval, acquisition testing, deployment, casualty 
response, and system upgrades is immense. Automated authentication and change 
logging within this life cycle support human-mediated checkpoints. Industry is looking to 
blockchain solutions for supporting the ecosystem, which opens an opportunity for 
leveraging the technology for parts tracking within the DoD. Blockchain mergence 
provides a bridge between local device repairs and blockchain integrity. In essence, it 
builds on the DLR system with similar fine-grain parts replacement and carcass tracking 
by means of hard-coded integrity stamps on the blockchain as a defense against 
adversarial or even undesired but accidental changes to a device’s logged history.  
We investigated the logistics challenges that a blockchain mergence solution 
must address, including pre- and post-acquisition concerns, procedural modifications, 
preventative and corrective maintenance, and field repair. Furthermore, we evaluated 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 207 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
potential solutions against fundamental requirements for interoperability, such as with 
the existing DLR system and MLS. Finally, our initial open-source, Hyperledger Fabric–
based simulation of the refined blockchain mergence solution demonstrates proof-of-
concept capabilities by applying a widely used industry software library for blockchain 
configuration, simulation, and confirmation. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
This proof-of-concept exemplar work is ready for further development to match 
the full logistics life cycle. A real-world prototype case study emulating multiple 
participants (ashore hardware suppliers, operational forces, and unmanned systems with 
hardware-dependent software updates) might further test and demonstrate necessary 
capabilities and ledger distribution. Using the preexisting CAC infrastructure for 
individual identification further enables a full, ready-to-test blockchain mergence solution.  
System engineering assessments can include potential augmentation of existing 
systems to better support the increased requirements accompanying the fast-growing 
deployment of unmanned systems. Use case considerations may also be assessed for 
trusted deployment and updates to hardware and software, as well as inclusion of 
additive manufactured parts. Future work might then emulate the full life deployment 
cycle for a fleet-critical system of interest to explore operational parallels in data-centric 
security for human–machine tactical deployments. 
The blockchain mergence solution is designed for smooth integration with the 
existing DLR system. Feasibility testing of the combined system comprised of blockchain 
mergence, with the DLR system, and CAC infrastructure is a logical next step for future 
work.  
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Abstract 
We describe how Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) blockchain (BC) technology that we 
previously applied to Navy logistics supply chains can be applied to data supporting 
artificial intelligence (AI) and software development in terms of system safety and the 
timely acquisition of data. Data-driven AI/machine learning (ML) requires trusted data for 
their use in AI functions and requires significant amounts of training data from diverse 
sources including Internet of Things (IoT) devices/sensors. Unauthorized alterations to 
data supporting AI/ML could go unnoticed within the AI function build process but surface 
during operation in hazards affecting unwanted human death or resource destruction. 
AI/ML controlling hardware usually falls into the two highest software control categories: 
Levels 1 and 2, risk of death, disability, or resource destroyed.  
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HLF BC is a tamper-resistant decentralized trusted ledger that provides proof of 
transaction where trust is implemented through distributed consensus to ensure that only 
authorized people can modify data and that the modification is traceable and transparent. 
Distributed ledgers provide system safety through BC provenance, immutability, and 
policy enforcement through smart contracts. 
We show how BC can contribute to the safety of the data and transactions and provide 
data to the researchers in a timely manner through “smart repositories.” 
Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) software exercises a high degree of control over a 
particular system function (e.g., movement/guidance of a missile). If the function creates 
a hazard, this can cause a mishap that has a consequence of a catastrophic and critical 
event, resulting in death or resources destroyed. There is no redo, reboot, or retraining 
of an AI function that fails in this scenario. Software safety engineering and test and 
evaluation efforts to ensure fidelity include data-related elements such as process flow, 
code level, and data structure analysis. These flows, for example, are similar to the use 
of blockchain (BC) in supply chains used in our previous research, the Navy supply 
chain process, which we believe can be adapted for system safety and software 
integrity.  
AI/machine learning (ML), the training sets, algorithms, and associated software 
supporting weapons systems are targets for increasingly sophisticated adversarial 
machine learning attacks, which attempt to fool models through malicious input into the 
system such as AI poisoning and other attacks. Athalye et al. (2017) showed that it is 
even possible to fool an AI into having it identify a turtle wrongly as a rifle. BC could be 
used as a countermeasure to prevent such poisoning as well as safeguard system 
integrity. BC, specifically Hyperledger Fabric (HLF), is a tamper-resistant decentralized 
trusted ledger that provides proof of transaction where trust is implemented through 
distributed consensus to ensure that only authorized people can modify the code base, 
AI algorithm, or training set and that the modification is traceable and transparent. 
Distributed ledgers provide system safety through BC provenance and policy 
enforcement through a feature called smart contracts, which imbed logical code. Data in 
support of AI and software development can also suffer not only from deliberate 
sabotage or ruse but also from human error.  
Machine learning increasingly requires complex data sources from repositories 
and sensors down to the edge for training sets supporting AI development. Getting the 
right and accurate data can be a complex process, and error or intentional manipulation 
is always a concern. The number of sensors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such 
as smart thermometers/oximeters to track COVID-19, has caused an explosion of data 
generation but not an increase in safeguards to ensure system safety if these edge 
devices are used to control machines or make life-critical decisions.  
Centralized security and authentication controlling IoT devices could lead to a 
single point of failure, a new target for cyberattack, and cause a bottleneck and high 
latency (Jia et al., 2020). Typically, an ML project may require diverse data sources and 
modalities. One example may be drones flying over an urban area, which requires its ML 
training set data on the region, including crime rate, weather, and road 
conditions/constraints. For just this simple example, data needed include Naval War 
College (NWC) wargaming, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) wargaming, Live Fire 
Event, Program of Record product performance specifications, contractor specifications, 
test evaluation results, a diverse set of sensors, IoT devices, and so on. Once an AI is 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 211 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
trained, BC can be used to ensure the integrity of the data during operations. BC can be 
used to find the right data, what is in it, who owns it, and how to get it with quick 
authorization. Data scientists have long recognized that just getting the right data and 
permission to use it can be an arduous and long process.  
The Problem of System Safety 
AI has the potential of creating a technological leap (Eden et al., 2013). That 
potential leap, especially when dealing with weapon systems, needs scrutiny. This 
scrutiny focuses on the specificity of the composition and size of the training data 
algorithm. This research describes how an HLF architecture can be used to increase 
safety and confidence in the deployment of AI functions. There must be confidence in 
the data and training sets and the algorithms, and there must be confidence that they 
are tamper-proof and free from anomalies, intentional or by accident. Acquisition 
communities cannot identify and certify operational constraints of an ML algorithm for 
deployment without having confidence in the training data quality, including any negative 
side effects (Everitt, 2018) that might result from the training process.  
The system safety concept calls for a risk management strategy based on 
identification, analysis of hazards, and application of remedial controls using a systems-
based approach. This is different from traditional safety strategies (Roland & Moriarty, 
1990).  
AI safety issues for naval weapon systems usually have not included 
consideration of adversarial attacks that might affect functional performance. AI 
adversarial network attacks using techniques like deepfakes, putting an image/video into 
another image/video for miscategorization (Chauhan, 2018), will be considered within 
our BC discussion. 
When assessing safety, the goal is to identify anything that might be safety-
critical. Safety-critical is “a term applied to a condition, event, operation, process or item 
whose mishap severity consequence is either catastrophic or critical (e.g., safety-critical 
function, safety-critical path, and safety-critical component)” (Defense Standardization 
Program Office, 2012). Specifically, the publication MILSTD-882E (Defense 
Standardization Program Office, 2012) helps software engineers determine the level of 
rigor (LOR), which specifies the depth and breadth of software analysis and verification 
activities necessary to provide a sufficient level of confidence that a safety-critical or 
safety-related software function will perform as required. ML/AI usually falls into the 
system safety two highest software control categories: Level 1 (autonomous) and Level 
2 (semiautonomous). We contend that BC could contribute to the analysis and 
verification of software activities by ensuring data integrity and better accessibility to the 
data.  
Applying Successful BC Techniques to Ensure System Safety of AI Deployed 
Weapon Systems:  
Our previous research used the HLF BC to generate three general use cases for 
Navy logistics, including financial and inventory transaction audit trails, serial number 
tracking, and maintenance log integrity. We believe the BC network derived from these 
three use cases could be adapted for system safety purposes since all our previous 
demonstrations dealt with the integrity of the data supporting work processes and 
events. BC tracks food/parts items as assets recorded on ledgers, and training data are 
assets and also created with similar work processes and events. With HLF you can 
control who, what, and when and identify those who have access to the logistics data 
representing assets as well through an immutable ledger containing logistics data that 
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cannot be tampered with. HLF is as transparent as needed but can hide data from those 
without a need to know.  
The data source flows of data and training sets supporting data scientists are 
similar to previous BC research on Navy supply chains to improve transparency and the 
safety of the related supply chain data and transactions, but there is a higher level of risk 
since they are often at Level 1 or Level 2 autonomous systems. In a sense, training sets 
and analytical data are like the tracking of parts and food since they point to resources 
represented by the information that needs to be protected and distributed in a friction-
free manner. Control of these sources during the integration process to create training 
data and general analysis is vital to ensure the training sets and AI algorithms are 
transparent to those who need them, controlled, and their validity supported by an audit 
trail that BC provides. Training set alterations could go unnoticed within the AI function 
build process but revealed during operation in hazards affecting unwanted human death 
or resource destruction. Our previous research demonstrated how BC can provide a 
needed data management technology through a tamper-resistant decentralized trusted 
ledger that provides proof of transaction where trust is implemented through distributed 
consensus. Only authorized people can modify the code base, AI algorithms, or training 
set modifications that are detectable, traceable, and transparent. Distributed ledgers 
provide system safety through BC provenance and policy enforcement through smart 
contracts.  
HLF is a consensus-based network that the Department of Defense (DoD) can 
control and has no “Proof of Work” protocol, which is a wasteful use of computer 
resources. HLF uses channels to control who can see what data and through 
consensus; the DoD can control what is allowed to be put on the BC ledger. Such 
technologies can not only be used in Navy supply and logistics to streamline and 
improve effectiveness in terms of how workflow can be improved to provide more rapid 
and secure distribution of material and two-way financial transactions but can also be 
used on data transactions such as datasets requested by data scientists. Data scientists 
have long recognized that obtaining “clean data” and the permission to use it has been 
hampered by administrative friction, which can be caused by data owner’s requirements, 
trust issues from generated data source transactions, and other administrative 
processes.  
The benefits of BC technology described in this paper support system safety in 
terms of providing objective quality evidence about data integrity, as well as test and 
evaluation teams in terms of data management control. We believe elements of BC, 
such as smart contracts, could contribute to all acquisition groups involved. We will 
discuss our previous logistics use case as well as new use cases specifically for 
software safety.  
The Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Solution 
HLF provides proof of transaction where trust is implemented through distributed 
consensus and not centralized policy enforcement. The specific version of BC we used 
is HLF, which is open-source from the Linux Foundation. HLF is a permissioned, 
distributed ledger that works on the consensus model that is an integral component of 
the “trust system” in the BC. Essentially, the Fabric environment provides the “common 
logging” and service management components on the platform, and the containerized 
infrastructure allows developers to build a BC network where data is recorded on 
distributed ledgers where the data written can be trusted, and transactions are 
immutable and tamper-proof. Smart contracts can embed legal knowledge, laws, and 
regulations, and enforce Navy data policy. BC/HLF can also provide “provenance” of an 
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item, such as food or a part, and trace back to the source of that part or food item in 
case of contamination or counterfeit/defective parts as well as other times such as 
blocks of data in support of AI.  
BC can be used for cyber currency such as bitcoin; cyber currency is not a part 
of this study, and a semiprivate BC in support of data integrity needs a specific set of BC 
features other than Everledger or Ethereum, which uses an inefficient way to verify 
blocks called Proof of Work (PoW) instead of the more efficient consensus algorithm 
such as Proof of Stake. 
With our previous research questions—Could BC simplify and enable access and 
identity management for the Navy supply and logistics systems in a cost-effective 
manner to reduce this friction? How could BC improve Navy logistics to the last tactical 
mile?—we demonstrated the feasibility in previous research of using IBM and Oracle 
versions of HLF to track assets such as food items. Tracking and moving assets could 
be applied to data assets and adapted for software safety use because in both cases we 
care about the integrity of the data generated. There have been planned pilot projects in 
the DoD, usually supply chain scenarios (Simerly & Keenaghan, 2019). 
Although HLF is a Linux open-source project, several software companies have 
adapted HLF as its core BC enterprise solutions and have added additional value 
through add-ons, cloud support, and company expertise that goes beyond the plain 
vanilla HLF. This is common with open-source products as you pay for more capability 
and support. We compared to enterprise versions of HLF, the IBM, and the Oracle HLF 
BC platforms and evaluated their ability to maintain an efficient, streamlined, and 
accurate ledger of all shipment transactions during transportation. Additionally, the team 
developed a ledger serialization function in the smart contracts for synchronized 
connection on ships and bases to the HLF Framework. The characteristics of enterprise 
BCs include 
• Permissioned architecture  
• Highly modular  
• Pluggable consensus  
• Open smart contract model—flexibility to implement any desired solution model. 
• Low latency of finality/confirmation  
• Flexible approach to data privacy: data isolation using “channels,” or share 
private data on a need-to-know basis using private data collections 
• Multilanguage smart contract support: Go, Java, JavaScript  
• Designed for continuous operations, including rolling upgrades and asymmetric 
version support  
• Governance and versioning of smart contracts  
• Flexible endorsement model for achieving consensus across required 
organizations  
• Queryable data (key-based queries and JSON queries)  
• Uses X.509 public key infrastructure (PKI), which is quite familiar to the DoD for a 
signed data structure that binds a public key to a person, computer, or 
organization. Certificates are issued by certification authorities (CAs) 
• Cloud support and SaaS (Software as a Service) 
 
Figure 1 is an example of a very simple BC ordering network. A1, A2, and A3 are 
different “off-chain” applications that could be on IoT devices or web browsers on 
computers or smartphones. These applications connect the on-chain world with the BC 
network/database. These client applications represent the “last mile” and could include 
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legacy programs pre-BC. The blue-shaded background represents the BC logical 
infrastructure layer—not whatever physical layer infrastructures might be used, such as 
satellite or fiberoptics. O4 is an ordering service. Network configuration (NC4) gives 
administrative rights to organizations R1 and R4. At the network level, Certificate 
Authority CA4 (DoD certs can be used) is used to dispense identities to the 
administrators and network nodes of the R1 and R4 organizations. Certification 
authorities CA1 and CA4 provide entity validation, as well as other CAs shown in the 
diagram. In this example, there are two consortiums (common interest parties), 
represented by R1 and R4 entities who set network configuration policies, seen CC1 and 
CC4 which set up channels. Channels are ways to decide who gets to see what ledgers. 
There are three peers: P1, P2, and P3. On the left, P1 has S5, which is a smart contract 
that provides the rules for the ledger L1. Only those who have access to Channel 1 (C1) 
have access to the ledger L1. You see that if you have access to A1 or A2 you have 
access to C1, but the A2 application has access to both C1 and C2 and, therefore, 
access to ledgers L1 and L2, which is set by configuration control (CCL). 
 
Figure 1. Generic HLF BC Network 
Methodology 
Our methodology involves two sets of use cases. The first set (original cases) 
were used in our previous research in Navy logistics, which we believe can also 
demonstrate BC use for system safety if modified, as both sets of use cases track 
assets—one tracks food items and the other tracks datasets as assets. The key for 
repurposing a supply chain for use in software safety support is through the addition of 
off-chain application programming interface (API), such as Representational State 
Transfer (REST, or many others), which provides an interface between the BC and the 
outside world and to what is called “the last mile,” which in most of our use cases is a 
web client. In our first set of use cases (the original use cases) we built two demos 
(Oracle and IBM cloud versions) illustrating the Navy logistics/supply chain. We 
demonstrated how BC can document and authenticate transactions along the supply 
chain, which would be similar to a data supply chain used for data system safety. We 
worked with both Oracle and IBM enterprise BCs to demonstrate the first set of use 
cases. In a work in progress, we have an additional set of use cases (labeled new 
cases) specifically for use with system safety using the open-source version of HLF 
(https://www.hyperledger.org/). 
 Blockchain Use Case Examples for the Navy Logistics/Supply Chain 
Working with our Navy sponsor (Navy Logistics N4) we looked at three general 
use cases to apply BC technology using both cloud versions of IBM and Oracle BC 
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platforms: (1) financial and inventory transaction audit trails; (2) serial number tracking, 
and (3) maintenance log integrity. Maintenance log integrity involves the same issues as 
AI dataset integrity. The three examples are 
• Original Case 1: Financial and inventory transaction audit trials. An investigatory 
inventory and financial transactions via audit trails can be a costly and timely 
process, and the audit trails could encompass different systems throughout a vast 
network in such an organization as the Navy. The questions to be answered might 
include what, where, and who—where a distributed ledger would be able to track 
“what” through immutable data blocks that make up the ledger. One of the BC 
strengths is identity verification and management, which would be able to verify and 
track the “who” in any financial and inventory transactions on the BC.  
• Original Case 2: Serial number tracking/BC tracking can also be applied to the 
tracking of specific items in the supply chain, such as serial numbers. Also, the 
tracking could include a visual identification of the item by an individual, which would 
automatically be identified as a trusted agent to make that verification along with the 
where and the when.  
• Original Case 3: Maintenance log integrity/maintenance repairs—such as on naval 
aircraft, ground, or ship systems—typically generate data on various transactional 
databases, which in turn may be sourced to other databases or repositories such as 
data warehouses’ Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. Our past research 
on aviation and ground maintenance systems databases shows that there are errors 
in the databases, and often information is not updated. At the tactical and 
operational levels, this could have an impact on the effective efforts to ensure 
maximum mission readiness. Smart contracts, which are integral to HLF, are code 
that can check, enforce, or flag bad data. Certainly, relational databases can have 
triggers to check for illogical data entries, but it isn’t always being done, and typically 
several databases and sources may be involved in a maintenance information 
system to make such error checking costly or not practical. While some minor errors 
may be acceptable in transactional databases, these errors could have an impact on 
data analysis and ML/AI if the data in these systems are used as training datasets. 
BC could use smart contracts to flag errors over a diverse set of data sources and 
provide basic provenance.  
Blockchain Use Case Examples for System Safety 
In our second set of use cases, we specifically address three software system safety 
use cases applied to the open-source HLF: 
• New Case 1: A researcher/data scientist needs to manage data or training sets 
for research or ML to process text or binaries (images, RFI signals), structured 
and unstructured. 
• New Case 2: A data scientist needs to derive metrics on a dataset but is not 
allowed to see raw data. 
• New Case 3: BC is used as a database for relatively small source code. 
Figure 2 is a simplified HLF BC network that could support our three scenarios 
for software safety in the blue background square on the right (see 
https://www.hyperledger.org/). This is the BC. This BC is supported by a physical 
network that could be cloud-based and supported by the internet. The “off-chain” 
applications, IoT, and storage are shown outside of the square. These are applications 
developed in a normal way and not a new technology. The applications use standard 
APIs such as REST to interface between the user, databases, and the outside world to 
connect to the BC. They are called off-chain because while they interface with the BC, 
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they are not part of the BC. From left to right are the identify certificates--CAs such as 
CA1, CA2, CA3 in our example to identify those who have access. BC is good at 
leveraging existing technologies, and CA is old technology using X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), which used to encrypt and sign email. A1, A2, A3, and so on are off-
chain client applications that have access to various ledgers (our database) which are 
controlled through CC1 and CC2 (CCL), which sets up channels and their access. P1 
and P2 are peer nodes that in the example host ledgers L1 and L2 for P1, and L3 for P2. 
Each ledger is supported by smart contracts (S5, S6, S7) that determine the business 
rules and logic of how the ledger is to be written and who can write on it. C1 and C2 are 
channels to determine what applications or entities are allowed to see what ledger, 
which makes Hyperledger very powerful as you can control who sees and changes 
what—such as Navy personnel and contractors having access to different data.  
Off-chain A1 is an application that administers access to the repository and 
writes to the ledger, which records the metadata in each dataset and provides a digital 
signature/hash value. CCL provides access to Channels 1 and 2 and, as shown, access 
to all ledgers. For structured data in the repository (maybe more than the one shown in 
the diagram), Al would post/write the metadata of a dataset of interest including, if 
practical, all of the data fields, DTG, and record a hash value or signature. This would be 
entered either in L1, L2, L3, or other ledgers created. It is not practical to record/post 
large datasets on a BC ledger, but metadata and pointer/anchors to the data could be 
provided through URLs. It is possible that through the administrator interfacing with a 
peer node, the BC could store some small datasets through CouchDB, which would 
provide the current information/state of an asset such as a dataset.  
New Case 1: Figure 2 shows application A2, which could be a customer/client 
such as a data scientist that is interested in datasets or training sets for an AI project. 
This customer per the diagram (set up by CC) has access to Channels 1 and 2, which 
means he can view Ledgers 1 through 3, which would be information about various 
datasets that can be accessed. In one scenario, the person using A2, the web 
application, for example, could search for a specific dataset or topic and then request 
that dataset through the application, which would check the smart contract—let’s say for 
L2—to see if the system allows read access to the repository. Existing off-chain software 
would complete the task and send an anchor or link (URL) to retrieve that dataset. The 
customer could later check back and see if the data have changed/been tampered with, 
or if the data were given to another user. Also, the client would be provided the 
provenance and metadata and even points of contact, including subject matter experts 
and the owner of the data. The client can check to see if the dataset has changed and 
who changed it, since any changes to the repository would be recorded in the 
appropriate ledger as to who, when, and what. Smart contracts could also provide some 
prefiltering through smart contracts to reduce unintentional errors. In the past, this has 
been done pre-analysis but by using smart contracts this would only need to be done 
once and not by each researcher or customer. This AI system safety idea is similar to 
the IBM concept (Sarpatwar et al., 2019), where the authors sought a trusted AI 
environment through provenance with a BC library exposed by REST or Python APIs 
that provided support for “immutable recording of the AI process, querying for traceability 
and audit, fair value attribution, etc.” We take it a further step to suggest that BC can be 
part of a smart repository solution that allows clients to search and find trusted datasets 
and safeguard them. A variation of this use case is a federated learning (FL) scenario 
that uses a collaborative ML technique whereby the devices collectively train and update 
a shared ML model while preserving their datasets. Even in a trusted military network 
using a private BC, some devices on the edge may prove untrustworthy, and ur Rehman 
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et al. (2020) propose a reputation-aware FL that enables trust through BC consensus 
and trust algorithms through BC smart contracts. 
New Case 2: A user wants to compile metrics but is not allowed access to the 
raw data because of security or cross-domain restrictions. Lampropoulos et al. (2019) 
proposed a similar scenario, where one Telco A holds private datasets and internally 
processes a data request by another Telco B, and Telco A only returns the results to 
Telco B and not the raw sensitive data. The whole process is performed with 
transparency, ensuring the quality of the results and the privacy of the processed data. 
A3 in Figure 2 is an application that only has access to Channel 2. The user then picks 
the dataset to use and looks at the metadata and fields; then the smart contract (S7) 
executes the query through A1 and post the results in the ledger L3. This use case could 
also be used for a cross-domain solution setting up rules when a user could have access 
to a different domain, the raw data, or just the results. 
New Case 3: Our last scenario is the data are not stored off-chain but in the BC 
itself. HLF has the option of using CouchDB that can use standard JSON queries to get 
the “World” or current state of an asset (like a dataset). Perhaps this use case would 
apply to IoT devices where you want real-time data from sensors but still want to ensure 
software safety. The data would be immutable but replicated throughout the network. 
 
Figure 2. HLF Scenarios 
Figure 3 summarizes the flow in our simple scenarios. First, the “customer”—a 
data scientist or developer—wants to access data such as for training sets in ML, or a 
developer wants access to code. The customer wants to find the right data quickly, know 
who owns it, and know that it can be reasonably trusted. In our example, this data 
resides in a repository that may include both structured data (relational databases) and 
semistructured and unstructured data such as in the form of .JSON files, text, or 
graphics. The customer starts a request for the data, and an answer comes back with 
the metadata, data fields, a date–time group, and a hash value of the set. This 
information is in a ledger in addition to an encrypted link to access the dataset. The 
customer can also see the complete history of changes to the data and can verify that 
the training set, data, or code has not been tampered with through the hash code both in 
the metadata and the ledger on the BC. Only those authorized can add to the chain, and 
it is immutable. 
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Figure 3. Summary of New Use Cases (adapted from Oracle diagram) 
 
 Use Cases Using Three Hyperledger Fabric Versions 
We discuss our results using the IBM, Oracle, and Linux Foundation versions of 
HLF and their application to system safety scenarios. Figure 4 provides a simplistic view 
of the system safety scenario where the data scientist is looking for training sets or 
related data. 
 
Figure 4. Data Scientist Use Case Example and Smart Repositories 
The data scientist (the client) uses a web browser, enabled by Rest API or other 
development interfaces, and searches for a dataset or training set through the BC which, 
through certificates (x.509) and smart contracts, knows who the client is. Based on 
governance, the BC and smart contract will decide if that data scientist has the authority 
to retrieve the data. If so, the client will be sent a link to access the repository or even an 
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IoT device or a BC repository with frequently used datasets. Through x.509 certificates, 
which will have the identity verified by the BC, as well as the sending to the client hash 
value making sure the dataset hasn’t been tampered with. The smart contract may do 
some initial cleaning up and filtering of the data. What normally takes months to get the 
data may only take a day and comes with assurance that the data had not been 
tampered with through an immutable BC. Such forms as in Figure 5 or other members of 
understanding could be eliminated. 
 
Figure 5. SAAR-N Form 
Successful Applications of Blockchain for Naval Supply Chain Tracking 
As discussed, our previous research investigated how BC could simplify and 
enable access and identity management for the Navy supply and logistics systems in a 
cost-effective manner to reduce administrative friction and how BC could improve Navy 
logistics to the last tactical mile. In our scenario, the first destination transportation (FDT) 
refers to the movement and cost of moving shipments from free on board (FOB) points 
of origin to the location at which the shipment is first received for use or storage. As 
naval regulations apply, the first checkpoint of where a shipment is received, whether 
within the United States (CONUS) or outside (OCONUS), begins with a supplier outside 
of the DoD supply system or industrial activity that creates the shipment. The labor and 
transportation charges, including freight drayage, cartage, port handling, and other in-
transit costs, are processed at the FDT. Freight cartage refers to any inland transit of 
cargo between locations, which serve as the “checkpoints” in the BC network. When a 
location is assigned responsibility for “cartage of consignments” to land-based activities, 
ships, or other transport units, the charges of transportation are given to the location of 
assigned responsibility, which acts as a peer node checkpoint in the network. At this 
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point, the initial entry in the ledger may be created and committed by the peer node 
belonging to the FDT and the orderers. It is important to note that FDT does not only 
include shipments of equipment but also the initial transportation of Navy-owned 
materials that are provided to a contractor for research. This indicates that the charges 
of a shipment from a contractor’s facility to its final destination point are paid by the 
government. However, to maintain the legitimacy of a decentralized ledger in this 
research study, the network for which the ledger is maintained consists of only 
contractors, supply facilities, and the final base destinations. Essentially, tracking 
responsibility is passed down from supplier to checkpoint. The checkpoint managers 
responsible for the charges in a shipment delivery may create and commit the 
transaction over the BC network, and the next checkpoint manager may agree or 
disagree about the condition and extraneous details of the shipment that the previous 
manager signed. Currently, the DON uses service-wide transport (SWT) as a 
clearinghouse, which is a centralized operations and maintenance manager created to 
provide transportation funds for naval shipments and mail. Since naval cargo and the 
movement of mail to bases is not a responsibility of a destination location, the SWT was 
created to pay for the movement of material, such as aircraft engines, mission module 
packages, catapult and arresting gear, propellers, shafts, civil engineering support 
equipment, safety equipment, drones, overseas mail, and Navy Exchange Service 
Command (NEXCOM) merchandise shipped from within the United States to 
international locations.  
For disconnected operations, to maintain an accurate ledger with the consensus 
algorithm, the peer nodes must be connected to the Fabric environment unless the peer 
node decides to save the ledger as a .JSON file and re-upload the ledger as a .CSV file 
once back online. The ledger is automatically updated after the node reconnects 
following disconnections due to shipboard communications. The Fabric environment will 
make BC technology a more viable option for all naval transportation activities.  
The Navy requires a multifunctional and secure platform that enables personnel 
to track multiple shipments from production facilities to bases and a secure ledger of 
inventory that can only be modified with either an undisputed consensus or access to the 
smart contract. Once a peer node administrator or user in the network has access to 
their smart contract, they can modify the transaction protocol that occurs on transactions 
in the network. However, the network will not instantiate a new version until there is an 
agreement with the channel creator or the majority of the channel members. 
In this simplified logistics BC network, the smart contract contains six methods 
that carry out the protocol for each transaction on the ledger: foodAssetExists, 
createFoodAsset, readFoodAsset, updateFoodAsset, trackFoodAsset, and 
deleteFoodAsset. The method of using names indicates that each shipment is checked 
to verify if it already exists at a location denoted by a string. After checking for 
duplication, the asset is created in the ledger using a key-value pair, such as “001: a 
shipment of supplies.” Once the asset is created, it is always a good practice to read the 
asset’s details into the ledger so that users further down the network have a detailed 
understanding of what a package is supposed to contain. Also, if a shipment is 
changed—say, a package is redirected to a base that requires supplies urgently—the 
shipment’s location is updated within the ledger and deleted once the shipment arrives.  
A multifunctional and secure platform that enables personnel to track multiple 
shipments from production facilities to bases or ships in transactions involving money, 
items, material, and history should be trusted, transparent, and traceable back to the 
origin of the item. These transactions involving information, money, or physical items 
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such as food or parts usually involve the enforcement of policy, technical, or legal 
requirements that require the enforcement of business rules. BC can maintain a secure 
ledger of inventory (or transactions involving data or information) that can only be 
modified with either an undisputed consensus or access to the smart contract, which can 
enforce business rules and flag “violations.” Once a peer node administrator or user in 
the network has access to their smart contract, they can modify the transaction protocol 
that occurs on transactions in the network. However, the network will not instantiate a 
new version until there’s an agreement with the channel creator or the majority of the 
channel members. 
Based on the above process, we showed how a food or item tracking scenario 
would work using both IBM and Oracle cloud versions of HLF (see Figure 6). In these 
BC networks we set up, the smart contracts contain six methods that carry out the 
protocol for each transaction on the ledger: foodAssetExists, createFoodAsset, 
readFoodAsset, updateFoodAsset, trackFoodAsset, and deleteFoodAsset. In our 
food/item tracking scenario, the method of using names indicates that each shipment is 
checked to verify if it already exists at a location denoted by a string. After checking for 
duplication, the asset is created in the ledger using a key-value pair, such as “001: a 
shipment of supplies.” Once the asset is created, it is always a good practice to read the 
asset’s details into the ledger, so that users further down the network have a detailed 
understanding of what a package is supposed to contain. Also, if a shipment is changed, 
say, a package is redirected to a base that requires supplies urgently, the shipment’s 
location is updated within the ledger and deleted once the shipment arrives.  
 
Figure 6. Sample Ledger of Shipments That Are Added and Updated (Contents/Location) 
Blockchain Use Case Examples for the Navy Logistics/Supply Chain 
Using IBM BC Platform™: To use the IBM BC Platform, users are required to 
install four vital components: (1) the Virtual Studio Code environment, (2) Node.js, (3) 
Docker, and (4) Kubernetes. The Virtual Studio Code environment is the offline 
integrated development environment (IDE), where developers create smart contracts 
using the open-source programming language Typescript, which was developed by 
Microsoft.  
Smart contracts serve as the fundamental basis of all enterprise BCs because 
they give certified users the ability to create new transactions and assets, as well as 
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other functions specific to a project. In this project, the team’s main goal was to create a 
consensus network that has the power to create food shipment assets, update or delete 
them from the ledger when required, and track their location using the “foodId” string, 
which may be replaced by radio-frequency identification (RFID).  
The HLF (from the Linux Foundation) is the basis of both IBM and Oracle 
platforms. Its components are created in a Kubernetes cluster usually within the IBM 
Cloud. A Kubernetes cluster contains a set of working machines (nodes) that run 
containerized applications. The nodes within the cluster host the components of the 
application workload. Within the cluster, the control plane manages the nodes and 
workloads that run across multiple machines, as shown in Figure 7: 
 
 
Figure 7. Visual Representation of the Interaction Between Kubernetes and Cloud 
Figure 8 illustrates the ordering service. When the Fabric environment is running, 
you can create the ordering service. The ordering service is a group of orderers that 
accepts approved transactions endorsed by the peer nodes based on the smart 
contracts and organizes the transactions in the appropriate order in the ledger blocks 
based on the consensus algorithm.  
 
Figure 8. Visual Representation of the Integration of Security and Nodes in a BC Channel 
The peer nodes host ledgers and smart contracts—the backbone of the BC 
network. The smart contract—the transaction protocol—automatically executes, controls, 
and documents transactions or events occurring on the network.  
Like all BC frameworks, the network’s integrity is upheld by the consensus 
algorithm. Each node in the network reviews the entire BC and checks that all previous 
blocks are valid so that a new transaction may be initiated into the network. However, 
IBM 
Blockchain 
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alternatively, in a permissionless public BC, the consensus algorithm is replaced by the 
PoW, which creates a hash system of all of the transactions.  
In a PoW system, miners constantly attempt to solve the algorithm so that they 
may mine new blocks and be the first to extend their BC. HLF doesn’t use the wasteful 
PoW but uses a system closer to the “Proof of Stake” as a consensus mechanism. 
Essentially, decisions are authorized by users who are permitted to join the system and 
specific channel, as not everyone can join the network. Unlike PoW, computational 
power is not required, since there are no puzzles needed to obtain “currency.” In a 
“Proof of Stake” system, “validators” are discouraged from creating faulty empty blocks 
because they have the motivation to incorporate a maximum number of transactions for 
gains.  
To ensure security, the hash must be solved by all the peer nodes in the network 
so that the new transactions may be approved for the network. While this alternate 
approach is viable, it is also time-consuming because ensuring that the ledger is tamper-
free requires each ledger copy in the nodes to be changed and hashes to be solved.  
Developers should install Node.js and Docker unless the developer exports both 
items into a .JSON file and re-uploads both the files onto the peer nodes as a .CSV file. 
Docker serves as an OS-level platform to package containers and bundled software, 
libraries, and configuration files.  
Figure 9 shows that using well-defined channels within the software, these 
containers communicate with each other to allow the user to connect to the Fabric 
environment and add to or change the ledger. Finally, the Kubernetes system, which 
was designed by Google and maintained by the Cloud Native Computing Foundation, is 
the main system that allows the IBM BC Platform to package, install, deploy, and 
manage the multiple peer nodes in the platform.  
 
 
Figure 9. Visual Representation of the Interaction Between the External Software and the HLF 
Environment 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 224 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Figure 10 provides an overview of how you would manage the offchain (UI[2]) and the 
actual BC network consisting of three Fabric components: CA(4), the peer nodes, and 




Figure 10: High-Level Representation of IBM Blockchain Platform Architecture 
 
Using the Oracle Blockchain Platform: On both Oracle and IBM platforms, we 
were able to set up a BC network with peer nodes (stakeholders) with smart contracts 
that set up the rules for transferring and tracking assets such as food items discussed 
previously. More work needs to be done on enhancing the network to accurately 
represent this aspect of the supply chain.  
The team set up the network using an Oracle cloud with four peer nodes set up 
over a single channel and used Oracle Identify Management for role-based access. 
Separate roles are required for adding users to a role with BC provisioning entitlement, 
which requires tenancy admin. Additionally, the cloud platform was used instead of the 
software package due to the amount of storage memory required to host the software 
appliance VM packages on a local computer. However, the fundamental concepts of 
using an HLF environment and consensus algorithm remained the same for both 
platforms to build a BC network.  
Oracle Blockchain Platform also provides wizards to simplify joining multiple 
instances to the network, creating new channels, and deploying chaincodes. 
Implementation of smart contracts is through Typescript (see Figure 11). These and 
other DevOps functions are also available via extensive REST APIs for off-chain 
applications to interface the BC network. 
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Figure 11. Sample Smart Contract for Tracking Food Shipments (Language: Typescript). 
Oracle offers both a managed Cloud version (Oracle Blockchain Platform) of 
OBP (Blockchain-as-a-Service) and a customer-managed OBP Enterprise Edition for on-
premise (or 3rd party cloud) deployment, and nodes can be deployed using both for a 
hybrid network deployment (see Figure 12). The Cloud SaaS version was used for this 
project. To access this platform, users must log in with authenticated credentials in 
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure. Once logged in, users can provision an instance, which 
comes with a default channel and participant nodes, along with “orderers” that are 
responsible for maintaining the order of the ledger. An operations Console is provided, 
and users are not required to download any external software to work with the platform, 
other than an Integrated Development Environment (i.e., Visual Studio Code) to develop 
the chaincode and the REST API Testing tool, such as Postman and/or HLF Software 




Figure 10. Oracle Blockchain Platform Cloud Service Architecture 
The Oracle Blockchain Platform (see Figure 10) comes with an API Gateway that 
supports REST API so that developers can invoke a transaction, invoke a query, 
subscribe events with a registered callback, and view the status of a transaction within 
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the ledger as well as a set of DevOps REST APIs for administration, configuration, and 
monitoring tasks.19  
Current Use Cases Using Linux version of HLF for System Safety 
While both IBM and Oracle are HLF-based, their complete solutions use their 
respective cloud services are enhanced by their specific products. For our new set of 
system safety use cases (a work in progress), we installed HLF on a Naval Postgraduate 
School virtual Red Hat server and installed HLF from the Linux open-source foundation, 
which provides all the needed images and tools to set up a BC. Unix tools include the Git 
client, CURL, and Docker with Docker-Compose without Kubernetes, which are key 
components to build the BC network in a rapid manner. This model suits the researcher 
who wants to study and test out the concepts before moving to production, at which 
point a vendor-supported option can better address the challenges. Typical enterprise 
BC platforms provide dashboards for BC management such as the status and health of 
the HLF network. In the case of the open-source version, no such tools are provided; 
instead, everything is done via command; thus one has to have a good idea of Unix 
command line tools and scripting languages like BASH. Both IBM and Oracle allow you 
to use an IDE to build the applications. All three platforms offer interfaces via APIs to 
programming languages like JavaScript, Java, Microsoft Visual Studio, and others. For 
most production instances, we think a cloud-based BC is usually the right way to go for 
maintainability, support, ease of use, and security.  
For the Linux Foundation version of HLF, the complete install includes 
commands to set up an HLF network, issue certificates, set up the ledger, create 
channels, install chaincode, and more. A sample BASH script is provided that goes over 
all these steps and can be customized for new projects such as for our three system 
safety use cases. The Docker container-based platform allows one to have several HLF 
projects to coexist. The test network is shown in Figure 13 with two organizations, R1 
and R2. Organization R0 owns the ordering service (O) of channel C1. A copy of the 









19 The team was given access to the Oracle Cloud Platform thanks to the NPS liaison 
relationship with the Oracle Blockchain team. 
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Use Case 1: First a channel is created, and member organizations are added 
into the channel. The ledger contains the needed URLs to access the different binaries. 
Using APIs, depending on the requester, the chaincode will craft a unique response to 
be sent back. When the response is received, the URL and text are preprocessed; this 
happens in a middleware server outside the HLF, thus a custom webpage is created and 
served to the end user. This webpage has links to authenticated repositories (database 
back end). Once authenticated access is granted to the data scientist (data and training 
sets used in research and stored in a database), an encrypted anchor or URL may be 
sent to the data scientist to download the dataset.  
Use Case 2: When a member organization needs to see a part of the ledger, 
then channels have to be created. Membership to a channel is restricted to a subgroup 
of the organizations. Using chaincode, the metrics part of the ledger is provided to 
members of the metrics channel. There exists another channel where members can see 
the raw data using queries—again dictated by the chaincode. Membership to the two 
channels is a different set of organizations. Similar development methods used in Use 
Case 1 apply to Use Case 2.  
Use Case 3: In this scenario again, a channel is created for a certain member 
organization (not all). These members will be able to access the data in CouchDB via 
API queries. Chaincode will decide which source code (stored in the CouchDB) is 
provided as a returned result of the query. The database is replicated on every node, 
which might be an advantage on the edge and an I/O to IoT devices on the edge. 
Specific use cases for this capability haven’t been developed.  
Summary and Conclusions 
From our work, the following lessons learned can be applied to protecting 
datasets such as training sets for AI: 
1. Various versions of HLF will work adequately, but due to complexity, we recommend 
not using open-source but software vendors such as Oracle, IBM, Microsoft Azure 
BC, and others. BC is not a DoD core competency; therefore, contractor support is 
needed.  
2. HLF or other BCs alone are not the entire solution, since BC is an enabling or 
general purpose technology (GPT)—so in itself, it is not a solution. You must use a 
BC protocol within an integrated network infrastructure that also provides for the last 
mile to bring the data to the user, and this is through APIs. We recommend, ceteris 
paribus, that you consider using the same company that runs your relational 
databases or ERP, as your team will be familiar with that architecture.  
We used a qualitative methodology that included three general logistic use cases: 
(1) financial and inventory transaction audit trails, (2) serial number tracking, and (3) 
maintenance log integrity. These were used in consultation with the topic sponsor. We 
created simple scenarios where items were tracked through a BC network, and smart 
contracts would check for certain conditions that would simulate quality control and 
tracking. We selected two enterprise HLF platforms, Oracle and IBM, and evaluated 
them in terms of functionality, development ease, and security.  
We found that both the IBM and Oracle BC platforms may be used to create a 
secure network of peer nodes and a consensus for the legitimacy of the shipment 
ledger, which can only be modified using smart contracts. A special concern with Navy 
logistics is the possibility of unreliable networks, especially from shore to ship. The BC 
protocol creates a multitude of copies of the blocks (the public ledger) and if connectivity 
is lost, the blocks will be updated once the network node communications are 
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reestablished. Both IBM and Oracle BC platforms were accessed through the cloud, but 
the option is for the Navy to put either platform on its implementation of the cloud or 
servers.  
There were differences between IBM and Oracle implementation of HLF, such as 
how the whole network infrastructure was implemented, user interfaces, the developer 
tools and application programming interfaces provided, and how the implementation 
would connect to the Navy’s legacy systems to reach the last mile—such as on the ship. 
These were real value-added capabilities since HLF alone cannot make an enterprise 
BC system that supports the existing logistics information system.  
BC technologies offer the potential to reduce costs and logistical friction by 
providing a trusted ledger in support of logistic transactions and processes. Errors can 
be reduced through smart contracts, as demonstrated in both IBM and Oracle BC 
platforms. BC tracks assets, and therefore, BC can track data assets just as well as a 
partial solution to software safety.  
Intermittent Communications 
The Navy primarily operates at sea, which means the communications 
infrastructure supporting the BC network may not always be available or reliable, or 
provide bandwidth. A significant concern when implementing BC technology in cargo 
shipments is its dependence on a continuous connection to the Fabric environment. 
However, HLF is a robust distributed database (ledger) that has many copies of itself.  
The BC platform does require you to be connected to the Fabric environment at 
all times or to consistently re-upload the ledger to the peer nodes to have a constant 
accurate ledger. BC provides an update method that if a node is offline, it will have an 
update of its BC once reliable network is reestablished.  
The Issue of Governance 
Figure 4 showed a simple notational circle labeled “Governance,” but this issue is 
far from simple and is the key to any implementation of BC in support of data. While a 
detailed discussion of governance is beyond the scope of this paper, Gaur and Gaur 
(2018) presented a variety of frameworks, some of which would apply to permissioned 
BC networks. Previous discussions of BC governance tended to be about public BCs 
supporting cyber currencies. They noted that while BC is about decentralization, there 
will have to be some aspects of centralized governance—especially ones involving 
policy and legal aspects in the storage and use of data. For example, governance could 
include safeguards through smart contracts that could flag possible AI bias, especially 
ones used for human resources. Governance can consist of different layers, and one 
classification recognizes the different levels the data serves and classified as strategic, 
operational, and tactical governance. Since BC is decentralized by nature, the 
governance should be at the lowest level if diversity and flexibility are important. 
Ziolkowski et al. (2020) looked at governance that includes demand and data 
management, system architecture design and development, membership, and data 
ownership. Each one represents a possible off- or on-chain solution that involves 
technical and policy considerations—both of which may include smart contracts as 
solutions and resources (Feagan, 2020). System architecture design and development 
are not trivial tasks and are based to a great extent on governance and policies. To 
resolve this, IT network engineers must work as part of a consortium to determine the 
appropriate way to expose their peers to other organizations to receive transaction 
endorsement proposal/simulation requests while minimizing an attacker’s ability to gain 
access to sensitive information stored in the simulating peer’s database (Feagan, 2020). 
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The level of rigor is ultimately determined by the policies derived by governance. Data 
accessibility is also a key, so governance should have policies that allow scientists 
working for the DoD to find data not through randomness but structure, without undue 
delay, and data that complies with software safety. BC supporting “smart repositories” 
may facilitate this goal. The default should be to allow our data scientists and analysts 
timely access to data unless there is a good reason not to. Our adversaries work for AI 
superiority, and withholding data from their researchers is something they avoid. We 
refer to unclassified and non-PII/medical data.  
Findings 
We demonstrated through IBM and Oracle examples that HLF could meet 
logistics/audit and security requirements through smart contracts and the inherent trust 
systems with embedded certificates. Data entry errors could be reduced through smart 
contracts, which is an inherent feature of HLF. We believe a consortium BC through HLF 
would be a way to go to be able to share information (through the ledger) with suppliers 
and other third parties but also have the capability not to share when appropriate. BC 
could add the capability for secure transactions through certificates and the immutability 
of the transactions on the BC. The additional capability of BC on Navy logistics and 
supply would be able to catch some data entry errors, to trace back to the source, and 
basically to better know the what, the who (verified), and the where of various 
transactions generated by the supply chain. 
We found that both the IBM and Oracle BC platforms may be used to create a 
secure network of peer nodes or naval hotspots that can generate a consensus for the 
legitimacy of the shipment ledger, which can only be modified using smart contracts. 
Since a key component of both platforms is maintaining accuracy and security of the 
ledger, all users must consistently export and import the smart contracts and ledgers 
onto their respective peer nodes every time an update is made on the ledger or if the 
transaction protocol on the smart contract is changed. A special concern with Navy 
logistics is the possibility of unreliable networks, especially from shore to ship. The BC 
protocol creates a multitude of copies of the blocks (the public ledger), and if connectivity 
is lost, the blocks will be updated once the network node communications are 
reestablished. Both IBM and Oracle BC platforms were accessed through the cloud, but 
the option is for the Navy to put either platform on its implementation of the cloud or on 
servers.  
There were differences between IBM and Oracle implementation of HLF—such 
as how the whole network infrastructure was implemented, user interfaces, the 
developer tools and application programming interfaces provided, and how the 
implementation would connect to the Navy’s legacy systems to reach the last mile, such 
as on the ship. These were real value-added capabilities, since HLF alone cannot make 
an enterprise BC system that supports the existing logistics information system.  
We found a “consortium BC” with a BC consensus network to be the best fit for 
the use cases. A consortium allows both private and public users to use the BC while 
control is maintained by the private users (the Navy) through a consensus network, 
which means by the consensus of trusted Navy entities. This is contrasted by PoW BC 
networks used in cyber currency, which are inefficient and not appropriate for a 
government entity. BC technology has the potential for revolutionizing the logistics 
process by ensuring the quality and trustworthiness of logistical generated data as well 
as providing provenance of parts and food, but it is new and risky.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 230 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
The team also compared the IBM and Oracle BC platforms on efficiency and 
maintainability of a ledger of shipments and discovered that it was easier to use the IBM 
platform to create and export smart contracts and ledger; however, in September 2021, 
Oracle will provide similar capabilities for developing and deploying smart contracts. The 
IBM platform required users to develop their smart contract on the Visual Studio Code 
environment, export the contract as a .JSON file, log in to the online BC network, and 
import the contract and ledger as a .CSV file using a converter.  
The Oracle Blockchain Platform, on the other hand, allowed users greater 
flexibility to join ledgers more cohesively. The Oracle platform allowed users to log in to 
the Oracle cloud after they were approved by an administrator and used simple software 
like IDE and the Software Development Kit. Furthermore, the Oracle Blockchain Platform 
employed chaincode as a smart contract for transactional protocols in the network. A 
chaincode is written in either Java, Node.js, or Go and packaged into a ZIP file, which 
can be installed on the network. This is similar to how smart contracts are exported as 
.JSON files and uploaded on the IBM network as .CSV files. More specifically, 
chaincodes outline the structure of the ledger, initialize it, create updates (such as 
reading or updating entries), and respond to queries.  
Should HLF be used for software safety for ML and AI development? BC is 
general purpose technology (GPT) like the Internet, so BC isn’t a solution in and of itself, 
but it acts as an enabler that provides a trusted, distributed ledger that could be used for 
smart repositories and software safety. If other technologies are better, then why aren’t 
they commonplace? BC isn’t the solution but, along with off-chain technology, may be a 
technology that enhances existing business processes.  
References 
Athalye, A., Engstrom, L., Ilyas, A., & Kwok, K. (2017). Synthesizing robust adversarial examples. 




Defense Standardization Program Office. (2012). System safety (MIL-STD 882E). Pentagon. 
Eden, A. H., Moor, J. H., Soraker, J. H., & Steinhart, E. (2013). Singularity hypotheses: A 
scientific and philosophical assessment. Springer. 
Everitt, T. (2018). Towards safe artificial general intelligence [Doctoral thesis, Australian National 
University]. https://www.tomeveritt.se/papers/2018-thesis.pdf  
Feagan, L. (2020, April). Hyperledger fabric myths and reality. Object Computing. 
https://objectcomputing.com/resources/publications/sett/april-2020-hyperledger-fabric-
myths-and-reality  
Gaur, N., & Gaur, N. (2018). Hands-on blockchain with Hyperledger: Building decentralized 
applications with Hyperledger fabric and composer (1st ed.). Packt Publishing. 
Jia, X., Hu, N., Yin, S., Zhao, Y., Zhang, C., & Cheng, X. (2020). A2 chain: A blockchain-
based decentralized authentication scheme for 5G-enabled IoT. Mobile Information 
Systems, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/8889192  
Lampropoulos, K., Georgakakos, G., & Ioannidis, S. (2019). Using blockchains to enable big 
data analysis of private information. IEEE 24th International Workshop on Computer-
Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks, 2019, 1–6, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/CAMAD.2019.8858468   
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 231 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Roland, H., & Moriarty, B. (1990). System safety engineering and management (2nd ed.). 
Wiley.  
Sarpatwar, K., Vaculin, R., Min, H., Su, G., Heath, T., Ganapavarapu, G., & Dillenberger, D. 
(2019). Towards enabling trusted artificial intelligence via blockchain. In S. Calo, B. 
Seraphin, & D. Verma (Eds.), Policy-based autonomic data governance (1st ed., pp. 
137–153). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-
17277-0_8  
Simerly, M. T., & Keenaghan, D. J. (2019). Blockchain for military logistics. Army 
Sustainment, 51(4), 48–49. 
ur Rehman, M., Salah, K., Damiani, E., & Svetinovic, D. (2020). Towards blockchain-based 
reputation-aware federated learning. IEEE Conference on Computer 
Communications Workshops, 183–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS50562.2020.9163027  
Ziolkowski, R., Miscione, G., & Schwabe, G. (2020). Decision problems in blockchain 
governance: Old wine in new bottles or walking in someone else’s shoes? Journal of 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 232 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Product Supportability Through Lifecycle Modeling and 
Simulation 
Magnus Andersson is a director at Systecon. Andersson started his career at the Swedish utility 
Vattenfall, where he worked on various wind power research and development topics. In 2011, he 
joined Systecon, where he has worked as a consultant within the fields of life asset cycle 
management, O&M, and lifecycle economics. Today he splits his time between Systecon’s 
Consultant Department and business development. Magnus holds an MSc in Energy Systems 
Engineering from Uppsala University in Stockholm, Sweden.  
Justin Woulfe is a principal and cofounder of Systecon North America, with expertise in systems, 
logistics, and cost optimization. For the past decade, he has focused on balancing cost and capability 
within the aerospace and defense industry. Justin has a BS in Electrical Engineering from Virginia 
Military Institute, an MS in Engineering Management from Drexel University, and an MS in Supply 
Chain Management from Syracuse University through the DoD LOGTECH program. His research and 
analysis has resulted in billions of dollars in savings and increases in readiness on large, complex 
acquisition and sustainment programs. His work in model-based systems engineering, optimization, 
and readiness analysis is widely published and taught in both university and DoD programs. 
Abstract 
Current changes in Department of Defense (DoD) budgeting processes and in the constraints 
on available funding have resulted in inadequate support for the warfighter’s needs. The 
decision environment evolves into a key question impacting warfighter capabilities: How 
should the funding be distributed to achieve the optimal balance between readiness, 
performance, and cost? 
This paper outlines the fundamentals of successful Product Lifecycle Management (PLM), a 
method to monitor systems towards fulfilling the operational needs at the lowest possible total 
ownership cost (TOC). The paper discusses critical decision points in different phases of the 
system’s lifecycle and suggests an approach to use modeling and simulation tools to answer 
key questions and provide the required decision support. 
Introduction 
Today’s constraints on funding the acquisition of systems and their associated 
lifecycle support costs require a rigorous and consistent analytical process to ensure the 
systems and supporting processes provide capabilities that are worth the expenditures. 
These funding constraints come at a time when many of our systems are very mature and 
“war-weary.” This fact exacerbates an already complex decision environment. The decision 
environment evolves into a key question impacting our warfighter capabilities: How should 
the funding be distributed to achieve the optimal balance between readiness, performance, 
and cost? 
Key Points: Recent Department of Defense (DoD) policies and guidance make 
significant strides towards identifying and promoting broad-based Product Lifecycle 
Management (PLM) strategies to design, field, and sustain more affordable and ready 
warfighting capabilities. The practical implementation and institutionalization of these 
strategies, however, has not kept pace with available analysis capabilities. The most 
significant barriers to attaining the desired implementation and institutionalization of these 
strategies are 
• The deep-rooted divisions between systems engineering, lifecycle product support, and 
programmatic and cost functions; 
• Divergence between policy requirements and organizational business 
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strategies/investments in enterprise-wide lifecycle process and knowledge management; 
• Sustainment data from the many “stovepiped” information sources within each of the 
services/organizations that needs to be extracted, transformed, and loaded into a 
common information analytics data warehouse with other PLM data sources and 
capabilities; 
• The need for developing and employing a comprehensive “Big Data” strategy to use 
effectively the large volume of sustainment data and resolve the complexities involved 
with effective integration of this data; 
• A scarcity of competency and proficiency in structured analytics, business intelligence, 
lifecycle product support package design, PLM technologies, and reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and cost (RAM-C) trade studies. 
In addition, the complexity of the decision environment is increased by: 
• The potential cost growth of continuing to operate systems that have been significantly 
degraded by war fatigue or have had their original operational life extended many times; 
• The decreased budgets and increased costs to maintain systems ultimately leads to a 
realization that spreading budget cuts across every program is probably no longer a 
viable solution; 
• Early decisions regarding concepts, requirements, and choice of supplier will impact the 
total ownership cost (TOC) more than anything. 
This paper outlines the fundamentals of successful PLM, a method to monitor 
systems towards fulfilling the operational needs at the lowest possible TOC. The paper 
discusses critical decision points in different phases of the systems lifecycle and suggests 
an approach to use modeling and simulation tools to answer key questions and provide the 
required decision support. 
Advances in lifecycle modeling and simulation technologies have provided a 
significant opportunity for the DoD to address these complex issues. Lifecycle management 
(LCM) simulation tools and techniques have been developed to automate and modernize 
the collection, aggregation, measurement, and visualization of system and platform 
performance from the in-service engineering agent’s (ISEA’s) perspective, with potential for 
providing valuable information to the service components and to the acquisition community. 
These new technologies assist with the capture, retention, translation, and aggregation of 
numerous forms of structured data. There are numerous databases being used that perform 
just as many tasks, and the primary purpose is to aggregate their data. In some cases, tools 
can translate database data elements so that they are compatible with other databases’ 
data elements. Data translation then paves the way for data integration. Data aggregation 
and integration reveal data relationships not otherwise known to program managers and 
subject matter experts. 
Additionally, early decisions regarding concepts, requirements, and choice of 
supplier will impact the TOC more than anything else. Unfortunately, these decisions need 
to be made without exact knowledge about all influencing parameters. To make these kinds 
of decisions under major uncertainties calls for an efficient and systematic decision-making 
process, using modeling and simulation tools to analyze the consequences of the decisions. 
Figure 1 shows the basic data modeling and analysis process. 
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Supportability in the Design and Acquisition Phases 
From a customer and owner perspective, any system typically goes through several 
phases—starting with concept definition, specification, and acquisition; continuing with 
system design and development, production, entry to service, operations, and maintenance; 
and finally disposal. All through the lifecycle, a program or product manager needs to make 
a lot of decisions regarding the technical system, its operations and maintenance, and the 
logistic support. The important point here is that consequences of decisions made will not 
come in daylight until many years after a decision is made. That is the background to the 
classic characteristics of a lifecycle cost curve (LCC), shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
The green curve shows the actual expenditures (both CapEx and OpEx) for a system 
throughout its lifecycle. The red curve, however, describes when stakeholder(s’) decisions 
make them commit to the costs, which usually occur long before the actual expenditures. 
Figure 11 Data Modeling and Analysis Process 
Figure 12 Characteristics of a Lifecycle Cost Curve (LCC; Woulfe, n.d.) 
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Thus, their possibility to influence the TOC will decrease during the system´s lifecycle 
according to the blue curve. 
It is also important to point out that if decisions are made in later phases without 
analyzing the potential consequences on operational performance and lifecycle cost, there 
is a great risk that you commit to future cost increase. 
Cost–Benefit Assessment During Product Lifecycle 
When should replacement of fleet of systems take place? What requirements should 
be put on a new system? Which systems should be purchased? What investments in logistic 
support, spares, and other resources should be chosen? What improvements are most cost-
effective to make to enhance my operations? 
These are some examples of major questions for a system manager. They all require 
an understanding of what the consequences of the choices at hand will be on operational 
performance and total cost of ownership. The questions are complicated to answer since 
there are so many influencing parameters. Figure 3. illustrates the decision problem and the 
three main influencing domains. 
 
To be able to assess consequences of alternative solutions in a systematic and 
consistent way throughout the system’s lifecycle, there is a need to use an analytical 
approach supported by efficient decision support models—a combination of tools to assess 
different aspects of a decision. Typically, an optimization tool is used to identify the best 
logistic support solution from a cost effectiveness perspective and to optimize the spares 
assortment. A simulation tool is used to validate sustainability and ability to handle different 
scenarios and to dimension fleet size, personnel, repair equipment, and other resources. A 
cost calculation tool is used for LCC comparisons, identification of cost drivers, budgeting, 
and cost analysis. These tools work together as a suite to provide decision support for each 
type of decision and to help find the optimal trade-off between cost and availability. 
A general approach when working with LCM analyses includes the following: 
• Define a system and scope, the decision at hand, and the alternative solutions; 
• Define prerequisites and limitations for operations and maintenance; 
• Define influencing parameters and create a model; 
• Acquire input data, beginning with a rough data model; 
Figure 13 The Dimensions That Influence the Relationship Between Cost and 
Availability (Woulfe, n.d.) 
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• Validate the model and the data quality, and improve data that have significant 
impact on the decision at hand; 
• Perform analyses and evaluate the results; 
• Perform sensitivity analysis, identify drivers of cost and effectiveness, and iterate 
to find the best solution. 
 
As per Figure 4, in the early phases, stakeholder(s) make the major decisions, which 
will commit most of the future lifecycle costs. This means that it is in the early phases that 
stakeholder(s) need to put in most of the effort. Nevertheless, to achieve the availability 
performance and the lifecycle cost that the early decisions have made possible, 
stakeholder(s) need to carry on making decisions in a systematic way throughout the rest of 
the system’s lifecycle. Otherwise, there is a great risk that stakeholder(s) will suffer from 
uncontrollable increasing costs or poor availability performance. 
Managing decisions over the lifecycle with overall requirements and goals on macro 
level in focus, modeling detailed data on micro level is a true lifecycle management 
challenge.  
Sample Test Cases 
Case 1 Objective 
A power utility company wants to investigate and analyze if it would be cost effective 
to invest in the procurement of spare transformers. Additionally, they need to determine the 
storage location for each of the transformers to optimize operational availability (Ao) of the 
power plant and operational costs. 
Figure 14 Lifecycle Maintenance Analysis Capability (Woulfe, n.d.) 
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 Case 1 Sample Data 
The power utility company used the data in Figure 5: 
Parameter Description 
Power Plant Name of power plant 
Manufacture Manufacturer of transformer 
Apparent 
Power 
The magnitude of 
the complex power [VA] 
Voltage Ratio 
Max/Min 
Ratio between LV 




  Existing Spare 
Transformer 
If spare units exist 










case of spare 
Time duration 
required to replace if spares 
 Downtime in 
case of no spare 
Time duration 
required to replace if no 
  Expected 
annual gross margin of 
 
Expected gross 
margin per annum if no 
 
Figure 15 Available Transformer Data 
The data concerning downtimes with and without spare units, and the data 
concerning the expected margin, enabled the utility to assess what possible downtimes 
would imply in terms of lost profit. Together with the reliability data and the price of each 
transformer, the risk of losing profit could be evaluated against the risk mitigation of 
investing in spare units. 
Case 1 Methodology 
The utility used a spare part and logistic support optimization tool to model and 
analyze their transformer case. The basics of the methodology is depicted in Figure 6. 
This tool uses turnaround times, reliability, and price data together with other 
logistics, maintenance, and technical data to calculate the optimal assortment and allocation 
of spares from a system cost-efficiency perspective. 
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Figure 16 Overview of the Analysis Method (Andersson, 2015) 
The spare part and logistic support optimization tool generates a cost/effectiveness 
(C/E) curve that plots the spares investment against the availability of the whole system (i.e., 
the average availability of all transformers). Each point on the C/E curve represents the 
optimal sparing solution for a specific budget frame, and as one progresses to the right in 
the C/E curve, the spares investment increases as power utility company invests in more 
transformers. As a consequence of the larger spares investment, the resulting availability 
also increases. 
As the value of availability can differ between transformers in this case, the utility 
took advantage of the possibility to prioritize the plants in the model and used the expected 
annual gross margin as the priority factor in the input model. 
Once the C/E curve had been established, the utility extracted the availability for 
each transformer in the case and for each point on the curve. Together with the information 
about the expected annual gross margin, the C/E curve was modified to a risk versus 
investment curve. 
Case 1 Results 
Figure 7 shows how the investments in spares influence the lost profits due to 
downtime caused by transformer failures. Naturally, lost production, and hence lost 
revenues, decreases with higher investment levels in spare transformers. 
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Figure 17 Risk Versus Spares Investment (Andersson, 2015) 
The power utility company was interested in evaluating how many and which 
transformers could be economically motivated to purchase as spares. Therefore, the delta 
risk reduction was divided with each respective spares investment to create Figure 8. 
 
Figure 18 Delta Risk/Delta Investment (Andersson, 2015) 
In the plot in Figure 8, the dimensionless ratio between risk reduction in dollars and 
investment in dollars is depicted. If this ratio is below 1, the investment is inevitably not 
profitable. However, all ratios above 1 will not necessarily prove themselves profitable since 
there are some uncertainties built into the risk value. 
The power utility company opted to vary different input parameters (e.g. the failure 
frequencies of the transformers), in order to study the sensitivity of the results. Results from 
three scenarios with different failure rates are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 19 Delta Risk/Delta Investment at Different Failure Scenarios (Andersson, 2015) 
Properly investigating the sensitivity of the results was an integral part of the 
analysis. To find the absolute availability level was not the priority of the analysis, more so 
was formulating a short list of transformers to invest in. After evaluating the case in different 
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scenarios, the power utility company could select a ratio between risk reduction and spare 
investment with good judgment and formulate a short list of transformers for their investment 
program. 
Case 2 Objective 
Navy type commanders (TYCOM) want to make sure that all the ships pass their 
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections. Ships are typically notified 1 year 
prior to the conduct of this upcoming INSURV. What can the TYCOM do to mitigate the risks 
to the ships of failing an INSURV, and where should they focus their limited resources? 
Develop a statistical model to prioritize ship departments for focus of upcoming INSURV 
inspections. 
Case 2 Sample Data 
The TYCOM used the following data (see Table 1): 
Table 5 INSURV Data 
Parameter Description 
INSURV  Material Inspection (MI) Data 
3-M Maintenance Material Management Data 
Training Sets Prior INSURV MI data  
Case 2 Methodology 
Develop a statistical inspection model using binomial logistic regression using the 
following parameters: 
• Formula 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 + 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 1 
where 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) 
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 (𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐷𝐷) 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
−1 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 
• Training Set = InspectionDate ≤ 2016 (90 Inspections) 
• Test Set = InspectionDate > 2017(24 Inspections) 
• There is no equivalent R2 for logistic regression 
• McFadden R2 index (0.2–0.4 = excellent fit) 
• Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) area under curve (AUC) is a (preferred?) binary 
classifier performance measurement (1.0 is ideal) 
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Case 2 Results 
Figure 10 shows approximately 9 times out of 10 that the model correctly identified 
that a specific discrepancy will occur within this Anti-Submarine (AS) Department with a root 
cause (i.e., model is a realistic representation of predicting root causes). 
• R2 = 0.3534082 
• Fit versus actual accuracy = 0.888888888889 
• AUC = 0.8476919 
 
Figure 20 Model Fidelity Curve  
Figure 11 shows the probability the defect (Pd) will occur for a particular area on the 
ship. ELEX/CCA/MODULE component failure is rated the highest probable defect in the 
reliability area (A). This provides a heads-up to the TYCOM team for a particular 
discrepancy area prior to the actual inspection. They may ask the ship to conduct additional 
preventive maintenance in order to mitigate these issues. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has presented a tool-based methodology to enhance supportability. 
These models can be used for optimizing spares and predicting areas where failures can 
occur. 
By conducting the analysis, the customers will be better prepared to provide 
informed decisions. The methodology quantifies the risks. 
Moreover, the case presented in this paper shows how logistics modeling tools can 
be successfully employed and deliver fact-based results, also in cases with low failure 
frequency systems. 
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Abstract 
This research quantifies fragility within the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and translates 
it into supplier risk. The proposed model identifies systemically critical suppliers, where 
critically is characterized in terms of the supplier either being highly coupled within the 
industrial base, operating in a limited competition space, or owning a disproportionately large 
market share within a specific commodity. Each of these properties is quantified using 
centrality and community detection methods. By correctly assessing critical suppliers in the 
defense base, it allows for a methodical approach to addressing standard failure modes that 
typically result in material disruptions in advance of realizing interruptions. Quantifying fragility 
in supply chains based on systemic centrality and communities is a novel effort. Direct 
application of this process within the DIB fundamentally approaches assessing and 
strengthening our supply base resiliency in a completely different manner. 
Keywords: Defense Industrial Base, Fragility, Centrality, Community Detection, Systemic 
Risk  
Introduction 
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) comprises a massive network of suppliers 
who, in totality, offer the capabilities and capacities required to meet and sustain the 
demand for the raw material, components, subsystems, and end-item deliverable weapon 
systems. Government agencies have focused on quantifying multiple dimensions of supply 
base risk within the DIB. In general terms, risk in this context is the uncertainty of events that 
would disrupt the material flow or create system availability delays. The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has provided multiple reports to the House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services recommending quantification methodologies and practices to 
manage supply base risk within the DIB (GAO, 2017). There is a two-part challenge in 
undertaking the effective execution of supply chain risk management within this 
environment. First, the DIB is supporting a range of diverse products and technologies. 
Secondly, traditional supply-chain risk management approaches focus on programmatic 
impacts versus systemic impacts (Sinha et al., 2004). The Department of Defense (DoD) 
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Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP) quantifies Task Critical Assets (TCA) annually 
(DoD, 2008). For material considered defense-critical or task-critical by the DoD, the rough 
cost and schedule impact to requalify an unknown supply source is as high as $10 million 
and 9 months. 
To illustrate the challenges of criticality assessment and program-centric supplier risk 
focus, consider a sole-source of supply for precision machined parts. One of the critical risk 
characteristics the GAO identifies is sole source dependencies (only one qualified source). 
In this hypothetical scenario, suppose that our sole source of supply were to declare 
bankruptcy and immediately cease operations. Programmatic consequences manifest as 
unfavorable impacts to cost, schedule, or both. The first realized consequence manifests as 
a limitation of manufacturing at the system level to the material on-hand position. This 
degraded state persists until a qualified alternative source of supply can be established. The 
total impact will directly correlate with the material’s complexity and relative criticality to 
system-level operational requirements. Suppose this supply source is limited to a single 
program. In that case, the impact is limited to the cost and schedule associated with 
requalification. In this example, identifying criticality and risk consequence is program-facing; 
there is no accounting for more extensive dependencies or consequences within the DoD. 
In contrast, consider the same bankruptcy scenario with a tightly coupled supplier 
within the DIB, meaning multiple programs provide manufacturing demand to the supplier. 
Connecting demand amplifies the impact of supply loss across programs, prime contractors, 
defense agencies, and, ultimately, throughout an entire commodity (North American Industry 
Classification System [NAICS]). Government program offices have limited information on 
single sources of supply. This research provides a pragmatic approach to quantifying a 
supplier’s criticality within the DIB relative to its potential negative impact within the defense 
acquisition spectrum and utilizes network analysis to visualize and quantify dependencies 
within the DIB, translating them into system-risk measures. 
Literature Review 
Existing principles, practices, and analytic tools support this research and allow 
open-source spending data to characterize dependencies and connectedness and quantify 
fragility in terms of systemic risk. Doing so supports two novel approaches to assessing and 
strengthening our industrial base. First, this approach quantifies the growing dependencies 
within the industrial base, supporting risk management of items like obsolescence, capacity, 
and availability. Second, it allows for a meta-level view of the DIB that supports dynamic 
modeling and simulation of supplier failure propagation through the network (Meyer et al., 
2014). 
Fragility and System Risk Within the Defense Industrial Base 
We define fragility within the DIB’s context as the impact of a failing supplier on other 
suppliers, where failing is any disruption in material flow (availability or capacity). The 
current DIB is a fragile network, less conducive to competition, and challenged to scale 
quickly, grow, or innovate (Aviles & Sleeper, 2016). In this sense, fragility manifests as a 
common-mode failure where causal effects leading to failures propagate through the supply 
chain network. These common-mode failures can come from a range of realized impacts 
stemming from a range of macro forces impacting the DIB: reliance on sole-sourcing, 
uncertainty in defense budgets, and “bull-whip” demand cycles. These forces are quantified 
in terms of risk and realized as network fragility before the systemic disruption. Additionally, 
these forces are fundamental to creating uncertainty that stifles industry investment and 
growth (DoD, 2018). 
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While not ideal from a resiliency standpoint, supplier fragility does not directly 
quantify the respective supplier’s risk (Lambert & Cooper, 2000), which means being a 
critical supplier within the DIB is not necessarily a direct indication or a probability that the 
supplier may fail. However, tight coupling or high dependencies within the network are a 
way to characterize the consequence of a respective supplier failing, most notably in terms 
of material disruption. Disruptions in material flow represent systemic risk, where systemic 
risk is the uncertainty of DIB network disruption. Moreover, realized consequence is 
associated with the supply base being unable to perform at total capacity or efficiency. As 
stated, there is a shared failure mode associated with disruption; the consequences, 
however, map to multiple dimensions; fragility quantification must adequately discern these 
modes. In this view, the DIB is not dissimilar to a complex social network or a financial 
network. Understanding the potential influence of a supplier within a network is a viable 
strategy to both modernize the industrial base and ensure a continuous supply for Defense 
procurement. 
Traditional Network Analysis Applicability 
Quantifying critical firm financial network analysis provides a pragmatic and scalable 
approach for defining critical suppliers and dependencies in a supply chain. Jorge Chan-Lau 
(2018) offered a risk-dimension mapping framework to quantify systemic risk within a 
financial network. Chan-Lau suggested three dimensions: first, “too-connected-to-fail,” 
where a tightly coupled firm’s failure represented a risk to its neighboring firms; second, “too-
important-to-fail,” where failure represents a considerable impact, even if the system-wide 
impact is not significant; and finally, “too-big-to-fail,” where the firm has a disproportionally 
large share of the systemic activities (Chan-Lau, 2018). This proposed architecture aligns 
well to supply chain mapping, as within the DIB supply chain, there is a range of highly 
connected, niche capability or massive suppliers.  
Characterization of Supply Chain Risk 
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) relates to the strategic management 
approach of risks, issues, and opportunities impacting a supply chain based on an 
organizational approach to assessing a respective event’s potential consequences (Hallikas, 
2004). SCRM directly leverages risk management tools in collaboration with supply chain 
professionals, both internally and externally. They focus on translating uncertainties of 
logistic and material flow efforts, material availability, or resources into an actionable plan for 
execution. Supply chain networks are inherently complex and dynamic; therefore, SCRM 
frameworks focus on providing effective risk management over a broad operational 
environment. Fundamentally, SCRM is the principle that an enterprise needs to prevent 
material disruptions throughout its entire supply base or supply chain. Critical measures of 
effectiveness are a systematic means to identify potential disruption sources, an enterprise 
approach to be an assessment of internal supply chain risks as well as an assessment of 
supplier or sub-tier supplier risk, assigned cognizant supply chain professionals managing 
identified risk, and, finally, the systematic means for continuous monitoring of disruptions or 
disruption sources (Blackhurst et al., 2008). 
By definition, a supply chain inherently relies on connected critical providers, 
knowledge points, or handoffs, where a failure within the chain disrupts its coupled partner. 
In each respective reliance, uncertainty manifests as vulnerability; SCRM reduces 
vulnerability throughout a supply chain’s entire value stream (Hallikas, 2004). Supply chain 
risk exists in multiple dimensions: natural disasters, raw material shortages, market forces, 
distribution challenges, or product or part technical maturity. This broad range of risks 
translates into a considerable exposure position that scales with the enterprise’s size and 
complexity (Finch, 2004). SCRM typically incorporates the following processes as part of the 
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risk management framework: identification, assessment, mitigation, acceptance, and 
monitoring of supply chain risks (Chopra & Meindl, 2009). It is a relatively heterogeneous 
literature base for SCRM, and the majority rely on traditional risk measures to influence 
action that can improve the agility or robustness of a supply chain. Supply chain agility is the 
speed an enterprise can react with should disruption or threat emerge within the supply 
base.  
Quantifying this measure is the manufacturing lead time for supplier material, where 
minimizing the make-span or procurement-span for the material is optimal. Also included in 
supply chain agility is the responsiveness to changing to market needs, where an 
organizational goal is to build a supply base capable of transition to a different or modified 
material solution without impacting delivery reliability. Supply chain robustness shares some 
similarities with supply chain agility, where the notable delta is not an organization’s ability to 
adapt but rather the quantified incurred disruption of a singular event. In a robust supply 
chain, when a change occurs, the supply base inherently provides more time to plan a 
course of action. Additionally, a supply chain’s robustness measures a supply chain’s ability 
to carry out its functions in a degraded state. Using a major natural disaster as an example 
of a disruptor, if an impacted supply base can maintain deliveries without a strategic shift in 
execution, it would be fair to say that the base was robust and not impacted by a singular 
event. 
Quantification of supply chain risk is the product of a consequence in terms of an 
event’s cost impact or material disruption incurring schedule increase compared against the 
event’s likelihood. Like traditional risk management approaches, this product approach 
prioritizes and characterizes the risk and opportunity spectrum (Hubbard, 2009). This 
approach is the most popular methodology for quantifying risk, both within a supply chain 
and in the broader sense of risk management. Regardless of this approach’s debatable 
effectiveness, it is, as stated, widely accepted within supply chain professional organizations 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). 
Factors likely to disrupt a supplier, product, program, or service establish risk 
archetypes; these archetypes help suggest the likelihood of impact realization (Outdot, 
2010). Traditional supply chain measures supporting this quantification are a supplier’s 
financial viability, operational capacity or expertise, or a quantifiable supplier resiliency 
score. Additionally, certifications provided by compliance organizations such as ISO or the 
National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program (NADCAP) indicate a 
low likelihood of an adverse event occurring via a supplier’s successful acquisition 
retainment of certification. Finally, quantification of supply chain risk in customer value is 
germane in industry practice, where the primary measure is on-time delivery and order 
correctness. Supply chains with risk in a customer value dimension manage threats 
associated with procuring the wrong or defective products within their demand portfolio 
(Nishat, 2006). This risk dimension aligns with traditional measures of quality management 
systems: defects per unit, the accuracy of an order, or rework cycles (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). 
Centrality and Community Measures of Criticality 
Provided a sufficiently complex network exists, there will inherently be relationships 
of either highly connected nodes or tightly coupled nodes within a localized area (Newman, 
2008). The well-defined principles and power laws that support these concepts stem from 
social network analysis and are both long-standing and proven (Bonacich, 1987). There is a 
nearly endless amount of research available where the application of centrality measures 
supports critical nodes or vertices identification within a network for a range of practical 
purposes, most notably the continued evolution of the use case of modeling influence in a 
social network (Wang & Street, 2015). Beyond social networks, these methods are in use in 
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biology research to identify critical species in pollination communities (González et al., 
2010), in health research to assess associations between measures of network centrality 
and health in a retirement community (Schafer, 2011), and within the financial industry to 
identify and assess the risk of financial firms (Chan-Lau, 2018). The common link in each 
application’s approach is a need to understand the network’s relationships that support the 
characterization of node importance or insignificance. 
Centrality and community indices directly answer what is fundamentally important to 
a node, vertex, or network. The output is a tangible function providing real-values for node 
and flow importance concerning the analyzed network. As stated previously, the word 
“importance” can relate to a range of actual definitions based on the analysis’s intent. Two 
general categories of “importance” have been proposed (Vivas et al., 2019). First, centrality 
indices reflecting network flow are critical nodes predicated on the classification of centrality 
based on the flow considered vital to a network (Opsahl et al., 2010). As an example, in 
financial network analysis, this is the amount of money flowing from firm to firm, where the 
out-strength of a node reflects direct spend or transfer of funds, and the in-strength 
represents receipt or acceptance of funds (Chan-Lau, 2018). This example results in the 
quantification of node importance in a minimum of two dimensions, dependency on money 
distribution (out) and the total holdings or receipts (in). Second, “importance” can be 
measured in terms of the coupling of nodes within a network. For example, in the modeling 
of pollination generalist species of plants, a tightly coupled sub-network of nodes increases 
the probability of cross-pollination among the subsets (Alvarez-Socorro et al., n.d.). 
Leveraging Centrality and Community to Quantify Systemic Risk 
As a novel approach to quantifying risk, vulnerabilities, and imbalances within the 
DIB, this research proposes that centrality and community measures provide critical insight 
into two macro forces threatening a supply chain. First, connectedness-based risk rankings 
quantify systemic risk. Second, community measures quantify fragility. A supplier can be 
both systemically risky and fragile. In this paper, the following arguments establish systemic 
risk, fragility, and imbalance: systemic risk directly relates to a supplier’s criticality within a 
supply chain network. A supplier with more influence carries a more significant negative 
impact on the overall network in the event of a disruption; it is, therefore, more systemically 
risky than a weakly-connected supplier. Fragility indicates vulnerability or the lack of supply 
chain network robustness (Perera et al., 2018). Larger communities with more outstanding 
overall systemic dependencies illustrate vulnerability within the supply chain network. 
Finally, imbalance represents disproportional levels of both risk and fragility for both 
commodities and suppliers.  
In the remaining sections of the paper, Methodology details the network creation and 
structure and the applicability of specific centrality measures and community, thereby 
providing acquisition agencies with lower sub-tier visibility regardless of program or 
procurement authority. Results uses Aircraft NAICS as a use-case to apply network 
analysis; this analysis supports a key research objective of detecting, evaluating, and 
characterizing supply base threats capable of disrupting material availability. Lastly, 
Conclusions presents the conclusions of this research, with the intent that through further 
modeling and via a coupled methodical supplier development approach, a more resilient and 
responsive DIB can be developed. 
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Methodology 
This section briefly describes the methods utilized to calculate centrality measures 
and assess modularity to support community identification.20 Systemically critical suppliers 
exist as highly linked nodes throughout the network (central nodes), tightly coupled links 
within neighboring nodes (community nodes), or a state where the supplier is both central 
and tightly bound within a community. 
Data Aggregation and Network Structure 
This research is limited to unclassified, open-source acquisition data; no prime 
generated or propriety data is within the analysis. Therefore, the analysis is subject to 
contractor reporting accuracy for material spend disclosed per the Federal Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA). The FFATA requires that any federal 
contract, grant, loan, and other financial assistance awards of more than $25,000 are on a 
publicly accessible and searchable website. Data reporting is limited to first-tier suppliers; 
subcontract award information contains awardee, DUNS information, parent company 
information, award date, program usage, and material type. The provided illustrations show 
the type of data and views available from open-source government data for Army Missile 
Procurement (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, 2021). 
 
 
Figure 22. Spending Over Time (Fiscal Year [FY] 2017+ Army Missiles) 
 




20 Underlying math foundations are provided as references. 
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Defense programs or NAICS commodities facilitate the analysis of relations between 
objects. Our vertices or nodes will represent the following organizations procuring agencies, 
prime contractors, and subcontractors (reference Figure 3). Edges will communicate both 
the existence of a relationship and a directed path or flow of acquisition dollars. Reference 
Figure 4 for an example of the visualization output. 
 
 




Figure 25. FY2019 Army Missile Procurement Visualization 
Centrality (Node Level) 
Centrality measures allow for identifying systemically critical suppliers in the supplier 
base; nodes reflect specific contractors and sub-contractors, node size reflects the centrality 
score, and color of the node reflects segregated communities’ subsystems. Table 1 
summarizes measures of centrality. Degree in this context is a local measure; the DIB 
financial network requires a global view of the supplier’s connections. Alternative centrality 
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measures are required to characterize systemically critical suppliers within the defense 
network correctly.  
Table 6. Measures of Centrality 
Item Basis Measure DIB Applicability Source 
Degree 
Importance score 
based on the number 




In-degree and out-degree 
measures to better 






The number of times 
a node lies on the 






indicates critical suppliers 
that are highly active 




Time required  
to spread information 
from a node to the 






Suppliers with high 
closeness centrality levels 
support mitigation of the 
impacts arising from 







relative strength or 
influence over other 





propagation of failure tied 








within the network, 
but PageRank also 
considers link 
direction and weight 
Node 
Influence 
The extent of failure 
propagated through a 
community of suppliers or 
across a commodity 
Page, 1999 
 
Communities (Network Level) 
While centrality measures provide insight on systemically critical suppliers, the 
complexity and size of a macro-view of defense procurement requires an approach capable 
of accurately decomposing highly interconnected nodes into communities. Doing so 
supports the quantification of fragility in the multiple dimensions in which it can exist. The 
usage of community detection allows for analysis of tightly coupled suppliers, further 
facilitating quantification of likely common failure-mode points within the network. As the 
applicability of centrality measures, multiple methodologies of community detection are 
germane in network science. Table 2 shows some of these community measures. 
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Table 7. Measures of Community 
Item Basis Measure DIB Applicability Source 
Network 
Diameter 
Edge count of the 




of local community 
authority or the lack of 










Higher density indicates 












agency, or prime 





The strength of the 
allocation of subsystems 




structure within an 






Reference Figure 5 for an overview of the applied risk framework. This graph depicts 
relative community strength on the x-axis, where a higher assigned score represents a more 
substantial connected supplier. EigenCentrality scores compose the y-axis, indicating a 
supplier’s strength or influence over other nodes in the network. Finally, the supplier node 
size represents a function of its relative community ranking and its overall authority within 
the network combined with the supplier’s weighted indegree. Leveraging Centrality and 
Community to Quantify Systemic Risk proposed systemic risk, which is a risk to the overall 
supply chain network’s efficiency or effectiveness, which could be determined using total 
supply-base influence measures. Two forms of risk are present: (1) the local criticality of a 
supplier, where subsequent supplier risk can be further defined using traditional defense 
industrial risk measures (reference Table 3) and (2) the systemic risk a node presents within 
its overall network or community. 
 
Figure 26. Mapping Risk to Centrality and Community 
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Four distinct zones form using this analysis technique. First is High-Systemic Risk 
and Low-Systemic Fragility; suppliers in this zone would carry considerable network 
influence but would have a lower strength of connection or community impact; this zone 
should be free of qualifying nodes, as a weakly connected supplier should not be supported 
with a high influence ranking. Second is Low-System Risk and Low Systemic-Fragility; 
suppliers in this zone would reflect both lower influence and community coupling, meaning 
they pose a low systemic threat; however, they carry considerable quantified local risk; as 
an example, prime contractors tend to appear here; they carry a disproportionally large total 
of spend with low in-strength. While these nodes are generally more central, nodes 
identified with more significant risk are more systemic. Third is High-Systemic Risk and 
High-Systemic Fragility; these suppliers are considered imbalanced; they are critical to the 
network from a community perspective; they also carry significant systemic risk. Additionally, 
their influence and in-degree can establish local risk. Fourth is Low-Systemic Risk and High-
Systemic Fragility; these suppliers represent the absence of network robustness. 
These measures are relative to the scope of the network analysis completed. For 
example, the Department of the Army spending analysis will result in a different set of 
identified risk, fragility, and imbalance than the same analysis focused on Department of the 
Navy spending. Moreover, the combination of both agencies will again shift quantification 
and output. Furthermore, analyzing modules or communities within an analysis will provide a 
different set of focus suppliers. This dynamic nature is critical for correctly identifying the 
specific threats for a cognizant program office or prime contractor and understanding the 
overlapping or shared risk.  
Mapping Risk to Traditional Supply Chain Risk Areas 
It is reasonable to leverage centrality and community measures against traditional 
risk areas. Table 3 provides GAO-identified risk areas threatening the DIB (GAO, 2018). By 
selecting node level measures with known supply chain network implications, further 
evaluation of systemically risky or fragile suppliers is achievable in terms of their local risk 
factors. 
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As an example, reference Figure 6. This subset view of suppliers shows suppliers 
with the least betweenness centrality while still holding system risk. Closeness centrality is 
critical to the effectiveness of the supply chain in the presence of a degraded state or 
inaccurate demand planning (Perera et al., 2018); these detractors contribute to the “bull-
whip” effect in supply chains (Xu et al., 2014). In our provided view, these are essentially 
critical suppliers within the network with limited or nonexistent closeness measures. They 
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cannot share total demand and are therefore risk considerations for traditional concerns like 
sole sourcing, limited capacity, or loss of skill or equipment. 
 
Figure 27. Network Measures Translated Into Sole-Source Risk 
The following section provides the application of these processes. They show the use of 
the methods outlined as they relate to Aircraft manufacturing in FY2020. The output of this 
analysis will be the identification of systemic risk, fragility, and imbalance within the supply 
base. 
Results 
Application: FY2020 NAICS – Aircraft Manufacturing 
This analysis evaluated roughly $25 billion in disclosed spend. Key prime contractors 
were BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon Technologies. NAICS analysis was limited to 
the following codes and their respective titles: Aircraft Manufacturing (336411), Aircraft 
Engine and Engine Part Manufacturing (336412), and Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment 
Manufacturing (336413). As a commodity, this represents deliverable items such as air 
vehicles, gas turbines, engine components, avionic subsystems, and engineering services. 
The primary procuring agencies are of the DoD, provided as follows in order of out-degree: 
Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, Defense Logistics Agency, 
Department of the Army, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 257 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 28. FY2020 NAICS Aircraft Supplier Network 
Per Figure 7, the node’s size reflects the network EigenCentrality score, conveying 
suppliers with network influence. The assigned node color indicates a subsystem within the 
network, and these are an output of the analysis of network modularity. Assigned modularity 
aligns with either a principal prime contractor, a specialized commodity provider with limited 
direct competitors (notable examples: sand castings, energetic materials, solid-state rocket 
motors), or a family of parent-company–owned sub-contract suppliers. As an example of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries driving communities, the suppliers United Technologies, Parker 
Hannifin, Aerojet, and L3 essentially build independent sub-tier mapping communities.  
Aircraft Centrality Measures 
Centrality for each supplier is quantified in four different measures: weighted degree, 
closeness, eigenvector centrality, and PageRank. These outputs provide the basis for 
fragility assessment; they inherently communicate the network’s criticality based on a critical 
node’s impact. The consequence in these terms is relative to the overall network versus a 
specific program or contractor; impact by a prime contractor can, however, directly map to 
an individual program. Table 4 summarizes the overlap of centrality-based network 
measures representing the systemic risk of sub-tier suppliers relative to the overall NAIC 
Aircraft supply base. 
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Table 9. Fragility Assessment Overlap (Centrality) 
 
 
When looking at the overlap of measures, suppliers’ composition should draw attention 
to prime contractors’ dependencies within the network. Table 5 shows the top 10 
overlapping suppliers for this network. 
Table 10. Top 10 Overlapping Suppliers (Aircraft NAIC FY2020) 
SUPPLIER NAME MODULARITY CLASS 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 92 
LEONARDO SPA 92 
EATON CORPORATION PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 92 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION 92 
BOEING COMPANY, THE 92 
AMETEK INC. 92 
L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 93 
Transdigm Group Incorporated 93 
HEICO CORPORATION 93 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION 122 
 
The presence of crucial prime contractors results from their weighted degree per the 
analysis provided in Table 4. In this example, suppliers like United Technology, Boeing, and 
Northrop Grumman are sub-contracts to prime spending. Their complete failure concerning 
the network (e.g., bankruptcy) is improbable. Overlapping firms carry the highest overall 
fragility or concern. Their respective modularity classifications convey the interdependencies 
that exist. These suppliers are not only critical to the performance of the supply chain 
network but are also highly dependent on each other. Traditional monitoring methods and 
assignment of fragility, criticality, or risk based on total monetary spend, whether it be by 
program or supplier, are insufficient to characterize total industry fragility. 
Expanding on the measurement intent outlay provided within the Methodology 
section, consider the following: The discernible differences in identified suppliers indicate 















































Weighted Degree 8 8 2 6 Weighted Degree 17 16 5 13
Betweenness 27 10 4 10 Betweenness 41 25 4 20
Closeness 26 45 5 10 Closeness 45 68 5 23
PageRank 6 6 5 3 PageRank 9 7 6 6
Eigen Centrality 25 28 28 6 Eigen Centrality 31 28 28 7
Weighted Degree 80% 80% 20% 60% Weighted Degree 68% 64% 20% 52%
Betweenness 54% 100% 40% 100% Betweenness 41% 100% 16% 80%
Closeness 52% 90% 50% 100% Closeness 45% 68% 20% 92%
PageRank 12% 12% 10% 30% PageRank 9% 7% 6% 24%
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that different centrality measures indicate that dimensions of fragility exist for supply chain 
networks by lumping measures together or looking myopically at total spending hides 
suppliers with considerable network influence. Table 6 provides a conceptual approach to 
matching dimensional fragility measures with traditional supply base risk measures.  
Table 11. Centrality Based Fragility Mapped to Systemic Risk Drivers 
Measure Fragility Dimension Systemic Risk Drivers 
Weighted Degree Primarily parent companies, or direct 
subcontract award to major prime 
contractors. The network is 
dependent on forecasted demand 
• Demand Uncertainty 
• Budget Uncertainty 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
Betweenness Composed of “bridge suppliers,” this 
model moves to the first tier of the 
prime contractor supplier spend. As 
an effect, these are primarily parent 
suppliers or familiar sources of supply 
for generic material (electronic 
components, fasteners) 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Single Sources of 
Supply 
Closeness Relatively high overlap of closeness 
and weighted degree indicates that 
the network’s agility or speed 
depends on large tier suppliers. 
Respective capabilities and capacities 
should facilitate shorter paths through 
the network. 
• Limited production 
capacity 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
PageRank The PageRank algorithm consistently 
highlights influential suppliers outside 
of the top spend. 
• Obsolete Items 
• Financial Viability of 
Suppliers 
• Sole sourcing 
• Loss of skill or 
equipment 
EigenCentrality They are highly coupled or connected 
suppliers within the network; their 
dependencies cross over programs, 
procuring agencies, and even 
commodities. 
• Limited production 
capacity 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Loss of skill or 
equipment 
• Financial viability 
• Sole source 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Risk 
The suppliers listed in Table 7 carry the highest systemic risk within this commodity 
code. The EigenCentrality measure dictates the supplier (displayed in Figure 8). There is a 
range of technical capability provisions listed, and this suggests critical suppliers across a 
broad spectrum of provided solutions. The influence of these suppliers propagates through 
the supply chain network. Their disruption impacts parent companies, prime contractors, and 
coupled procurement agencies. It is important to note that these suppliers share community 
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measures; Aircraft Supply Chair Network – Systemic Module Risk describes the impacts to 
systemic risk at a community level. 
 
Table 12. Top 10 Systemic Risk Suppliers 
SUPPLIER NAME PROVISION 
GOODRICH CORPORATION Lighting Systems, Actuation, and Control 
HAMILTON CORPORATION Propulsion Systems, Flight Control Systems 
COBHAM INC. Antenna, Electronic Subsystem, RAD-Hard 
AMI INDUSTRIES, INC. Emergency evacuation systems, Seating systems, 
Life rafts 
B/E AEROSPACE, INC. Structures 
INTERTRADE LIMITED Recertified airframe and engine parts 
EXOTIC METALS FORMING LLC Engine ducting and exhausts 
L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. R.F. equipment, Data Link Communication 
WESCAM INC Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance 




Figure 29. Aircraft Systemic Risk Visualization 
 
 Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Module Risk 
A crucial module or communities that formed within the network centered around 
United Technologies Corporation (UTC). UTC is a parent company within this analysis; the 
basis for this community is derived from the material acquisition across NAICS either directly 
to UTC or one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries. While the complete list of suppliers will not 
result in a complete module composed of UTC subsidiaries, Table 8 provides a list of the top 
10 systemically risky suppliers within the module. This analysis provides a supply chain 
manager insight into critical dependencies within a community. More notably, this analysis 
supports further risk characterization based on the supplier’s authority and valuation (size of 
the node); reference Figure 9.  
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Table 13. Systemic Risk - Module Analysis 
SUPPLIER NAME PARENT COMPANY 
HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
GOODRICH CORPORATION UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
Rockwell Collins, Inc. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
AMI INDUSTRIES, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
B/E AEROSPACE, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
INTERTRADE LIMITED UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
GOODRICH ACTUATION SYSTEMS SAS UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
ROSEMOUNT AEROSPACE INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
J. A. REINHARDT & CO., INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 
GOODRICH LIGHTING SYSTEMS, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
CORPORATION 




Figure 30. Systemic Risk - Module Analysis 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Fragility 
Table 9 lists top identified suppliers as a function of their authority and relative 
component strength measure. These represent weak points in the supply chain network. 
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They are network vulnerabilities with the general implication that there is no ready-made set 
of alternative sourcing options. 
 
Table 14 – Top 10 Systemic Fragility Suppliers 
SUPPLIER NAME PROVISION 
ACME EMBEDDED SOLUTIONS Ruggedized Computing 
Systems 
SIERRA ALLOYS COMPANY Titanium Manufacturing 
PERILLO INDUSTRIES, INC. Power Subsystems 
FIBREFORM ELECTRONICS, INC. Precision Machining 
TORAY ADVANCED COMPOSITES ADS, LLC Composite Materials 
S&L AEROSPACE METALS, LLC Structural Machining 
RIVERSIDE MACHINE & ENGINEERING, INC. Precision Machining 
MICROWAVE DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES, INC. Waveguide Components 
ADVANCED CONVERSION TECHNOLOGY, INC. Power Subsystems 
BOEDEKER PLASTICS, INC. Molded Plastics 
 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Imbalance 
Given the massive nature of this supply chain network, narrowing systemic risk and 
fragility to each category’s top 10 drivers is less than ideal for taking a pragmatic approach 
to improving the base’s robustness. The concept of imbalance introduced in the Literature 




Figure 31. Aircraft NAICS - Imbalance Assessment 
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In Aircraft manufacturing, the following sub commodities are systemically risky and 
fragile: titanium manufacturing and forging, engine component manufacturing, structures, 
and precision machining. The suppliers providing this material share similar network 
influence measures and are primarily shared sources of supply regardless of the prime 
contractor, consequently resulting in a disproportional (imbalanced) amount of total spend 
distribution and, consequently, network criticality assignment. This analysis augmented with 
targeted supplier development efforts would both highlight and make mitigation activities 
actionable. These are critical points within the supply base that could be augmented with 
direct investment in capabilities, training, and long-term demand stabilization or additional 
suppliers developed to build redundancy in the overall network. 
Conclusions 
We have presented a detailed approach for leveraging centrality and community 
measures to quantify systemic risk, vulnerability, and imbalance in defense supply chain 
networks. This approach evaluates defense procurement supply-base resiliency by 
commodity, program execution office, or overarching defense procurement agency. As a 
result, the following three objectives and their conclusions are as follows: First, systemic risk 
is quantified using centrality measures to identify the most critical nodes within the network. 
A supplier with more influence carries a more significant negative impact on the overall 
network in the event of disruption and is, therefore, more systemically risky. Second, DIB 
fragility is quantified using community measures; facilitating identification of communities 
with more significant overall systemic dependencies illustrates vulnerability within the supply 
chain network. Third, imbalance represents disproportional levels of both risk and fragility in 
both specific commodities and suppliers. 
To illustrate the application of these concepts, an FY2020 view of Aircraft manufacturing 
was provided. This analysis addressed 80,000+ records of subcontract procurement for 
material ranging from fasteners to avionic subsystems. This visualization facilitated the 
identification of suppliers in terms of systemic risk and fragility in the following technical 
areas: power subsystems, structures, forgings, microwave components, and electronic 
components. Furthermore, a novel approach to quantifying traditional risk measures using 
centrality and community detection was proposed, highlighting sole source risks within a 
network. 
By leveraging network analysis principles and practices, we have demonstrated how 
application within the DIB can differentiate supplier criticality. Future work will refine supplier 
risk measures and integrate trend analysis to quantify industry contraction or expansion by 
commodity. Additionally, a dynamic version of this modeling application is in work, 
supporting modeling and simulation of the DIB to quantify the consequences of systemic 
failures further.  
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Abstract 
In acquisition planning and management, all information needs to be considered to ensure 
the successful execution of a project. Key pieces of information, with high data quality, must 
be used for accurate risk management that requires a good understanding and quick 
identification of the potential factors that might affect a program. This paper investigates 
effective data science techniques for a quick identification of high risks posed by natural 
disasters to a supply/production chain. The paper proposes a tool for helping a project 
manager analyze the integrity of a supply chain and find alternative potential contractors in 
lower risk areas. We focus on assessing the risks related to natural disasters at a contractor’s 
location, business type, and business relationships and networks. The system described here 
seeks to first identify critical contractors based on the natural disaster risk of the places they 
perform their main activity for a contract and the uniqueness of their business types. Second, 
we design a risk assessment framework and a visualization framework that enable an 
acquisition expert to assess a project’s risk by identifying contractors that may become critical 
and require additional redundancy. The visualization tool also can be used to determine 
additional potential subcontractors that are located in lower risks areas of the country.  
Key words: visualization dashboard, data analytics, risk assessment, natural disasters 
Introduction 
The goal of this work is to assess and assign the risk level of a contractor based on 
its location and business properties. We built a tool to help identify alternative contractors for 
the high-risk ones. In addition to designing a risk assessment framework, our work relies on 
visualization tools to enable an acquisition expert to assess a program’s risk by identifying 
the potential of failure for various contractors. Our approach also allows an expert to 
compare multiple acquisition programs to identify whether the same contractors or the same 
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high-risk geographic areas occur in more than one project, thus becoming a single potential 
point of failure or delay for multiple programs. 
Assessing the natural disaster risk of an area is a challenging task because multiple 
metrics and dimensions must be considered for a comprehensive picture. National Centers 
for Environmental Information (NCEI) has been collecting natural disaster data for each U.S. 
county since 1950. The data cover a wide range of natural disasters, including flood, 
tornado, hurricane, blizzard, high wind, flash flood, hail, dust storm, and so on. However, 
there is no standard way to categorize a disaster by its intensity and damage level. Even 
though some disaster types, such as tornadoes and hurricanes, do have a categorization 
system for their intensity, it is often difficult to assess an incident’s impact to the local 
communities without other supporting information. Furthermore, it is hard to compare the 
impacts of different disaster types. One challenge of this study is to identify appropriate 
techniques to categorize the severity levels of natural disasters. New data sources will be 
researched to complement the NECI data for a better risk categorization system. One 
possible source is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which can provide 
information about the recovery efforts after a natural disaster strikes. 
Critical contractors are those who provide unique products and services or have 
some special characteristics so that if they failed, it would be hard to find alternatives to fill 
their roles. Critical contractors could be a weak link in a supply chain, and their early 
identification will help the project manager control the risks effectively. The study will 
leverage the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code along with other 
business information for identifying the critical contractors.  
NAICS is the standard used by federal agencies to describe the business 
specialization of a company (Office of Management and Budget, 2017). A NAICS code can 
be attached to many products and many companies, and so it can be used to identify 
potential alternative contractors for a program or a collection of programs. Because there 
might be many companies with the same NAICS code, to effectively identify critical 
contractors, acquisition experts may need to find more business-related information using 
the Internet or a data science–based tool such as the business risk indicators by Gill et al. 
(2019) or the Internet text processing framework by Wu et al. (2018). 
We considered two case studies to demonstrate our framework. The first one 
focused on https://www.fpds.gov/ and extracted places of performance for various types of 
business used by the Navy over a period of 10 years. The second case study focused on 
awards with a high number of contractors in high-risk areas. These data were extracted from 
historical records from a data set we built based on https://www.usaspending.gov/. Based 
on the natural disaster risk assessment framework we developed, each U.S. county is 
assigned a risk level of high, medium, or low, depending on the historical NCEI weather data 
of the area as well as the FEMA assistance programs that had been utilized in the past. 
Then, the database was searched for contracts with a high percentage of contractors 
located in the high-risk areas. Contracts with a high concentration of risky contractors are 
prone to fail and thus require an effective risk management plan. One approach to reducing 
the overall risk of a contract is to replace high-risk contractors with low-risk ones. 
The technique we present here allows an expert to find projects with a high number 
of contractors in high-risk areas. Once that has been accomplished, we provide two 
mechanisms for an expert to find possible alternative contractors. One is to find 
geographical areas with low risk of natural disasters and where there is a concentration of 
industries that could provide products and services for a given project. The second is to find 
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actual contractors that have been involved in federal awards and are in areas with low 
disaster risks, regardless of the concentration of related industries.  
Related Work  
Previously, policy-makers and researchers have recognized the need to employ data 
as a multifaceted means of increasing the agility of the acquisition process (Krzysko & 
Baney, 2012). To this end, research has looked at automatic means of dealing with the 
heterogeneous acquisition data sources from text processing (Zhao et al., 2015), systems 
engineering (Cilli et al., 2015), and business (Gaither, 2014) perspectives. Our paper is 
different both in content and in approach—in content in that we rely on big data to identify 
hidden risk factors, and in the approach in that our expertise in information visualization, 
data quality, data governance and policy (chief data officers), and in data science provides a 
value-based perspective. 
Gill et al. (2019) took a step further and employed data science techniques to 
determine a model that would assist an expert in source-selection decisions. Using a set of 
decision forests approaches, they distilled a number of risk indicators to predict which 
contractors are most likely to succeed in their federal contract obligations. Their method also 
uses publicly available data, but it focuses primarily on the financial and business aspects of 
the contractors. Our approach seeks to include natural disaster risk into the risk analysis 
model. 
Tudoreanu et al. (2018) investigated employment data in an attempt to correlate 
changes in employment with negative modifications to contracts. Such correlations can be 
exploited to infer hidden and undisclosed contractors that are part of the defense acquisition 
network. Hidden contractors may pose the risk of becoming a weak stress point of a project 
and would affect the overall outcome of the project.  
Wu et al. (2018) proposed a framework based on data science approach that aims to 
utilize the online information to assess and improve acquisition database quality as well as 
to find the hidden patterns to further acquisition research. The main component of the 
framework is a web-search and text mining module, whose main function is to search the 
internet and identify the most credible and accurate information online. 
Apte et al. (2016) explored the use of big data analytics techniques to explore and 
analyze large data sets that are used to capture information about Department of Defense 
(DoD) services acquisitions. The paper described how big data analytics could potentially be 
used in acquisition research. As the proof of concept, the paper tested the application of big 
data analytic techniques by applying them to a data set of Contractor Performance 
Assessment Report System (CPARS) ratings of 715 acquired services. It also created 
predictive models to explore the causes of failed services contracts. Since the data set used 
in the research was rather small and far from the scope of big data, the techniques explored 
by the paper mainly focus on traditional data mining techniques without taking into account 
big data properties.  
Black et al. (2014) studied the quality of narratives in CPARS and their value to the 
acquisition process. The research used statistical analysis to examine 715 Army service 
contractor performance reports in CPARS in order to understand three major questions: (1) 
To what degree are government contracting professionals submitting to CPARS contractor 
performance narratives in accordance with the guidelines provided in the CPARS user’s 
manual? (2) What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives beyond the 
value of the objective scores for performance? (3) What is the statistical relationship 
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between the sentiment contained in the narratives and the objective scores for contractor 
evaluations? 
Previous Research Results 
This paper builds upon the natural disaster risk model by Wu et al. (2020), and we 
review the main points here. A natural disaster risk was calculated by integrating two 
sources to data, NCEI and FEMA. Weather data of all U.S. counties between the years 
1950 and 2018 from https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/ and natural disaster assistance data from 
https://www.fema.gov/ covering 1953 to 2020 was used to create a weighted disaster score 
(WDS). That score uses the declared assistance programs to assess a natural disaster’s 
intensity and damage level. The score itself is then analyzed and simplified to a three-level 
scale—namely high, medium, and low—based on the distribution of the WDS. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of risk levels both geographically and by location of federal contractor. 
 
 
Figure 1. Natural Disaster Risk Level (Low, Medium, High), Displayed Geographically (Top) 




21 The index takes into count both the number of occurrences of disasters and their magnitude. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 270 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Research Results 
The work presented in this paper can be broken down into three main thrusts:  
• Find awards with a large number of contractors in high-risk areas; 
• Show alternative areas that have the desired industrial concentration, industry type, 
and lower natural disaster risk level; 
• Show alternative individual contractors that are of the desired industry type and 
satisfy other geographical requirements a project might have. 
All of these are meant to provide an acquisition expert the ability to assess the risk 
posed by natural disasters to a project or a set of projects. Furthermore, our goal is to also 
assist an expert in selecting alternative subcontractors in order to mitigate delays and 
failures posed by natural disasters. 
 Determine Projects with a Large Number of Contractors in High-Risk Area 
The framework we propose is to maintain a database with the information from NCEI 
and FEMA. That database is periodically updated, and a new WDS is computed for every 
county in the United States. Specifically, we focus on FEMA disaster declarations and 
determine the number of disasters in an area during a period and the types of assistance 
programs declared. The data are cross-referenced with the NCEI to only consider natural 
disasters and eliminate man-made ones. WDS is calculated as follows: 




where ni is the number of a specific type of the assistance programs, and wi is the 
corresponding weight for the type. The weight for each assistance program is defined as 
follows: 
• Disaster mitigation: 0.25 
• Public assistance: 0.50 
• Housing assistance: 0.75 
• Individual assistance: 1.0 
The next step is to search for projects that have more contractors located in high-risk 
areas of natural disasters than in other types of areas. For https://www.usaspending.gov/, 
the process involves locating sub-awardees for each project, and it is relatively 
straightforward given the organization of the publicly available data. For 
https://www.fpds.gov/, the archives are provided in a different format, and we use a 
combination of data fields to match project to subcontractors. A different processing pipeline 
is used for each of the two data sources. For https://www.usaspending.gov/, database 
queries and Tableau are employed to obtain the dashboard, while for https://www.fpds.gov/, 
a Python and Jupyter Notebook pipeline was developed. 
 Alternative Geographical Areas for an Industry Type 
We developed a technique to allow an acquisition expert to better inform their 
source-selection decision with regard to natural disaster risk. This thrust of our approach 
aims at providing the means to discover regions, in particular counties, where there exists 
some concentration of industry with a given profile. The level of concentration is to be set by 
an acquisition professional, and it involves the existence of a certain number of historical 
federal contracts that have been awarded in that region. The industry type can be specified 
through NAICS codes. 
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A program manager can examine the historical distribution of federal contractors for 
a given industry type (i.e., NAICS code). Figure 2 shows the distribution for a sample code 
that includes ventilation, heating, air-conditioning, and commercial refrigeration equipment 
manufacturing. In this scenario, the manager would then look at the areas that have medium 
or low risk of natural disaster and that also have been used in the past in many federal 
contracts. One possible view may be to show only those areas that have had an above-
average number of federal awards (see Figure 3, top). If the selection is not sufficient, the 
analyst could lower the requirements on the total number of past federal contracts, which 
shows more potential regions with a lower natural-disaster risk (see Figure 3, bottom). 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Contractors from Historical FPDS Records for NAICS Code 33341, 




22 The color represents the natural disaster risk level for the place of performance. 
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Figure 3. Regions in the Lower Risk of Natural Disasters That Have an Above Average of 
Past Federal Contracts (Top) and Below Average of Past Federal Contracts (Bottom)23  
Alternative Contractors and Multiple Award Comparison 
The data in https://www.usaspending.gov/ are categorized based on the types of 
spending, which include contracts, grants, loans, and other financial assistance. The 
information on contracts is organized into two tables: one for prime contracts and the other 
for subcontracts. The subcontract table was used in this study as it contained the detailed 
information of each award, including the award ID and funding agency’s information, as well 
as the business name, address, DUNS number, and NAICS code of both primary contractor 
and each subcontractor. In addition, the address where each subcontractor physically 
performed the work is also listed in the table. Combining with the information from our 
natural disaster risk assessment framework, we are able to identify the awards with a high 




23 Data is for NAICS code 33341, Department of the Navy contracts. 
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identify the subcontractors of a same business type based on their NAICS codes and 
partition them by their locations and the natural disaster risks of their locations.  
For illustration purposes, two contracts with a higher-than-average concentration of 
contractors in high-risk areas were randomly selected and are apparent in Figure 4. One of the 
awards has some of the largest numbers of contractors; the other has a relatively small number of 
contractors. For each business type identified by a unique NAICS code, we partitioned the 
corresponding contractors into two groups: one located in a high-risk area, the other in an area with 
either a medium or low risk level. The contractors in the second group can be used to find alternatives 
to high-risk contractors when needed and are the subject of Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4. Dashboard Showing Sub-Awardees for Two Awards as Seen in the Checkboxes in 
the Top Right24 
The first dashboard, Figure 4, is designed to provide a view of the distribution of 
subcontractors for a project. It consists of a map in which the places of performance are 
shown on a map and color-coded to reflect the natural disaster risk level. A list of awards of 
interest is provided on the top-right side. The bottom-right shows a bar chart, which gives an 
idea of the size of an award in terms of number of subcontractors. Stacked bars show how 
many contractors operate in areas with high, medium, or low risk. The final view, bottom-left, 




24 The four panels are map, award selector, bar chart showing number and risk type for 
awardees, and individual contractor list. Panels are linked, and selection in any one of them 
determines what is displayed in the other three. 
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level. Note that the same contractor may be producing goods or performing services in 
multiple places. 
The interaction with this dashboard allows an expert both to analyze a single award 
and to compare multiple ones. The panels are linked and selecting or clicking on one 
element in one panel results in changes in all the others. The map allows the selection of 
geographical regions and the analysis of the subcontractors in that area. The bar chart can 
be used to focus on subcontractors from any selected project and allows the user to focus 
further on those subcontractors who operate in the desired risk category: high, medium, or 
low. Finally, the individual list of subcontractors provides fine-grained details and allows the 
user to examine one contractor at a time in terms of location, map position, and natural 
disaster risk level. 
In addition to analysis and comparison, a program manager may need to be able to 
find alternatives for some subcontractors in order to mitigate the risk posed by natural 
disasters. To this end, our framework can search existing and past federal projects to find 
such alternatives. The results are provided to a user visually through the dashboard shown 
in Figure 5. The data are automatically filtered to eliminate high-risk areas of performance, 
and the sheer number of potential solutions can be further narrowed down using NAICS 
codes. For this paper, we defaulted to a five-digit NAICS code, which can provide relatively 
closely related businesses. Just as the previous panel, the map is the main feature of the 
dashboard, and it is augmented by a NAICS code selection panel and a list of 
subcontractors. 
The user of this panel would start by focusing on one or more likely related NAICS 
codes. Codes can be added into the analysis if a suitable subcontractor replacement is not 
found, or they can be removed if there are too many candidates. The map offers a way of 
finding subcontractors who are close to a geographical area, to waterways, or to highways if 
transportation is an issue to be considered by the project. Finally, the list of subcontractors 
provides both the location of the subcontractor and the place(s) of performance of the 
service or work.  
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Figure 5. Dashboard for Finding Alternative Contractors by Name (Top Panel), NAICS Codes 
(Left Panel), or Geographical Location (Center Map)  
Conclusion and Future Work 
The paper presented a framework for allowing a user to manage the risk posed by 
natural disasters to a project or program. We developed visual tools to allow a program 
manager or planner to identify potential alternative subcontractors that operate in areas with 
a lower risk of natural disasters. Visual tools can also be used to analyze the existing risk of 
natural disasters for an existing project. The tool can provide various levels of details from 
an overview of the where and how many high-risk subcontractors are operating to individual 
listing of each contractor. Furthermore, a domain expert can compare multiple awards and 
look for common potential risk among those awards. The expert can also analyze 
concentrations of various industry types in locations that are both prone to natural disaster 
and relatively safe from them. Finally, all of these visual, user-friendly tools are supported by 
data science approaches to organize, manage, integrate, and transform the underlying data. 
The research results would be helpful for the acquisition management and planning to 
control the risks of natural disasters and their impacts to a project.  
Our future work will focus on two directions. First, investigate other risk factors in 
order to develop a comprehensive, data-driven risk assessment framework that can be 
applied quickly to both large and small acquisition and purchasing projects. Second, explore 
the use of deep-learning and website crawling to provide more focused and real-time 
information about contractors to a domain expert.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 276 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
References 
Apte, U., Rendon, R., & Dixon, M. (2016). Big data analysis of contractor performance information for 
service acquisition in DoD: A proof of concept. Proceedings of the 13th Annual Acquisition 
Research Symposium, 2, 398–418. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/53512  
Black, S., Henley, J., & Clute, M. (2014). Determining the value of Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) narratives for the acquisition process (NPS-CM-14-
022) [Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School]. NPS Archive: Calhoun. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42583  
Cilli, M., Parnell, G. S., Cloutier, R., & Zigh, T. (2015). A systems engineering perspective on the 
revised Defense Acquisition System. Systems Engineering, 18(6), 584–603. 
Gaither, C. C. (2014). Incorporating market based decision making processes in defense acquisitions. 
International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management, 6, 38–50. 
Gill, D., Muir, W. A., & Rendon, R. G. (2019). Predicting federal contractor performance issues using 
data analytics. Proceedings of the 16th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, 2, 16–27. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/62901  
Krzysko, M., & Baney, B. (2012). The need for “acquisition visibility.” Journal of Software Technology, 
15(1), 4–9. 
Office of Management and Budget. (2017). North American Industry Classification System. Executive 
Office of the President. 
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf  
Tudoreanu, M. E., Franklin, K., Rego, A., Wu, N., & Wang, R. (2018). Searching hidden links: 
Inferring undisclosed subcontractors from public contract records and employment data. 
Proceedings of the 15th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, 2, 491–499. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58788  
Wu, N., Tudoreanu, M. E., Siruvolu, S., Wang, R., & Talburt, J. R. (2020). Analysis of contractor data 
in federal acquisition databases. Proceedings of the 17th Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium, 1–11. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/64767  
Wu, N., Tudoreanu, M. E., & Wang, R. (2018). Leveraging public data for quality improvement and 
pattern discovery of federal acquisition data. Proceedings of the 15th Annual Acquisition 
Research Symposium. 
Zhao, D., MacKinnon, D., Douglas, J., Gallup, D., & Shelley, P. (2015). Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) 
application: Improving web service to Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (NPS-AM-15-
129). Naval Postgraduate School. https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/2653 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 277 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Building Industrial Resilience with a Little Help from Our 
Friends: Adapting DoD Acquisition Processes to  
Facilitate Allied and Partner Engagement  
John G. (Jerry) McGinn—is the Executive Director of the Center for Government Contracting in the 
School of Business at George Mason University (GMU). In this role, he has established and is leading 
the first-of-its-kind university center for research, education and training, and collaboration on issues 
facing the more than $500 billion government contracting industry. McGinn is also a trusted strategic 
advisor sought after for his expertise in U.S. industrial policy, supply chain, the Defense Production 
Act (DPA), industrial security, export control, foreign military sales, and industrial base policies. He 
currently serves on the Economic Security Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. 
[jmcginn5@gmu.edu] 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on numerous existing and recent initiatives and programs involving allied 
and partner support to the U.S. defense industrial base and explores how they are currently 
instantiated in DoD acquisition processes. Are DoD acquisition processes able to effectively 
utilize efforts such as the National Technology Industrial Base (NTIB), Reciprocal Defense 
Procurement Agreements, Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III, and others to foster 
programs with partners that build industrial resilience in the defense industrial base? 
Research and interviews found that most of these efforts have promising foundations, but 
DoD acquisition processes need adaption to effectively increase allied and partner 
involvement. The author makes a series of recommendations to address these findings about 
the programs analyzed and the acquisition system itself. The author concludes that reframing 
acquisition processes and programs to better include partners and allies is ultimately a win-
win proposition for all parties involved. Pursuing this approach will help to provide a concrete 
foundation for the future of international industrial collaboration and will build the industrial 
resilience needed to face the national security challenges of today and tomorrow. The paper 
also points to areas for further research to further refine the recommendations and explore 
specific areas in greater depth.  
Research Question 
This paper focuses on the numerous existing and recent programs and initiatives 
focused on building resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base and examines how current 
DoD acquisition processes support or hinder the involvement of allied and partner 
governments and companies. Specifically, there are a large number of existing and recent 
programs or initiatives that are designed, at least in part, to enable the involvement of 
companies based outside of the United States in U.S. defense acquisition programs. These 
efforts include Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements, the National Technology 
Industrial Base (NTIB), Trusted Capital Marketplace (TCM), and Defense Production Act 
(DPA) Title III. How are these programs impacting DoD acquisition processes, and are close 
allies and partners able to effectively contribute to building resilience in the U.S. defense 
industrial base?  
Need for Increased U.S. Defense Industrial Base Capacity 
The annual Department of Defense (DoD) industrial capabilities report to Congress 
lays out key trends in the defense industrial base. To quote from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 
report, “The defense industrial base is the key to preserving and extending U.S. competitive 
military dominance in the coming century and, with it, deterrence that will keep Americans 
safe and keep the peace” (DoD, 2021). This report and previous annual reports showed 
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fragility at lower levels of the defense supply chain, workforce challenges, troubling trends in 
the sole sourcing of materials such as rare earth elements and chemicals from China, and 
chronic weaknesses in areas such as microelectronics.  
China is the principal challenge as outlined in the current National Security Strategy 
(White House, 2017) and National Defense Strategy (DoD, 2019). These legacy documents 
from the Trump administration will change in priorities and focus under the Biden 
administration, but the new administration has made clear in its Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance (White House, 2021) and other venues that a focus on China as the 
“pacing” national security challenge will remain (Shelbourne, 2021). 
China has co-opted the free market system for its purposes. Today, China is no 
longer focused on being the locus for low-cost manufacturing and is looking to move up the 
value chain and gain intellectual property. The Made in China 2025 strategic plan clearly 
demarcated the areas where Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises would invest 
(robotics, AI, autonomy, etc.) and the investment has followed (Sutter, 2020). The approach 
for this is multifaceted: from licit business transactions to illicit intellectual property theft. 
Moreover, the truth of the matter is that any Chinese company, under the 1993 state law, is 
compelled to provide information deemed important for national security to the Chinese 
government (Brown & Singh, 2018). 
 These industrial base concerns have led to a greater focus on reshoring industrial 
capabilities previously conducted overseas to domestic locations. This prioritization began in 
earnest after the whole of government review of the U.S. manufacturing and defense 
industrial base launched in July 2017 by Executive Order No. 13,806 (2017). This effort 
underscored similar themes found in earlier reports but with greater fidelity and detail. The 
recommendations coming out of the final report, released in September 2018, focused first 
and foremost on addressing industrial base weaknesses where the United States was 
reliant on Chinese single and sole sources in areas such as rare earth elements, specialty 
chemicals, and small unmanned aerial systems (Executive Order No. 13,806, 2017). 
DoD industrial base investment has concentrated on these and other priorities, but 
the concern about China has also led to an increased focus on Buy America efforts in some 
quarters. During 2020, for example, a congressional effort to expand Buy America in the 
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would have required 75% of Pentagon 
major defense acquisition programs to be procured solely from U.S. sources by 2021 and 
100% by 2026. This provision would have obviated the industrial contributions by companies 
headquartered in allied countries, many of whom have significant U.S. subsidiaries 
(Greenwalt, 2020). This Buy America approach undermines those close allies that support 
thousands of American jobs through the development and purchase of U.S. defense 
systems. Because of existing Buy America regulations and national security priorities, 
defense systems are already one of the strongest domestic manufacturing sectors. 
Eliminating key international suppliers, many of whom have significant U.S. physical and 
economic presence, from our defense industrial base is counterproductive. Moreover, these 
countries—mainly our NATO allies and close partners like Japan, Australia, and Israel—buy 
billions of dollars of U.S. defense systems each year (McGinn, 2020). 
Rather than excluding them, it is important to look at how partners and allies can 
contribute to efforts to building resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base.  
International Involvement in DoD Acquisition 
The principal objective of DoD acquisition system is to get the absolute best 
capabilities to meet U.S. warfighter needs. DoD programs do this primarily through 
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contracting with U.S. companies large and small. However, given the global nature of 
technology in general and the aerospace and defense business in particular, allied and 
partner governments and companies have been participating in DoD programs for decades. 
Participation occurs in three principal ways: (1) as a contributor to a program, (2) as a 
customer, and (3) as part of an international cooperative program. I will briefly discuss each 
in turn. 
International Contributions to DoD Programs 
The rationale for involving non-U.S. companies in DoD programs derives directly 
from the objective of the defense acquisition system. In some cases, the best technology or 
system for a program can be obtained from a non-U.S. source. The same goes for 
technology, subsystems, and components procured by U.S. prime integrators. Working as 
prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers, foreign sources have made significant 
contributions to the U.S. defense industrial base.  
In addition, many foreign companies have U.S.-based subsidiaries that manufacture 
products or conduct services for unclassified and classified DoD programs. For those 
conducting classified work, these subsidiaries operate under foreign ownership, control, or 
influence (FOCI) regulations governed by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security 
Agency, which limits communications and sharing of information between the parent 
company and the U.S. subsidiary (Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, n.d.-
a). Regardless, U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies are considered U.S. 
companies for purposes of DoD acquisition. 
International Purchases of U.S. Systems 
The purchase of DoD systems by international customers through foreign military 
sales (FMS) or direct commercial sales (DCS) is another major avenue for international 
participation in DoD acquisition. FMS are conducted via government-to-government 
agreements overseen by the Department of State (State) and executed by the DoD through 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), while DCS are conducted via 
government-to-industry competitions, and sales are licensed by State or the Department of 
Commerce under their respective export control regimes governing military or commercial 
dual-use items.  
U.S. international defense sales are significant and number in the tens of billions of 
dollars each year, but it is very difficult to track actual dollar expenditures associated with 
specific FMS and DCS transactions. This is because FMS are reported by DSCA in 
proposed letters of offer and acceptance that cite an “estimated” price for a “possible” sale 
(Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, n.d.-b). This is required under the U.S. 
Arms Export Control Act. DCS transactions, meanwhile, are reported by the purchasing 
governments and/or the U.S. company producing the system. The U.S. government reports 
the granting of an export license to authorize the sale of items via DCS, but the authorized 
value reported does not equate to a sale or the actual sale dollar amount (Department of 
State, 2021). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides the 
most comprehensive estimate of international transfer in its Arms Transfers Database 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.). 
International Cooperative Programs  
DoD International Cooperative Programs (ICPs) are acquisition partnership 
arrangements between the United States and foreign countries that are established via 
memoranda of understanding (MoU) or project agreements (PAs) that often combine both 
foreign government and foreign commercial source participation. ICPs began in the 1960s, 
most prominently with the NATO Sea Sparrow missile, and continue today (Kenlon, 2018). 
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The largest ICP by far is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, with eight countries initially 
participating in the program. Each country contributed various amounts to the research and 
development of the program, receiving in return various levels of participation (Gertler, 
2020). Numerous other major programs have ICPs, including the Guided Multiple Launch 
Rocket System (GMLRS), P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, 
and SM-3 Block IIA. There have only been a few new major system ICPs established in the 
past decade, however (Kenlon, 2018). 
International Impacts on the U.S. Defense Industrial Base 
These international contributions in DoD programs have both direct and indirect 
impacts on the U.S. defense industrial base: 
• Direct impacts. Many of these contributions have direct impacts on the health of the 
U.S. defense industrial base through employment and purchases. Specifically,  
o U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-headquartered firms employ tens of thousands of 
American workers through the production of systems and the performance of 
services in direct support of DoD programs. The United Kingdom (UK), for 
example, has estimated that U.S. subsidiaries of UK companies employ more 
than 56,000 U.S. personnel (Pierce, 2020). 
o The purchase of DoD systems by foreign government customers through 
FMS and DCS support the development and production of U.S. programs. 
Some programs, most notably the F-16 fighter, continue in production today 
solely because of these continued international sales.  
o ICPs such as the F-35, GMLRS, and P-8 support the continued production 
and product improvement of these U.S.-based programs. 
• Indirect impacts. Other international participation in DoD acquisition programs also 
have a more indirect impact on the U.S. defense industrial base. For example, 
o The purchase of foreign-produced subsystems and parts by DoD programs 
contribute to the production and sustainment of programs across the DoD 
enterprise. These contributions do not have a direct impact on U.S. jobs or 
facilities, but they do enable the successful performance of a program and 
therefore support the economic impact of the program over the acquisition life 
cycle. 
o Partnering relationships established by the DoD and U.S. industry with their 
foreign counterparts can lead to additional teaming in technology 
development and product improvement efforts beyond the scope of the 
original program, leading to expanded U.S. industrial base opportunities in 
the global defense marketplace.25 
Successes and Challenges 
There have been recent notable successes in the involvement of international-
headquartered firms in DoD programs. For example, Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the U.S. 
subsidiary of the Italian shipbuilding Fincantieri, won the Navy’s Future Frigate competition 
in April 2020. The company invested nearly $180 million in its Wisconsin facility over several 
years, which helped the company position for its win of this almost $800 million contract 




25. Thanks to Frank Kenlon for suggesting this impact.  
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the preliminary design phase of the U.S. Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle 
(OMFV), three of the four announced bidders are led non-U.S. headquartered companies: 
BAE Systems (teamed with Elbit Systems of America), Rheinmetall (teamed with Raytheon 
Technologies and L3Harris), and Hanwha (teamed with Oshkosh; Callan, 2021). 
In the regulatory space, the FY2019 NDAA created an exemption for NTIB entities in 
the United States operating under a special security agreement to not be required to obtain 
a national interest determination for access to proscribed information (John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2018b). This streamlined the involvement of 
U.S. subsidiaries of NTIB countries performing highly classified programs for U.S. 
government agencies and was fully implemented in December 2020 (National Industrial 
Security Program Operating Manual [NISPOM], 2020). 
However, significant challenges remain. Most of these challenges are either cultural 
within the DoD acquisition system or are an artifact of existing acquisition practices and 
processes. For example, in the development of system requirements in many DoD 
programs, requirements documents are frequently classified as SECRET NOFORN (or 
higher). This requires non-U.S. companies to obtain DoD technology security and foreign 
disclosure authorizations to even engage in classified discussions with DoD program offices 
or formally respond to DoD contracting officer requests for information that have classified 
aspects. This hinders the ability of these companies to better understand program office 
needs at early stages in program requirements formulation. It can even prevent them from 
responding to or making them less competitive for eventual DoD solicitations.  
Even after winning a program, these types of challenges can continue. For instance, 
the intellectual property for a DoD program is designated U.S.-only. That is appropriate in 
most cases but can be problematic when a U.S. subsidiary is the prime. In the Navy’s Future 
Frigate program, Fincantieri Marinette Marine was not permitted to speak with the parent 
company engineers to discuss engineering challenges during the design stage. This created 
difficulties that could have been more easily addressed if they could have obtained a U.S. 
government export license that would have enabled the U.S. subsidiary to conduct 
authorized technical discussions with parent company engineers (R. Hunt, personal 
communication, April 2, 2021). 
Recommendations  
There are several ways that the DoD can educate acquisition professionals and 
adapt existing processes to facilitate greater involvement of partners and allies in DoD 
programs: 
• The DoD should promote current DoD 5000 series processes for incorporating allied 
and partner companies’ technologies and systems into DoD programs. 
• The DoD should improve the ability of acquisition professionals to develop 
requirements documents that facilitate the early involvement of allied and partner 
companies in DoD programs (e.g., avoid citing classified, U.S.-only documents in 
either informal or formal requests for information or solicitations where possible). 
• The DoD should facilitate communications between U.S. subsidiary firms performing 
on DoD contracts and their parent foreign firms in areas of engineering with direct 
impact on the conduct of the system being developed or fielded (e.g., working with 
U.S. government export control organizations to authorize appropriate engineer-to-
engineer engagement throughout the program life cycle). 
• The DoD should reexamine its approach to ICPs to identify different types of 
cooperative opportunities leading to a new generation of programs in the coming 
years. 
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Existing and Emerging Initiatives and Programs 
Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of 
Understanding (RDP MOUs) 
 Current Use 
There are currently 26 countries that have RDP MOUs with the United States 


























• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
These MOUs establish agreed upon procurement principles that foster transparency 
and openness to competition in each country’s respective defense marketplace.  
The largest tangible benefit for the non-U.S. signatory countries is that they are 
waived from Buy America provisions when competing for DoD programs (DFARS 225.872-
1, 2021). The existence of this exemption is often not well recognized in some program 
offices or on Capitol Hill, and others are opposed to these exemptions in the first place, as 
described above. Moreover, the Buy America focus of the current administration, which is 
directly at odds with its Interim National Security Strategy Guidance emphasis on 
strengthening relationships with allies and partners, sends conflicting signals to allies and 
partners (White House, 2021).  
In addition to its RDP MOU, Canada also has a Defence Production Sharing 
Agreement (DPSA), which guides defense trade procedures between the two allies 
(Canadian Commercial Corporation, n.d.). The DPSA is further codified within the U.S. 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 225.870 (DFARS 225.870, 2021) and 
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permits the Canadian Commercial Corporation to help Canadian firms compete for DoD 
opportunities.  
 Potential Future Uses 
There is a clear lack of awareness of the RDP MOUs and what they mean for DoD 
acquisition and for strengthening the defense industrial base. More detailed analysis of the 
impact of the presence and spending of RDP MOU countries, for example, would help to 
explicate the benefits of allied participation in DoD acquisition. This analysis would assist in 
educating acquisition professionals, DoD officials, and congressional staff and members 
about these tangible benefits. This could also spur greater involvement in DoD programs, 
leading to more investment as well as economic and national security benefits. In addition, 
written statements by the Biden administration on their support for RDP MOUs would go a 
long to reassure signatory countries.  
 Recommendations 
• The administration would be well served to formally articulate their support for RDP 
MOUs as part of their emphasis to strengthen relationships with allies and partners. 
• The DoD or Congress should request an analysis of the impact of RDP MOU 
countries’ contributions to the U.S. defense industrial base through participation in 
DoD programs and the purchase of U.S. defense systems through foreign military or 
direct commercial sales. 
• The DoD should work to increase awareness of and educate acquisition 
professionals across the services about the Buy America exemption for RDP MOU 
countries as well as the Canadian DSPA DFARS clause to help spur additional 
competition and innovative solutions in the U.S. defense industrial base. 
Security of Supply Arrangements  
 Current Use 
There are currently 9 bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SoSAs) between 
the United States and partner countries. Specifically, the following countries have SoSAs 









• United Kingdom 
Not surprisingly, all of the SoSAs are with RDP MOU countries. These arrangements 
implement part of the Declaration of Principles in the RDP MOUs and recognize the “mutual 
interdependence of supplies needed for national security” as well as calling for the 
signatories to “explore solutions for achieving assurance of supply” (Industrial Policy, n.d.-b). 
Some of the signatory nations have established industry codes of conduct as a measure of 
reliance of their respective industry partners to support defense priorities.  
The most telling part of these efforts, however, is the fact that they are 
arrangements, not agreements. That underscores the relatively informal and voluntary 
nature of these bilateral initiatives. There arrangements are confidence-building measures, 
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and there is value in that, but they are not formal commitments by the respective 
government signatories. Thus, it is not surprising that these arrangements have not been 
invoked directly in any specific case to date (Hasik, 2021). 
 Potential Future Uses 
It is time to reexamine SoSAs and their use for today’s national security challenges. 
They can continue to be utilized as confidence building measures, but the United States and 
signatory nations should also consider methods for strengthening them. For example, the 
DoD could explore ways to partner with countries on mutually beneficial efforts through 
SoSAs. An arrangement with Japan for microelectronics and arrangements with Brazil and 
India for chemicals, for instance, could strengthen industrial capacities in those critical 
areas.  
 Recommendation 
• The DoD should conduct a review of SoSAs with partner countries to determine the 
future of SoSAs, specifically how these (and any future) arrangements could be 
adapted to make them more relevant for today’s global industrial security challenges. 
 National Technology Industrial Base  
 Current Use 
The NTIB has deep roots. Initially born out of the North American Technology and 
Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO; Government of Canada, n.d.), the NTIB was first 
codified in law in 1992. At that time, Congress required the DoD to report annually on “steps 
to foster and safeguard” the NTIB. The NTIB was defined at the outset to include the United 
States and Canada (Hunter et al., 2017). NATIBO conducted periodic bilateral studies on 
industrial base issues, but neither NATIBO nor NTIB gained significant visibility (or impact) 
until the NTIB was expanded to include Australia and the United Kingdom in the 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 2016).  
The expansion of the NTIB brought greater attention to the need to increase 
industrial cooperation between these key allies (Greenwalt, 2019). The NTIB countries 
established an initial governance structure and identified areas for initial focus. The 
increased dialogue has been favorably viewed by the NTIB governments, but the NTIB 
made an immediate impact in area of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Prior to 2010, for example, the vast majority of FDI in the United States came from 
allied and partner countries. In less than a decade, those ratios shifted dramatically. From 
2016 to 2018, transactions originating from China were the largest proportion of cases filed: 
26.5%. Moreover, the nature of the Chinese transactions drew increased scrutiny because 
the vast majority of these proposed acquisitions (84%) were focused on the manufacturing, 
finance, information, and services sectors (Department of the Treasury, 2021). 
This shift drew significant bipartisan attention on the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews foreign transactions for national 
security concerns, and led directly to a significant strengthening of CFIUS authorities 
through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA; NDAA, 
2018a). As the United States has strengthened its position on FDI, Chinese investment 
started to focus on other countries with advanced technology companies. Thus, NTIB 
governments have undertaken significant efforts to share best practices among NTIB 
countries to counter potential national security impacts. 
NTIB was also featured in the Executive Order 13,806 final report of the U.S. 
manufacturing and defense industrial base. The final report, published in October 2018, 
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recognized the global nature of the defense industrial base and underscored the importance 
of allies and partners. For example, the broadening of the NTIB is cited favorably: “These 
types of agreements [i.e., NTIB] with partners and allies provide economies of scale and 
scope, help facilitate cost-effective defense production, and increase Warfighter 
interoperability” (DoD, 2018). 
 Potential Future Uses 
The governments are focusing on NTIB governance and on sharing best practices in 
FDI and will continue to do that. What else can be done? Analysts such as William 
Greenwalt (2019) argue that the NTIB should be used to foster export control reform among 
member countries. While that goal is laudable, there has been little progress on this front 
since the NTIB expansion. One potential related area that could be promising to pursue is 
releasability. For example, when companies from NTIB countries are working with program 
executive offices and program offices, those offices sometimes establish releasability 
provisos on the program’s technology. These provisos require companies not based in the 
United States to file for an export license. That delays the time before a foreign company 
can examine technical data and speak at a technical level with a DoD customer for a 
potential or actual solicitation, thereby making them less competitive. Establishing 
releasability criteria at the outset to include appropriate NTIB-based companies, for 
example, could create opportunities for greater competition for DoD customers.  
The recently passed FY2021 NDAA had a provision that directed the DoD to 
establish criteria for expanding the NTIB to include additional countries (NDAA, 2021). This 
clearly indicates congressional intent to increase NTIB countries, and there have been 
numerous countries seeking to be part of the NTIB. As part of establishing any criteria for 
expansion, the DoD should look at creating specific opportunities for strengthening the 
ability of NTIB-based companies to contribute to the U.S. defense industrial base.  
An immediate opportunity for success is to create acquisition pathways for DoD 
projects and programs to employ NTIB-based companies that are able to provide leading 
edge technology and affordable solutions to emerging DoD requirements. A concrete way 
for the DoD to incentivize NTIB contributions to U.S. efforts to strengthen the defense 
industrial base, for example, would be to create opportunities for companies based in NTIB 
countries to compete for projects and programs by simply changing acquisition rules to 
incentivize DoD acquisition personnel to consider facilitating NTIB offerings at prime, 
subcontractor, and supplier levels. The DoD has started to do this to a modest degree. In a 
March 2019 memorandum to DoD acquisition officials, for example, then Acting Principal 
Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting Kim Herrington specifically recommended the 
“inclusion of” NTIB members in innovation-focused Other Transactions (OT) consortia 
(Herrington, 2019). Memos like this are useful to set the conditions for change, but the NTIB 
needs to be formalized through rule changes and DFARS clauses that can be deployed in 
solicitations and contracts. Once the rules are changed, education and training can help to 
expand opportunities for NTIB companies (McGinn, 2021). 
This education need also extends to industry. One of the biggest failures of the 
previous U.S.–UK and U.S.–Australian defense trade cooperation treaties, for example, is 
the fact that the governments did not get industry engaged early enough to incentivize 
companies to use the treaties. These treaties, approved by the U.S. Senate in late 2010, 
were designed to create a “trusted community” of companies that could share technology 
and compete for opportunities in this trusted community (Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls, 2010). Unfortunately, they never realized their potential, and while they have been 
used for government-to-government efforts, they have almost never been used by industry.  
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The NTIB provides an opportunity to do better, but the governments need to help 
create pathways where industry can see the potential business benefit. DoD and NTIB 
governments can and should make the value proposition of NTIB clear to industry and then 
let the resulting business relationships grow and flourish. Industry will not always pursue 
these incentives, but there is 100% certainty that they will not pursue them in the absence of 
a clearly defined pathway to success.  
 Recommendations 
• Conduct rule-making and establish DFARS clauses focused on facilitating NTIB 
participation and membership in opportunities such as OT consortia, DPA Title III, 
IBAS, and other appropriate programs. 
• Educate the acquisition workforce on the use of NTIB clauses for use in programs 
across the DoD. 
• Advertise these NTIB-inclusive opportunities to NTIB countries and trade 
associations to facilitate additional solutions to U.S. industrial base challenges. 
 DPA Title III 
 Current Use 
The Defense Production Act (DPA) is a long-standing authority that derives from the 
Korean War. Passed in 1950 and drawing on the War Powers Acts of World War II, the DPA 
is a broad set of authorities to help the U.S. government strengthen the defense industrial 
base to respond to national emergencies. Title III of the DPA is focused specifically on the 
expansion of productive capacity and supply and utilizes grants, loans, loan guarantees, 
purchases, and purchase commitments to build industrial capacity (Cecire & Peters, 2020). 
The DoD has been delegated authority to execute Title III projects and has used this 
authority for decades to expand industrial capacity in areas such as the creation of a 
domestic beryllium production facility to complex forgings for naval propulsion shafts (Air 
Force Research Library, 2013; Earmark Declaration, 2009). 
The COVID-19 pandemic response has put DPA Title III into overdrive. Where DPA 
annual appropriations fluctuated between $40 million and $100 million during the decade 
preceding the pandemic, $1 billion was appropriated for DPA Title III in the March 2020 
CARES Act. The recently passed American Recovery Act dramatically upped the ante, 
appropriating $10 billion for current and future pandemic response that almost certainly will 
be allocated via DPA Title III (American Rescue Plan Act, 2021). The focus of these Title III 
projects is to increase domestic production capacity to reduce reliance on non-U.S. sources 
for items such as vaccine production, personal protective equipment (PPE), testing 
equipment, and so on. The primary focus is on reducing dependencies on Chinese sources, 
as COVID had exposed the dominant positions of China in areas such as PPE and 
antibiotics production (Bradsher & Alderman, 2020; Swanson, 2020). 
 Potential Future Uses 
In efforts to reshore or onshore manufacturing capacity, one relatively unknown 
provision of the DPA defines the term domestic source as a business concern  
that performs in the United States or Canada substantially all of the research 
and development, engineering, manufacturing, and production activities 
required of such business concern under a contract with the United States 
relating to a critical component or a critical technology item. (Defense 
Production Act, 1950) 
This permits Canadian firms to apply for DPA Title III grants and for Title III projects 
to be conducted in Canada as well. This is a legacy of long-standing U.S.–Canadian 
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industrial base collaboration in the Cold War North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) and NATIBO (Hunter et al., 2017). Given the geographic proximity and the 
expertise of Canadian industry in areas such as mining and chemicals, this could 
significantly benefit the U.S. defense industrial base. If the DPA were amended to include 
other NTIB countries in the definition of domestic source, this would substantially expand the 
opportunities for firms in Australia and the UK to contribute to strengthening the U.S. 
industrial base.  
 Recommendations  
• The DoD and Canada should promote the ability for Canadian-based firms to 
contribute to DPA Title III projects. 
• The DoD should submit a legislative proposal to amend the DPA to include all NTIB 
countries to reflect the fact that they are already part of the U.S. industrial base and 
make their respective industrial capabilities available to strengthen that base. 
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program 
 Current Use  
The Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program was established in 
2014 in the DoD to fund the mitigation of defense industrial base issues (Nelson, 2016). 
Defined in 10 U.S.C. § 2508 (Industrial Base Fund, 2011), IBAS has four principal functions: 
(1) to support the monitoring and assessment of the industrial base … ; 
(2) to address critical issues in the industrial base relating to urgent operational 
needs; 
(3) to support efforts to expand the industrial base; and 
(4) to address supply chain vulnerabilities. (Industrial Base Fund, 2011) 
With a similar mandate to DPA Title III, IBAS conducts projects to build industrial 
capabilities to support DoD priorities. IBAS has both an open Broad Agency Announcement 
(BAA) and the Cornerstone OT Authority to support a broad range of industrial base 
requirements (Industrial Policy, n.d.-a). IBAS has ranged from $10 to $100 million in 
appropriations annually, depending on congressional adds, and has conducted a wide array 
of projects ranging from updating naval propulsion foundry and electron beam welding to 
munitions and missile improvements (Defense and Aerospace Competitive Intelligence 
Service, 2019). 
 Potential Future Uses 
IBAS is an active program that will continue to receive funding for industrial base 
projects. IBAS does not have a clause in its BAA or OT like DPA Title III explicitly including 
Canadian or other non–U.S.-headquartered firms, but there is no explicit restriction either. 
Firms based or headquartered in allied or partner countries are currently eligible to join the 
Cornerstone OTA, where the majority of IBAS contract opportunities are posted, on a case-
by-case basis. Designating NTIB countries as eligible for IBAS projects through a DFARS 
clause or by changing the DPA definition of domestic source would create a number of new 
eligible firms to help strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base.  
 Recommendations 
• The DoD should consider creating and adding a DFARS clause to the IBAS BAA and 
Cornerstone OT making companies based in NTIB countries eligible to compete for 
IBAS opportunities to reflect the fact that they are already part of the U.S. industrial 
base. 
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• The DoD should advertise and encourage NTIB-based companies to join the 
Cornerstone OTA and to develop solutions to meet IBAS solicitations in the coming 
months. 
Trusted Capital Management  
 Current Use 
Trusted Capital Management (TCM) is one of the newest DoD efforts to strengthen 
the defense industrial base. After several previous aborted efforts, TCM formally launched in 
late 2020 with the creation of its digital marketplace. The overall objective of TCM is to 
reduce the vulnerability of high-technology start-ups funded by venture capital or private 
equity to funding from sources of adversarial capital, principally from China. Chinese 
technology priority areas in recent years have included many high-tech areas such as 
robotics, autonomy, and artificial intelligence. In addition to funding domestic sources of 
innovation in these areas, Chinese-based private equity and venture funds have invested in 
U.S.-based start-ups. Some of these investments have been shielded from easy discovery 
by start-ups. In response to some publicly revealed instances of adversarial investment, the 
DoD created TCM (Trusted Capital, n.d.). 
TCM is intended to create a trusted clearinghouse for companies and investors to 
conduct business free of potential adversarial investment. This effort is still in its early 
stages, but approximately 50 venture capital firms and companies have been vetted, and 
additional firms are in the pipeline (McLeary, 2021). 
 Potential Future Uses 
TCM was created first and foremost for U.S. companies and investors, but there has 
always been an appreciation for non-U.S. companies and investors in allied and partner 
countries given the global nature of investment and technology. To that end, TCM is open to 
venture capital (VC) funds and companies based in other countries as long as they go 
through the same vetting process of other firms in the trusted capital marketplace and are 
currently on a DoD contract.26  
In addition, there is strong DoD interest in the development of TCM-like regimes in 
partner and allied countries or even in organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). These could develop over time because U.S. allies are facing the 
same adversarial challenge of Chinese investments in their markets.  
 Recommendations  
• The DoD should promote TCM to allied- or partner-based VC firms and companies 
focused on DoD business. 
• The DoD and State should work with allied governments and NATO to establish 




2. The latter requirement can be challenging for many start-ups, however, because current 
Small Business Administration rules do not permit foreign firms to compete for early-stage 
opportunities such as Small Business Innovation Research funding.  
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Conclusions  
Allies and partners have long played a productive role in our defense acquisition 
system and have contributed to the U.S. defense industrial base. Given the common threat 
that we face in our respective supply chains, it is imperative to eliminate exposure to 
Chinese suppliers in critical national security areas. It makes little sense, however, to 
reshore all industrial capacity in a Buy America “Only” approach. Instead, we should focus 
first and foremost on those manufacturing areas where we are most vulnerable to China. In 
that effort, there are numerous manufacturing and resource areas where we can work with 
our close allies and partners to help achieve that common goal. From mining and chemicals 
to microelectronics and hypersonics, government and industry partnerships are synergistic 
and mutually beneficial for parties involved.  
The focus, therefore, should be on actions to foster true international industrial 
collaboration. That is done through actual participation in defense programs. Interestingly, 
there is a surprising amount of that happening right under our noses. Leonardo partnered 
with Boeing to win the Huey helicopter replacement program; Saab partnered with Boeing to 
win the Air Force T-X deal; SAIC partnered with Singapore’s ST Engineering and Belgium’s 
CMI Defence to prototype a light tank for the Army; Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s won the 
Navy’s Future Frigate program and the Army OMFV partnerships described above; and the 
list goes on and on (Judson, 2018). Not all of these partnerships have been or will be 
successful, but they create more competition for the DoD customer and lead to more 
industrial base resilience. And that, ultimately, is the goal.  
We need to create opportunity spaces for companies to operate within groups of 
“trusted communities,” to borrow a phrase from the treaties. The preceding has detailed how 
we have started to build these communities, but there is a long way to go. The NTIB is best 
postured to become one of those trusted communities. Whether NTIB companies are small 
or medium-sized enterprises operating exclusively in one of these countries or if they are 
subsidiaries of U.S.-headquartered primes, these companies are now part of one industrial 
base. The RDP MOU countries are a different trusted community, and we can build on these 
over time.  
In sum, reframing acquisition processes and program to more effectively include 
partner and allied government and industry participation is ultimately a win-win proposition 
for all parties involved. Pursuing programs, initiatives, and recommendations like those 
described in this paper will help to provide a concrete foundation for the future of 
international industrial collaboration and will build industrial resilience we need to face the 
national security challenges of today and tomorrow.  
Summary Table of Recommendations  
Area  Recommendation 
General 
• The DoD should promote current DoD 5000 series processes for 
incorporating allied and partner companies’ technologies and systems into 
DoD programs. 
• The DoD should improve the ability of acquisition professionals to 
develop requirements documents that facilitate the early involvement of 
allied and partner companies in DoD programs (e.g., avoid citing classified, 
U.S.-only documents in either informal or formal requests for information or 
solicitations where possible). 
• The DoD should facilitate communications between U.S. subsidiary 
firms performing on DoD contracts and their parent foreign firms in areas 
of engineering with direct impact on the conduct of the system being 
developed or fielded (e.g., working with U.S. government export control 
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Area  Recommendation 
organizations to authorize appropriate engineer-to-engineer engagement 
throughout the program life cycle). 
• The DoD should reexamine its approach to ICPs to identify different 
types of cooperative opportunities leading to a new generation of programs 
in the coming years. 
RDP MOUs 
• The administration would be well served to formally articulate their 
support for RDP MOUs as part of their emphasis to strengthen relationships 
with allies and partners. 
• The DoD or Congress should request an analysis of the impact of RDP 
MOU countries’ contributions to the U.S. defense industrial base through 
participation in DoD programs and the purchase of U.S. defense systems 
through foreign military or direct commercial sales. 
• The DoD should work to increase awareness of and educate 
acquisition professionals across the services about the Buy America 
exemption for RDP MOU countries and the Canadian DPSA DFARS clause 
to help spur additional competition and innovative solutions in the U.S. 
defense industrial base. 
SoSAs 
• The DoD should conduct a review of SoSAs with partner countries to 
determine the future of SoSAs, specifically how these (and any future) 
arrangements could be adapted to make them more relevant for today’s 
global industrial security challenges. 
NTIB 
• Conduct rule making and establish DFARS clauses focused on 
facilitating NTIB participation in solicitations for industrial base opportunities 
such as DPA Title III, IBAS, and other appropriate programs. 
• Educate the acquisition workforce on the use of NTIB clauses for use in 
programs across the DoD. 
• Advertise these NTIB-inclusive opportunities to NTIB countries and 
trade associations to facilitate additional solutions to U.S. industrial base 
challenges. 
DPA Title III 
• The DoD and Canada should promote the ability for Canadian-based 
firms to contribute to DPA Title III projects. 
• The DoD should submit a legislative proposal to amend the DPA to 
include all NTIB countries to reflect the fact that they are already part of the 
U.S. industrial base and make their respective industrial capabilities 
available to strengthen that base. 
IBAS 
• Conduct rule-making and establish DFARS clauses focused on 
facilitating NTIB participation and membership in opportunities such as OT 
consortia, DPA Title III, IBAS, and other appropriate programs. 
• The DoD should advertise and encourage NTIB-based companies to 
join the Cornerstone OTA and to develop solutions to meet IBAS 
solicitations in the coming months. 
TCM 
• The DoD should promote TCM to allied- or partner-based VC firms and 
companies focused on DoD business. 
• The DoD and the Department of State should work with allied 
governments and NATO to establish TCM-like organizations in their 
respective jurisdictions. 
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Abstract  
Purpose: For uniformity, present value methodologies and clauses are needed.   
Design: Based on a review of literature, FASB Concept Statement No. 7, and the FAR; a way to 
calculate present value of commercial item contracts is identified as well as present value 
clauses. 
Findings: Commercial items involving an uncertain degree of risk and dynamic costs use a fuzzy 
net cash flow methodology, forming basis of net present value, to calculate cash flow in order 
account for risk and changing costs. Clauses should be inserted into commercial item contracts to 
allow for greater clarity as to how present value is calculated with certainty.    
Practical Implications: No method to calculate the present value of recovery of cost of work 
performed prior to termination in commercial contracts exists. Present value clauses and methods 
are consistent with the intention of framers of the FAR.  
Originality/Value: Due to lack of a current methodology to calculate the present value of 
commercial item contracts, FASB Concept Statement No. 7, present value, and fuzzy net cash 
flow are used to calculate present value of commercial items. 
Background 
The “Section 809 Panel” (n.d.) was tasked with improving efficiency of acquisition 
regulations and recommended improving acquisition of commercial items; but did not address 
what is fair and reasonable profit on work performed prior to termination. Thus, the following 
research question is addressed: How is present value identified in commercial item contracts 
and what corresponding contract clause should be inserted into the contract?  
While the termination for convenience clause has “been around since the end of the Civil 
War”(Acquisitions.gov, n.d.) when the government needed to terminate contracts entered into 
during wartime when the need doesn’t exist during peacetime, it has not been defined what is 
fair and reasonable.  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) might define what is fair and reasonable since 
the FAR regulates acquisitions with most executive agencies.  
One consults FAR 2.101 on Acquisition.gov since it contains the definitions used in the 
FAR. However, FAR 2.101 does not define what fair and reasonable profit on work performed 
prior to termination is.  
One looks to the FAR conventions as fair and reasonable profit on work performed prior 
to termination could be a “permissible exercise of a contracting officer’s authority” 
(Acquisitions.gov, n.d.). However, a contracting officer’s interpretation of what is fair and 
reasonable based on prior experience, regulations, etc. may be different from a contractor’s 
definition of fair and reasonable based on the usage of estimated costs in its accounting system. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 296 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
For instance, a computer is estimated to cost $100 by the government while contractor 
actually incurs $150 to make the computer, which is what a reasonable business person would 
expect to pay for a computer given reasonable efficiencies and market conditions; however they 
yield different results when the contract is terminated.  
FAR 31.201-1’s five part-time for allowability defines reasonable costs. Reasonable 
costs are not uniformly applied as FAR 31.201-3(b) states “What is reasonable depends upon a 
variety of considerations and circumstances, including generally accepted sound business 
practices.”  
A reasonable cost for a fixed-price contract to paint a house differs from reasonable cost 
for a fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment because price of paint went up or other 
factors. Reasonable cost fails to address valuation of the unfinished portion of contracts 
terminated for convenience varies from contract to contract even if it performed with the same 
contractor. Inconsistent valuation of the unfinished portion of the contract could leave either 
contractor or government wondering if they were compensated fairly for their efforts. 
Reviewing DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, n.d.), PGI, and 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) fails to address the question of fairness of valuation of the 
unfinished portion of contracts. DFARS 212.102 (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement, n.d.) applicability is limited to acquisitions over $1,000,000, and DFARS 249.5 
(Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, n.d.) applicability is limited to major 
acquisitions over $25,000,000 for RDT&E and more than $100,000,000 for production inventory. 
Since many commercial item contracts are below the DFARS threshold, the UCC is consulted. 
UCC Section 1-204 defines “value for rights if a person acquires them in return for any 
consideration sufficient to support a contract” (Cornell Law School, n.d.). A contractor could give 
a dollar in exchange for a ballpoint pen. It may not be fair to both parties; however, it creates a 
legally sufficient contract or that it adequately compensates the contractor for their effort they 
put in making the ballpoint pen.  
How does the lack of a uniform definition of fair and reasonable compensation impact 
acquisitions practice?  
Perhaps the answer is in FAR 12.403(d)(i)(B)(ii) since fair compensation includes “any 
charges the contractor can demonstrate directly resulted from the termination.”  
Contractors may demonstrate such charges using its standard record keeping system 
(including Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or GAAP). While the FAR does not 
preclude the usage of analytical tools or methods to determine the amount of settlement of 
commercial item contracts terminated for convivence, the word may implies that the contractor 
has the discretion of using GAAP to prove that its settlement costs represent fair compensation 
(see Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States) which makes FAR 12.403(d)(i)(B)(ii) a 
discretionary rule which all contractors must follow. Contractors not using GAAP to demonstrate 
termination claims could use an alternative method to meet the requirement to prove fair and 
reasonable compensation for cost recovery in commercial item contracts. FAR 49.201(a) 
mandates through the usage of the word should that the contractor needs to be fairly 
compensated for work and preparations associated with terminating contracts for convenience. 
Recouping cost for a computer valued using estimated costs to be $100 by the 
government and valued using actual costs by the contractor as being $150, the contractor could 
use GAAP to value the computer at $150. It may seem to be fair since the contractor used 
GAAP; however the government can argue that the estimated costs of $100 is fair and 
reasonable valuation given that the $100 is “consideration sufficient to support a simple 
contract” under section 1-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code and is consistent with the 
government’s estimating methodologies.  
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The difference on what is fair valuation for a commercial item, such as a computer, 
makes it difficult to determine if the contractor should be compensated $70 (70% of $100) using 
estimated costs or if the contractor should be compensated $105 (70% of $150) using actual 
costs. Negotiations of termination settlements may not reflect what each party perceives as the 
effort that they put into the contract since FAR 12.403(d)(i)(B)(ii) does not specifically identify a 
standard recordkeeping system. Record keeping can be non-GAAP or GAAP. Current practice 
in commercial environments for contractors is to choose valuation methodologies depending on 
their industry norms, which results in varying valuations of commercial items (e.g., commodities) 
due to market conditions thus leading to the perception that termination settlements are not 
being valued fairly.  
It is proposed that net present value be used as a standard by which to value 
commercial item contracts terminated for convenience to allow both the government and 
contractors to be fairly compensated for the effort, they put into contracts terminated for 
convenience.  
Terminating for Convenience on Commercial Contracts vs. Non-Commercial Contract 
Terminations  
Termination for Cause termination may be used for cost recovery and negotiation. FAR 
12.403(c)(2) states “the government’s rights after a termination for cause shall include all the 
remedies available to any buyer in the marketplace.” Termination for Cause centers on 
acquiring similar items, such as commercial items, for instance, exchanging a lawnmower with 
the make and model because it contained a defective blade. The lawnmower would still cost 
$100.  
It is not addressed how a partially completed item is fairly valued by the government 
when a contract is terminated for convenience is not addressed.  
For instance, a $100,000 widget is only 30% completed. While contractor may use 
GAAP to value the 70% of the widget contract that is incomplete, there is not a guarantee that 
the contractor will do so since FAR does not make the usage of GAAP mandatory. Since GAAP 
is not applied uniformly to value terminations, widgets purchased under the same conditions by 
the same contractor may be valued using both GAAP and non-GAAP measures which leads 
contractors to question if they are getting a fair valuation for their efforts.  
So, attention must be turned to alternative uniform ways to calculate cost recovery.  
 Introduction to Cost Recovery in Commercial Item Contracts  
To provide context for a discussion of a potential uniform way to calculate cost recovery 
in commercial item contracts, GAAP, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, are discussed. 
GAAP principles include:  
• Recognition: What items should be recognized in the financial statements (for example 
as assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses). 
• Measurement: What amounts should be reported for each of the elements included in 
the financial statements.  
• Presentation: What line items, subtotals, and totals should be displayed in the financial 
statements and how line items might be aggregated within the financial statements. 
• Disclosure: What specific information is most important to the users of the financial 
statements. Disclosures both supplement and explain amounts in the statements. 
GAAP is followed by most organizations and was developed and established by FASB 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board).    
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 298 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Uniformity is an issue when calculating amount “contractors are entitled to recover the 
amount of cost of the contract work performed prior to termination” in contracts terminated for 
convenience. To calculate cost recovery using the present value of actual costs completed with 
certainty as required by Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F. 2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 
1987), FASB Concepts Statement No. 7 (FASB, 2000) is used to calculate the present value of 
actual costs completed. To address the issue of uniformity as well as to ensure the cost 
recovery is calculated with certainty, this paper seeks to address the following research 
question: How should the present value of commercial item contracts should be calculated and 
what corresponding contract clause should be inserted into the contract? This research question 
is relevant because there is no empirical evidence or support or current literature which already 
answers this question.  
Review of Existing Literature 
A literature review was conducted to determine if present value is currently being used 
for commercial item contracts. This not the case, as present value is currently being used for 
other contracting functions. For instance, the General Services Administration uses a “Present 
Value Analysis Model” (General Services Administration, 2019) for lease proposals which does 
not pertain to commercial items or to termination of contracts. The General Services 
Administration’s model only takes into account variables (e.g., utilities) which go into rental 
agreements. Chapter 9 of the Contract Pricing Guide discusses net present value in relation to 
cost price and analysis, which does not address net present value for commercial item contract 
cost recovery. Thus, there is no existing literature that addresses net present value usage in 
commercial item contract cost recovery.  
What Are Commercial Items? 
To provide context for potential commercial item termination reform, commercial items 
are defined. For non-government commercial acquisitions, the Federal Register identifies 
commercial items as including installation services, maintenance services, and other services 
procured to support a commercial item as well as products that were created by integrating 
commercial subsystems and components into a unique system (National Archives, n.d.).  
The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 (United States Department of 
Labor, 1995) and Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (United States Congress, 1994) identifies 
that the government prefers to purchase of commercial items for a myriad of reasons including 
minimizing acquisition lead time. FAR Council implementation of FARA with FAR Part 12, 
Acquisition of Commercial Items, streamlined commercial acquisition procedures and made 
them contingent upon a commercial item determination.    
However, commercial item reform has not established a uniform way to value the 
terminated portion of a commercial item contract in a manner that is perceived to be both fair 
and reasonable by the contractor and the government.  
FASB: What is the FASB and Why Use Concept Statement No. 7 
Discussion of what the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) is and why 
Concept Statement No. 7 is used helps to give context to the calculation of present value and 
fuzzy present value. The FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) is an independent, non-
for-profit organization that establishes financial accounting and reporting standards for public 
and private companies and non-profit organizations that follow GAAP. FASB is recognized as 
authoritative guidance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), state Boards of 
Accountancy, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) among other 
organizations.    
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Widespread acceptance of FASB pronouncements as being authoritative by the SEC, 
AICPA, and state boards of accountancy makes it makes likely that usage of a FASB Concept 
Statement to calculate the present value of actual costs completed will be unchallenged by 
expert witness testimony before the GAO, Boards of Contracting Appeals, or United States 
Court of Federal Claims during the appeal of a contracting officer’s decision. Recent decisions 
by the GAO, Armed Services Board of Contracting Appeals, Civilian Board of Contracting 
Appeals, and the Court of Federal Claims do not identify any instances where the FASB 
Concept Statement was used by either the government or the contractor to calculate the 
present value of actual completed. While usage of the FASB Concept Statement goes into 
uncharted territory in terms of whether it will be blessed by the judiciary, the authoritative nature 
of FASB and the acceptance of FASB pronouncements by the SEC, AICPA, and state boards 
of accountancy makes it prudent for the present value of actual costs completed to be 
calculated using a FASB Concept Statement. Since usage of GAAP is a widely accepted 
accounting practice recognized by the SEC, AICPA, and state board of accountancy, it is sound 
business judgment to award a contract using GAAP using FASB Concepts Statement No. 7.    
Why Use FASB Concept Statement No. 7   
FASB Concepts Statement No. 7 (FASB, 2000) is used to calculate present value of 
actual costs completed to determine amount of cost to be recovered due to the lack of a 
mechanism in the marketplace to readily observe the present value of actual costs completed to 
be recovered. While commercial item contracts may be “distinguished from one another in 
timing and uncertainty (FASB, 2000, p. 7), present value measurement helps to establish an 
economic difference between the commercial item contracts. Noted in FASB Concepts 
Statement No. 7 (FASB, 2000, p. 7–9), elements of present value include: (a) estimate of future 
cash flow, or in more complex cases, series of future cash flows at different times; (b) 
expectations about possible variations in the amount or timing of these cash flows, (c ) time 
value of money, represented by risk-free rate of interest; (d) price for bearing the uncertainty 
inherent in the asset; (e) other, sometimes unidentifiable, factors including illiquidity and market 
imperfections. The contracting officer shall consider these elements of present value in 
determining amount of cost to be recovered because some commercial items as identified in 
the Commercial Item Handbook may be: (a) “noncommercial modification” (Commercial Item 
Handbook, n.d.), (b) minor modifications of a type not customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace made to meet the government’s requirement, (c) evolved items, or (d) a type not 
identical to those in the commercial marketplace. Except modifications of commercial items 
available in the marketplace and the usage of a commercial item already on the marketplace 
meeting the government’s requirement, commercial items identified in the Commercial Item 
Handbook do meet the elements of present value set forth in FASB Concept Statement No. 7 
since they are illiquid in that they do not have a marketplace outside of the government. Illiquid 
commercial items may be commodities, such as gold, being purchased specifically for use by 
the government. These illiquid items would most likely be valued by consulting with experts on 
the particular item or by other estimating techniques permissible in the FAR and other 
procurement regulations.  
Calculation of the value of cash flow of cost to be recovered, either using best estimate 
or expected present value, applies to commercial items because they meet the elements of 
present value. Best estimate is used to determine amount of cost to be recovered for 
commercial items available in the marketplace and modifications of commercial items in the 
marketplace since there is a commercial item already in the marketplace to compare it to.    
How to Identify Cash Flow for Present Value 
The following steps, based on FASB Concept Statement No.7, are recommended to 
identify cash flow for commercial items using the best estimate method: 
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1. Comparison of commercial item in the contract to another commercial item existing in 
the marketplace that has an observed interest rate (this is commonly referred to as “the 
rate commensurate with the risk” [FASB, 2000]). 
2. Identification of set of discounted cash flows and comparison of cash flow sets between 
two commercial items. 
3. Evaluation of characteristics or elements in commercial items which are different from 
each other. 
4. Evaluate if changing economic conditions will cause the two commercial item cash flows 
to behave differently. 
Changing economic conditions may include labor strike increasing or decreasing the 
price of one commercial item. Different characteristics or elements of commercial items may 
have different capabilities (such as the speed of a machine lathe). Economic conditions may be 
outside of government or contractor control; however, it is considered when calculating present 
value.    
Best estimate method cannot be used for commercial items for which no market for the 
item or comparable item exists. For instance, actual cost to complete a supercomputer may be 
$100 million, comparable supercomputers on the market are valued at $200 million and $300 
million based on market research. Best estimate or most likely cash flow necessary to complete 
the supercomputer is $200 million. Therefore, contractor can expect to recover $200 million on 
the contract to build a supercomputer.   
Estimated Cash Flow Example   
An expected cash flow estimate method example is when actual cost to complete 
building a commercial (e.g., supercomputer computer) item may be $100 million, comparable 
supercomputers on the market are valued at $200 million and $300 million with probabilities of 
completion of actually completing the supercomputer at 10%, 60%, and 30%, respectively. The 
expected cash flow is $220 million using the following formula: ($100 million x .1) + ($200 
million x .6) + ($300 million x .30) =$220 million. Therefore, contractor can expect to recover 
$220 million on the contract to build a supercomputer.    
Although the estimated cash flow estimate method results in a higher cost of recovery 
for the contractor ($220 million versus $200 million using the best estimate method), the 
estimated cash flow method is preferred because it accounts for the uncertainty in the timing of 
the cash flow. Assigning risk in commercial item contracts to calculate present value of cost 
recovery is not an exact science. Economic or other conditions may contribute to the 
uncertainty of the contractor recovering these actual costs. Also, risk needs to be assessed on 
the commercial items under contract in relationship to the extent the commercial item adds to or 
diminishes total risk in the total commercial items under contract. Returns on one commercial 
item vary with the market for all commercial items or recent experience and framing of decisions 
by contracting officers influence the price of commercial items in the market. Alternatively, 
behavioral economics might also influence price of commercial items in the marketplace. 
Economic factors and different contracting officers may assign different degrees of risk to a 
commercial item necessitate market research to be conducted to justify calculations of actual 
costs to be recovered on a commercial item contract.    
Examples of economic factors impacting price of commercial items would be inflation or 
deflation.  
 Why Use Estimated Cash Flow Method?  
One of the objectives of the FAR is to “minimize administrative costs” per FAR 1.102. 
Usage of estimated cash flow method to calculate estimated cost to complete a contract is a 
consist method to determine how best to calculate the percentage of contract to be completed. 
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The cash flow estimate method results in a higher cost of recovery for the contractor ($220 
million versus $200 million using the best estimate method), which results in cost recovery 
being calculated using a generally accepted method. Thus, contracting officer oversight and 
legal scrutiny of contracts for commercial items using estimated cash flow method is reduced.  
Different interpretations trigger contradictory results since some contractors elect to use 
different net present value analysis techniques and some not electing to use any techniques at 
all. Inevitably, court decisions will differ on the same sets of facts if contractors use different 
present value analysis techniques or no present value techniques, promoting doubt as to amount 
of cost to be recovered. A contractor using estimated cash flow method does not risk a court not 
finding fair compensation in terminations for convenience because of usage of generally accepted 
method to calculate net present value.   
Valuation Based on Past Performance 
Actual cost to complete may be valued solely using value of the commercial item 
multiplied by probability of completion based on past performance in instances when prices of 
comparable commercial items cannot be obtained. For example, a supercomputer contract 
costing $100 million and a probability of completion of 10% would result in actual cost recovery 
to complete of $10 million.  
This approach is used in contingency operations; defense or recovery from cyber, 
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack; major disasters or emergency assistance 
required under the Stafford Act as declared by the president; and Humanitarian or 
Peacekeeping Operations. A contingency operation might be a hurricane because the president 
issues emergency assistance declarations for those natural disasters. During contingencies, it 
may be impractical to gather other commercial sources for the purposes of valuing the 
commercial item or it must be so urgent that the contract be terminated, and another contractor 
selected that it would be impractical to gather other commercial sources for comparison. Other 
sole source acquisitions scenarios may also apply other than contingency operations and the 
same valuation procedure would apply.  
Unique Systems: Present Value 
A unique system could range from a weapons system to a supercomputer. Thus, “fuzzy 
net cash flow” (Maravas & Pantouvakis, 2012) is useful in determining present value of the 
commercial item. The following formula based on Maravas and Pantouvakis (2012) is proposed 
in order to calculate cash flow: Cash Flow = Time Savings + Operating Cost Savings + Accident 
Savings + Environmental Savings – Investment Cost – Operation and Maintenance Cost. 
Accident Savings includes manpower and facilities damage and is determined by the contractor 
subject to verification by government auditors.  
Investment cost is the cost of acquiring the commercial item, including research and 
development expenses. Time savings include manpower as well as facilities overhead and 
other incurred direct and indirect costs.  
Due to lack of empirical data and usage of fuzzy cash flow, administrative burden to 
government and industry may or may not be increased or decreased. Data is collected for each 
of the year(s) of operation and may be reduced or increased by a certain percentage and 
variables of time savings may be reduced or increased by a certain percentage in order to 
determine the valuation of cash flow. This quantifies risk inherent in the commercial item 
system. In the initial years of a system, the investment costs of the project, such the cost of 
component commercial items, may be present while there are no benefits or maintenance costs 
present. Time savings, operational cost savings, environmental savings, and operation and 
maintenance costs are realized in later years of the project based on contractor provided data. 
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The system becomes unsustainable when investment cost (e.g., cost of replacement parts) 
outweighs the benefits and savings of the project. Since it is unknown how risky a project will 
be, cash flow calculated is from the previous formula will be multiplied by the probability of the 
unique system being successful in order to derive the present value of a system over time. In 
FASB Concept Statement No. 7 page 21, the expected present value of a system is the sum of 
the present value of the present values.     
For example, present value of a system being 10% successful is 95.24 in year 1, 541.64 
as the probability increases to 60% in year 2, and 255.48 as the probability decreases to 30% in 
year 3, the total expected value is 892.36. Contract was 30% complete at time of termination; 
therefore contractor is entitled to recover 30% of 892.36 as the amount of contract work 
performed prior to termination.     
Watson as an Example of a Unique System and Present Value 
Watson, the IBM supercomputer used in the popular television series Jeopardy, is a 
unique system. In year 1, Watson would be unsustainable because of tweaks needed for its 
algorithm, thus a 10% success rate is assigned to Watson and for the purposes of this example 
it is valued at $95.24 million in year 1, and the next year the probability increases to 60% 
because the kinks in algorithm were worked out thus probability increases to 60%, which results 
in a value of $541.64 million. Valuation is increased to $892.36 million in year 3. If the contract 
to build Watson was terminated when it was 30% completed, the contractor is entitled to recover 
30% of $892.36 million as the amount of contract work performed prior to termination.    
 Why Use Fuzzy Net Cash Flow?  
An objective of the FAR is to “minimize administrative costs” as documented in FAR 1.102. The 
estimated cash flow method to calculate estimated cost to complete a contract is a consistent 
method. Thus, it reduces the need for contracting officer oversight and legal scrutiny of 
commercial item contracts using fuzzy net cash flow method. Currently, no contractors use 
fuzzy net cash flow since it is not mentioned in the FAR. 
Inevitably, court decisions will differ on the same sets of facts if contractors use different 
present value analysis techniques or no present value techniques, promoting doubt as to 
amount of cost to be recovered. Contractors using the estimated cash flow method may have 
courts find fair compensation in terminations for convenience because of the usage of a 
generally accepted method to calculate net present value. 
Are These Changes Permissible in the FAR? 
FAR 12.403(d)(1)(i)(a) (“Welcome to FARSite”, n.d.) states the percentage of the 
contract price reflecting percentage of work performed is the amount that the contractor should 
be paid when terminating a contract for convenience. FAR 12.403(d)(1)(i)(a) states in part: (d) 
Termination for the Government’s convenience. (1) When contracting officer terminates a 
contract for commercial items for the Government’s convenience, the contractor shall be 
paid --   
(i) (A) The percentage of the contract price reflecting the percentage of the work 
performed prior to the notice of the termination for fixed-price or fixed price with 
economic price adjustment contracts.  
 Net Present Value Clause 
Lack of existing literature on an NPV clause for commercial item contracts terminated for 
convenience warrants rationale for this clause based on policy goals of the FAR. A policy goal 
of the FAR is uniformity. Contractors can’t elect not to use NPV, a type of analytical method, 
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just because FAR 12.403(d)(i)(B)(ii) only includes the word may, rather than shall, which the 
Supreme Court has held to be discretionary. 
The drafters of the FAR required “coordination, simplicity and uniformity in the Federal 
acquisition process” (Mason, 2000, p. 724). Requiring net present value in all cases of 
government contracting furthers this goal. Conversely, different interpretations would occur with 
some contractors electing to use present value analysis and some electing not to do so. 
Inevitably, court decisions will differ on the same sets of facts if contractors used GAAP 
as a means of fair compensation merely because of the usage of the term may, promoting 
doubt as to if the contractor should use net present value analysis as promogulated by GAAP. A 
contractor using NPV clause is fair compensating in terminations for convenience because of 
the lack of the word shall in the clause.   
 Alternative 1: The term net present value (NPV) shall mean present value of cash 
payments generated by a commercial item(s), calculated using a discount rate determined by 
an actuary selected by the government and determined in accordance with GAAP. Probability 
shall be determined by conducting an analysis of alternatives analysis. Contractors shall 
calculate cost recovery or charges from commercial item terminations based on NPV or fuzzy 
net cash flow. 
Alternative 2: The term net present value (NPV) shall mean present value of cash 
payments generated by a commercial item(s), due in the future reduced by a discount rate 
equal to 100% of the Applicable Federal Rate (as defined in Code Section 1274(d). Contractors 
shall calculate cost recovery or charges from commercial item terminations based on NPV. 
Probability shall be determined by conducting an analysis of alternatives analysis.     
Internal Revenue Code Section (IRC) 1274(d) applies to debt instruments which are 
publicly traded or issued for publicly traded property, such as government property. As noted in 
IRC 1275(a)(1), a debt instrument includes: 
Daily portion of original issue discount for any day shall be determined under section 
1272(a) (without regard to paragraph (7) thereof and without regard to section 1273(a)(3)). In 
the case of an obligor of a short-term obligation (as defined in section 1283(a)(1)(A)) who uses 
the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, the original issue discount (and any 
other interest payable) on such obligation shall be deductible only when paid.   
An example of a debt instrument may be a loan from a bank to a contractor.   
So, alternative 2 applies to commercial items purchased using debt financing. 
Conversely, a contractor who does not use net present value clause risks a court not finding fair 
compensation in terminations for convenience because of the usage of word may in FAR 
12.403(d)(i)(B)(ii).   
A final policy benefit is consistent enforcement of the usage of present value in 
termination of commercial item contracts. Definition of NPV, either in alternative 1 or alternative 
2, and uniform application gives contractors a clear path to take prior to court intervention. This 
“minimizes administrative operating costs” as required in FAR 1.102, by having government 
spend less time and money in oversight functions (such as audit) ensuring that contracting 
officers fairly compensate contractors in terminations since it is mandatory not optional to do so.  
 Example of Net Present Value Clause  
Using Alternative 1, an acquisition would be valued at $61,446 today assuming a return of 
$10,000 per year over 10 years having a discount rate of 10%. Without using net present value, 
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the present value of the acquisition at year 10 would be $3,855. If the contract is terminated 
prior to completion without using net present when it is 70% completed, the contractor would be 
entitled to recovery $2698.50 compared with $43012.20 using net present value due to the time 
value of money. It is not practical to provide an example of Alternative 2 because the AFR 
changes from month to month within a given year.  
Conclusion 
Calculation of cost recovery in commercial item contracts terminated for convenience is 
a challenge due to a lack of current literature and a lack of mandatory techniques to be used. 
Usage of FASB Concepts Statement No. 7 after calculating a fuzzy net cash flow, 
present value of commercial item contracts is determined for complex commercial acquisitions. 
Usage of fuzzy net cash flow reduces the overall administrative burden for contract 
administration since it is a consistent technique being used. Present value is calculated using 
FASB Concepts Statement No. 7 for other commercial items. 
Usage of present value reduces the overall administrative burden for contract 
administration since it is a consistent technique being used. The difference between present 
value and fuzzy net cash flow is that fuzzy net cash takes into account other variables impacting 
valuation, such as operating time, which may provide a more accurate projection of present 
value for complex commercial items. Two present value clauses are proposed in order to assist 
contracting officers in determining the present value of commercial item contracts and to serve 
a variety of policy benefits as to the construction of the FAR. Mandatory usage of NPV clauses 
provides for uniformity while providing a framework to base negotiations upon.  
It is unknown if the present value, fuzzy value, and present value clauses will hold up to 
scrutiny by the Armed Services Board of Contracting Appeals and other courts due to the lack 
of cases which address these issues. There is a lack of empirical evidence or existing literature 
regarding the usage of present value and fuzzy value in commercial item contracts since these 
methods have not been tried in the field yet. 
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Abstract 
In this research, we answer the following primary question: Would an advanced analytical model 
be a more effective metric to estimate total ownership cost (TOC) with life-cycle cost under 
uncertainty and risk than the current method of life-cycle cost estimates for surface electro-optical 
infrared (EO/IR) sensors? To accomplish this, we developed and analyzed a computational 
model for Total Ownership with Life-Cycle Cost Model Under Uncertainty for Surface Electro-
Optical Infrared Sensors. During the development of the model, we identified the required data 
and examined the current Department of Defense (DoD) method for determining system life-cycle 
costs for defense systems and determined that the proposed model is a useful alternative to the 
current method of determining the life-cycle costs for EO/IR sensors on surface ships. Finally, we 
concluded that the developed model can be applied to cost estimating in other sectors of DoD 
cost projections.  
Introduction 
Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to develop a model to estimate total ownership with life-cycle 
costs under uncertainty associated with surface electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) sensors. We examine 
the basics of total ownership cost (TOC) modeling over the life cycle of the EO/IR sensors, including 
the inception phase of acquisition costs, followed by annual operations and maintenance (O&M) 
expenses, along with a final set of disposition costs at the end of life of the sensor. This model will 
allow managers to have better decision analytics of the costs of said sensors for use in subsequent 
cost comparisons across sensor platforms, return on investment analysis, portfolio allocation of 
resources, and analysis of alternatives. 
Research Focus 
In this research, we answer the following primary question: Would an advanced analytical 
model be a more effective metric to estimate TOC with life-cycle cost under uncertainty and risk than 
the current method of life-cycle cost estimates for surface EO/IR sensors? To accomplish this, we 
develop and analyze a Total Ownership with Life-Cycle Cost Model Under Uncertainty for surface 
EO/IR sensors. In the development of the model, we determine what data are required to implement 
our proposed model for surface ship EO/IR sensors. We also examine the current Department of 
Defense (DoD) method for determining system life-cycle costs for defense systems and consider 
whether the proposed model is a useful alternative to the current method of determining the life-cycle 
costs for EO/IR sensors on surface ships. Finally, we consider whether the developed model can be 
applied to cost estimating in other sectors of DoD cost projections. 
Research Summary 
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While executing a standard life cycle–based TOC analysis, we assume that, before the 
system is operational, there are substantial acquisition costs. These costs are usually referred to as 
Year 0, followed by the operational years where operation and maintenance costs will apply. The 
final price analyzed is the salvage cost, or the cost to properly dispose of, sell, or render the system 
inoperable. The sum of these three expenses is called the life-cycle cost. Unfortunately, the accurate 
calculation of these costs is not as straightforward as their descriptions. To accurately incorporate 
these three factors, it is essential to consider economic theory. The elements of time valuation of 
money are critical in the analysis of alternatives. The economic growth, annual discount rate, inflation, 
and opportunity cost of investing in a specific system are essential to our study. Other factors include 
budgetary cutbacks and changes in technology. The model will allow the user to input these changes 
to manually adjust for each of these. Utilizing this model will serve as a proof of concept to 
understand how this approach could be used to reduce cost overflow and prevent budget overruns. It 
will provide greater insight into the true nature of the cost of cash outflow and the life cycle of the 
product and its associated costs. These results would give leaders a more effective metric to analyze 




This background and literature review provide a comprehensive overview of the topics 
pertinent to our project. We first examine the concepts and best practices in the field of cost and cost 
estimation and their application inside of the DoD. We then investigate the DoD’s acquisition process 
as a whole to analyze how the DoD can utilize cost estimation to influence decision-making. After 
covering basic cost estimation and the acquisition system, we then discuss TOC and life-cycle cost 
estimations and how these factors play a role in calculating the overall cost of a system. The review 
also covers the topics of risk and uncertainty to explain the relationship and the differences between 
the two as well as to highlight the importance of properly accounting for both factors. We conclude 
with an overview of our model’s subject, the EO/IR sensor. We give a brief rundown of the 
capabilities as well as the applications that these sensors have on Navy surface vessels, along with 
their rapidly changing technology, and state why it is imperative that the Navy continues to buy these 
sensors while ensuring the cost stays at a rational price point.  
Cost Estimation 
The DoD receives a limited amount of funds every fiscal year and must decide how those 
funds are used in support of U.S. national strategies and goals. Specifically, those decisions fall into 
one of three categories: long-term planning, budgeting, or choosing among alternatives (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). The government is tasked with spending taxpayers’ dollars effectively and 
efficiently. This means that the DoD decision-makers must ensure they make strategic investments, 
including the acquisition of new programs and systems. Before a program is implemented or a 
system is purchased, decision-makers must understand the full cost that will be incurred and its effect 
on the DoD’s limited budget.  
The projected costs of major acquisitions are produced through a process known as cost 
estimation. Cost estimation is defined as “the process of collecting and analyzing historical data and 
applying quantitative models, techniques, tools, and databases in order to predict an estimate of the 
future cost of an item, product, or task” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 11). In basic terms, cost 
estimation is performed by running relevant data from the past through a model or database to 
predict what an item will cost in the future. It is important to note that reliable historical data are 
fundamental to this process.  
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In order to produce cost estimates, we must first gather available historical data. Collecting 
data is often the most time-consuming and costly step of the entire cost estimation process (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). Only after the historical data have been obtained can the cost analyst start the 
“organization, normalization, and management of that historical data” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 
11). Normalization refers to taking the historical data and “applying adjustments to that data to gain 
consistent, comparable data to be used in your estimates” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 78). 
Normalizing the data set allows the analyst to compare data across different periods of time by 
adjusting for different factors. The data set must be normalized three different ways: for content, for 
quantity, and for inflation (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Normalizing for content ensures comparison 
across the same category or type of data (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Normalizing for quantity 
ensures comparison of data at the same point on the learning curve of production and of equal 
quantities (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Finally, the data are adjusted to account for inflation when 
comparing data from different years (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015).  
The second component of cost estimation is the quantitative model that is used to turn 
normalized historical data into a future cost estimate. Mislick and Nussbaum (2015) explain that the 
“profession of cost estimating is scientifically grounded by using transparent, rationally defensible and 
reviewable quantitative methods” (p. 12). The development of a high-quality quantitative model is key 
in cost estimation. If a poor quantitative model is used, then the quality and reliability of the cost 
estimate will also be poor. This highlights the importance of the quality cost models for EO/IR 
sensors.  
The third part of Mislick and Nussbaum’s (2015) definition of cost estimation is to predict. The 
ultimate goal of cost estimation is to predict a future cost. The prediction is based on the information 
available at the time. We can only “estimate the conditions that will pertain later when the project is 
executed” and must rely on the information available in the present (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 
12). While no one can forecast the future with 100% accuracy, through historical data and 
quantitative models, we are able to provide a more accurate prediction that, while not perfect, is still a 
useful tool for decision-makers in the acquisition process. 
One of the most important characteristics of a quality cost estimate is that it must be 
understandable to the user or decision-maker in order to be an efficient decision-making tool (Mislick 
& Nussbaum, 2015). To this end, a complex approach to cost estimation should be avoided and a 
simpler approach should be used (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). An understandable estimate also 
clearly lays out the assumptions and ground rules that were used in the process (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). With the diversity among people’s background and experiences, there can be 
differing underlying assumptions in the cost estimation process. Therefore, the assumptions used 
must be clearly stated, and a sensitivity analysis should be performed to accommodate additional 
variations of assumptions (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015).  
Cost Overview  
Before comprehending cost estimation methods, it is important to become familiar with the terms 
associated with cost estimation. To begin with, an understanding of “cost” provides a solid foundation 
in the cost estimation process. If we do not understand what we are trying to predict, then we will not 
produce a quality or credible estimation. The term cost is often used interchangeably with the term 
price; however, they do not have the same meaning. There is an important distinction between the 
two terms. Mislick and Nussbaum (2015) define cost as the total amount of money needed to 
produce a certain item, or a quantitative measurement that accounts for all resources needed to 
produce an item. However, they refer to price as the amount of money that a person must pay for an 
item. When we go into a store, we normally ask the salesperson “What does this item cost?” 
Answering the literal question of what an item costs would encompass every resource that went into 
the development and production of that item. Instead, the accurate question is, “What’s the item’s 
price?” or “How much money must I exchange to receive that item?”  
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Because the term cost can refer to a number of different types or categories, the type of cost 
is important to understand during the cost estimation process. One of the first distinctions is between 
recurring and nonrecurring costs. A recurring cost is “repetitive and occurs each time a company 
produces a unit” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 26). When a bottling company produces a bottled 
beverage, each bottle cap has an associated cost. The cost of each bottle cap is recurring. In 
contrast, a nonrecurring cost is “not repetitive and cannot be tied to the quantity of the items being 
produced” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 26). The cost associated with purchase of the bottling 
machine would be considered nonrecurring. Closely related to recurring and nonrecurring costs are 
fixed and variable costs. Variable costs are associated and vary with the level of production (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). The more units produced, the more the total variable cost. However, fixed costs 
are unaffected by the level of production and are “generally associated with nonrecurring costs” 
(Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 27). No matter how many units are produced, the fixed cost will 
remain unchanged. 
Another distinction between types of cost is direct and indirect costs. A direct cost can be 
“reasonably measured and allocated to a specific output, product, or work activity” (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015, p. 26). The material used to produce an item is a direct cost. An indirect cost 
“cannot be attributed or allocated to a specific output, product, or work activity” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 
2015, p. 27). The maintenance required for the upkeep of a machine used in production is indirect. 
Operating costs that are not direct labor or material, such as electricity and property taxes, are 
classified as overhead costs (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). 
The Theory of Predictive Modeling in Cost 
Generally, forecasting can be divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches. Qualitative 
forecasting is used when little to no reliable historical, contemporaneous, or comparable data exist. 
Several qualitative methods exist, such as the Delphi or expert opinion approach (a consensus-
building forecast by field experts, marketing experts, or internal staff members), management 
assumptions (target growth rates set by senior management), and market research or external data 
or polling and surveys (data obtained through third-party sources, industry and sector indexes, or 
active market research). These estimates can be either single-point estimates (an average 
consensus) or a set of prediction values (a distribution of predictions). The latter can be entered into 
Risk Simulator as a custom distribution, and the resulting predictions can be simulated (i.e., running a 
nonparametric simulation using the prediction data points as the custom distribution).  
For quantitative forecasting, the available data or data that need to be forecasted can be 
divided into time series (values that have a time element to them, such as revenues at different 
years, inflation rates, interest rates, market share, failure rates, and so forth), cross-sectional (values 
that are time independent, such as the grade point average of sophomore students across the nation 
in a particular year, given each student’s levels of SAT scores, IQ, and number of alcoholic 
beverages consumed per week), or mixed panel (mixture between time-series and panel data; e.g., 
predicting sales over the next 10 years given budgeted marketing expenses and market share 
projections, which means that the sales data are time series, but exogenous variables such as 
marketing expenses and market share exist to help to model the forecast predictions). Here is a 
quick review of each of the most commonly used forecasting methodologies.  
Life-Cycle Cost  
In developing a cost estimate, we first must understand a program’s or project’s life cycle. A 
life cycle follows the project or program from its inception to its disposal, or “cradle to grave.” It 
includes “the various stages of activity or phases through which the project progresses on its way 
from beginning to completion” (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 3). The life cycle starts at a program’s 
development; flows through its production, operation, and maintenance; and finally concludes after 
proper disposal. The costs associated with this process are classified as the program’s life-cycle cost.  
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The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines life-cycle cost as the direct cost of the 
acquisition program as well as the indirect cost that can be logically attributed to the program over the 
entire life cycle (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], n.d.-b). It includes the cost to the government 
to “acquire, operate, support (to include manpower), and where applicable, dispose” of a system or 
program (DAU, n.d.-b). There are multiple stakeholders in the DoD—such as Congress, the program 
manager and office, and contractors—that view a program’s life-cycle cost from different 
perspectives. These multiple perspectives have led to three different methods of breaking down and 
displaying life-cycle cost.  
The first method is breaking down program life-cycle costs by five different appropriation 
categories (DAU, n.d.-b): research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); procurement; 
operations and maintenance (O&M); military construction (MILCON); and military personnel 
(MILPERS). This method is used to develop and submit budget requests to Congress (DAU, n.d.-b).  
However, program managers and program offices would not find the first method as useful as 
Congress does. Instead, they utilize program life-cycle costs that are broken down by Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS; DAU, n.d.-b). The DAU describes a Work Breakdown Structure as a 
framework that displays “the total system as a product-oriented family tree composed of hardware, 
software, services, data, and facilities” (DAU, n.d.-b). The WBS relates all of the work elements to 
each other and eventually to the final product (DAU, n.d.-b). A WBS encompasses all of the work 
necessary to produce a product (Huynh & Snider, 2008). This breakdown shows the relationship 
between costs and different elements of a system, which is a useful tool for program managers and 
contractors.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD 
CAPE) outlined the third life-cycle cost display method in its Operating and Support Cost-Estimating 
Guide (Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation [OSD 
CAPE], 2014). The OSD CAPE defines a program’s life-cycle cost as the summation of four different 
cost categories or phases: research and development (R&D), investment, operating and support 
(O&S), and disposal. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the four cost categories over a 
program’s life cycle.  
R&D is the initial cost category or phase in a program’s life cycle. These costs are the first 
incurred in the research, design, and development of a new system or program. They can also 
include the “system design and integration; development, fabrication, assembly, and test of hardware 
and software for protypes and/or engineering development models” (OSD CAPE, 2014, pp. 2–3).  
Following R&D is the investment cost category. These costs are incurred from “procurement 
and related activities from the beginning of low rate initial production (LRIP) through completion of 
deployment” (OSD CAPE, 2014, pp. 2–3). Low rate initial production refers to the production of the 
minimal number of a product or system that is required for initial operational test and evaluation 
(IOT&E; DAU, n.d.-c). Investment costs can include program management, initial spares, technical 
publications, and equipment training (OSD CAPE, 2014).  
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Figure 1. Notional Profile of Annual Program Expenditures by Major Cost Category over the 
System Life Cycle. Source: OSD CAPE (2014). 
The O&S phase is the third phase in the OSD CAPE definition of life-cycle cost. The O&S 
phase normally accounts for a majority of a project’s life-cycle costs (OSD CAPE, 2014). O&S 
consists of all of a system’s operation and sustainment cost from initial deployment to the end of its 
operational life. This includes all the costs associated with “operating, maintaining, and supporting a 
fielded system” (OSD CAPE, 2014, pp. 2–3). Specifically, costs can include “personnel, equipment, 
supplies, software, and services associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, and 
otherwise supporting a system” (OSD CAPE, 2014, pp. 2–3). 
The fourth and final OSD CAPE cost category is disposal. Disposal costs are those 
associated with the proper disposal or demilitarization at the end of a system’s operational life (OSD 
CAPE, 2014). These costs can include “disassembly, materials processing, decontamination, 
collection/storage/disposal of hazardous materials and/or waste, safety precautions, and 
transportation of the system to and from the disposal site” (OSD CAPE, 2014, pp. 2–5). However, 
disposal costs can also be incurred during the sustainment phase due to unplanned system losses 
(OSD CAPE, 2014). We revisit this method of life-cycle costing in our discussion of total ownership 
costing. 
Cost Estimation in the Department of Defense 
Cost estimation is an important and required tool used by decision-makers in defense 
acquisitions. The requirement for a cost estimation is outlined in Department of Defense Instruction 
5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. Specifically, the instruction mandates that the  
DoD Component will develop a DoD Component Cost Estimate that covers the 
entire life cycle of the program for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) prior to Milestone A, B, and C reviews and the Full-Rate Production 
Decision; and for all Major Automated Information System (MAIS) programs at any 
time an Economic Analysis is due. (DoD, 2017, p. 135) 
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This means that before the acquisition process can move beyond the MSA, TMRR, and EMD 
phases and ultimately continue on to full production, a cost estimate encompassing the entire 
program life cycle must be produced. In addition to the DoD’s Component cost estimate, a separate, 
independent cost estimate is also required. DODI 5000.02 requires the Milestone Decision Authority 
to consider an “independent estimate of the full life-cycle cost of a program, prepared or approved by 
the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (DCAPE)” (DoD, 2017, p. 135). The DoD 
Component and DCAPE cost estimates are typically classified as Life-Cycle Cost Estimations 
(LCCEs). Mislick and Nussbaum (2015) describe an LCCE as a “a cost estimate for the totality of the 
resources that will be necessary throughout the product’s life cycle” (p. 18).  
There are four main cost estimating techniques used in the DoD to develop an LCCE, and 
they can be used in different phases of a program’s life cycle (Ambrose, 2017). The first method is 
parametric cost estimating and involves the use of statistical inferences to generate an estimate 
based on system performance and design (Ambrose, 2017). Using historical data from similar 
systems, cost estimation relationships (CERs) and patterns are identified. Those patterns are 
assumed to hold true in the future and are used to predict cost (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). The 
second method is analogy cost estimating, whereby a new system is compared to a similar existing 
system. The analogy method is a relatively quick and inexpensive method; however, it may not be as 
precise as other methods (Ambrose, 2017). The parametric and analogy methods are normally used 
early on in the acquisition process during the materiel solution analysis (MSA), technology maturation 
and risk reduction (TMMR), and engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phases 
(Ambrose, 2017). The third and most time-consuming method is engineering cost estimation. In this 
method, the system is broken down into its WBS elements in which individual detailed estimates are 
conducted. These estimates are then summed together to create the overall estimate (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). The engineering method is used during the TMMR phase and through the 
remaining acquisition process (Ambrose, 2017). The last main method used by the DoD is actual 
costing. This method uses the actual costs from a system that were incurred in the past to predict the 
cost of producing that system in the future (Ambrose, 2017). This method can be used after a 
program has entered the production and deployment (P&D) phase.  
Total Ownership Cost 
While LCCEs are a useful tool for decision-makers, they present a narrower scope when a 
broader perspective may be more beneficial (Kobren, 2014). Thus, we introduce the concept of total 
ownership cost (TOC). The DAU defines total ownership cost as including the “elements of life-cycle 
cost as well as other infrastructure or business process costs not normally attributed to the program” 
(Kobren, 2014). Infrastructure refers to “all military department and defense agency activities that 
sustain the military forces assigned to the combatant and component commanders” (Kobren, 2014). 
The major infrastructure categories are support to equipment, support to military personnel, and 
support to military bases (Kobren, 2014). Not normally included in a traditional LCCE, other support 
activities to consider in a cost estimate are recruiting, environmental and safety compliance, 
management headquarters functions, and logistics infrastructure activities (Kobren, 2014).  
DoD Directive 5000.01 states that  
DoD Components shall plan programs based on realistic projections of the dollars 
and manpower likely to be available in future years. To the greatest extent 
possible, the MDAs shall identify the total costs of ownership, and at a minimum, 
the major drivers of total ownership costs. (DoD, 2003) 
This requires the DoD to expand beyond the basic life-cycle cost estimation and include the support 
activities and infrastructure costs. To support the DoD directive, the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
issued its Total Ownership Cost (TOC) Guidebook in which it describes “new departmental and naval 
processes” that support the DoD policy of the identification of total costs of ownership (DoN, 2014, p. 
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6). Specifically, the guidebook assists the DoN and its organizations in developing, understanding, 
and applying the TOC requirements of the DoD.  
The DoN outlines the importance of TOC: “As the DoD (and Navy) funding remains constant 
or declines, and as Navy’s purchasing power declines as a result, increasing the decision weight 
priority for alternatives that can mitigate and reduce TOC becomes our clearest path to a capable an 
optimally affordable Fleet” (DoN, 2014, p. 8). For this reason, we focus our model on TOC instead of 
a standard life-cycle cost. 
Risk and Uncertainty  
A key point that we need to understand in cost estimating is that the future is uncertain. 
Therefore, an essential pillar in developing a defensible and credible cost estimate is ensuring that 
risk and uncertainty are incorporated. A cost estimate can be severely affected by factors such as 
technological maturity, schedule slips, software requirements, or any other unforeseen event (Mislick 
& Nussbaum, 2015). Unknown factors make any “point estimate” or any exact answer extraordinarily 
unlikely (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). A more accurate estimate uses a central tendency centered on 
the original point estimate and a range both higher and lower to define the bounds of the estimate.  
Though similar and related, risk and uncertainty are not synonymous. In the simplest terms, 
risk is the “probability” of the occurrence of a negative or unfavorable event, while uncertainty is the 
lack of certainty, or the realization that definitively knowing the outcome of any future event is 
completely impossible (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Unlike with risk, with uncertainty we are not able 
to predict the possibility of any future outcome. In Johnathan Mun’s book, Readings in Certified 
Quantitative Risk Management (CQRM), he states,  
The concepts of risk and uncertainty are related but different. Uncertainty involves 
variables that are unknown and changing, but uncertainty will become known and 
resolved through the passage of time, events, and action. Risk is something one 
bears and is the outcome of uncertainty. Sometimes risk may remain constant 
while uncertainty increases over time. (Mun, 2015, p. 28)  
A good way to think about risk and uncertainty is to imagine going on a sky diving trip with a 
friend. As the plane takes off, you and your friend realize that there is only one parachute and that the 
parachute is looking like it is somewhat past its service life. Your friend, being slightly more 
adventurous than you, decides to grab the parachute and take the jump. Both you and your friend 
share the same level of uncertainty about whether the parachute will open and whether your friend 
will live to tell the story. However, only your friend will assume the risk of jumping out of the plane and 
falling to his death.  
Electro-Optical Infrared Sensors  
Electro-optics (EO) are the field systems that convert electrons into photons (Driggers & 
Nichols, 2012). These systems are designed to respond to wavelengths within the 0.4–0.07 
micrometer wavelength (Driggers & Nichols, 2012). They deliver images that are analogous to 
human vision; some EO systems are even capable of processing the near or short infrared spectral 
region (Driggers & Nichols, 2012). Figure 2 shows the basic components of an EO/IR sensor system. 
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Figure 2. EO and IR Sensors (Driggers & Nichols, 2012) 
The term target is used to describe the desired image that we are looking for with an EO 
sensor. The signal from a target usually has a large reflective component typically in the EO 
wavelength band. The target is provided this reflective component by moonlight, starlight, sunlight, or 
any artificial light source (Driggers & Nichols, 2012). The light sources reflecting off of the background 
and the target are known as external radiation. Radiation reflected by targets and background does 
not go directly to the EO sensor. The reflected radiation must first transition through the atmosphere, 
where it experiences scattering, before being processed by the EO sensor (Driggers & Nichols, 
2012). Scattering is a phenomenon where particles in the atmosphere such as smoke, smog, or mist 
interfere with the reflection. Once the reflected radiation meets the EO sensor, it is passed through 
the sensing element, which could be detectors, tubes, or image intensifiers (low light situations; 
Driggers & Nichols, 2012). Next, the output of the sensor element is digested by the electronics and 
sent to a human interface for the operator (human) to gather some information from the process. This 
information could take a myriad of shapes such as detection, recognition, or identification of targets 
such as a warship. In short, EO sensors are essentially products of the light reflected from the scene 
(Driggers & Nichols, 2012). Figure 3 represents a typical EO sensor scenario.  
 
Figure 3. Typical EO Sensor Scenario (Driggers & Nichols, 2012) 
Infrared is able to digest the spectral region from 0.7 to 14 micrometer wavelengths and is divided 
into four subregions:  
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The near-infrared (NIR) region is from 0.7 to 1.1 mm, the short-wave infrared 
(SWIR) region is from 1.1 to 3 mm, the midwave infrared (MWIR) region is from 3 
to 5 mm, and the long-wave infrared (LWIR) region is from 8 to 14 mm. Infrared is 
primarily used in night operations. (Driggers & Nichols, 2012) 
The science of infrared is based on the science supporting Planck’s law, which states that all bodies 
above the temperature of absolute zero emit electromagnetic radiation. The electromagnetic radiation 
is exploited to uncover the electromagnetic signatures given off that do not correlate to the 
wavelengths visible by the human eye or EO sensors.  
As the temperature of the object gets hotter, the peak wavelength moves to shorter 
wavelengths so that at very hot temperatures the radiation is perceived by the eye 
as light. The emissive surface characteristics of the hot object determine the 
spectral emission weighting of the radiation. The radiation emitted travels through 
the atmosphere, where it will then meet the aperture of the sensor. (Driggers & 
Nichols, 2012, p. 7) 
EO/IR Sensors on Surface Ships 
Before the advent of EO, direct optics were a commander’s main resource in support of 
tactical decision-making. Binoculars, stadimeters, and periscopes were the keys to situational 
awareness and obtaining fire control solutions for torpedoes and gun engagements (Davidson, 
2015). With the invention of EO, warfighters are no longer restricted to the limitations of the human 
eye. The application of using television cameras and the discovery of light-sensitive semiconductor 
materials allow images to be converted into electrical signals that are fed into displays for humans to 
process information. EO sensors paired with the ability of infrared detection allow warfighters to 
discern a target in the most vast and unlit environments (Davidson, 2015).  
In Stefan Nitschke’s (2007) article, “New Generation Naval Electro Optics,” he states, “Electro 
Optical/Infrared technology is an invaluable aid for the 21st century battlespace arena. It provides 
surface warships, submarines, and maritime aviation operating in the varying naval environment with 
extensive image gathering, navigational, and targeting capabilities” (p. 87). The constant advances in 
EO/IR systems have led to the development of sensors with integral lasers that are used to measure 
distances with extreme accuracy and are a fraction of the size of the range finders of legacy ships 
(Davidson, 2015). In the report given by the Institute of Defense Analyses entitled A Tutorial on 
Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Theory and Systems, it is stated that “the performance of an EO/IR 
sensor depends on the optics, detector, display, target-background contrast, and the intensity of the 
illumination source” (Koretsky et al., 2013, p. 5).  
Technological advances have emphasized the importance of the opportunity and the 
necessity to reinvest in the newest technologies and systems. These advances in technology will 
drive future EO/IR systems purchases by the DoD. These system acquisitions will require credible 
and reliable cost estimations to ensure that the DoD manages its budget effectively. With the 
complexity and uniqueness of EO/IR systems, an efficient cost estimation model is needed to 
account for all life-cycle costs. The additional aspect of uncertainty should also be considered in the 
estimation. The cost estimation model we are proposing considers TOCs and uncertainty for the 
acquisition of EO/IR systems for U.S. Navy surface ships. This model will serve as a proof of concept 
to help future DoD decision-makers understand the cost associated with EO/IR systems so they can 
make strategic investments. 
Model Application and Results 
The inputs for this model were sourced from the program components lists provided by 
the research sponsor, NAVSEA, for the (generic or specific) EO/IR sensor. The cost estimates 
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for this model were sourced using rough of order magnitude (ROM) values. The values fluctuate 
slightly between the five different systems to illustrate the differing systems’ costs between 
contract estimates. These values were explicitly created to further the proof of concept of the 
model and, therefore, do not necessarily reflect the accurate value for component, part, or 
salary of support team members. However, these values do show how the simulation can 
provide an estimate of an entire system and demonstrate how much impact each variable will 
have on the overall life-cycle cost estimate. In this example, we simulate a cost estimate of an 
EO/IR system being implemented on 55 platforms with a service life of 20 years. 
Model Inputs and Data 
The Total Ownership Cost is calculated by summing the initial Acquisition Cost, 
Operation Cost, Maintenance Cost, and Disposal Cost. The model accounts for these four 
phases, beginning with the Acquisition Cost. In a real-world scenario, a cost analyst would 
utilize the technical specifications given by the program office to enter the required values. From 
the technical specifications, the analyst would insert two crucial metrics. The first is the number 
of platforms that will receive the system, and the second is the number of components required 
in each system. Since real-world data are not available for this notional model, this research 
uses the ROM system to fill in the blanks. In Systems A–E, the model uses 55 as the number of 
platforms.  
The Acquisition Unit Cost accounts for all of the planning, design, and construction costs 
to make each component possible. The model also considers the estimated cost for a 
replacement component. The estimated cost for replacement parts should be considerably 
lower than the initial Acquisition Cost because developed technology will only need to be 
reproduced instead of being redeveloped. The Operational Cost per year is an estimate of the 
amount required to run the component for a year. The Operation Cost includes equipment 
depreciation, costs of the energy source used to power the component, cost of damage due to 
use, and so on. Similarly, the Maintenance cost is an estimate based on the amount required to 
maintain the equipment every year. Figure 4 shows the categories for Acquisition and Operation 
and Maintenance Costs.  
Once the cost analyst has entered the acquisition cost for the hardware and software 
required for the system, the analyst must remember to account for the human element. The 
analyst will need to ensure that the cost required to pay for those responsible for the design, 
logistics, management, and technology are represented in the model. This model uses the 
Acquisition Cost column to record the initial salary of each job. The Number of Platforms column 
describes the number of teams required for each system. The Number of Units per System 
column describes the number of people required on each team. The Operation Cost column is 
used to annotate the continuing salary for the human element for the remainder of the 
program’s life. Essentially, this is how an analyst would annotate a recurring salary payment. 
Throughout the five systems, the number of people per team and the amount requested per 
salary will vary. Figure 5 shows an example of where salaries are inputted into the model.  
All of the costs mentioned previously are recurring costs, costs that will be multiplied by 
the number of years of the program and summed to get the total cost. Analysts must be sure not 
to forget to account for all of the one-time costs associated with the origins of any project. Figure 
6 shows the list of nonrecurring costs accounted for in the model. 
Finally, we account for all of the disposal and end-of-life-cycle costs that will also be one-
time costs. Figure 7 shows the nonrecurring end-of-life-cycle costs. 
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Figure 4. Categories for Acquisition and Operation and Maintenance Costs
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Figure 5. Manpower and Personnel Salary Input Section 
 
Figure 6. Nonrecurring Acquisition and Procurement Costs 
 
Figure 7. Nonrecurring End-of-Life-Cycle Costs 
Results and Analysis 
Once the data have been manually inputted into the model, the cost analyst can utilize 
the multitude of charts, graphs, and tools to analyze the TOC of the systems. These graphs, 
charts, and tools allow the analyst to compare multiple cost estimates over the entire life of the 
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system at the same time. This research analyzed the following tables and charts to highlight the 
functionality of the model: Total Net Life-Cycle Cost, Present Value of Discounted Total Net Life-
Cycle Cost, Cash Total Net Cost at 5-Year Increments, Total Ownership Cost Forecast Statistic 
Table, Simulation Probability Charts, and the Tornado Analysis.  
Total Net Life-Cycle Costs and Cash Total Net Cost at 5-Year Increments 
Figure 8 shows the Total Net Life-Cycle Cost for all five systems over a span of 30 
years. The table and graph show the cost for the systems broken down into 5-year estimates. 
The model projects the life span of the system past the 20-year expected service life. This 
extension allows the cost analyst to consider cost out to the 30-year point, as many DoD 
systems tend to exceed their expected service lives. However, the 5-year increments also allow 
a decision-maker to understand the total net cost of disposing of a system before its 20-year 
service life. The side-by-side comparison enables a decision-maker to graphically perceive the 
potential differences between the cost estimates of the multiple systems. When choosing 
between alternatives, Figure 8 can be a beneficial decision aid. 
In the analysis table in Figure 8, the 20-Year Cash Total Net Cost ranges from $554 
million (System C) to $771 million (System D). If cost were the determining factor, a decision-
maker could quickly determine that System C should be selected. To make the comparison 
even easier to analyze, Figure 9 provides a side-by-side comparison of all five systems at each 
of the 5-year increments. Looking at the 20-Year Total Net Cost Graph, it can be clearly seen 
that System C has the lowest Total Net Cost. 
Cost analysis should only be one part of the picture when it comes to making the correct 
strategic decision. For example, each system’s specifications and capabilities––its military 
benefits or returns––should also be computed, such that each system will have its own return 
on investment (ROI). Nonetheless, the major component of any ROI analysis is cost. The focus 
of this research is to determine this cost computation. Another aspect of TOC analysis is its use 
in cost mitigation, cost savings, and cost deferred, which constitute another point of view of 
cost-based decision analytics. 
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Figure 8. Total Net Life-Cycle Cost 
Present Value of Discounted Total Net Life-Cycle Cost 
While Figure 10 shows the Total Net Life-Cycle Cost, it does not include 
consideration of economic factors such as the time value of money and uncertainty risk. 
To mitigate these factors in the model, Figure 10 incorporates a Net Present Value Life-
Cycle Cost estimate using a discount rate of 3% (i.e., the government’s cost of money, 
where we can use 20-year and 30-year Treasury bond yields as proxies). In the analysis 
table in Figure 10, the 20-Year Total Net Cost ranges from $554 million (System C) to 
$771 million (System D), but when looking at the more realistic Present Value 
Discounted Net Life-Cycle Cost, the range between Systems C and D decreases to 
$418 million and $577 million. Not only do the estimates for the minimum and maximum 
values decrease when the discount factor is applied, but the delta of the range between 
the values also shrinks by $57.8 million. Incorporating the discount rate into the model 
gives the decision-maker a complete analysis of the costs. Specifically, it shows the 
value of the lifetime cost of a system in today’s money, thereby putting all systems with 
different life cycles and life spans on an equal footing with each other for a better cost 
comparison. 
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Figure 9. Present Value of Discounted Net Life-Cycle Cost 
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Figure 10. Total Ownership Cost Forecast Statistics Table
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Stochastic Total Ownership Cost Forecast Statistics Table 
The Forecast Statistics Table, shown in Figure 10, summarizes the distribution of the 
Total Life-Cycle Cost and the Total Present Value (PV) Life-Cycle Cost for the five systems 
at different points in the life cycle of the system based on risk-based simulation and 
stochastic TOC models used to value the alternative cost paths. Figure 10 highlights the 
outcomes of running 10,000 trials using the Monte Carlo Risk Simulator. The takeaways 
from this figure are the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and range data 
points. These metrics provide a decision-maker with a better understanding of how 
uncertainty can affect the Total Life-Cycle Cost and Total PV Life-Cycle Cost of a system. 
System C looks at the cost over a 20-year life span. Using the Monte Carlo Risk 
Simulator, the maximum Total Life-Cycle Cost of the system is $568 million, while the 
minimum is $540 million. These values represent the worst- and best-case scenarios, 
respectively. The simulations produced a Total Life-Cycle Cost range of $28 million and a 
mean value of $554 million. The standard deviation of Total Life-Cycle Cost simulations for 
System C is $4.5 million, meaning that 68.2% of the estimates will fall within ±$4.5 million of 
the mean if the distribution is somewhat normally distributed. Figure 10 also shows the same 
metrics for the PV of the Total Life-Cycle Cost for all systems.  
Simulation Probability Charts 
A simulation probability chart is a histogram or frequency distribution of all of the total 
life-cycle costs of a system based on 10,000 simulation runs or trials. The probability chart 
produces a graphic representation of the information contained in the forecast statistics 
table. Figure 11 shows the frequency distribution of the total life-cycle cost for System A 
over a 20-year life. In the figure, System A’s frequency distribution is shaped as a roughly 
symmetrical bell curve centered on a mean of $700 million. Using this chart, an analyst 
could confidently conclude that the total life-cycle cost for this system will fall between $679 
million and $721 million. The figure also shows the 90% confidence interval of the TOC to 
be between $690 million and $710 million. This means that there is a 90% chance that given 
all uncertainties that exist in each of the input assumptions, the 20-year total lifetime cost for 
System A will be between these two values. In addition, there is only a 5% chance that the 
cost can be below $690 million and a 5% chance it can exceed $710 million. Figure 12 uses 
the same frequency distribution over the same 20-year system life as in Figure 11; however, 
Figure 12 takes into account the discount rate to better illustrate the economic factor of 
inflation over time. Similarly, the 90% confidence interval in present values is between $518 
million and $533 million. 
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Figure 11. Total Life-Cycle Cost for System A (20 Years) 
 
Figure 12. Total Present Value Life-Cycle Cost for System A (20 Years) 
 
 
Figure 13. Probability Distribution Cost Overlay of the Five Systems 
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Tornado Analysis 
The tornado analysis chart gives decision-makers the ability to break down which 
variables have the most significant impact on the overall outcome of the simulation. By 
focusing on the top critical factors, decision-makers can focus on cost reduction techniques 
in places that will have the most effect. The tornado analysis allows the decision-makers to 
adjust how many critical variables to display. Figure 14 shows the tornado analysis chart 
detailing the 20 most impactful variables on the TOC model. Based on the notional cost 
values inputted into the model, the number of platforms containing that ancillary material is 
the most critical factor. 
 
Figure 14. Tornado Analysis 
Conclusion 
Key Conclusions 
The purpose of this report was to develop a total ownership with life-cycle cost model 
while considering uncertainty for EO/IR sensors on U.S. Navy surface ships. Through the 
examination of TOC modeling over the life cycle of EO/IR sensors, including the inception 
phase of acquisition costs, followed by annual O&M expenses, along with a final set of 
Disposition Costs, we were able to develop a useful model for TOC estimations. Using 
Monte Carlo risk simulation, our model accounts for risk and uncertainty when producing 
cost estimates. The model also provides analysts with a more realistic estimate by factoring 
in economic theory, such as economic growth, annual discount rate, and inflation.  
As discussed, the cost analysis models presented should be only one part of a larger 
picture when it comes to making the correct strategic investment decisions. For example, 
each system’s specifications, capabilities, military benefits, or financial and noneconomic 
returns should also be computed, such that each system will have its own return on 
investment (ROI). Nonetheless, the major component of any ROI analysis is cost. The focus 
of this current research is to determine a suitable method to compute critical life-cycle cost. 
Another use of TOC modeling is in determining cost mitigation, cost savings, and cost 
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deferred, that is, what the cost differential might be or an Analysis of Alternatives, which 
constitutes another point of view of cost-based decision analytics. The model allows 
decision-makers to have better decision analytics of the costs of surface EO/IR sensors. 
These analytics can be used in subsequent cost comparisons between different sensor 
platforms, Analysis of Alternatives, and portfolio allocation of resources. Specifically, 
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) and NAVSEA can utilize 
this model in future program cost estimation development. Since the model is tailorable to 
different sensor configurations, it can provide clarity in analyzing different and complex 
alternative sensor systems to develop and outfit the fleet. The results of this model give 
decision-makers a more effective metric to analyze TOC under uncertainty; this can reduce 
cost overflow and prevent budget overruns. Ultimately, the model allows leadership to make 
more informed decisions in the DoD acquisition process and maximize the use of its limited 
resources. 
Current Research Limitations and Follow-on Research 
The main limitation of the current study is that notional cost data were used to 
provide a proof of concept that the model functions as designed. However, this presents an 
opportunity for future research whereby additional follow-on research with empirical data 
should be conducted. This model can analyze cost data in past, present, and future EO/IR 
models.  
Beginning with historical data, a cost analyst could compile a list of program 
components associated with a system that is either retired or currently in use. Once the list 
of components is obtained, the analyst can then associate the estimated historical cost 
assigned to each component during the program’s initial cost estimate (e.g., a program cost 
estimate developed in 1992). Using the original cost data and component list, the analyst 
could then run the new total ownership with life-cycle cost model under uncertainty. This 
would produce a new cost estimate for the program, which could then be compared to the 
original estimate and the actual life-cycle cost of the program. Executing this study would 
determine whether the TOC model developed in this thesis is a superior method of cost 
estimation for the DoD. 
Another follow-on study could be done using the data from a program that is 
currently undergoing its initial cost estimation. The cost estimate could be done in 
conjunction with the DoD’s current methods of cost estimation. Another researcher could 
partner with PEO IWS and the new system’s program office to complete a cost estimate 
using the TOC model developed in this thesis. This process would allow for real-time cost 
comparisons at different stages in the acquisition process. The comparison between the two 
estimates would provide decision-makers with another method of verifying assumptions and 
validating that their cost estimates are reasonable and credible. Concurrently conducting the 
cost estimates allows researchers and cost estimators to compare their estimates to actual 
cost data at the different increments throughout the program’s life cycle. This comparison 
would determine which method of cost estimation was more accurate at different points in 
the system’s life cycle.  
These follow-on studies require real-world cost data from historical or current EO/IR 
programs. While data collection may prove difficult and time-consuming, this research would 
be beneficial to the DoD and well worth the investment. Working with PEO IWS and the 
program office’s cost estimation teams could result in model improvements and provide an 
even more robust total ownership with life-cycle cost model under uncertainty.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 327 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Other Applications and Conclusions 
This research focuses specifically on the application of this TOC model with regard 
to EO/IR sensors on surface ships; it barely scratches the surface of the model’s potential. 
This model could be applied to any one of the thousands of acquisition projects in the DoD. 
The model’s use is not confined to EO/IR sensors on surface ships but can be adjusted and 
developed for various programs. The process and the strength of the results that the model 
would provide would be the same; the only necessary change a cost analyst would need to 
make is to alter the list of components to reflect whichever system or program is being 
analyzed. In the same fashion, this model could also provide contractors and non-DoD 
organizations with an additional method of cost estimation.  
Cost estimation is not an exact science; however, this model provides a coherent 
method of estimating the total ownership with life-cycle costs under uncertainty for EO/IR 
sensors on surface ships. It gives a decision-maker another tool when evaluating alternative 
programs and courses of action. The ultimate goal of this model is to provide a more 
effective tool in determining how the DoD spends its limited resources on competing 
priorities. While follow-on research needs to be conducted to validate the efficacy of the 
model, this thesis offers a proof of concept and takes a step toward DoD portfolio 
optimization.  
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Abstract  
Traditional learning curve theory assumes a constant learning rate regardless of the number 
of units produced; however, a collection of theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that 
learning rates decrease as more units are produced in some cases. These diminishing 
learning rates cause traditional learning curves to underestimate required resources, 
potentially resulting in cost overruns. A diminishing learning rate model, Boone’s Learning 
Curve (2018), was recently developed to model this phenomenon. This research confirmed 
that Boone’s Learning Curve is more accurate in modeling observed learning curves using 
production data of 169 Department of Defense (DoD) end-items. However, further empirical 
analysis revealed deficiencies in the theoretical justifications of why and under what 
conditions Boone’s Learning Curve more accurately models observations. This research also 
discovered that diminishing learning rates are present but not pervasive in the sampled 
observations. Additionally, this research explored the theoretical and empirical evidence that 
may cause learning curves to exhibit diminishing learning rates and be more accurately 
modeled by Boone’s Learning Curve. Only a limited number of theory-based variables were 
useful in explaining these phenomena. This research further justifies the necessity of a 
diminishing learning rate model and proposes a framework to investigate learning curves that 
exhibit diminishing learning rates.  
Introduction 
The Budget Control Act of 2011 subjected the Department of Defense (DoD) to a 
more fiscally constrained and financially conscious environment than ever before, 
contrasted with a demand for new acquisition programs of almost every type. As an 
increasing number of programs are terminated, managers at every level in the DoD are 
expected to ensure the DoD’s shrinking budget is being used in the most cost-effective way. 
The increased scrutiny adds greater emphasis on the accuracy of program office cost 
estimates given that an approved program cost estimate supports every major acquisition 
program funded by the DoD.  
In order to obtain reliable cost estimates, cost estimating models and tools within the 
DoD must be evaluated for their relevance and accuracy. The current learning curve 
methods used within the DoD’s cost estimating procedures are from the 1930s (Wright, 
1936). As automation and robotics increasingly replace human touch-labor in the production 
process, the current 80-year-old model may no longer be appropriate for accurate learning 
curve (and cost) estimates. Robotics and automation machines do not learn; however, they 
are inevitably a part of future production. New learning curve methods that incorporate 
automated production should be examined as a possible tool for cost estimators in the 
acquisition process. Additionally, we examine the flattening effect that occurs toward the end 
of the acquisition process and the impact this has on different learning curve formulas. 
Originally published by Badiru (2012), the half-life of a learning curve is the incremental 
production level required to reduce cumulative average cost per unit to half its initial level. 
Conversely, a half-life forgetting curve is the amount of time it takes for performance to 
decline to half of its initial level. A model that more accurately reflects true cost is critical for 
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planning, especially over the long-term when there are hundreds of millions of dollars 
involved. The results of this research will inform the acquisition community as well as 
provide a tool that has the potential to significantly outperform the cost estimation and 
learning curve models currently in use.  
The purpose of this research ultimately is to investigate new learning curve methods, 
develop learning curve theory within the DoD, and pursue a more accurate cost estimation 
model.  
Research Approach (Methodology) 
The premise of this research is to apply a new learning curve in such a way that the 
estimated learning rate is modeled as a decreasing function over time as opposed to the 
constant learning rate that is currently in use with Wright’s Learning Curve. The current 
model in use today mathematically states that for every doubling of units there will be a 
constant gain in efficiency. For example, if the manufacturer observed a 10% reduction in 
man-hours in the time to produce unit 10 from the time to produce unit 5, then they should 
expect to see the same 10% reduction in man-hours in the time to produce unit 10 to the 
time to produce unit 20. Unfortunately, in real world situations this constant rate of decay is 
rarely the case. We propose that more accurate cost estimates could be made if a decay 
factor was taken into consideration. The proposed modification may take this form:  
 
( )Cos ( ) f xt X aX=  
Where:  
Cost(X) = the cumulative average time (or cost) per unit  
X = the cumulative number of units produced  
A = time (or cost) required to produce the first unit  
F(x) = the learning curve slope represented as a function of units produced  
 
The specific function used for the slope is what this research will attempt to 
understand. Figure 1 shows the phenomena this research will attempt to model, where the 
black (flatter) line depicts the traditional curve used to model learning, the red (steeper) line 
represents the hypothesized learning structure, and the blue line represents actual data.  
 
Figure 32. Learning Curve Comparison 
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Learning Curve Background 
The concepts of learning and learning curves are intuitive: as a worker repetitively 
performs tasks to assemble a product, the worker will gain efficiencies. These efficiencies 
should decrease the time the worker spends on each unit as more units are produced. 
These efficiencies translate to a continuous reduction in labor hours and cost savings over 
time. The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (2009) lists four reasons for these 
gains in efficiency that broaden the scope of learning. First, as more units are produced, 
workers tend to become “more physically and mentally adept” at performing tasks, and 
supervisors become more efficient at utilizing workers. This aspect of learning is considered 
to be learning-by-doing at the laborer level and is termed autonomous learning (Levy, 1965). 
Second, the work environment is improved to include the “climate, lighting, and general 
working conditions” (Leonard, 2009). Third, the production process is changed to “optimize 
the placement of tools and material and simplify tasks.” Lastly, market forces in the 
competitive business environment will require suppliers to improve efficiency to survive. 
These last three aspects of learning are considered to be organizational learning by 
continuous improvement efforts termed induced learning (Levy, 1965; Dutton & Thomas, 
1984). 
Several terms are used to describe learning curves that include cost improvement 
curve, cost/quantity relationship, manufacturing process function, experience curve, and 
product improvement function (International Cost Estimating and Analysis Association 
[ICEAA], 2014, p. 7). The original and most generalized term learning curve will be used in 
this research. Although learning curves are used most popularly in aircraft manufacturing, 
the concept can be applied to “relatively large and complex products that require various 
types of fabrication and assembly skills” (Asher, 1956, p. 5). The Air Force Cost Analysis 
Handbook includes several specific situations in which learning curves apply that include 
“the manufacture of a complex end-item, limited changes to product characteristics or 
technology, continuous manufacturing process, constant management pressure to improve, 
and consistent production rates” (Department of the Air Force, 2007, pp. 8-1–8-2). The 
Handbook also includes other criteria, including “a high proportion of manual labor, labor 
efficiency/job familiarization, standardization, specialization, and methods improvements, 
improved materiel flow and reduced scrap, improved production procedures, tools, and 
equipment, improved workflow and engineering support, and product redesign 
improvements” (Department of the Air Force, 2007, pp. 8-1–8-2). These situations describe 
aspects of the manufacturing process that enable organizational learning and allow for labor 
efficiencies, although learning can occur without all criteria being present.  
Cumulative Average Learning Curve Theory 
The concept of a learning curve was first formally recorded by Theodore Paul Wright 
in 1936 in his work “Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes.” Wright identified the learning 
curve concept in a pre-World War II production environment of a small two-seater aircraft 
(ICEAA, 2014, p. 16). He observed that as a worker repeatedly performs the same task, the 
time required to complete that task will decrease at a constant rate. More specifically, Wright 
formulized that as the number of aircraft produced doubles, the cumulative average labor 
cost would decrease at a constant rate (Wright, 1936). This relationship is described in 
Equation 1 and is the Cumulative Average Theory widely in use. When learning curves 
utilize this Cumulative Average Theory, they are frequently called “Wright Curves” (ICEAA, 
2014, p. 16).  
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Equation 1 
𝑌𝑌� = 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 (1)  
 
where Y  ̅is the cumulative average cost of the first x units, A is the theoretical cost to 
produce the first unit, x is the cumulative number of units produced, and b is the learning 
curve slope (LCS) divided by the natural logarithm of 2.  
The learning curve slope in the learning curve exponent “b” of Equation 1 defines 
how each doubling of produced units reduces cumulative average costs. For example, 
Wright used his empirical data to calculate a learning curve slope of 80%. Therefore, as the 
cumulative number of units doubles, the cumulative labor cost of the doubled units would be 
80% of the original undoubled amount, resulting in a 20% cumulative average reduction in 
labor cost (Wright, 1936). This 20% cumulative average reduction can also be called the 
rate of learning. Higher rates of learning lead to greater reductions in labor costs. Although 
Wright’s model cited 80% as a universal learning curve slope, learning curve theory evolved 
to realize that other slopes are possible based on an end-item’s unique manufacturing 
characteristics (Jaber, 2006).  
Wright’s Cumulative Average Learning Curve is cumbersome to use because 
cumulative average costs are calculated in place of the unit cost. Figure 2 depicts Wright’s 
Learning Curve with an 80% learning curve slope based on a first unit cost of 100. Figure 2 
shows that as the cumulative number of units produced doubles, the cumulative average 
cost decreases by 20%. The corresponding unit cost is also displayed to highlight how the 
cumulative average cost differs from the unit cost. The unit cost is calculated by summing 
the cumulative costs up to but not including the unit number and subtracting it from the total 
cost. In Figure 2, the first unit cost for both cumulative average cost and unit cost is 100. For 
unit two, the cumulative average cost of the first two units is 80; this is a 20% reduction due 
to an 80% learning curve slope. The total cost of the first two units is 160. Because the first 
unit cost is known to be 100, the second unit cost can be calculated from the difference to 
be 60. These same calculations can be used to obtain the unit costs for the remaining units.  
 
 
Figure 33. Wright’s Cumulative Average Theory at an 80% Learning Curve Slope 
 
Wright illustrated Equation 1 using a graph with vertical and horizontal axes 
displayed in logarithmic rather than linear scale. Wright illustrated his equation on this 
logarithmic graph in order to highlight the straight line representing a constant rate of 
learning (Wright, 1936). The same function can be graphed in linear scale by transforming 
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Equation 1 into a log-linear form by taking the natural logarithm of both sides. This log-linear 
transformed equation is shown in Equation 2. The parameter definitions for Equations 1 and 
2 are the same.  
Equation 2 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝑌𝑌� = 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀     (2)  
Equation 2 also allows analysts to apply linear regression analysis in order to 
estimate the parameters A and b from a set of cumulative average cost data (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015, p. 185). Figure 3 displays Wright’s Cumulative Average Theory at an 80% 
learning curve slope transformed into a log-linear form. The parameters are identical to the 
parameters of Figure 2 with a first unit cost of 100. The constant learning curve slope 




Figure 34. Wright’s Cumulative Average Theory at an 80% Learning Curve Slope in Log-Linear Form 
Unit Learning Curve Theory  
Several years following Wright’s Cumulative Average learning curve theory, J. R. 
Crawford formulated the Unit Learning Curve Theory, formally written in 1944. Together, 
these theories form the basis of the traditional learning curve theory. Crawford proposed his 
Unit Theory first in an undated manual prepared for Lockheed Aircraft Company personnel 
after realizing the difficulty of calculating unit costs from Cumulative Average Learning Curve 
Theory equations (Asher, 1956, pp. 21–22). As shown in Equation 3, Crawford’s Learning 
Curve yields an estimated unit cost given the unit’s sequential unit number within the 
production line, a learning curve slope, and a theoretical first unit cost. Crawford’s Unit 
Theory is the same as Wright’s aside from these differences in variable interpretation. 
Learning curves are often called “Crawford Curves” when they utilize Crawford’s Unit Theory 
(ICEAA, 2014, p. 31).  
Equation 3 
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 (3)  
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where Y is the individual cost of unit x, A is the theoretical cost of the first unit, x is the unit 
number of the unit cost being forecasted, and b is the LCS divided by the natural logarithm 
of 2.  
Using Crawford’s Unit Theory with a learning curve slope of 80% and a first unit cost 
of 100 labor hours, the cost of the second unit is 80 labor hours. This 20% reduction in labor 
hours or rate of learning is due to the 80% learning curve slope. Figure 4 illustrates 
Crawford’s Unit Theory using the same parameters from Wright’s Cumulative Average 
Theory shown in Figures 2 and 3. The cumulative average costs are not shown in Figure 4 
because these are not germane to Unit Theory.  
 
 
Figure 35. Crawford’s Unit Theory at an 80% Learning Curve Slope 
 
Crawford’s Unit Theory Learning Curve is transformed into a log-linear form using 
the same methodology used to derive Equation 2. Crawford’s Learning Curve in log-linear 
form is shown in Equation 4 using the same parameter definitions from Equation 3.  
 
Equation 4 
 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀     (4)  
 
Crawford’s Unit Theory Learning Curve is shown in logarithmic scale in Figure 5. 
Similar to Cumulative Average Theory, the constant learning indicated by the linear slope in 
Figure 5 is a vital concept of this theory: the rate of learning remains constant as the units 
double regardless of the number of units produced.  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 336 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 36. Crawford’s Unit Theory at an 80% Learning Curve Slope in Log-Linear Form 
 
Crawford’s Unit Theory parameters are straightforward to estimate when data are 
available by each unit (also called unitary data); however, manufacturers generally report 
cost data in the form of production lots that include the total lot cost and the number of units 
in that lot (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 191). Unlike Wright’s Cumulative Average Theory, 
Crawford’s Unit Theory must utilize lot midpoints to estimate parameters when unitary cost 
data is unavailable. The algebraic lot midpoint is defined as “the theoretical unit whose cost 
is equal to the average unit cost for that lot on the learning curve” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 
2015, p. 192). In other words, the lot midpoint is the unit that will divide the area under the 
learning curve evenly within the lot (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 192). This lot midpoint is 
used in the Unit Theory learning curve formula as the sequential unit number or independent 
variable “x” in Equations 3 and 4. The lot midpoint supplants using sequential unit numbers 
because sequential unit numbers are unavailable when using lot cost data. When the lot 
midpoint is the independent variable in Equation 3, the dependent variable will yield the 
average lot cost. The average lot cost results because this x-coordinate is the most 
representative point for the lot (ICEAA, 2014, p. 40).   
Lot midpoints are calculated in a two-step approach due to the lack of a closed-form 
solution. A closed-form solution does not exist because the lot cost is a function of the 
learning curve exponent b from Equations 3 and 4 used to estimate the lot midpoint. 
However, the lot midpoint is also used to estimate the learning curve exponent “b.” The first 
step in calculating a lot midpoint utilizes a parameter-free approximation formula to estimate 
the lot midpoint. These lot midpoint estimates are then used to estimate the learning curve 
exponent “b.” The second step is to use a lot midpoint formula that includes an estimate of 
the learning curve exponent “b” and iterate until successive values of the estimated lot 
midpoints and “b” are sufficiently small (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, pp. 200–201). The 
parameter-free lot midpoint approximation is shown in Equations 5 (Mislick & Nussbaum, 
2015, p. 193).  
 
Equation 5 
 Lot Midpoint (LMP) = 𝐹𝐹+𝐿𝐿+2√𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿
4
  (5)  
where F is the first unit number in a lot and L is the last unit number in a lot. These lot 
midpoint estimates are then used to estimate the learning curve parameters for Crawford’s 
model (Equation 3) using the GRG non-linear optimization algorithm.  
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Several parameter lot midpoint approximations exist, but a simple and popular lot 
midpoint approximation is Asher’s Approximation shown in Equation 6. The same parameter 
definitions presented in Equation 5 also apply to Equation 6, and the learning curve 
exponent “b” is the same as shown previously in Equations 1–4 (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, 
p. 201).  
 
Equation 6 








   (6)  
 
where F is the first unit number in a lot, L is the last unit number in a lot, and b is the 
estimated value from Equation 1.  
Comparison of Cumulative Average and Unit Theory  
Cumulative Average Theory and Unit Theory will produce different predicted costs 
provided the same set of data despite all predicted costs being normalized to unit costs. 
Figure 6 demonstrates this point where Unit Theory was used to generate data using a first 
unit cost of 100 and a learning curve slope of 90%. The original Unit Theory data was 
converted to cumulative averages in order to estimate Cumulative Average Theory Learning 
Curve parameters. Cumulative Average Theory estimated a learning curve slope of 93% 
and a first unit cost of 101.24. These Cumulative Average Theory parameters were then 
used to predict cumulative average costs. These predicted costs were then converted to unit 
costs. This conversion allows for the Cumulative Average predictions to be directly 
compared to the original Unit Theory generated data.  
 
 
Figure 37. Cumulative Average and Unit Learning Curve Theory Comparison 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the Cumulative Average Learning Curve predictions first 
overestimate, then underestimate, and ultimately overestimate the generated Unit Theory 
data for all remaining units. A similar case would occur if Cumulative Average Theory were 
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used to generate data and Unit Theory learning curve parameters were estimated from this 
data. Figure 6 highlights that these two theories are inherently different due to differences 
that occur when estimating learning curves parameters using unit costs or cumulative 
average costs. Several factors can assist an analyst in deciding which theory to apply; 
however, solely relying on goodness-of-fit statistics will likely bias the decision toward 
Cumulative Average Theory (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 215; Cullis et al., 2008). 
Frequently goodness-of-fit statistics to include the coefficient of determination (R2) and 
standard error are used to determine which model best explains variation in a dataset. The 
coefficient of determination is the total variation of the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variable (Hilmer, 2014, p. 90). The standard error is the measure of how far on 
average the data tend to fall from the predicted learning curve (Hilmer, 2014, p. 91). These 
goodness-of-fit statistics can be used when comparing models of the same units, which is 
not the case when comparing Cumulative Average and Unit Theory learning curves.   
Researchers investigated this Cumulative Average Theory goodness-of-fit statistic 
bias and presented at a Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA) conference (Cullis 
et al., 2008). The researchers used a methodology similar to that used to produce the 
example illustrated in Figure 6. Cumulative Average data were first generated, and a Unit 
Theory learning curve was fit to this data. Unit Theory data were then generated, and a 
Cumulative Average learning curve was fit to this data. The goodness-of-fit statistics reliably 
indicated the correct learning curve theory to model these perfect data. Next, artificial 
variation was injected into the generated data, and the researchers repeated the process. 
When the researchers injected variation or error in the data, the goodness-of-fit statistics 
overwhelmingly favored selecting Cumulative Average Theory over Unit Theory even with 
small amounts of variation in the data (Cullis et al., 2008). In other words, Cumulative 
Average Theory Learning Curves will tend to have a higher coefficient of determination and 
lower standard error when compared to Unit Theory learning curves. This bias in the 
goodness-of-fit statistics is because Cumulative Average Theory is a cumulative running 
average, so the curves are generally smoother and closer to the data points (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015, p. 215). Therefore, bias exists in favor of Cumulative Average Theory, so 
more subjective judgments are warranted to determine which learning curve theory to utilize.  
The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (2009) provides factors to 
consider when choosing which learning curve theory to model data. Analysts should review 
which theories were applied to analogous systems that are similar in form, fit, or function to 
the current system being considered (GAO, 2009, p. 369). Next, some industries have 
standards that prefer one theory over the other (GAO, 2009, p. 369). Experience should also 
be considered by reviewing which theory has been applied to the contractor in the past 
(GAO, 2009, p. 369). Lastly, some aspects of the production environment can indicate which 
theory is best to apply (GAO, 2009, p. 369). For example, Cumulative Average theory is best 
when “the contractor is starting production with prototype tooling, has an inadequate 
supplier base, expects early design changes, is subject to short lead times,” or where there 
is a risk of concurrency between development and production phases (GAO, 2009, p. 369). 
In contrast, Unit Theory is more suited for contractors that are well-prepared to begin 
production (GAO, 2009, p. 369).   
Other factors must be considered when deciding which learning curve theory to use. 
Cumulative Average learning curve theory will provide more conservative estimates and is 
less responsive to trends than the Unit Learning Curve theory (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, 
p. 215). For these reasons, Unit Learning Curve theory is frequently favored by government 
negotiators when negotiating contracts (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 215). Cumulative 
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Average Learning Curve theory also relies on continuous data and is unable to be 
calculated with missing prior data using traditional estimation techniques.   
Finally, when ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate 
Cumulative Average learning curve parameters, the cumulative averaging technique violates 
the OLS regression assumption of independence. For OLS regression to provide an 
unbiased estimator, the data must be obtained through independent random sampling 
(Hilmer, 2014, pp. 111–112). In other words, the unit labor cost and its associated unit 
number cannot be statistically related to other observations of unit labor cost and their 
associated unit numbers. This assumption is violated due to the costs of earlier observations 
being a function of the costs of later observations from cumulative averaging calculations. 
This violation biases the learning curve parameters to produce expected values that are not 
equal to the population parameter being estimated (Hilmer, 2014, p. 109). Despite this 
violation, Cumulative Average Learning Curves estimated using OLS regression are widely 
used and remain a valid method for estimating learning curves.  
Cost Accounting for Learning Curves  
The fundamental aspects of traditional learning curve theory apply only to a subset of 
total program costs. Hence appropriate costs must be considered when applying the theory 
to yield viable parameter estimates and predictions. In a complex program, costs can be 
presented in units of hours or dollars and organized as recurring and non-recurring for 
various cost elements of the end-item or the program as a whole. For each cost element, 
labor costs are also categorized into further groups. The analyst must select the applicable 
subset of costs and consider their units when utilizing learning curve theory.   
Costs are generally categorized as recurring and non-recurring costs. Non-recurring 
costs are one-time costs that are not directly attributable to the number of end-items being 
produced (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 26). Recurring costs are costs that are incurred 
repeatedly for each unit produced (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 26). At the basis of 
learning curve theory is the idea that costs vary as more units of an end-item are produced. 
Therefore, non-recurring costs are excluded from learning curve analysis due to the inability 
to relate these costs with the number of units produced (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 180). 
Traditional research also has limited insight into how learning applies to nonrecurring costs. 
For these reasons, learning curve analysis focuses solely on recurring costs in estimating 
learning curve parameters and predicting recurring costs (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 
180).   
Manufacturing program costs are also organized broadly as labor, material, and 
overhead. T. P. Wright initially claimed that all these categories vary with the number of units 
produced, although he specifically focused on labor hour costs when forming his seminal 
theory (Wright, 1936). Due to this focus and the intuitive idea of learning at the laborer level, 
researchers have since focused solely on labor costs, including J. R. Crawford. Crawford 
exclusively studied labor learning and elaborated at length on how learning occurs from the 
laborer’s perspective (Asher, 1956, p. 24). Both fundamental theorists also focused on the 
laborers who manufactured the aircraft by considering touch labor (Asher, 1956, pp. 16, 21). 
Additionally, cost estimating standard practice and guidance concerning learning curves 
also provides the basis for considering touch labor costs only (ICEAA, 2014, p. 7; 
Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 8-1).   
Defense contractors are often contractually required to submit costs incurred when 
producing large, complex end-items for the U.S. government. These costs have historically 
been submitted on the Defense Department (DD) Form 1921 report series to include the 
Functional Cost-Hours Report DD Form 1921-1 and Progress Curve Report DD Form 1921-
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2. The DoD transitioned to using the Cost and Hour Report “FlexFile” and Quantity Data 
reports on May 15, 2019 (Burke, 2019). However, historical program data will likely remain 
in the legacy 1921 series forms, and “FlexFile” and Quantity Data reports can easily be 
manipulated to legacy 1921 forms. The 1921-1 form is organized by work breakdown 
structure (WBS) elements that include various functional cost categories both in units of 
hours and dollars. Three broad functional cost categories: labor, material, and other costs 
are included in both forms of recurring and non-recurring costs. This form also has four 
functional labor categories that include manufacturing, tooling, engineering, and quality 
control labor. These four labor category costs, when summed with the material costs and 
other costs, comprise the total cost for each WBS element for recurring and non-recurring 
costs. This total cost is provided in units of dollars due to the underlying units of material and 
other costs. A document accompanies the 1921-1 to describe the elements of the form 
called a 1921-1 Data Item Description (DID). The 1921-1 DID defines these various 
functional cost categories to include the four labor categories whose definitions are useful in 
determining which categories pertain to learning curve analysis.   
The definition for the manufacturing labor cost category most clearly aligns with the 
extant literature to be the focus as the pertinent labor cost category for learning curve 
research. According to the 1921-1 DID, the manufacturing labor category “includes the effort 
and costs expended in the fabrication, assembly, integration, and functional testing of a 
product or end-item. It involves all the processes necessary to convert raw materials into 
finished items” (1921-1 Data Item Description, p. 12). This manufacturing labor category 
aligns with the categories examined by Wright (1936), which he called “assembly 
operations” (p. 124), along with those cost categories Crawford studied, which he called 
“airframe-manufacturing processes” (Asher, 1956, p. 21). A RAND learning curve study also 
defined the direct labor used in the study as “those expended to manufacture the airframe 
and install the equipment required to transform the airframe into a complete, flyable 
airplane” (Asher, 1956, p. 49). Therefore, the manufacturing labor cost category as defined 
by the 1921-1 DID is associated with the types of labor costs studied by traditional learning 
curve theorists and succeeding research. However, data availability can prompt analysts 
and researchers to use total costs instead. Although these curves remain valid according to 
Wright (1936), they are composite learning curves with caveats to be discussed later.  
The 1921-1 is organized into WBS elements defined for each program. A WBS 
element is a method to display, define, and organize the overall end-item into sub-products 
while maintaining their relationship with the end-item and other sub-products (DoD, 2018, p. 
4). For example, WBS elements for an aircraft program could include the airframe, wings, 
and engines, among other elements. These WBS elements are comprised of lower-level 
elements as well. For example, the airframe element may include elements such as the 
forward, middle, and aft airframe. WBS elements can also comprise activities instead of 
physical components such as testing the aircraft. Although some of these activities may 
experience efficiencies over time, traditional learning curve theory focuses exclusively on 
the production of physical components. WBS elements are frequently organized into various 
cost categories that can comprise elements suitable and unsuitable for learning curve 
analysis.  
WBS elements are organized into various cost categories to include procurement 
costs, weapons system costs, and flyaway/rollaway/sail-away costs among others. Not all 
WBS elements and their respective cost categories are pertinent for learning curve analysis. 
The group of WBS elements in which learning is relevant is prime mission equipment and its 
sub-elements. Prime mission equipment is all hardware and software WBS elements 
installed on the weapon system such as “propulsion equipment, electronics, armament, etc.” 
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(Flyaway Costs, n.d.). The prime mission equipment WBS aligns with those elements that 
experience learning according to the traditional learning curve theorists. The prime mission 
equipment WBS group excludes elements such as systems engineering and program 
management (SE/PM) and system test and evaluation (STE); these costs are instead 
included in flyaway costs (Flyaway Costs, n.d.). These latter elements are activities 
tangentially related costs that may not experience learning as theorized by the traditional 
learning curve literature.  
Recent learning curves research has considered equivalent WBS elements. Moore 
et al. (2015) scoped their research to consider airframe costs, which is a sub-element of 
prime mission equipment due to the homogeneity of the programs they analyzed. Honious 
et al. (2016) also used airframe costs. Boone used prime mission equipment WBS elements 
to perform analysis due to the wide variety of programs researched (Boone, 2018, pp. 22–
23).   
Another cost accounting item to consider is whether to use hours or dollars as the 
units for labor cost. The total cost for each WBS element is provided in dollars due to 
material and other costs not having associated labor hours. Therefore, if the total WBS cost 
is used for analysis, units of dollars will be used. In contrast, the four labor categories to 
include manufacturing labor has both dollars and hours associated with each. Ideally, labor 
hours would be analyzed for a variety of reasons as discussed by the Air Force Cost 
Analysis Handbook (2007). First, labor dollars must be normalized to remove the effects of 
escalation (Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 8-65). Escalation effects comprise 
economy-wide price changes as well as industry-specific price changes. Normalization 
removes these price variations that allow for labor costs to be compared across different 
fiscal years. The escalation indices used to normalize data are estimates of the escalation 
that the industry experienced that year. Therefore, the use of escalation indices can inject 
error into the data. In contrast, if labor hour data were used, labor costs between years 
could easily be compared without normalization. Furthermore, changes in labor rates can 
also bias the labor cost learning curve. Senior personnel are brought on to a program 
initially due to the initial complexity (Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 8-65). Once the 
program stabilizes and production increases, the program usually transitions to more junior 
labor (Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 8-65). This labor rate effect, when combined 
with the effect of normal learning, artificially steepens the learning curve (Department of the 
Air Force, 2007, p. 8-65). Therefore, the slopes of learning curves utilizing labor dollars will 
likely be steeper due to the influence of declining average labor rates as the workforce 
builds towards full-rate production (Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 8-65). Although 
using labor cost data in dollars does not invalidate analysis and is frequently utilized due to 
data availability, labor hour data would ideally be used for these reasons.   
In summary, the literature indicates using direct, recurring, manufacturing labor costs 
in the form of hours. These costs should be considered only for the WBS elements that 
include prime mission equipment and its lower-level elements. Using these specific WBS 
costs in the form of hours ensures alignment with the original costs and elements 
considered to be affected by learning in the traditional models. Although this review 
exclusively examined the DD 1921-1 form, the 1921-2 form reports the same cost data, 
albeit in a different format for specific use in learning curve analysis. The methodology on 
which WBS elements and costs to consider is translatable between the two legacy forms 
along with the current Cost and Hour Report “FlexFile” and Quantity Data reports.  
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Variations to Traditional Learning Curve Theory  
The traditional learning curve models assume a constant learning environment 
comprised of a stable production line and invariable end-item design. Due to the realities of 
changing production environments and modifications to the end-item configuration, many 
researchers have investigated non-stable learning environments. These areas include 
production rate changes, changes to the end-item design during production, and breaks in 
production, among other topics.   
Production rates of end-items can vary as the program proceeds through the 
production life cycle. Researchers in a 1974 RAND report first formally proposed that 
production rate effects can alter unit costs (Large et al., 1974). The researchers 
hypothesized that as more units are produced, fewer costs would be allocated to each unit 
due to fixed costs within the manufacturing process (Large et al., 1974). When fixed costs 
are allocated over more units, each unit will be less expensive. The researchers also 
hypothesized that as more units are produced, the contractor may be able to take 
advantage of volume discounts, resulting in lower material costs per unit (Large et al., 
1974). This modified learning curve equation, termed Unit Theory with Rate Adjustment, is 




 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐     (7)  
 
Where:  
𝑌𝑌 = cost of the xth unit  
A = theoretical cost to produce the first unit (T1)  
x = sequential unit number of the unit being calculated  
b = ln 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
  
R = Annual production rate  




Despite these logical hypotheses, the researchers rarely found the rate term to be 
statistically significant. Several factors can cause the rate term to be not statistically 
significant, such as how the contractor responds to the production rate changes. There are 
also statistical challenges when investigating rate effects due to the likely presence of 
multicollinearity. The independent variables “x” and “R” in Equation 7 do not make 
independent contributions to describe the dependent variable because there is no means to 
hold “x” constant while changing “R.” For these reasons, statistical analysis is unable to 
discern the effects that either variable has on the dependent variable. The presence of 
multicollinearity tends to cause one or both independent variables to be not statistically 
significant when using linear regression analysis (Department of the Air Force, 2007, pp. 8-
31–8-32). Also, researchers have studied how production breaks alter the learning curve. 
Production breaks occur when the manufacturer of the end-item stops production for a 
period. During the time lapse between the completion of a unit and the start of another unit, 
a loss of learning can occur. This learning loss results in an increased cost for the first unit 
following a production break and all subsequent units (Honious et al., 2016).  
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One popular method to assess the loss of learning and subsequent unit costs is the 
Anderlohr Method (1969). This method identifies five factors that when weighted 
appropriately account for the amount of learning lost during the production break. The 
amount of lost learning is used to regress up the original learning curve before production 
resumes. Once production resumes, the manufacturing process resets to the cost of a 
previously produced unit and progresses back down the revised learning curve at the 
original learning rate for all units produced after the production break (Anderlohr, 1969).   
The final area in which research has focused is changes to the end-item during 
production. These changes include additions, deletions, and substitutions of components of 
the end-item. These modifications can occur due to conventional engineering change orders 
to the configuration of the end-item or due to concurrency between development testing and 
production that reveals necessary design changes. The addition, deletion, and substitutions 
of components of an end-item during production can cause the following units’ costs to differ 
significantly from what is predicted using traditional learning curve theory (Department of the 
Air Force, 2007, pp. 8-50–8-56). Additionally, configuration changes can also affect the rate 
at which the manufacturing process learns, which alters and often steepens the original 
learning curve slope (Honious et al., 2016). The learning curve slope is especially affected 
during concurrency between development testing and production due to the continual flow of 
design changes, which tend to flatten the learning curve slope (Department of the Air Force, 
2007, p. 8-50–8-56).   
This research into production rates, production breaks, and changes to end-items 
demonstrates the importance of a stable production environment with a constant end-item 
configuration. Without these tenets, traditional learning curve analysis becomes challenging 
due to confounding variables. The influence of confounding variables obscures how unit 
costs are related to the number of units produced.  
Forgetting & Plateauing Phenomena  
An implicit assumption in the traditional learning curve theories is that knowledge 
obtained through learning does not depreciate (Epple et al., 1991). However, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that knowledge depreciates in organizations (Argote, 1993; Argote 
et al., 1990). Argote et al. (1990) have shown that knowledge depreciation occurs at both 
the laborer level and the organizational level. Many variations of the traditional models make 
use of a concept of performance decay and forgetting to model non-constant rates of 
learning. Forgetting and its effects on lost learning can take many forms and is essential to 
consider in contemporary learning curve analysis. Forgetting is the concept that laborers 
and the organization as a whole will experience a decline in performance over time resulting 
in non-constant rates of learning. Badiru (2012) theorizes that forgetting and resulting 
performance decay is a result of factors “including lack of training, reduced retention of 
skills, lapse in performance, extended breaks in practice, and natural forgetting” (p. 287). 
According to Badiru (2012), these factors may be caused by internal processes, including 
training policy or external factors such as breaks in production.  
Badiru (2012) lists three cases in which forgetting arises. First, forgetting may occur 
continuously as a worker or organization progresses down the learning curve due in part to 
natural forgetting (Badiru, 2012). In other words, the impact of forgetting may not wholly 
eclipse the impact of learning but will hamper the rate of learning while performance 
continues to increase at a slower rate. Second, forgetting may occur at distinct and bounded 
intervals such as during a scheduled production break (Badiru, 2012). Third, forgetting may 
intermittently occur at random times and for stochastic intervals such as during times of 
employee turnover (Badiru, 2012). Figure 7 illustrates this third case where intermittent 
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periods of forgetting degrade the regular learning curve path to result in a degraded 
performance curve. In this illustration, the learning curve is shown as an increase in 
performance rather than a decrease in time or cost (Badiru, 2012). Others have expanded 
on the causes of forgetting and have drawn similar conclusions to Badiru (2012), such as 
Glock et al., 2019; Jaber, 2006; and Jaber & Bonney, 1997.  
 
Figure 38. Effects of Forgetting on the Traditional Learning Curve 
This decline in performance decays the rate of learning that causes longer 
manufacturing times and higher costs than would be forecasted using traditional learning 
curve theory. Although forgetting is common when production breaks occur as previously 
discussed, forgetting can occur without interruptions to the production line as discussed by 
Argote et al. (1990) and Badiru (2012). Many contemporary learning curve models attempt 
to incorporate the concept of forgetting. Models that incorporate variations to traditional 
learning curves—including rates of production, breaks in production, and configuration 
changes to end-items—attempt to model Badiru’s (2012) second case of forgetting. Badiru’s 
(2012) third case is challenging to model due to the stochastic nature of when and for how 
long forgetting will occur.   
The concept of forgetting and its impact on decaying and non-constant rates of 
learning has proven relevant in contemporary learning curve research. Several forgetting 
models have been developed to include the learn-forget curve model (LFCM; Jaber & 
Bonney, 1996), the recency model (RCM; Nembhard & Uzumeri, 2000), the power 
integration and diffusion (PID) model (Sikström & Jaber, 2002), and the Depletion-Power-
Integration-Latency (DPIL) model (Sikström & Jaber, 2012) among others (Glock et al., 
2019). However, these forgetting models focus solely on the phenomenon of forgetting due 
to interruptions of the production process and most directly model Badiru’s (2012) second 
case of forgetting (Glock et al., 2019; Anzanello & Fogliatto, 2011; Jaber, 2006). Jaber 
(2006) states that “there has been no model developed for industrial settings that considers 
forgetting as a result of factors other than production breaks” (p. 30-13) and mentions this as 
a potential area of future research. Although forgetting models have emerged after Jaber 
(2006), a review of the popular forgetting models cited confirms Jaber’s statement. 
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Therefore, Badiru’s (2012) first case of forgetting along the learning curve and its effect on 
the curve should be investigated.   
A related concept to the forgetting phenomenon is the plateauing phenomenon. 
According to Jaber (2006), plateauing occurs when the learning process ceases. This 
ceasing of learning results in a flattening or partial flattening of the learning curve 
corresponding to rates of learning at or near zero. These near-zero rates of learning are in 
contrast to forgetting curves where rates of learning may become negative resulting in 
inverted learning curves. There remains debate as to when plateauing occurs in the 
production process or if learning ever ceases completely (Asher, 1956; Crossman, 1959; 
Honious et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2015). Jaber (2006) provides several explanations to 
explain the plateauing phenomenon that include concepts related to forgetting. Baloff (1966, 
1970) recognized that plateauing is more likely to occur when capital is used in the 
production process as opposed to labor. According to some researchers, plateauing can be 
explained by either having to process the efficiencies learned before making additional 
improvements along the learning curve or to forgetting altogether (Corlett & Morcombe, 
1970). According to other researchers, plateauing can be caused by labor ceasing to learn 
or management’s unwillingness to invest in capital to foster induced learning (Yelle, 1980). 
Related to this underinvestment to foster induced learning, management’s doubt as to 
whether learning efficiencies related to learning can occur is cited as another hindrance to 
constant rates of learning (Hirschmann, 1964).   
Li and Rajagopalan (1998) investigated these explanations and concluded that no 
empirical evidence supports or contradicts them while ascribing plateauing to depreciation in 
knowledge or forgetting. Jaber (2006) concludes that “there is no tangible consensus among 
researchers as to what causes learning curves to plateau” and alludes that this is a topic for 
future research (p. 30-9).  
Boone’s Learning Curve: Accounting for the Flattening Effect 
In an attempt to address the previous issues highlighted in constant learning rates, 
Boone (2018) developed a learning curve model with a rate of learning that diminishes as 
more units are produced. The traditional learning curve theories diminish the rate of cost 
reductions as more units are produced because costs will decrease at a constant rate only 
when the number of units produced doubles. Because the rate at which units double 
decreases as more units are produced, the rate of cost reductions will also decrease as 
more units are produced. However, the literature review cited various theoretical and 
empirical evidence indicating that the cost reductions that occur with each doubling of units 
may not be constant as the number of units produced increases. Therefore, Boone (2018) 
sought to attenuate the cost reductions that occur with each doubling of produced units by 
reducing the amount that each doubled unit’s cost decreases as the number of units 
increases. This attenuation of cost reductions was accomplished by decreasing the rate of 
learning as the number of units increases.   
Boone (2018) began by formulating a model where the exponent of the traditional 
learning curve equation is a function of the number of units produced. This amendment was 
intended to vary the learning curve exponent with the independent variable “x” in order to 
alter the degree of cost efficiencies experienced as the number of units produced changes. 
He then devised a series of specific models that decreased the learning curve exponent “b” 
as the number of units produced “x” increased. Boone (2018) first created a model without 
an additional parameter that aimed to reduce the learning curve exponent “b” directly by the 
unit number. However, he claimed that it resulted in too drastic of changes to the exponent 
value and did not model data appropriately (Boone, 2018, p. 20). To temper the effect each 
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additional unit has on the parameter “b,” a qualifier was added. This qualifier “c” was named 
Boone’s Decay Value with an initially studied value ranging from zero to 5,000 (Boone, 
2018, p. 21). The resulting Boone’s Learning Curve is shown in Equation 8.  
 
Equation 8 
 𝑌𝑌� = 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏/(1+
𝑥𝑥
𝑐𝑐)      (8)  
Where: 
𝑌𝑌� = the cumulative average time (or cost) per unit  
X = the cumulative number of units produced 
a = time (or cost) required to produce the first unit  
b = slope of the function when plotted on log-log paper = log of the learning rate/log 
of 2  
c = Boone’s Decay Value (range can be anything except 0)  
 
Boone found this curve was not only flatter near the end of production but was also 
steeper in the early stages in comparison to the traditional theory learning curve (Boone, 
2018, p. 21). Holding the cumulative number of units produced “x” constant, as Boone’s 
Decay Value approaches zero, the parameter “b” approaches zero representing a learning 
curve slope approaching 100%. As Boone’s Decay Values approaches infinity, the 
parameter “b” remains unchanged, and Boone’s Learning Curve simplifies to the traditional 
learning curve (Boone, 2018, p. 23).   
Boone (2018) proceeded to test his model using Cumulative Average Theory against 
Wright’s model. Boone (2018) utilized prime mission equipment cost data in units of total 
dollars for fighter, bomber, and cargo aircraft programs along with missile and munition 
programs (p. 21). He constrained his data to require at least five lots per program to prevent 
overfitting the data (Boone, 2018, p. 22). In total, 46 weapon system platforms were tested 
(Boone, 2018, p. 23). The OLS regression method is unable to estimate the parameters for 
Boone’s Learning Curve because of the non-constant rate of learning; Boone’s Learning 
Curve is convex in logarithmic scale. Instead, Boone utilized Microsoft Excel’s Solver 
package to minimize the sum of squares errors (SSE) by iteratively adjusting the theoretical 
first unit cost “T1,” the learning curve slope “b,” and Boone’s Decay Value “c” (Boone, 2018, 
p. 24). The conventional OLS methodology was maintained to estimate the parameters for 
Wright’s Cumulative Average learning curve because this model remains linear in 
logarithmic scale (Boone, 2018, p. 24). Microsoft Excel’s Solver requires bounds for each 
parameter when solving for the combination of parameter values that minimize the SSE. 
Wright’s Learning Curve parameters informed these bounds to assist in estimating Boone’s 
Learning Curve parameters (Boone, 2018, pp. 24–25).  
Boone’s theoretical first unit cost parameter minimum bound was equal to half of 
Wright’s theoretical first unit cost and twice the value of Wright’s first unit cost for the 
maximum bound (Boone, 2018, pp. 24–25). Boone’s “b” parameter bounds were set 
between -3 and 3 times Wright’s “b” specific to each estimated learning curve (Boone, 2018, 
pp. 24–25). These two bounds’ values varied for each learning curve estimated due to their 
dependence on Wright’s Learning Curve parameters. Lastly, Boone’s Decay Value was 
bound from zero to 5,000 for all estimated learning curves (Boone, 2018, pp. 24–25). The 
only limits that were found to be binding when solving for optimal values were the upper limit 
of Boone’s Decay Value (Boone, 2018, p. 25).   
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Boone then estimated the parameters for his curve and Wright’s curve for each of 
the 46 programs using Cumulative Average Learning Curve theory. He obtained goodness-
of-fit statistics in the form of the SSE and MAPE for each estimate in order to compare the 
accuracy of both curves (Boone, 2018, pp. 25–26). Boone then performed a paired 
difference t-test for both SSE and MAPE statistics (Boone, 2018, pp. 25–26). Both the SSE 
and MAPE paired difference t-tests rejected the null hypothesis that the means were equal 
to zero (Boone, 2018, pp. 29–30). These tests indicate that Boone’s Learning Curve more 
accurately explains the cost data in comparison to Wright’s Learning Curve at a significance 
level (α) of 0.05. Therefore, Boone demonstrated his learning curve to be more accurate to a 
statistically significant degree in comparison to Wright’s Learning Curve (Boone, 2018, pp. 
30–31).   
Boone did not assess the predictive capacity of his model in comparison to Wright’s 
by estimating parameters for a subset of early units and then extrapolating to future lots 
using the same estimated parameters. This approach departs from previous research 
including Moore et al. (2015) and Honious et al. (2016); however, this may be due to data 
availability as several lots are required for predictive analysis. Additionally, Boone did not 
hold constant the traditional learning curve parameters and estimate his new parameter, 
Boone’s Decay Value, with these values fixed. Instead, Boone allowed all three of his 
parameters to change from Wright’s estimated parameter values. Boone’s methodology is 
also a departure from the previous methodology where Moore et al. (2015) and Honious et 
al. (2016) estimated the traditional learning curve, held the estimated parameters constant, 
and then added additional parameters. Boone’s methodology may also be justified because 
Boone’s Decay Value is a result of estimating learning curves and requires a different 
learning curve slope and first unit cost be considered. This Decay Value is unlike the 
parameters Stanford-B parameter and incompressibility parameter “M,” which are 
measurable values that describe the manufacturing process itself.  
Methodology Population and Sample 
In order to test Boone’s Learning Curve against the traditional learning curve 
theories, quantitative data from a diverse set of DoD programs was gathered. The 
population studied is DoD programs that have produced several complex end-items over 
time. These complex units can include aircraft, land vehicles, and missiles along with their 
complex sub-systems and sub-components. The data sample consists of programs with the 
necessary information required for learning curve analysis. This required program data 
included direct recurring labor costs in units of labor hours or total dollars per production lot 
along with the number of units per lot.  
The direct recurring manufacturing labor cost category for each applicable WBS 
element was used to obtain labor hour data for each program. If this labor hour data were 
unavailable, the total recurring cost for each applicable WBS element was utilized instead. 
The total recurring dollar cost comprises the costs of all functional categories of labor along 
with materials costs and other costs for each WBS element. Unlike labor hours, costs in 
units of dollars must be normalized to be compared over time; therefore, all costs in units of 
dollars were normalized using escalation rates based on Producer Price Index (PPI) 3364 
Aerospace Products and Parts. Removing the effects of escalation using PPI 3364 is 
common practice when normalizing costs in the aerospace industry. Additionally, total costs 
in units of dollars were provided and maintained in units of thousands of dollars. These labor 
cost data included costs at the prime mission equipment. WBS level prime mission 
equipment costs are directly related to touch labor and experience learning. Depending on 
data availability, additional elements below the prime mission equipment WBS elements 
were also analyzed to include engines and wings among other sub-systems and sub-
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components. Therefore, one program may contribute several unique components for 
learning curve analysis.   
This final sample included direct recurring cost data from bomber, cargo, and fighter 
aircraft along with missiles and munitions. The programs in this dataset are both historical 
and contemporary spanning 1957–2018 and include a variety of defense contractors. This 
diverse dataset tested the generalizability of Boone’s Learning Curve due to the varying 
levels of analysis along with the multitude of platforms, contractors, and production periods 
that foster various learning environments. In total, data from 123 weapon system programs 
were gathered with 258 unique components. Learning curve analysis will be performed on 
these unique components.  
Data Collection  
This dataset was created using DD Form 1921-1 “Functional Cost-Hour Report” and 
DD Form 1921-2 “Progress Curve Report” data obtained from the CADE Defense 
Automated Cost Information Management System (DACIMS). CADE DACIMS is a 
repository of DoD weapons system program cost data available to DoD analysts. Some 
historical data was also extracted from the AFLCMC Cost Research Library.   
Business rules were created to avoid overfitting the data and to ensure learning 
curve analysis was appropriate to model each component’s cost. The first business rule 
omitted programs with production lots of four or fewer. This business rule is consistent with 
Boone (2018, p. 22) and limited the sample from 258 to 169 unique components. A second 
business rule was also necessary when performing Cumulative Average Theory analysis. 
Cumulative Average Theory relies on continuous data because each lot’s cumulative 
average cost and cumulative quantity is a function of all previous lots’ costs and quantities. 
Therefore, if a program’s production lot was missing cost or quantity data, all lots after that 
missing lot were removed for that program; however, all lots before the missing lot were 
retained. These lot removals decreased the number of lots in the total program. This 
reduced number of lots warranted the complete removal of some programs by applying the 
first business rule. This second business rule limited the dataset to 140 unique components 
for Cumulative Average Theory analysis. Despite these business rules, there was not a 
systematic elimination of any characteristic of the program labor cost data; a diverse dataset 
remained with the previously stated attributes.  
Data Analysis  
This analysis will examine whether Boone’s Learning Curve more accurately 
explains variability in program labor cost data than the traditional theories. Both Cumulative 
Average Theory and Unit Theory will be used to make these comparisons. In order to test 
these hypotheses, learning curve parameters were estimated using each program’s labor 
cost data for Boone’s Learning Curve and the traditional learning curve models. Next, 
parameters from Boone’s Learning Curve and the respective traditional theory were used to 
predict a learning curve. These predicted learning curves were then compared to the 
observed data. In order to utilize Unit Learning Curve Theory, Boone’s Learning Curve was 
adapted from its original Cumulative Average Theory form to Unit Learning Curve Theory 
form. When Boone’s Learning Curve utilized Cumulative Average Theory, Boone’s Learning 
Curve was compared to Wright’s Learning Curve. When Boone’s Learning Curve utilized 
Unit Theory, Boone’s Learning Curve was compared to Crawford’s Learning Curve.   
Parameters for each learning curve were estimated using non-linear optimization 
techniques in Microsoft Excel. The traditional learning curve theories could be estimated 
using OLS regression. However, non-linear optimization was utilized to estimate the 
traditional curves for equitable comparison with Boone’s Learning Curve. In contrast, 
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Boone’s Learning Curve required the use of nonlinear optimization techniques. This 
requirement spawns from the fact that Boone’s Learning Curve is not linear when 
logarithmically transformed due to the decaying learning curve slope. This non-linearity of 
Boone’s Learning Curve precludes the parameters from being estimated using OLS 
regression. The learning curve parameters for Boone’s Learning Curve (i.e., “A,” “b,” and “c”) 
and the traditional theories (i.e., “A” and “b”) were estimated by minimizing the SSE using 
Excel’s Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG) Nonlinear Solver and Excel’s Evolutionary 
Solver engines. The SSE is calculated by squaring the vertical difference of the observed 
data and predicted data for each lot and summing these squared differences across all lots. 
The SSE is calculated separately for Boone’s Learning Curve and the traditional learning 
curves. For each model, Excel Solver is set to minimize the objective cell that is set as the 
SSE. The changing variable cells are the learning curve parameters specific to each 
learning curve model. These parameters are iteratively solved for using optimization 
techniques specific to each engine for each learning curve model. When using Evolutionary 
Solver, it is also necessary to bound the changing variable cells and choose a set of values 
from which to begin the optimization process. Due to the inherent differences in both 
Cumulative Average Theory and Unit Learning Curve Theory, different specific processes 
were used to estimate parameters for each.  
Cumulative Average Learning Curve Theory  
The following process was implemented to estimate parameters for Wright’s 
Learning Curve and Boone’s Learning Curve using Cumulative Average Theory for each 
program.  
1. Wright’s Learning Curve parameters “A” and “b” were initially estimated using OLS 
regression.  a. Cumulative Average Cost was the dependent variable, while 
Cumulative Number of Units Produced was the independent variable. 
2. These initial learning curve parameter estimates were used as starting values to 
more precisely estimate Wright’s Learning Curve parameters using GRG Non-Linear 
Solver. This process generated final estimates for Wright’s Learning Curve 
parameters.  
3. Boone’s Learning Curve parameters “A,” “b,” and “c” were estimated using Excel’s 
Evolutionary Solver. This process generated initial estimates for Boone’s Learning 
Curve parameters.   
a. Final estimates for Wright’s Learning Curve parameters were used to 
calculate the upper and lower bounds of Evolutionary Solver.   
b. The starting values were calculated from the upper and lower bounds.  
4. The Evolutionary Solver learning curve parameter estimates for Boone’s Learning 
Curve were used as starting values to more precisely estimate parameters using 
GRG Non-Linear Solver.  
 
This process produced final estimates for Boone’s Learning Curve parameters. 
When estimating Wright’s Learning Curve parameters, the GRG Nonlinear Solver technique 
should produce SSE at least equal to the SSE using OLS regression. The GRG Nonlinear 
Solver technique was appropriate to estimate Wright’s Learning Curve parameters because 
this technique is used to find locally optimal solutions of smooth and non-linear functions 
(Solver Technology–Smooth Nonlinear Optimization, 2012). Because OLS regression was 
used to provide starting values for GRG Nonlinear Solver, it was reasonable to assume that 
the global minimum is within this local region approximated using OLS regression. However, 
GRG Nonlinear Solver cannot guarantee that a global minimum is found. The GRG 
Nonlinear Solver Multistart method was also utilized to ensure this technique yielded a 
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global minimum. However, the Multistart method failed to provide consistent, reliable 
parameter estimates, unlike GRG Nonlinear Solver.   
When estimating Boone’s Learning Curve, the GRG Nonlinear Solver optimized 
values for Wright’s Learning Curve parameters were used to calculate bounds for Boone’s 
Learning Curve. For the “A” parameter, the lower bound was half of Wright’s “A” parameter, 
and the upper bound was twice that of Wright’s “A” parameter. For bounds on Boone’s 
Learning Curve “b” parameter, the absolute value of Wright’s Learning Curve “b” parameter 
was multiplied by 3 to yield upper (positive) and lower (negative) bounds. Lastly, for Boone’s 
Decay Value “c,” bounds were set between 0 and 500,000 in contrast to Boone’s original 
bounds of 0 and 5,000. This bound was increased in comparison to Boone (2018) due to the 
upper bound being binding in Boone’s analyses. Except for Boone’s Decay Value, these 
bounds are consistent with Boone (2018) and provide the optimization model with a 
restricted range to decrease the search time for an optimal solution but a broad enough 
range to not constrain the model. Similar to Boone (2018), none of these constraints were 
binding except for the Decay Value “c” upper bound despite relaxing this constraint in 
comparison to Boone (2018). Further relaxing this constraint would not have led to 
substantive changes to Boone’s Learning Curve; as Boone’s Decay Value “c” approaches 
infinity, Boone’s Learning Curve transforms into Wright’s Learning Curve.   
In order to estimate Boone’s Learning Curve, the starting values were set as the 
midpoint of the negative values of the slope parameter “b” because negative values are 
those that represent learning curve slopes below 100%. This starting point is reasonable 
because most programs in this analysis will experience cost efficiencies from learning. Thus, 
these programs will have learning curve slopes at or below 100% that translate to a negative 
learning curve exponent “b” parameter. The starting values for Boone’s Learning Curve first 
unit cost “A” parameter were the midpoint of the upper and lower bounds. These two starting 
values and bounds depend on the parameters estimated by Wright’s Learning Curve. The 
last starting value was set as the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds of the 
Boone’s Decay Value “c,” which was static at 250,000 due to the static bounds.   
Once these starting values and bounds were set, Evolutionary Solver was used to 
estimate a globally optimal solution. The Evolutionary Solver technique was appropriate to 
estimate Boone’s Learning Curve parameters because this technique is used to find a 
globally optimal solution of smooth and non-smooth functions (Solver Technology–Global 
Optimization, 2016). In contrast to estimating Wright’s Learning Curve, a local region with 
the global minimum cannot be reliably approximated before using this optimization 
technique. This local region cannot be reliably approximated because OLS regression 
cannot be used to provide starting values for Boone’s Learning Curve. Similar to GRG 
Nonlinear Solver, Evolutionary Solver cannot guarantee the parameter estimates produce a 
global minimum. However, using the Evolutionary Solver solution as starting values, the 
GRG Nonlinear Solver was then used to ensure the solution is locally optimal.  
Unit Learning Curve Theory  
Unit Learning Curve Theory parameter estimation maintained the Cumulative 
Average Learning Curve Theory parameter estimation methodology for calculating various 
bounds and starting values. Additionally, the justification for utilizing both Excel Solver 
engines also remains the same. However, the inclusion of lot midpoint calculations required 
different analysis techniques. The following process was implemented to estimate 
parameters for Crawford’s Learning Curve and Boone’s Learning Curve using Unit Theory 
for each program.  
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1. Parameter-free lot midpoint approximations (Equation 6) were calculated for each 
production lot. 
2. Crawford’s Learning Curve parameters “A” and “b” were initially estimated using 
OLS regression.  a. Average Unit Cost was the dependent variable while Lot Midpoint, 
calculated in Step 1, was the independent variable.  
3. These initial learning curve parameter estimates were used as starting values to 
more precisely estimate Crawford’s Learning Curve parameters using GRG Non-Linear 
Solver. This process generated intermediate estimates of Crawford’s Learning Curve 
parameters. 
4. The intermediate estimate of Crawford’s Learning Curve “b” parameter was used 
to calculate a more precise set of lot midpoints using Asher’s Approximation (Equation 7).  
5. Applying these more precise lot midpoint approximations, Crawford’s Learning 
Curve parameters “A” and “b” were more accurately estimated using GRG Nonlinear Solver. 
  
a. Steps 4 and 5 were repeated until the iterative process converged on a solution to 
produce final estimates of Crawford’s Learning Curve parameters and lot midpoint 
approximations.  
6. Parameter-free lot midpoint approximations (Equation 6) were used to estimate 
Boone’s Learning Curve parameters “A,” “b,” and “c” using Excel’s Evolutionary Solver. This 
process generated intermediate estimates of Boone’s Learning Curve parameters.   
a. The final estimates for Crawford’s Learning Curve parameters were used to 
calculate upper and lower bounds.   
b. The starting values were calculated from the upper and lower bounds. 
7. The intermediate estimates of Boone’s Learning Curve parameters “b” and “c” 
were used to approximate a more precise set of lot midpoints using Asher’s Approximation 
adapted for Boone’s Learning Curve (Equation 14).  
8. Applying these more precise lot midpoint approximations, Boone’s Learning Curve 
parameters were more accurately estimated using Evolutionary Solver. This process 
generated Evolutionary Solver parameter estimates of Boone’s Learning Curve.  
9. These Evolutionary Solver parameter estimates were used as starting values to 
improve further the accuracy of Boone’s Learning Curve parameters estimates “A,” “b,” and 
“c” using GRG Non- Linear Solver.   
a. Steps 7, 8, & 9 were repeated until the iterative process converged on a solution 
to produce a final estimate of Boone’s Learning Curve parameters and lot midpoint 
approximations.   
 
For both Crawford’s and Boone’s Learning Curves, an iterative process is used to 
calculate precise parameter estimates and lot midpoint approximations. This iterative 
process was repeated until a solution converged. A solution converged when small changes 
in the learning curve exponent “b” parameter were calculated between iterations. This 
process of iterative solving was adapted from Hu and Smith’s “Accuracy Matters” (2013). 
For Boone’s Learning Curve, a limit of 10 iterations was placed on the iterative process. This 
limit of 10 iterations was reached a limited number of times and still produced relatively 
small differences of Boone’s Learning Curve exponent “b” between iterations. In order to 
estimate lot midpoints and Boone’s Learning Curve parameters, Asher’s Approximation from 
Equation 6 was adapted to incorporate Boone’s decaying learning curve slope.  
Statistical Significance Testing  
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The estimated parameters for Boone’s Learning Curve and the traditional learning 
curves were used to create predicted learning curves. These predicted curves were then 
compared to observed data. Total model error was calculated by comparing the difference 
between observations and predicted values to determine which learning curve theory more 
accurately explained variability in the data. Two measures were used to determine the 
overall model error. The first error measure was RMSE. RMSE is calculated by dividing the 
total SSE by the number of observations; in our case, the number of lots in that program 
(McClave et al., 2014, p. 14-25). RMSE is a scale-dependent measure. Additionally, RMSE 
is not robust to outliers; therefore, the greater the magnitude of an outlier from the average 
error values, the more influence this outlier will have on RMSE. RMSE was used instead of 
total SSE because RMSE transforms units from squared units to original units. This 
transformation eases interpretation. RMSE can be interpreted as the average amount of 
error of the model in the model’s original units.   
The second measure used to determine the overall model error was MAPE. MAPE is 
calculated by subtracting the predicted value from the observed value, dividing this 
difference by the observed value, taking the absolute value, and multiplying by 100%; these 
absolute percent errors are then summed over all observations and divided by the total 
number of observations (McClave et al., 2014, p. 14-25). MAPE provides a unitless measure 
of accuracy and can be interpreted as the average percentage the model is inaccurate. 
MAPE is robust to outliers, so the effects of outliers do not unduly influence this measure.  
After calculating these measures of overall model error, a series of paired difference 
t-tests were conducted to determine if reductions in error from Boone’s Learning Curve are 
significantly different than zero or due to random chance. In order to conduct the first paired 
difference t-test, Boone’s Learning Curve RMSE using Cumulative Average Theory will be 
subtracted from Wright’s Learning Curve RMSE, and the difference will be divided by 
Wright’s Learning Curve RMSE by observation. This calculation will yield a percentage 
difference rather than raw difference to compare programs of varying differences in 
magnitude equitably. Only programs with errors reported in total dollars will be examined 
first to examine the results of the different unit measures. The null hypothesis for this test is 
that the percentage difference in RMSE is equal to or less than zero. This null hypothesis 
represents that Boone’s Learning Curve results in an equal amount of or more error in 
predicting observed values in comparison to Wright’s Learning Curve. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the percentage difference is greater than zero. The alternative hypothesis 
represents that Boone’s Learning Curve results in less error in predicting observed values 
than Wright’s Learning Curve. This same methodology was repeated five more times to 
examine both learning curve theories, each with two measures of model error for programs 
examined using labor hours and total dollars.  
Results 
The diverse dataset utilized in Phase 1 was augmented with observed learning 
curves estimated at the flyaway cost level to form the basis of the dataset used in Phase 2. 
Phase 2 utilized Unit Theory learning curve predictions generated from analyses in Phase 1. 
Observed learning curve data, Crawford’s Learning Curve data, and Boone’s Learning 
Curve data were used to answer a variety of research questions. These analyses sought to 
determine 1. if the plateauing and forgetting phenomena occur using traditional learning 
curve theory, 2. how Boone’s Learning Curve models observed learning curve data in 
comparison to traditional learning curve theory, and 3. which program attributes, if any, can 
explain the programs that are best modeled by Boone’s Learning Curve as well as explain 
the prevalence of plateauing and forgetting phenomena.   
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In order to understand if the plateauing and forgetting phenomena occur using the 
traditional learning curve theory, the mean percentage error of Crawford’s Learning Curve in 
the fourth quarter was isolated. These fourth quarter mean percentage errors indicated that 
Crawford’s Learning Curve did not systematically underestimate observed learning curves. 
In fact, the statistical tests across all quarters indicated Crawford’s Learning Curve 
systematically overestimated observed learning curves with a high amount of variability. 
These findings suggest that the plateauing and forgetting phenomena are not systematically 
present in observed data when modeled with Crawford’s Learning Curve. This conclusion 
limits instances where Boone’s Learning Curve can more accurately model observed 
learning curve data in comparison to Crawford’s Learning Curve.   
The mean percentage error of Crawford’s Learning Curve in the fourth quarter were 
then analyzed using proportions. Crawford’s Learning Curve underestimated 47.6% of the 
observed learning curves tested. Therefore, these hypothesis tests of proportions also failed 
to indicate that Crawford’s Learning Curve systematically underestimates observed learning 
curve data in the fourth quarter. Lastly, for the proportion analysis, the proportion of learning 
curves that Crawford’s Learning Curve underestimated in both the first and last quarter was 
investigated. These instances represent learning curves with high rates of learning decaying 
to low rates of learning; Boone’s Learning Curve models these observed learning curves 
exceptionally well. The proportion of learning curves that experienced high rates of learning 
decaying to low rates of learning was 35% when modeled using Crawford’s Learning Curve. 
This proportion highlights that if an observed learning curve is experiencing high rates of 
learning in the first quarter, it is also more likely to experience low rates of learning in the last 
quarter when modeled with the Crawford’s Learning Curve. Although these results failed to 
show a systematic presence of plateauing, they emphasize opportunities for Boone’s 
Learning Curve to improve upon Crawford’s Learning Curve.   
Next, Boone’s Learning Curve was analyzed to determine how it models observed 
learning curve data in comparison to the traditional learning curve theory. Because Boone’s 
Learning Curve contains an additional, empirically-estimated parameter, it is expected to 
improve upon Crawford’s Learning Curve at an aggregate level. However, if Boone’s 
Learning Curve more accurately models observed learning curves that plateau and remains 
approximately equal to Crawford’s Learning Curve in terms of error for observed learning 
curves that do not plateau, then Boone’s Learning Curve provides inherent value in 
modeling the plateauing phenomenon. To investigate this, a confusion matrix was used to 
determine how learning curves that plateau interact with learning curves that are more 
accurately explained by Boone’s Learning Curve. The confusion matrix indicated that 
Boone’s Learning Curve more accurately modeled observed learning curves based on if 
those observed learning curves plateaued for 77% of observations. These results provide 
mixed conclusions as to if Boone’s Learning Curve improves upon Crawford’s Learning 
Curve by more accurately modeling the plateauing phenomenon of observed learning 
curves or because of its an additional, empirically-estimated parameter.   
To further investigate how Boone’s Learning Curve models observed learning 
curves, the MAPE percentage differences between Boone’s Learning Curve and Crawford’s 
Learning Curve in the first, middle, and last quarters were investigated. Hypothesis tests 
were conducted to determine in which quarter Boone’s Learning Curve improved upon 
Crawford’s Learning Curve to a statistically significant degree. Outliers were excluded, and 
the dataset was limited to observations in which Boone’s Learning Curve was a significant 
improvement in error. The hypothesis tests indicated that Boone’s Learning Curve improved 
upon Crawford’s Learning Curve to a statistically significant degree in the first quarter only. 
Furthermore, the tests indicated that the error improvements in the last quarter were not 
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statistically different from zero. The middle quarters’ hypothesis test indicated that Boone’s 
Learning Curve was systematically worse at explaining observed data in comparison to 
Crawford’s Learning Curve. Each of these tests had a high amount of variability. These 
results suggest that Boone’s Learning Curve improves upon Crawford’s Learning Curve 
more than it merely having an additional empirically estimated parameter. However, Boone’s 
Learning Curve was not shown to model the plateau effect in the last quarter to a statistically 
significant degree. There is a possibility observed learning curves improved in different 
sections of the learning curves while performing worse in others in comparison to Crawford’s 
Learning Curve. These error improvements in different sections of the learning curve would 
have caused substantial variations of error in each section. These substantial variations of 
error improvement within each section could significantly obscure the statistical results due 
to the variability included in each hypothesis test.   
Regression analysis was also used to investigate which program attributes, if any, 
can explain the programs that are best modeled by Boone’s Learning Curve as well as 
explain the plateauing and forgetting phenomena. For the first part of this regression 
analysis, the percentage difference between Boone’s Learning Curve MAPE and Crawford’s 
Learning Curve MAPE was used as a dependent variable. A variety of independent 
variables were created using the Literature Review and operationalized using available data. 
The independent variables representing the level of aggregation of the learning curve was 
significant in the model. The regression analysis indicated that Boone’s Learning Curve 
MAPE would decrease 26% on average when modeling learning curves at the highest 
(flyaway cost) and second highest (air vehicle cost) levels of aggregation, respectively, in 
comparison to Crawford’s Learning Curve. This finding is consistent with the research 
hypotheses. The independent variable that measured the amount of time that spanned 
between the first and last years of production was also statistically significant although the 
coefficient estimate’s sign was opposite of the hypothesized sign. In a separate regression, 
the independent variable representing the learning curve units of measure in total dollars 
was also statistically significant. This independent variable indicated that Boone’s Learning 
Curve is associated with a 14.9% decrease in error on average when modeling observed 
learning curves with units of measure in total dollars rather than hours in comparison to 
Crawford’s Learning Curve. Despite these pool of significant variables, several hypothesized 
were not significant in the model. Additionally, the Adjusted R2 for these models was 
relatively low at 6.7% and 5.3%, respectively. These Adjusted R2 values highlight that a 
large amount of variability remains to be explained in the dependent variable. These theory-
based independent variables were also tested using data-mining independent variables 
using a mixed stepwise regression. This methodology was employed to potentially expose 
statistically significant theory-based independent. Some groups of data-mining independent 
variables were statistically significant and able to explain more variability in the dependent 
variable; however, no additional statistically significant theory-based independent variables 
were revealed. Furthermore, the stepwise regression model results and statistical inferences 
may have been invalid due to not passing overall model tests.   
For the second part of this regression analysis, the percentage error between 
Crawford’s Learning Curve and observed data in the fourth quarter of the observed learning 
curve served as a dependent variable. This variable provided a measure of plateauing 
indifferent to how Boone’s Learning Curve models observed data. After testing various 
independent variables and validating the model with statistical tests, no hypothesized 
independent variables were significant in the model. This finding suggests that either the 
operationalization of plateauing was inappropriate, there exists too much variability in the 
data to explain instances of plateauing, or the hypothesized independent variables are 
unsuitable or were not appropriately operationalized. These theory-based independent 
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variables were also tested using a mixed stepwise regression in order to potentially expose 
other statistically significant theory-based independent. Some groups of data-mining 
independent variables were statistically significant and able to explain more variability in the 
dependent variable; however, no statistically significant theory-based independent variables 
were revealed. Furthermore, the second set of stepwise regression model results and 
statistical inferences may have also been invalid due to not passing overall model tests.  
Summary 
This research sought to determine 1. if the plateauing and forgetting phenomena 
occur using traditional learning curve theory, 2. how Boone’s Learning Curve models 
observed learning curve data in comparison to traditional learning curve theory, and 3. 
which program attributes, if any, can explain the programs that are best modeled by Boone’s 
Learning Curve as well as explain the plateauing and forgetting phenomena. The various 
statistical results indicate that the plateauing and forgetting phenomena do not 
systematically occur using the traditional Unit Learning Curve theory. Despite these results, 
there remain instances where plateauing and forgetting occur that provide opportunities for 
Boone’s Learning Curve to improve upon Crawford’s Learning Curve.   
Additionally, results provide mixed conclusions as to if Boone’s Learning Curve 
improves upon Crawford’s Learning Curve by more accurately modeling the plateauing 
phenomenon of observed learning curves or because of its additional, empirically-estimated 
parameter. Tests also did not show that Boone’s Learning Curve improved upon Crawford’s 
Learning Curve to a statistically significant degree in the last quarter but instead in the first 
quarter. This finding brings into question if Boone’s Learning Curve does in fact more 
accurately model the plateauing phenomenon.   
Finally, few hypothesized independent variables were significant in explaining when 
Boone’s Learning Curve more accurately models observed learning curves, and a significant 
amount of variability in the data remained. Despite these results, OLS regression analysis 
confirmed that the level of aggregation, the units of measure, and the time span of a 
program explain a small amount of variability of the degree to which Boone’s Learning 
Curve more accurately models observed learning curves. The OLS regression results for 
explaining plateauing independent of Boone’s Learning Curve indicated that no 
hypothesized independent variables were significant in the model even when non-
theoretically based independent variables were included in the OLS regression model.   
These results indicate that Boone’s Learning Curve may provide value by more 
accurately explaining observed learning curves. However, the theoretical explanations as to 
where Boone’s Learning Curve improves upon the traditional learning curve theory and 
under what circumstances Boone’s Learning Curve is more appropriate to use than the 
traditional learning curve theory remains to be discovered.  
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